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RUSSIA THROUGH THE AGES

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RUSSIA
THROUGH
THE AGES

From the Scythians to the Soviets

By

STUART RAMSAY TOMPKINS

Associate Professor of History, University of Oklahoma

New York: 1940

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To
SENATOR AND MRS. A. C. HARDY

THIS BOOK IS
GRATEFULLY DEDICATED

PREFACE

THIS book is a child of the Great War. In 1916, as the drumfire on the Somme was beginning to die away, a young officer, bored with the long night watches, sought to relieve the tedium of trench life by beginning the study of a language at that time strange to him. Begun thus as a means of relieving *ennui*, given up a dozen times in discouragement, and then resumed, this study seemed at length to begin to fit into the scheme of things when the officer found himself on the fringes of the revolution that engulfed the dominions of tsarist Russia in 1917. The events in eastern Siberia have now passed into oblivion or been inscribed on the long scroll of history. But they kindled in the mind of the soldier the passion to know more of the people that spoke this language, of their creation in art and literature, of the mighty state they forged through the ages, and of its vicissitudes. Some of the things he has learned are here at last set down.

The author has not borne faith to any special theory of history and has endeavored to tread warily amid still fiercely burning partisan fires. Where witnesses disagree and where truth has been perverted, it is scarcely possible that his account escape bias altogether. But if the narrative falls short of strict impartiality, it is not from want of a desire to ascertain the truth.

Nor does the writer hope to be above reproach in the commoner sins that beset the path of the historian. All reasonable care has been taken in the matter of dates. An effort has been made to avoid confusion between the calendars, the Julian prevailing in Russia, the Gregorian in western Europe since the seventeenth century. In the spelling of place names or the names of persons, as well as in the transliteration of Russian words, an effort has been made to follow the system used by the Library of Congress. But the writer has allowed himself some

latitude in applying these rules; when a form has been hallowed by custom and when the change would bring only confusion, the older form has been retained. For instance, "Moscow" has been preferred to the strictly more accurate "Moskva." Where words are obviously of other than Russian origin, we have gone back to the original form, in the not unreasonable belief that greater clarity has been attained.

The writer is under obligation to the University of Oklahoma for a grant for the purchase of illustrations and for the preparation of maps used in this book. When maps, charts, or textual citations have been drawn from other printed works, fitting acknowledgement has been given to the publishers in question.

The writer wishes to testify to the help and encouragement he has received from Professor Samuel N. Harper, of the University of Chicago. He would like also to acknowledge his debt and that of other Slavic scholars to Sir Bernard Pares, of the School of Slavonic Studies of the University of London, for his unceasing efforts to promote the study of the Russian language and Russian history throughout the English-speaking world.

THE AUTHOR

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INTRODUCTION

TO ONE who has surveyed the course of a people's history, the question must insistently arise, what, if any, is the inner meaning of its long and tangled sequence of events. The writer is of the opinion that no simple answer can be given. But while declining to subscribe to any one formula as containing within itself the full explanation for these diverse and complex phenomena, he holds that certain things stand out sharp and clear.

The heart and core of the old Russian state was the autocracy, born under the Mongols, cradled in the Muscovite period, and reaching its maturity in modern times. The circumstances that favored its growth were the increasing division and subdivision of the rival principalities of the north, the peculiar advantages enjoyed by the princes of Moscow as tax collectors of the Golden Horde, the relation of suzerain in which the princes stood to Great Novgorod, and the support they received from the Russian Orthodox Church. Yet despite these privileges the Muscovite princes must have gone the way of the other princes had they not understood how to turn these advantages to their own profit, had they not had the shrewdness and, perhaps, the audacity to make such innovations in the old law of succession as would give cohesion to their patrimonies and continuity to their dynasty. But the growing strength and pretensions of the *boyar* class, on whose shoulders they had climbed to greatness, was in itself a menace to their continued preëminence. It was Ivan the Terrible who perceived the full significance of this danger and sought to counter it by raising to power a new "serving" class and abasing the class of hereditary *boyars*. But under the prevailing economic conditions the "serving people" could fill the role for which they were cast only if they were secured a competence by grants of land for which a permanent

supply of labor could be ensured. This involved the calling into existence of a class of hereditary bondsmen to supplement the hereditary servants of the state. This change was not made without a struggle, as evidenced by the Time of Troubles.

Although the system out of which modern Russian society had evolved might be called feudal, it was destined to pursue a course different from that followed in western Europe. In the latter there were conflicting and competing powers—the lay feudality, the church, the towns, and finally the royal power. The absolutism that eventually emerged rested on an equilibrium of forces rather than on the complete dominance of any one; on a combination of the middle classes and the monarchy to defend their interests against the nobility. When the *bourgeoisie* could dispense with the monarchy, it was toppled, along with the nobility, into the dust.

But in Russia all was different. The middle classes remained feeble in numbers and unenterprising in spirit, as is evidenced by the long dominance by foreigners of Russia's trade and industry. Hence the autocracy, developing on its quasi-feudal foundation, became what the western monarchy never became, the apex of a pyramid formed by the various classes superimposed one on the other. In such a system there was little scope for political liberty or individual enterprise. As Mannstein observed in the eighteenth century, the only thing the Russian understood was force, and the fear of punishment the only motive by which he regulated his conduct. The Church, being merely one of the functions of the state, tended to become authoritarian. The emotions it appealed to were awe and fear rather than divine love and human sympathy. So harsh a system of government was recommended less by its intrinsic merits than by extraneous factors, terror of the Mongol and hatred of the alien confession that continually encroached on the land from the west. The state's survival of the countless perils that beset its path, and its continued expansion witness to its marvelous strength and stability.

But the essential justification of such a system, apart from its ability to survive, must be proportionate sacrifices of all for the

common good. But in the eighteenth century the serving nobility was set free from its obligation to serve the state. The aristocracy thus became a privileged caste to whose comfort and luxury the labor of the lower classes contributed. The peasants, the productivity of whose toil was then, and continued to be, lower than that of any other country in Europe, were thenceforth called on to provide means of support for the nobility as well as for the maintenance of the state. The middle class, whose enterprise and thrift in more favored societies provides the financial needs of government, in Russia made an insignificant contribution.

We see, then, that while such a social system was admirably adapted to securing the survival of the state through Mongol and later times, it was an anachronism in the modern world. Peter had visions of a Russia transformed and vitalized, but though he found means to compel the adoption of new fashions in beards, in dress, and in weapons, yet his power did not avail to bring the people in all things abreast of western Europe, a gigantic task far beyond the capacity of an individual, requiring perhaps centuries to effect. The result was that in the time of Peter, Russia began to play a part in European and world affairs which overtaxed her material resources. Attempts by Catherine II and Alexander I to introduce fundamental reforms were half-hearted, for they ran counter to the whole spirit of the Muscovite state, whose strength lay in the force at its command to compel obedience rather than in the use of gentler appeals.

The emancipation of the peasants in 1861, though it righted a historic wrong, did not touch the deep-seated *malaise* of society. The apparent economic progress of the late nineteenth century merely aggravated the evil. It superimposed a modern industrial system on an outmoded and shaky economic and social foundation. In the more or less self-sufficient economy which Alexander III sought to promote, the increase in the urban population put an added strain on the country's food supply, to the expansion of which no thought was given, an oversight that had fatal results in the famines of the nineties. To stimulate home industries was to place a new burden on the

peasant, for the goods which he now bought were more expensive than the imported goods formerly available, a result to be ascribed to wasteful and inefficient methods of production. To purchase the expensive products of native industry the peasant had to sell abroad a larger quantity of the foodstuffs so sorely needed at home.

The margin of comfort enjoyed by Russian society has always been a narrow one, for two reasons: first, they are the most prolific of the European races; and, second, the expansion of their food supply has been attended by great difficulties. Such a condition is almost inconceivable in a community where a surplus is sometimes regarded as a calamity. But agriculture in Russia has always lagged behind the rest of the world in efficiency, while passport regulations and other restrictions that hampered the movement of population retarded the settlement of new regions. The backwardness of farming in Russia is not, perhaps, to be explained so much on the basis of racial traits as on the basis of the accumulated habits of centuries. Whereas in the United States the farmer and the worker are surrounded by influences that impel them to master and apply the proper techniques of their callings, and that stimulate their desire to improve their methods and increase their production, in Russia there seems to be an inertia that baffles attempts to overcome it. In a country where production and consumption so nearly balance one another, any vagary of the climate may easily cause a widespread famine. So in any scheme of industrial expansion, a corresponding increase in the food supply is a vital necessity.

It was the hope of statesmen at the beginning of the present century that, if the landholding communes could be broken up and the peasant turned into an individual landed proprietor, he would in time develop habits similar to those of his prototype, the farmer in England and the United States, and thus, agricultural production would automatically expand. But the land reforms of Stolypin were operative for eight years only, instead of the fifty which he anticipated would be required to complete the change. Russia entered the Great War with a medieval agriculture based on a social system that was out of date. Three

short years of war proved too great a strain, and it collapsed. Then came chaos.

The February revolution in 1917 at first raised hopes that by an appeal to reason and good will all classes could be induced to work together toward the establishment of a new order based on democratic concepts. But this way was strange to a people who had for centuries known only absolute rule and had but recently taken the first halting steps along the road toward self-government. Any new regime would have had to face the problem of finding food for the one hundred and fifty million people whose productive capacity had been weakened by three years of war and was now collapsing under the intolerable strain of revolution. The triumph of the Bolsheviki in October, whatever else it brought, involved the practical extermination of the possessing classes, the *bourgeoisie* and the aristocracy. While under the old regime they may have appropriated a disproportionate share of the national income, they were nevertheless the elements accustomed to taking initiative and familiar with the problems of the modern business world. Likewise the landowners, whose holdings comprised twenty-five per cent of the land in European Russia under cultivation, had by modern methods brought their estates to a high degree of productivity. The disappearance of these classes meant an inevitable and immediate decline in production. Civil war, the blockade, and the inflation of the currency completed the ruin which the war had begun. From the depths of this complete economic collapse, society had to climb slowly back, with tremendous effort, for five years after the inauguration of the New Economic Policy, to the level of 1913. What wonder if the new masters of Russia, where no class was prepared to take the initiative and assume the leadership that was required, decided that the recuperative forces of society would not of themselves avail to heal the wounds of war and revolution? Heroic measures were needed, backed up by every form of propaganda and coercion known to the modern world, and directed by the technical skill and organizing capacity borrowed from the west.

The Soviet Union has been turned into "a sounding labor

house vast," but absent are the free play of individual enterprise, the motive of unlimited gain, and the forms of that political freedom in which the modern industrial world was cradled. But the new system is more in keeping with the Muscovite past, with its obligatory service and the coercive power of a strongly centralized state. Marxism it is not, save by a distortion of that term. The theories of Marx were drawn from a study of a highly industrialized society, and could not do more than provide a groundwork of ideas, many of which were alien to Russian experience, and which the stern logic of events has compelled the Communist party to discard. There is, for example, no longer any pretense that the new Soviet state is to wither away.

The Muscovite soul since Peter's time seems to have been torn by an inner contradiction between the ideas of the modern world and those inherited from a remote past. Perhaps the Communist has resolved this inner conflict by a return to earlier forms and concepts. He has at least purged society of those elements which, originally dedicated to the service of the state, had ended by becoming, in part, at least, parasitic. It may be that he proposes, like Japan, to borrow the sciences and techniques of the west while retaining a political and social system which has its roots in an earlier age.

On the other hand, it is questionable whether the people of the Soviet Union can divorce themselves permanently from western Europe. It is true that much of their earlier culture was drawn from Byzantium; that for two hundred and fifty years the people were under the suzerainty of the Mongols, and thus cut off from Europe; that their long feud with the Polish-Lithuanian state, their refusal to submit to the Papacy, and their strong antipathy to the Catholic confession, have both widened and deepened the gulf between the Russians and western Europe. But while many of the customs and habits of occidental culture are alien to the prevailing conceptions of this land that is neither east nor west, but both at once, one is permitted to doubt whether a people that remains essentially European in spite of racial admixtures can permanently cut

themselves off from the cultural contacts with other countries. The prevailing trend of the moment in the Soviet Union is to withdraw into themselves and to shift their centers of population and production farther and farther east. This trend is perhaps just a passing phase. Russian history has been marked by this ceaseless ebb and flow, by the alternations of periods of intense and narrow nationalism with periods of eager borrowing of foreign ideas. Slavophilism and westernization have competed for Russia's soul without in any way affecting the fundamentally European character of her culture.

We have, therefore, told the story of Russia as though it were essentially a western country, and in our narrative have endeavored to put events in their European setting; for we are convinced that that is where they belong.

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THE SETTING OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

THE history of Russia is but one phase of the story of Europe and its civilization. The vicissitudes of mankind on this eastern frontier should be viewed in the light of the evolution of the continent as a whole. Not that its society has always and everywhere been conscious of this underlying unity of culture; indeed, at times, the stream of cultural influences has seemed to reverse its flow, and Oriental habits of life and thought have threatened to claim eastern Europe for their own. But in general, the civilization at first associated with the Hellenic city-state and the Roman Empire, and later with one or other of the confessions of the Christian Church, achieved an early triumph over its rivals that has never been seriously disputed. This religious and spiritual ascendancy was transformed into a material one when the Muscovite Tsars were able to call the military and scientific technique of western Europe to the aid of their still-unstable society.

But human events are not chronicled in terms of mere abstractions. Ideas born in the mind of the philosopher or scientist must be translated into acts or embodied in institutions, a work that belongs rather to the sphere of the statesman or of the administrator; they must be carried forward into new regions by the soldier, the missionary, or the colonist ere they reach their ultimate fruition. To comprehend, therefore, the moving forces of our civilization, we must seek them not only in the cultural centers, where a thousand converging streams, under favoring circumstances, unite in bringing to birth eras of intense creative effort. We must also study the impact of

these ideas and institutions at the frontiers of competing cultures. Hence the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Industrial Revolution, and the French Revolution are not more significant for us than events produced by the clash of the western world with the institutions of alien societies in which standards of another sort prevail. Such a battleground of warring creeds and institutions Russia has been from time immemorial. The ancient chronicler of Russia records the doubt that afflicted the mind of one of her early princes, Vladimir, in his efforts to resolve this conflict of religious and moral values that harried society in the tenth century:

In the year 6495 (987 A.D.), Vladimir summoned his Boyars and his city council and said, "Lo! the Bulgars have come to me saying, 'Receive our law.' Then the Germans came and spoke in praise of theirs. After that came the Jews. Finally, the Greeks arrived denouncing all other religions, and extolling theirs, and they spoke at great length of the creation of the universe, of the history of the whole world, and they talk very persuasively; it is a marvel and a delight to hear them; and they say that there is another world. They say, 'He that receives our faith will never die; but if he refuses it, he will burn in the midst of flames, in another world.' What is your advice and what do you propose?"

In these simple but striking words, the annalist thus early sounds the keynote of Russian history, the eternal conflict of ideas that has troubled the long history of the eastern Slav.

The former Russian Empire (now officially the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics) may, for the sake of simplicity, be regarded as almost co-extensive with the great plain that stretches from the Carpathian mountains and the Vistula, on the west, across the whole of northern Europe to that irregular mass of mountains in eastern Asia that severs it from the waters of the Pacific. More properly, Russia (to use a term whose long use justifies its adoption, instead of the newer and more cumbersome name cited above) may be said to begin at the Pinsk marshes and the Dniester river on the west and reach, in the east, the shores of Bering Sea. It thus extends from the 30th to the 190th degree of east longitude, a distance of approximately ten thousand miles. Its most southerly projection, along the Afghan border, lies in 36° north latitude; Cape Chel-

iuskin, the most northerly point in continental Siberia, is approximately in latitude 78° north. The distance from extreme south to extreme north is not far short of three thousand miles. The total land area of the present Soviet Union is given as about 8,000,000 square miles. It thus dwarfs by comparison even the United States; indeed, besides the Soviet Union, all countries except the British Empire and France, with her African and Asiatic possessions, seem of insignificant proportions. Russia's climate, which is remarkably uniform for so vast an area, is severe in winter; but precipitation and temperature permit the growth of crops of a wide diversity over much of the country's surface. The soil that the ages have deposited on its surface is for the most part deep and productive. Ice, which renders many of its harbors inaccessible for many months of the year, and the handicap to transportation imposed by stupendous distances, have retarded the country's progress. In recent years the steam railway and, to a less degree, the steamboat, have gradually opened its most distant regions and revealed the presence of untold natural resources. Additional sources of power, which is a means for the further exploitation of these resources, are being rendered available by the techniques of western science.

Since the retreat of the ice cap, this land with abundant soil and ample rainfall has apparently not lacked human inhabitants. Though we may not be able to determine whether these, like the other peoples of Europe, were autochthonous or immigrants from Asia, yet we cannot altogether ignore the question as to who were these early peoples that moved through the shadow of prehistoric times. Are they the ancestors of the inhabitants of modern Europe? Have they all but vanished from the earth before the advance of more vigorous and perhaps fitter races?

THE ZONES OF VEGETATION

Before engaging in this discussion, we must first observe that in Russia natural factors have imposed limits on human efforts. The great Eurasian plain, though an area of uniformly

low relief and without formidable barriers, does not lack frontiers, though these differ from the natural boundaries of more diversified regions. The greater part of Russia, comprising both its European and Asiatic parts, is divided into five distinct zones of vegetation. Though each is sharply set off from its neighbors, a remarkably uniform physical environment prevails throughout each separate zone. The effect is to impose a corresponding uniformity of culture and economic life on its inhabitants. If we traverse Russia from north to south, we should cross each of these five belts, which stretch with great regularity from west to east.

In the north we have the tundra region, which extends along the Arctic Ocean and its various parts, the Kara Sea, the Nordenskiöld Sea, and the Siberian Sea, and ends only on the shores of Bering Sea. Beginning in the west, it embraces the greater part of the Kola Peninsula, its southern boundary crossing the White Sea in the neighborhood of the Arctic circle, with which this boundary roughly coincides to about the 80th meridian of east longitude. Here it bends to the north, approaching the mouth of the Yenisei, where, turning east, it skirts the northern edge of the plateau of eastern Siberia.

The second of the zones is that of the northern forest, a vast area, in Siberia called the *taiga*, with a uniform width from north to south of about seven hundred fifty miles. Its southern boundary begins near Kiev on the Dnieper, crosses the Upper Don to extend to the great bend of the Volga at Kazan, strikes directly across the Urals to Tomsk, and beyond to Krasnoyarsk and Kansk, whence it bends southward, around Lake Baikal, to the Vitim plateau, and goes down the Amur to the Pacific.

Next in order comes the grassland or steppe region, divided into two belts, the central grassland and the dry grassland regions, each of about the same average width—three hundred miles. The first of these, the central grassland, widens out in the west to include almost the whole of the Ukraine, and then contracting to its normal width, it passes eastward across the Don and the Volga, and embraces that vast area known as the Kirghiz Steppes that reaches to the foot of the Tian Shan moun-

tains in central Asia. Outlying portions even extend into the Transbaikal province and join with the dry plains of Mongolia.

South of this region lie the deserts of central Asia, only one diminutive corner of which pushes westward, beyond the Volga, into European Russia. This vast region of insufficient rainfall, scant vegetation, and salt deposits occupies the whole of central Asia as far south as the frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan and the Pamir plateau, where Russian outposts look down on British India. Its eastern limits are the Tian Shan mountains, on the border of the Chinese province of Sinkiang, commonly known as Chinese Turkestan.

Each zone has imposed on its inhabitants the conditions of the life they must lead: the tundra has produced the fisher folk of the Arctic coast; the forest, at first, the hunter and trapper, to be followed by the peasant tilling his rough clearing in the forest. In the grassland in the south, suited to both agriculture and grazing, the peasant with his plough and the nomad with his flocks may be equally at home. This equal suitability of these lands for either pasture or tillage was the cardinal fact in early history. The competition between cattle and sheep on the western ranges of the United States or the feud between cowman and homesteader was child's play compared with the long struggle that went on throughout the centuries for the possession of the vast and empty steppes of southern Russia. To find a parallel we must take the bitter contest between white man and Indian for the possession of the continent of North America. But even this analogy can give but a faint picture of the devastation and bloodshed that marked the incidents in this conflict between the "desert and the sown," the alternate advance and retreat of settlement and civilization, that attended the ebb and flow of the great nomad drives from the east. The terror inspired by the Huns, the Avar, and the Polovtsi in the annals of the steppes is due to the defenselessness of the sedentary population that had, during intermittent lulls in the storm, crept out on the bare and unprotected plains, only to be swept away or destroyed in the next raid of horsemen from the Kirghiz steppes or the Turkoman desert of western Asia. Not till

the time of Ivan the Terrible were the Russian tsars able, by the occupation of Astrakhan and the erection of a fortified line, effectively to close the door and bar it to the nomad for all time to come.

THE GREAT RIVERS

Second only in importance to the zones of vegetation are the waterways, especially of European Russia. The whole Eurasian plain is furrowed by great rivers whose unique arrangement has admitted the trader to the interior and permitted the exchange of wares between the most widely sundered regions. From the Baltic Sea amber and furs could pass by the Volkhov and the Dnieper to the Black Sea and so to Constantinople. From the Caspian Sea the products of central Asia could ascend the Volga and pass overland to the rivers draining into Lake Ladoga and so eventually reach the Scandinavian peninsula or western Europe. The Kama gave access to the Urals and the Tartar Khanates of Sibir. Today in Siberia the Ob', the Yenisei, and the Lena play a similar role in commerce and exploitation to that played a thousand years ago by the Dnieper and the Volga. It may be that a thousand years before that, the forests echoed to the chorus of boatmen as they sped their crude craft, laden with furs and slaves, down the water routes that led to the Euxine and civilization. Scythians and Greeks, Arabs and Norsemen, plied their trade through these forests and across these plains. Perhaps the advantages of easy water communication attracted hither the first native Finns. Later comers, improving on the early methods of navigating these mighty streams, turned the streams ultimately into much-frequented thoroughfares of trade. Not by chance does Moscow lie at the point of convergence of overland route and waterway, remote from the dangerous steppe frontier, yet readily accessible to those who come in peace.

EARLY SEVERANCE FROM EUROPEAN CULTURE

Russia is a country of limitless distances. For centuries her main centers of population have lain remote from the seaboard

in the center of a vast plain. This disadvantage has been further aggravated by a severe winter climate that renders her coasts inaccessible and paralyzes transportation on her inland waterways. But she has been immured in the emptiness of her great spaces less by purely physical than by man-made conditions. Her first and her most promising cultural contacts were established with Constantinople in the tenth century. But less than two centuries later she was cut off from the Byzantine civilization by the great raids of the Polovtsi which destroyed the city of Kiev and laid waste a great part of the south.

The break became permanent with the Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century, when Russia became a part of the state of the Great Khan. On the west, where the eastern Slavs might have obtained compensation by opening and maintaining a connection with the world of western Europe, the door was closed by the final schism in the church. A frontier of bitterness between rival confessions imposed an ecclesiastical bar to the intercourse between neighboring peoples where physically there was no barrier. To the north the snowy wastes of the Arctic slope gave slight chance of contact with the world of western Europe. The pagan Lithuanian and the scarcely less dreaded Brethren of the Sword closed the approaches to the Baltic. Only to the east did the way lie open. Here the fact that they were included in the Tartar khanates made for common interests with the restless peoples of western Asia. A difference of religion, where some degree of tolerance was practised by the rulers, was not an obstacle to the exchange of cultural influences. Indeed, the wonder is that the Slavic settlements of the Oka, the Volga, the Volkhov, and the Dnieper were not drawn within the orbit of Islam during the long period when Russia was cut off from western Europe; and that when the nomad menace was removed, she reverted once more to her place in the European family of nations.

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PRE-SLAVIC RUSSIA

TRADITION has placed the foundation of a settled order in the region embraced in modern Russia in the middle of the ninth century of the Christian era, when Norse adventurers, entering the country from the Baltic Sea and the rivers draining into it, established an easy ascendancy over the indigenous tribes of the forest and steppe. But the Norse found the Slavs already installed astride the chief waterways that provided the only intercourse in what was still a primeval wilderness; while far off to the southeast, an Asiatic folk, the Khazars, held nominal sway over the steppe region of the Black Sea and the Lower Volga, even levying tribute on some of the tribes that dwelt on the forest fringe. But both of these peoples, the Slavs and Khazars, were late comers in a land that had been occupied from time immemorial by the Finns—a race with a much more primitive culture. Even the deeds of the Vikings had been anticipated some six hundred years before by the Goths, a kindred race that issued from the same homeland, seized the commercial highways leading to the south, and with their fleets spread devastation and terror far and wide over the whole eastern Roman Empire. Before the Goths there were the Sarmatians. If we pursue the quest still further, we come to the Scythian empire of the sixth century B. C. And if we are willing to embark on the sea of legend and tradition, we can even go back to the Cimmerians—a mysterious race whose history goes back to the times of Esarhaddon, King of Assyria, and Gyges, King of Lydia in the seventh century. Out of the seemingly aimless and faintly descried folk-wanderings of

early times, can we select any that are supported by ample evidence, and that seem vitally related to the development of European civilization?

THE PONTIC STEPPES IN ANTIQUITY

The first event to draw the steppes of southern Russia within the orbit of world affairs was the invasion of these regions undertaken, according to the traditional date, in 512 B. C. by Darius, King of Persia. Long before this, it is true, the Greeks had established trading centers at points along the northern coast of the Black Sea suitable for the exchange of goods with the interior. Some of these trading towns were on the Taman peninsula, the Tauric Chersonese (Crimea), and at the mouths of the Dnieper, the Bug, and Dniester rivers. The presence of Scythian slaves in Athens in the sixth century attests the lively interchange at this early date of objects of commerce between the dwellers of the steppes and the Greek world. It is largely to these contacts with the Mediterranean civilization that we are indebted for our definite knowledge of the history of these regions. Tempting as it is to pursue the subject back even further, it seems better to leave this part of the story to the paleontologist and the anthropologist and to confine ourselves to the historical events vouched for by contemporaneous records. Our horizon in this direction cannot therefore extend further than the beginnings of the recorded history of the Hellenic world, which goes back to the sixth century B. C.

During the centuries spanned by Greco-Roman civilizations, three political groups held sway by turns in the Pontic steppes—the Cimmerians, the Scythians, and the Sarmatians. The fate of all three is closely woven into the history and legend of the ancient world. Of the last two we have such abundant descriptive material that many writers have attempted to identify them with one or other of the peoples associated with this region in more recent times. Moreover, the almost monotonous succession of invasions from the east, successive cycles of

conquest, ascendancy, and decline, have suggested a common reservoir out of which each of these stocks was drawn. Wave after wave of nomad folk swept forward impetuously, the movement of each becoming slower and slower till it in time was overtaken and overwhelmed by a succeeding wave. The traits and customs that distinguished the Asiatic nomads, from the time of the Scythians down to that of the modern Kazaks, have been taken as evidence that these older races were the precursors of the present steppe-dwellers. But it is doubtful whether we have not simply three succeeding races that, living in the same environment, borrowed the culture of that environment. In view of the obscurity and confusion in the prevailing system of classification of peoples of present-day western Asia and the lack of unanimity among ethnologists on the exact racial affinity of such groups as the Tartars, the Kirghiz, the Turkomans, the Tadjiks, it seems foolish to attempt to make more than the merest generalizations about the races that occupied eastern Europe some twenty-five hundred years ago. One well-known writer has admirably summed up this difficulty:

It is a hopeless task to deal with any of the people of Asia under the name by which they were known on the various occasions of their visits to, or rather their invasions of, Europe. When people talk about Scythians, Altayans, or Tartars, and define their physical types and social customs, just as if they were a homogeneous people, it always makes me feel hopelessly ignorant and unable to grasp what they mean. I think that if our knowledge of Asiatic people had to be drawn from classical writings or the early chronicles, it would never have been possible to clear a way out of the dark forest of misunderstanding. To my mind, there are only two methods by which to approach the subject, either to study the people on the spot, or to study the Asiatic sources of information. Still better is it to combine these two methods. As regards central and northern Asia. . . I see no better Asiatic sources than the invaluable, limitless and alas! very unapproachable Chinese annals, dynastic histories, and other historic treasures . . .

It is for anthropologists to work side by side with historians and archeologists, in trying to clear up the question of the origin and type of these three fundamental races of central and northern Asia—the Turkic, the Mongolic, and the Tungusic—and when this is done, perhaps we shall

understand what is the ethnological meaning of such ambiguous terms as "Tartars," "Huns," and "Scythians."¹

Even a well-informed writer like Herodotus used the term "Scythian" in the loosest and most general way, applying it now to the whole population of the Pontic steppes and the wooded hinterland, and again confining it more strictly to the ruling caste among them—the Royal Scyths. The constant tendency was to invest with a wide political significance a term that in its origin had some narrow local or racial connotation. It therefore seems impossible after the great lapse of time to get back of these terms and resolve the groups they stand for into the constituent racial parts. For the present, until the ethnologists are able to speak with more conviction and unanimity on this subject, we are limited to such general and colorless words as Asiatic, Aryan, Iranian, or Indo-European.

It appears that during the first millennium before the Christian era, the plains of southern Russia were dominated by various nomad peoples of unknown racial origin—the Cimmerians, the Scythians, and the Sarmatians; that all three possessed similar or related cultures, perhaps Oriental in their origin and with a veneer of Hellenic traits. As time went on, these two types of culture met and were partially fused in the fringe of Greek settlements along the Black Sea coast, and the resultant civilization found its political counterpart in the Kingdom of the Bosphorus. The sovereigns of this hybrid kingdom dominated the northern littoral of the Black Sea and controlled the trade between the Pontic steppes and the Mediterranean. This state was incorporated in the empire of Mithradates Euergetes, overthrown by Pompey in 66 B. C. But though the rest of the realm of Mithradates was incorporated in the empire, the trans-Euxine parts of the Pontic kingdom were excluded, ultimately to be formed into a political unit that became one of Rome's client states. Its importance to Rome is attested by the measures taken by more than one emperor to secure it against the pressure of the barbarians exerted from the landward side.

¹ M. A. Czaplicka, "On the Track of the Tungus," *Scottish Geographical Magazine*, XXXIII (1917), pp. 289-303.

In the second century of our era a great disturbance in northern and central Europe, whose nature we can only conjecture, set in motion forces that had far-reaching consequences. The Quadi and the Marcomanni hurled themselves against the Roman frontier along the Danube. The threatened destruction of the empire was only averted by the tireless efforts of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, whose life was largely spent in remote frontier campaigns. At the same time the Goths were thrust out of their home along the southern shore of the Baltic and migrated into the forests of White Russia and Polesie. Thence, pushing down the Dnieper to the shores of the Black Sea, they overran the petty states on the Bosphorus and ended their political and economic dominance of the Euxine. Here, northeastward of the Danube was established in time a formidable Gothic power which controlled the trade of the whole Black Sea region. This role its people readily combined with piracy and raids on the rich cities that dotted the coasts of the Euxine and the Aegean. Only the resolution and ceaseless activity of the Emperor Claudius (Gothicus) relieved this pressure and compelled the Goths to restrict their military and naval operations to regions lying beyond the Roman *limes*. As the result of civil strife the Gothic state was finally severed into an eastern and a western part. The Romans had naturally a close connection with the West Goths, whose king, Fritigern, they appear to have succoured against the more powerful Ostrogoth, Athanric, who was extending his sway far into the interior. An epochal event occurred at this time, the conversion of the whole Gothic people to Christianity. The change which brought them within the orbit of ancient civilization was signalized by the adoption by the Goths of a new alphabet (in place of the older Runic) suitable for the transcription of the sacred literature. But the Gothic states on the Black Sea proved evanescent. An invasion of Asiatic nomads in the third quarter of the fourth century brought disaster to the Goths and changed the whole course of history. Both Gothic states crumbled, the Visigoths entering the Roman Empire, where they contributed materially to its dissolution. The Ostrogoths

were swept westward into central Europe in the tide of nomad invasion.

THE GOTHS AND THE HUNS

The spearhead of this thrust was formed by the Huns, as these newcomers were known to the writers of the fourth century. They are sometimes identified with the Hiung-nu, a Turkish race living in the second century in the arid regions to the north of China, whose raids on that Oriental empire had led to the building of the Great Wall and other measures concerted by the Emperors for the security of their frontiers. As a result, the Hiung-nu were displaced westwards into the Tarim basin of Western China. They appeared in the pre-Christian era just beyond the Greco-Bactrian kingdom of Antiochus the Great, and spread westwards to Europe about 100 A. D. In the fourth century, gathering their forces, they moved westward through the natural passage that opens into Europe between the Urals and the Caspian Sea. They threw themselves against the exposed frontier of the Alans and, having either exterminated or absorbed these half-civilized nomads, they moved forward against the Goths in 375 A. D. The destruction of the unstable barbarian kingdoms scattered the tribes in mobs of frenzied refugees that surged against the Roman frontier and, frantic with fear, overbore all efforts to arrest them. These events are too integral a part of European history to need further emphasis.

The sketch we have given of the movements of an uprooted nomad folk of far-eastern Asia is vague and disconnected. It is drawn from evidence that has left gaps of whole centuries, but it seems to be in its outline essentially true. Can we start from this and make an intelligent deduction as to the racial and linguistic affinities of the Huns? Or of the causes that swept them into Europe?

There is no reason to doubt that the Huns were of Asiatic origin. It is usual to refer them to Turkish or Mongolian stock. Even at their first appearance, their savage, outlandish features, their squat figures, and their awkward gait, which

marks the dismounted horseman, stamped themselves indelibly on the minds of observers and combined naturally with the uncouthness of their manners to produce the legend of the untamed ferocity of the Huns. But it is hard to escape the impression that this legend is in part the product of Roman rhetoric. Ammianus Marcellinus, who described the nomads in terms repeated by every historian since, perhaps did not intend his words to be taken too literally. If we look closely, we shall find that Ammianus describes the Alans in language not far different from the terms with which he portrays the Huns.

If the Chinese tradition is to be relied on, the Huns were of Turanian rather than Mongolian origin. But we are as little able to determine their affinity as we are that of the Scythians of the sixth century B. C. Both races were nomadic; for each we have evidence that points to an appearance that struck the Mediterranean peoples as being uncouth and inhuman. Hippocrates of Cos draws a picture of the Scythians not materially different from Ammianus' account of the Huns.

If the Scythian and the Hun were of Asiatic and possibly Turkish stock, are we to assume that these, like later invasions of nomads, were owing to some natural and recurring factor? The ready assumption that in a nomad condition man is a warlike, roving creature at all times capable of harassing or of breaking up settled societies is only partially true. "Nomad" implies grazier as "nomadic" means pastoral; that is, it applies to a population compelled by natural conditions to move its flocks and herds from winter to summer range and from summer to winter. The nomad, though armed, attempts warlike operations primarily in defense of his family and stock and to guard his grazing grounds from intruders. Powerful factors are required to impel him to undertake military operations on a large scale or to move far afield into distant and unknown regions. Moreover, the degree of political and military organization requisite for enterprises on so vast a scale is scarcely to be found among a primitive people. We are, therefore, driven to assume that the movements that brought the Huns and others into Europe were the culmination of a series of long-

continued and complex political events of surpassing magnitude that involved a whole continent. These events were not the results of the passing whim of a bold and enterprising leader, nor were they the spontaneous manifestations of a warlike spirit. There being almost no records to guide us, we can only guess what were the chief factors in such a wholesale migration. The growing aridity and recurring cycles of drought of large parts of central Asia are among the causes commonly advanced for this recurring phenomenon, but it is surely somewhat naïve to assign to so simple a cause what must have been a singularly complex development. To quote the words of Gibbon:

It is impossible to fill the dark interval of time which elapsed after the Huns of the Volga were lost in the eyes of the Chinese, and before they showed themselves to the Romans. There is some reason, however, to apprehend that the same force which had driven them from their native seats still continued to impel their march towards the frontiers of Europe.

Was this force the desiccation of the land, as Ellsworth Huntington assumes? Possibly, but the evidence is hardly conclusive even though there is some proof that within historical times central Asia has been transformed from a well-watered, densely populated region to one of increasing aridity.

THE AVARS, THE MAGYARS, THE BULGARS

The Huns overthrew the Alans, drove part of them back against the Caucasus, and swept the others westwards with them in their march into Europe. A similar fate overtook the Ostrogoths. The Empire of Hermanric dissolved overnight. The Visigoths saved themselves by flight. Within the space of months the steppe region was taken over by a new people. The anarchy let loose here threatened to engulf the whole of central Europe. The armies of the nomads and their conquered subjects hurled themselves against the Roman frontier and surged westward through the forests of Germany towards the Atlantic Ocean. The defeat of the Huns at the hands of Aëtius and his Gothic allies on the Catalaunian fields averted a complete disaster. The Hunnish tide began to ebb and their empire to crumble.

On the wide steppes their place was taken by another Turkish race, the Avars, who sought to emulate in the Balkans the exploits of the Huns in central Europe. To the north the Bulgars founded a new Turkish kingdom on the Middle Volga. These migrations were part of the same general movement that continued from the fifth to the eighth century and that carried the Germans far into the Roman Empire. The Avars and the South Slavs, detaching themselves from their homeland to the north of the Danube, swept down into the Balkans as far as southern Greece. The Magyars, a Finnish folk who had followed the Huns into Europe from their home in western Asia, and had adopted the horse and a nomad life, started on a career of conquest of their own. They pushed a wedge between the southern and western Slavs and ultimately occupied the plains of Hungary when these had been partially depopulated by the cruel campaigns of Charles the Great. Though the latter had extended his effective political control as far as the Elbe in the east and the Saale in the southeast, his claims, though pretentious, were not serious and offered no great resistance to the Magyars. It remained for the Saxon king, Henry the Fowler, and his son, the Emperor Otto the Great, by a fortified line and a system of marches, to bar central and western Europe to further advances of Slavs and Magyars. Eastward of this bastion swirled the human tide engulfing the still nascent states of the Slavs and throwing to the surface new states that were destined to survive.

THE FINNS AND THE SLAVS

The actors in the drama played out on the plains of southern Russia and the Ukraine were the Cimmerians, the Scythians, the Sarmatians, the Goths, the Huns, and the Avars. But each in turn descended into oblivion, and their place knew them no more. So far the Slavs have not appeared on the stage. Are they the descendants of some of these early occupants of the steppes? Or were they the basic stock of the great plain conquered by each immigrant tribe and left behind when these departed? Are they a race of newcomers who moved into a land emptied of its former inhabitants?

The Slavs as such first appear in recorded history at the beginning of the sixth century. Jordanes (circa 550 A. D.), the historian of the Goths, speaks of a race called the "Suavi" with whom Hermanric waged a series of long wars. Procopius in his *History of the Gothic Wars* mentions the Sclaveni and their country in connection with the great migration of the Heruli from Pannonia to the shores of the North Sea. Among the troops that arrived as reinforcements for Belisarius in his defense of the city of Rome was a contingent of "Huns and Sclaveni and Antae who were settled above the Ister River not far from its banks."² From then on they appear in the chronicles of the time under this name or some variant of it—Slovenes, Slavs, Sclavi, Sclavini, Slovaks. Are we to infer from this abrupt appearance that they had flashed from nowhere upon the stage of history?

Historians have devoted much attention to this problem and have diligently searched the annals of the ancient world in the hope of discovering there some evidence of the presence in these regions in early times of the ancestors of the modern Russian people. It has been the fashion to see in the Neuri and the Budini referred to in the Fourth Book of Herodotus a Slavic people who had submitted to Scythian domination. The vague and somewhat fanciful description of the Budini (and of the Geloni, with whom they are confused) as well as the Neuri seems to suggest some prevalent belief among the Greeks that all three of these people were in some way set apart from the dominant nomad type. The Budini erected their buildings and the walls of their towns of wood, and the Geloni dwelt in the midst of the forest and tilled the soil. Although the Neuri are distinctly said to be nomads, they were apparently closely associated with the Budini. Other peoples appear in vaguely discerned outlines in the unknown regions to the north—the Man-eaters, the Black-cloaks, the Agathyrsi. It seems impossible to make much of Herodotus' account of these peoples and the campaigns of Darius, except to recognize it as the confused gossip current in the Greek towns along the

² Procopius, *Bellum Gothicum*. The Antae are sometimes regarded as Slavs.

Euxine. There was little first-hand information, but many rumors passed from mouth to mouth and were badly garbled in the process. Indefiniteness and inaccuracy in regard to geography add to the obscurity by making it difficult to locate any of these peoples with certainty. In the background possibly there hover the Finnish tribes, the Black-cloaks, the Man-eaters, and the Agathyrsi associated with the inhospitable deserts of the north.

We are on somewhat surer ground when we come to Tacitus, who, writing of the Germans in 98 A. D., incidentally describes eastern Europe and some of its people. After giving an account of the various German peoples, he surveys the tribes that live beyond: the Esths (Aestii), the Swedes (Suiones), the Peucini, the Veneti, and the Fenni. It is generally accepted that the Veneti were so named by the Germans and that the word is the German *Wend* (Adj., *Wendisch*) applied by them to the Slavs. The Fenni are the Finns. The Peucini referred to here are a subdivision of the Bastarnae, as Tacitus himself hastens to add. We therefore have fairly conclusive evidence that at this time, i.e., 100 A. D., two of the peoples of modern Russia can be definitely identified and located in a part of the great Russian plain. Of the Finns Tacitus reports:

The Finns are exceedingly primitive and poverty-stricken; they have no arms, no horses, no household goods; roots are their food; skins of animals their clothing, their bed is the ground; the only weapon they rely on is the arrow, which, being without iron, they point with bits of bone. Hunting is the occupation of both men and women; for they hunt together and seek their prey in company. Infants have no other protection against the inclemency of the weather than some branches woven together for a covering; hither the young men resort; the old take refuge here. But they think it is better to eke out a livelihood in this way than to sweat in the fields or to labour to erect houses to subject their lot to alternations of hope and fear; secure against mankind, secure against the gods, so rigorous a life do they lead that they have no need even of a religion.⁸

Some historians maintain the Slavic origin of the Antae, who appear in Roman writers of the fourth century, but it is not till

⁸ Tacitus, *Germania*.

the sixth century that the Slavs definitely began to emerge from obscurity, as we noted above. The reason may be that, from the second century, all the indigenous tribes of the south Russian plain had been absorbed in the Gothic state which dominated the Black Sea littoral till the fourth century, when it went down before the Huns. The latter succeeded to the Gothic dominion, and it was the break-up of the vast Hunnish empire that allowed the component peoples of the race to appear once more under their proper names. From this period, the Slavs, with the Avars and the Bulgars, menace the Danube frontier of the Eastern Empire; they hover on the verge of the Frankish state and, under the Frankish leader, Samo, they resist the eastward thrust of Merovingian power. They finally break through the Danube line and overrun the Balkans, penetrating even to Greece. Here the first Slavic kingdoms are created. The conversion of Germany by Boniface under the aegis of Pepin the Short, the great monastic establishments of Thuringia, could be secure only behind some formidable military barrier. With the conquest of the Saxons by Charles the Great, the Slav frontier was carried forward to the Elbe and the Saale and given a military and feudal character. From this time the tide of the Slavic invasion in the west began to ebb and whole areas once completely Slavic were surrendered to the Germans, along the Baltic, in the Elbe valley, in the valley of the Danube and its tributaries, and in Hungary, whither the Magyars penetrated from the steppes. This retreat, in part, is to be explained by their political impotence, which in turn is to be ascribed to their multiplicity of divisions. It involved a shift of the whole Slavic population to the east and was probably accompanied by a penetration of the lands of the Lithuanians, but more clearly of the territories of the Finns from the Upper Volga to Lakes Ladoga and Onega. The Slavs compensated themselves for their losses in the west at the expense of the "*mitissimi Fenni*."

So far we have been attempting a reconstruction of the history of the Slavs, and particularly of the so-called eastern Slavs, from the inadequate literary records of the Roman and Byzan-

tine world. But other sciences than that of the historian demand to be heard on this subject, and particularly ethnology and philology. The assumption is that by a close study of the modern Slavs, their physical characteristics, their customs, and particularly their language, it is possible to reconstruct the story of their early development or at least go far to supplement our scanty literary records. Proceeding along these lines, a number of modern scholars have attempted to assign to the whole Slavic people their original habitat and the direction and date of their dispersion. Study of the various Slavic languages discloses that the greater number of them have common words to describe certain trees of central Europe, while for other trees, different words are employed. By comparing these common words with the forest flora, the theory has been tentatively put forward by Peisker that the original home of the Slavs is a rough quadrilateral, bounded on the east by the Middle Dnieper, on the north by the Dvina and the Vilya, the Narew and the Vistula, on the west by the Oder, on the south by the Carpathians and a line drawn through the valleys of the Upper Dniester and the Bug to the Dnieper at Kiev.⁴ Peisker further restricts them at this period to Polesie, the great region of marshes drained by the Pripet. From this region, penetration of the Middle Dnieper would be comparatively easy for the eastern Slavs.

The first definite record we possess of the movements of the Slavs is contained in the so-called Chronicle of Nestor, begun originally at the end of the eleventh and the beginning of the twelfth century at the Pechersky monastery in Kiev, and prolonged by various continuators to the end of the Middle Ages. After recounting the story of the tower of Babel, which the pious writer associated with the dispersion of the Slavic races, the annalist says:

After many years, the Slavs settled on the Danube where the Hungarians and Bulgarians live today. This was the centre from which the Slavs spread over the earth and in various lands where they settled, they

⁴ J. Peisker, "The Expansion of the Slavs," *Cambridge Medieval History*, v. II, Chap. XIV, pp. 418-457.

came to be called by different names; some migrated to a river called Morava and were called Moravians and others called themselves Czechs. The White Croats, the Serbs, the Khoroutani are also Slavs. The Vlakhs, having reached the Slavs on the Danube and having settled among them and having oppressed them, these Slavs moved to the Vistula, and were called Lekhs and from these Lekhs, some are called Poliani, others Loutichi, others Mazovians, others Pomory [Pomeranians].

And the Slavs who settled along the Dnieper were also called Poliani, others Drevliani because they dwelt in the midst of the forest; others settled between the Pripet and the Dvina and called themselves Dregovitches; others settled on the Dvina and were called Polotchani from the name of a stream, Polota, which flows into the Dvina. The Slavs who settled around Lake Ilmen kept their name, built a city and called it Novgorod; and others settled on the Desna, the Sem, and the Soula called themselves Severians; this is how the Slavic race expanded and its writing is called Slav.

After linking up early Russian history with the legend of the missionary efforts of St. Andrew (drawn from Eusebius), the annalist comes back to contemporary times and gives us an account of the polyglot population of forest and steppe:

After the death of his [Kii's] brothers, their descendants began to rule over the Poliani; the Drevliani had their rulers as well as the Dregovitches, the Slavs of Novgorod, and the Polotchani of the Polota. Beyond the Polotchani are the Krivitchi who live at the sources of the Volga, the Dvina and the Dnieper, and whose capital is Smolensk; there are the Krivitchi and near them are the Severians; to the north on White Lake [Bielo Ozero] are the Ves, and on Lake Rostov, the Merians, who also live on Lake Klachtchino; and on the River Oka which falls into the Volga, are the Mouromians, the Cheremisses, the Mordvians, nations each with a language of their own, for in Russia there are no Slavic languages except those of the Poliani, the Drevliani, the Novgorodians, the Polotchani, the Dregovitches, the Severians, the Boujani settled along the Bug; and the alien folk who pay tribute to Russia are the Chuds, the Merians, the Ves, the Mouromians, the Cheremisses, the Mordvians, the Permians, the Pecherians, Iam, the Lithuanians, the Semigalli, the Kors, the Norovians, the Livonians. These peoples who speak a different language belong to the race of Japhet and live in the north.

In this involved language, the chronicler gives an account of central and western Russia which accords fairly closely with what can be deduced from later history and with what a study

of the present composition of the races inhabiting the same regions would amply justify. The original home he assigns to the Slavs does not quite agree with the views of modern scholars (as indicated above) but embodies native tradition. And it is to be noted that the Slavs, according to the same tradition, came as a ruling people, imposing tribute. This implies that they brought with them the weapons whose use they had learned from their western neighbors, the Germans, and some political organization capable of giving weight and power to their eastward thrust—perhaps the inchoate feudalism of the seventh and eighth centuries. The fatal divisions for which they were noted among the Arabs may have paralyzed their resistance to foreign foes. But western Europe with its incipient feudalism, unable to make headway against Norse or Magyar, was scarcely mistress in her own house. Nor must we take the Russian chronicler at his word when he ascribes the foundation of the new state in Russia to Norse adventurers in the middle of the ninth century. There is little reason to believe that political genius is the monopoly of one people or is confined to rare and exceptional periods of history. This early stage in the occupation and development of the central Russian plain the Ancient Chronicle ascribes to the opening up of the water route from the Baltic to the Black Sea:

From the time when the Poliani had lived apart on their mountains [apparently the Carpathians or the Transylvanian Alps], there was a route leading from the country of the Varangians to Greece and from the Greeks back to the Varangians, along the Dnieper; and above the Dnieper, there was a portage for boats to the Lovat; descending the Lovat one comes to Lake Ilmen. Out of this lake flows the Volkhov which falls into the great Lake Nevo [Lake Ladoga] which drains into the Varangian Sea [Gulf of Finland]. Across this sea, one can journey to Rome, from Rome by sea to Constantinople, and from Constantinople to the Euxine, into which the Dnieper flows. For the Dnieper rises in the forest of Okov and flows toward the south; the Dvina issues from the same forest and flows north into the Varangian sea; the Volga also rises in this forest, flows toward the east and empties by sixty-six mouths into the Khvalisian Sea [the Caspian]. So one can go by the Volga from Russia to Bulgaria [the Bulgarians of the Kama] and the Khvalis to the east as far as the country of the Semites; by the Dvina to the

Varangians, from the country of the Varangians to Rome, from Rome to the race of Cham. The Dnieper flows into the Euxine by three mouths. This sea is called Russian and it is on the shores of this sea that according to tradition Saint Andrew, the brother of Peter, preached.

To summarize the above, we may say that the original home of the Slav was a great quadrilateral in eastern Europe, at the center of which lies Polesie, the swamp region of the Pripet. Beginning some time in the pre-Christian era, the Slavs began to expand in all directions from their homeland, splitting into three main divisions; the West Slavs embracing those living in modern Poland, Germany, and Czecho-Slovakia, i.e., the Poles, Polaks, Pomeranians, Lusatian Wends, Sorbs, Czechs, Moravians, and Slovaks; the next great division was that of the South Slavs, including the Serbs, Croatians, the Slavs of the Save and Drave valleys in the duchies of Carinthia, Styria and Carniola, and the Slavicized Bulgars; the greatest group of all is that of the East Slavs, including the Great Russians, the majority of the inhabitants of the Russian plain, the Ukrainians of the southwest (modern Ukraine), and the White Russians, who live along the line where Russian, Pole, and Lithuanian meet. Beginning probably with the great barbarian movements of the second century, the East Slavs began to expand eastward along the river courses and through the forest; there were setbacks when the Goths, Huns, and Avars impinged on their settlements (mostly in the forest). With the backward surge of the Germans as a consequence of the Carolingian *Drang nach Osten* in the eighth century and the bringing of civilization to eastern Germany, the movement of the Slavs to the east was accelerated. Little resistance was offered by the Finns and Lithuanians. If they kept to the forest, the Slavs avoided trouble with the nomads of the steppes; perhaps they took advantage of the comparative peace that came to the steppes with the foundation of the Khazar state. They were thus enabled to entrench themselves in their settlements distributed through the forest and along the rivers before the disorders of the ninth and tenth centuries broke upon them.

[3]

THE VARANGIANS

THE chronicler records that in the year 859:

. . . the Varangians from over the sea forced the Chuds, the Slavs, the Merians, the Ves and the Krivitches to pay them tribute; the Khazars forced the Poliani, the Severians and the Vyatichi to pay them tribute—an ermine skin for each hearth.

With this simple but significant statement, Russian history leaves the mist of legend, tradition, mythology, and hearsay, and embarks on the broad stream of recorded human events. The monk, in his cheerless cell poring over the manuscript on which he had bestowed his labor of love and to whom the Christian religion had granted the priceless gift of writing, has, with this record, put later ages under an eternal obligation in thus enshrining in his narrative the unadorned tale of the rise of ordered society among the East Slavs.

If the plains of Russia were the scene of the latest *Völkerwanderung* (folk wandering) of the Middle Ages, they are none the less also closely linked with the history of the Near and the Middle East during the Dark Ages. For we have incontestable evidence in the literary records of the Arabs that they too shared in the penetration and opening up of this dark continent. And even if these had been destroyed, we still have no less valuable testimony of their activity in the discovery in these regions, of coins of the caliphs of Bagdad and the rulers of Samarkand, Bokhara, and other flourishing cities of central Asia. The frequent references to the Khazars that occur in the annals remind us also that contacts of the Pontic steppes with the Middle East, as well as with Byzantine civilization, were

made through the Khazars, who acted as intermediaries. We have also to take account of the Bulgars, the Avars, and the Lithuanians, all of them races that touched at some point the Russian plain. The question arises: can we get behind these casual mentions of racial strife and conflicts of religion and civilization to the surging forces at work in these still-dark corners of the earth that eventually brought into being a new and vigorous political order destined to triumph over its rivals? Indeed, not only did this state outlast contemporary foes, but it was its destiny to survive even more catastrophic vicissitudes than the observer of the twelfth century could have foreseen.

THE VARANGIAN WATER ROUTE

In whatever numbers the East Slavs penetrated eastern Europe, they were not by any means the sole occupants of the plains and the forests. They shared them with the Chuds, the Mordvians, the Cheremissians, and other Finnic peoples, while to the southeast the Khazars had established themselves along the Volga and near the mouth of the Don; and along the Kama a Bulgarian state was arising. On the borders of this region new developments were bringing this great lowland within the scheme of world commerce and calling into life new and vitalizing forces. Far to the southeast, in central Asia, on the tide of Moslem conquest Saracen civilization had swept across the deserts and mountains to far Kashgar, where rich and powerful states had been created amid fertile valleys and oases. Under the protection of these states a great trade sprang up and was maintained between east and west.

To the northwest, the last and most vigorous of the barbarian nations was sending forth her untamed brood to prey at first on the hapless young nations of the west, later to revivify them with life-giving blood. But corsair raids on France and Germany, the conquest of the British Isles, the settlement of Iceland, the discovery of America by no means exhausted the vigor of the Norse peoples. They swarmed over the Baltic, established trading posts and settlements on its islands and

along its southern coasts; they ascended the rivers and took their share of the trade with the interior and the more distant cities of southern Europe. But no country lay so open to their penetration as northern Russia. Here the Gulf of Riga and the Gulf of Finland offered shelter from the stormy blasts that sweep the Baltic Sea. From their furthest recesses open rivers leading to the distant interior; from Riga, the Dvina goes through the land of the Lithuanians and the Semgalli to the marshy water-partings that give access to the Dnieper and the Volga; from the Gulf of Finland, the Neva leads to Lake Ladoga; hence, ascending the Volkhov, the traveller passes to Lake Ilmen; ascending the Lovat an easy portage carries him to the Dvina; a tributary of the latter approaches the great bend of the Dnieper and the traveller, once on its broad waters, could float without effort till he heard the hoarse roar of the cataracts now silenced by the great dam at Dnieprostroi. Hauling his boats around these obstructions he could launch them once more on the now swollen Dnieper and within a few days his ships could ride at anchor on the broad bosom of the Euxine. Or, if he preferred, he could follow an alternative route to the Caspian Sea by the Sia, the Chadoga, the Chadoshcha, the Mologa, and the Volga.

Were the Norse the first to discover and open up these trade routes between the Baltic in the north and the Black and Caspian seas in the south? Or were they merely following in the wake of other enterprising races of traders? Had these peaceful inland waters been broken by the splash of the oars of the Scythians or the Sarmatians? Had merchants from Greece or Italy or from the Hellenized coast of the Euxine crossed the region of the steppes or penetrated the northern forests? Had the venturesome Goths launched their boats on the upper Dnieper or ridden the cataracts, answering their fury with shouts of savage joy? Or did the stillness of the northern rivers remain unbroken till the coming of the Slav and the Northman?

No categorical answer to these tantalizing questions can be made. It is not open to serious doubt that from early Greek

times commerce had penetrated these wilds and that commercial contacts became more frequent with the passing of time. The trade of the Greeks with the Scythians and other peoples of the interior appears to have been intermittent and to have been carried on by barter. Not till Roman times did coins find their way from the Mediterranean to the steppes. It seems probable that eastern as well as western Europe was to an increasing extent traversed by merchants from east to west and from north to south during late Roman and early medieval times. What trade there was probably was not in the hands of individual traders, but in the unsettled conditions of the times was more than likely carried on by organized groups, held together by bonds of kinship or common racial origin. If such groups were not powerful enough to secure themselves against chance raiders, either the forest dwellers or the nomads of the steppes, they would of necessity put themselves under the protection of that particular political power that chanced to be dominant. Undoubtedly such trade was ill-developed and subject to interruptions. It would depend also on the varying demands of the civilized regions of the Mediterranean whose fastidious tastes it catered to with its exotic products. In Greek times the Euxine and its shores supplied the Hellenic cities with grain and fish; in Hellenistic and Roman times, they furnished fish, slaves, gold, and salt, the production of grain for export having declined owing to disturbed political conditions. With the disappearance of the Kingdom of the Bosphorus and the decline of Roman power, political conditions altered, but there was no cessation of trade between north and south. Roman coins found along the watercourses witness to the persistence of trade far beyond the limits of the Roman domain. We can scarcely doubt that Roman industrial products were common objects of trade or barter throughout the whole of central and eastern Europe; or that the raw materials that formed the staple products of these regions—fur, wax, honey, and slaves—found their way down the rivers to the Black Sea or were transported across country to the commercial towns on the Danube. When the Goths established themselves north

of the Danube and along the coast of the Euxine, presumably in the second century, they doubtless were dazzled by the glamour of Roman civilization, proximity to which would enable them to enter into direct trade relations. Was the "road from the Varangians to the Greeks" opened by the Goths six centuries before their enterprising kinsmen from the Scandinavian peninsula made their abrupt appearance under the walls of Constantinople? If it was, the venture was doomed to a speedy termination; for the collapse of the short-lived Gothic state exposed these inland waterways to the devastating raids of the Huns, who severed the connection of the Black Sea with the Baltic.

For centuries, the steppes were swept by hosts of nomads—the Huns, the Avars, the Bulgars, the Magyars. But in the sixth century the southeastern area of the Pontic steppes came under the control of a semi-nomad people, the Khazars, who lived along the lower Volga and around the Caspian and were reputed to have been pushed from a former home in the Caucasus. These folk developed an uncommon bent for trade which their position at the crossroads of commerce enabled them to indulge to the full. The establishment of the caliphate of Bagdad and the Saracen conquest of central Asia without doubt stimulated the cultural and economic life of the Middle East. Not only did central Asia produce much that found a ready market in the still-rustic lands of Europe, but the comparative security which the government of the caliph and his local emirs was able to guarantee commerce, enormously stimulated the caravan trade from western China. Many Oriental wares found their way to the Black Sea and Constantinople, but the domination of the western Mediterranean by the Mohammedan corsair states in Sicily and North Africa may have dammed up much of this trade and turned it into new channels. Venice had not yet developed her direct economic relations with central and western Europe over the Alpine passes. The trade of the Italian cities was in its infancy. Everything indicates that the water routes were opened not earlier than the ninth century A. D.

THE EARLIEST ACCOUNTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

While the water route from the Baltic may have been opened and used by the Slavs during the period of expansion and occupation of what is now western Russia and the Ukraine, it is, on the other hand, indissolubly linked in legend and chronicle with the Norse Varangians. It must be admitted that there are contradictions between various traditional accounts recorded by the Ancient Chronicle, but the purport of the annalist is that the Varangians entered the land of the Slavs by ascending the rivers that discharge into the Gulf of Finland; that, whatever their original motives, they immediately established a dominance over the country; and that from this event dates the origin of the Russian state. At the very beginning of the Chronicle we read:

Below is the account of ancient times recorded by the monk of the monastery of Theodosius of the Crypts; how Russia was formed; who first ruled at Kiev and where Russia had its beginning.

and later:

In the year 6360 (852) on the accession of the Emperor Michael, the land began to be called Russian. We know this because it was under this Emperor that Russia attacked Constantinople as the Greek annals record.

Tradition has it, therefore, that "Russia" and "Russians" were new names associated with the coming of the Norse. And if we remember the sharp distinction drawn by the Greek writers, especially Constantine Porphyrogenitus, between Russians (Ῥῶς) and Slavs, we are forced to the conclusion that the Scandinavians imposed their name and rule at once on the native Slavs and Finns. Their first concern with Russia and its rivers was as a thoroughfare for their raids on Constantinople. Indeed, the Chronicle hints at earlier raids than those actually recorded in it. It is only when these buccaneers turned from mere adventure to serious occupation that the writer concerns himself with their doings.

The year 6367, the Varangians from overseas levied tribute on the Chuds, the Slavs, the Merians, the Ves, and the Krivitches; the Khazars levied tribute from the Poliani, the Severians, the Vyatichi, an ermine skin for every hearth.

The years 6368, 6369, 6370. They [the native population] drove the Varangians beyond the sea and refused tribute, and they tried to govern themselves and there was no longer any justice among them; family quarrelled with family, there was continuous strife and fighting among them. Then they came to an agreement among themselves, "Let us find a prince to reign over us and judge us according to the law." And they crossed the Varangian Sea to the Russians; for these Varangians were called Russians; others had the name of Swedes, some were called Normans, still others Angles, others Goths. That is what they called themselves. Now the Chuds, the Slavs, the Krivitches and the Ves said to the Russians; "Our land is large and productive; but there is no order among us; we want you to come and rule us." Three brothers were chosen with their families and brought over with them all the Russians; at first they went to the Slavs, built the town of Ladoga, and Rurik, the elder [brother], settled at Ladoga; the second, Sineus, settled on the banks of the White Lake [Bielo ozero] and the third, Truvor, at Izborsk [on the Dvina]. It is from these Varangians that the people of Novgorod have been called Russians and today the Novgorod people belong to the Varangian race, though at first they were Slavs.

There can be little doubt that the chronicler has colored his facts with a bold brush, though at the same time he has oversimplified them. But the perpetuation of local tradition in written form is an historical contribution of no mean importance and we shall perforce have to follow this, except where it is in conflict with facts derived from another source. Obviously, therefore, the Slavs, from their original habitat had spread eastward to the headwaters of the four rivers mentioned, and probably had moved down these waterways. We are left in doubt as to when the commercial importance of these was first discovered and exploited, but the discovery is here evidently ascribed to the Slavs at some time prior to the middle of the ninth century. Undoubtedly in this favoring environment the Slavic peoples had come in contact with numbers of the most advanced races of that time, the Greeks to the south and southwest, the Khazars on the lower Volga, the Bulgars both of the Danube and the Kama, the Arabs from the outlying portions of

the land subject to the Caliph of Bagdad. But representatives of these stocks came only to trade, not to make permanent conquests or to settle; for neither climate nor soil tempted them to stay. But some time about the early part of the ninth century a new element intrudes into this polyglot land—the “Russ,” as the Chronicle calls them. The time of their arrival is given exactly as the year 858 A. D.

Inasmuch as the first raids on England had begun as early as 790 and as the Northmen had appeared off the coast of France in the time of Charlemagne, the Norse world must have been astir in the eighth century, and there is some evidence that warlike expeditions of the Danes had taken place as early as the time of Gregory of Tours (seventh century). It is but reasonable to assume that Scandinavia had been linked up with the great trade routes across Russia by the end of the eighth century and that hardy merchants or adventurers had already made their appearance there by the year 800. The country proved to their liking, for they could combine commerce with the profession of arms, and when no profit was to be made from commerce more or less honest or from the booty of a rich city or the plunder of a convoy or caravan, they could turn to the exploitation of the simple folk who dwelt in the clearings of the forests deriving a meager living from the soil or from the chase, as the Chronicle records. In exchange for the tribute they wrung from the peasants they gave them a rude security, and dealt out a primitive kind of justice, simple yet stern, as the Normans everywhere were wont to do.

What kind of a state did these Northmen set up? According to the Chronicle it was frankly predatory and was based on the exploitation of the native population. Yet times obviously were ripe for a warlike race to bring order into this no-man's land, and to direct into regular channels the intermittent though profitable trade that traversed its vast spaces. And while the first Norse attempt to impose the yoke of subjection failed for insufficient force, their second was more successful, perhaps because, as the Chronicle records, by that time the natives had tasted the blessings of a strong government. At any rate the

Norse established their strongholds, whence they could command the country and particularly the waterways to the south, and prevent the spoliation of the convoys by others than themselves. In this they joined hands with the Khazars who, settled on the southern plains, furnished security to the Arab caravans from central Asia and to the vessels arriving at the mouth of the Volga from the Persian ports on the Caspian. And out of this strange commercial pact there grew a network of trade routes along the lower Volga and the Dnieper and that, passing through the steppes and the northern forests, converged at Novgorod, near the water-parting of four great river systems. The importance of Novgorod and its intimate relation with the Russ from beyond the seas is well attested by the Chronicle.

Thus was laid the foundation of the earliest Russian state, one of the first and the most enduring of all the Slavic states to arise in the Middle Ages.

Almost at the same time that the Northmen took possession of the key positions in the neighborhood of Lake Ilmen some of their number pushed down the Dnieper and seized the city of Kiev, a place long since built by the Slavs. It is easy to see why they were drawn southwards. They could scarcely descend the Volga without running the gauntlet of the Bulgars and the Khazars. The cities of Persia were too remote to beckon them with the chances of rich plunder. The occasion on which we know they did carry out a pirate raid on the Caucasus they followed a roundabout route that avoided the land of the Bulgars. Novgorod commanded the trade routes that converged in the north along the river highways. But Kiev, on the middle Dnieper, controlled the trade that originated on the Black Sea littoral before it diverged up the Pripet into Polesie or up the Desna to the Oka. Moreover, it was scarcely near enough the Khazar capital to invite efforts to intercept trade. The shrewd Norse glimpsed the possibilities of plying with profit the double trade of merchant and armed warrior; probably they had heard of the blackmail wrung by other warrior bands by warlike demonstration on the Roman frontiers; doubtless kinsmen of theirs were levying Danegeld in western Europe at this

time. They had little difficulty in detaching from the Khazar empire the loosely knit Slavic tribes along the lower course of the river. The Slavs were but exchanging one yoke for another, and there was always the chance of a change for the better. Twenty years later Rurik's son Igor and his maternal uncle Oleg descended the Dnieper. They dispossessed the other Norse bands and established the seat of their government at Kiev. "This city," said Oleg, "will be the mother of Russian cities."

But while the chronicler through the mellow haze of time saw in this event a symbol of the future greatness of Russ, the impartial historian is compelled to see in it a quite different significance. Fifteen years earlier (according to the Chronicle) the first Norse bands had used Kiev as a base of operations for a raid on Constantinople. The menace of the capture and pillage of the great metropolis on the Golden Horn was, according to tradition, averted only by a miraculous storm which played havoc with the frail craft of the Northmen, and sent them home discomfited. But these first warlike excursions, little more than piratical descents or a sort of reconnaissance in force, were eclipsed by the great invasions attempted by Oleg as regent for Rurik's son and successor, Igor. This bold buccaneer recruited a motley array of Varangians, Slavs, Chuds, Krivitchi, Meri, Poliani, Severiani, Drevliani, Radimichi, Croats, Dulebes, and Tivertsi and, descending the Dnieper, approached the imperial city with a flotilla of two thousand vessels. The terror this great armament inspired in the court of Constantinople led to an offer of peace with the time-honored expedient of the payment of tribute. The tribute was paid and the expedition returned home. The following spring, Oleg sent plenipotentiaries to make a definitive treaty which would provide for peaceful commercial relations between the Russians and the subjects of the emperor. Special privileges at Constantinople were granted Russian merchants with adequate safeguards against their abuse. After Oleg's death, in 912, this treaty was superseded by a third one negotiated by Igor, the son of Rurik, in 915. Elaborate regulations were drawn up to

control all commercial and political relations between the two peoples. These warlike feats and treaties of peace are but the foreground of the picture; in the background is a confused welter of rival racial groups, nascent kingdoms, each struggling with its neighbors and with the empire for its existence. In this war for survival, intrigue, diplomacy, and arms all bear their part, while one can now descry the new though potent force of Christianity seeking to turn aside the pagan assaults from the imperial city and to subdue their violence and craftiness in the interests of the great empire.

[4]

THE COMING OF CHRISTIANITY

WITH the death of Igor in 945, his widow Olga assumed power on behalf of her infant son Svyatoslav. The inheritance of Rurik, after passing through troublous times, now entered on a new era in which paganism gave way to the Christian religion. Exactly why a land so long and intimately connected with the Rome of the East should have retained beliefs long abandoned by the peoples of western Europe is to be explained by the storms through which it had passed. The ecclesiastical historian, Socrates, tells us that the Goths living beyond the Danube and along the Black Sea embraced Christianity during the reign of Valens, toward the end of the fourth century A. D. Yet it was six hundred years later that the Slavs living in the same region were converted to Christianity. Perhaps the reason for this fact is that the Goth's sojourn in the Pontic steppes was but fleeting. They fled before the hordes of the Huns. Fresh invasions of nomads from the east followed at intervals. Though during the fifth century the new faith made progress, in the welter of the sixth and succeeding centuries there was little place for the evangelist in these barbarous regions, and the land remained unredeemed. Moreover, each new race entering the steppes brought its own beliefs. The work of conversion therefore had to be begun afresh. The Slavs brought the worship of Perun; the Avars, doubtless the Shamanism of Asia; the Magyars, the primitive beliefs they had had in western Asia; the Khazars adopted Judaism. Yet doubtless there lingered on in the towns of the Black Sea littoral, barbarized as they were, some vestiges of the Christian faith which had found such ready converts in the

fourth century. Some knowledge of it may even have penetrated to the interior.

Christianity had already made progress among the western Slavs, a circumstance which could scarcely be without its effect on the regions to the east of the Carpathians. The evangelization of the Danubian regions coincides with the invasion of central Europe by the Magyars toward the end of the ninth century, and the annalist links these events closely with developments in eastern Europe:

Then they [the Magyars] began to make war on the Moravians and on the Czechs; for there was only one Slav race; that is, the Slavs settled along the Danube and who submitted to the Magyars, the Moravians, the Czechs, the Lekhs, and the Poliani now called Russians. It was for them that books were first written in Moravian with Slav characters which are in use today in Russia and among the Bulgars of the Danube.

He then proceeds to give the history of this first Slav alphabet and, incidentally, the first beginnings of Christianity:

When the Slavs of Moravia had been thus baptized, their princes, Rostislav, Svyatopolk and Kotsel, sent to the Emperor Michael and said: "Our country is baptized and we have no instructor to preach to us, to teach us or to explain the sacred books. We do not know either the Greek or the Latin language; some instruct us in one way, others in another. Send us instructors who can explain to us the letter and spirit of holy writ." Having heard this, the emperor assembled all his philosophers and repeated to them what the Russian princes said; and the philosophers said; "At Thessalonica there is a man named Leo; he has sons who are well acquainted with the Slavic language, two sons versed in the sciences and the philosophies." Hearing this the emperor sent to Thessalonica to Leo saying, "Send me at once Methodius and Constantine." Leo hearing this sent them and they came to the emperor's court and the latter said to them, "Behold, the Slavs have asked me for a teacher to explain the sacred books to them; such is their desire." He induced them to depart and he despatched them into the lands of the Slavs, to Rostislav, to Svyatopolk and to Kotsel; and on their arrival, they fixed the letters of the Slavic alphabet and they translated the acts of the apostles and the gospel. The Slavs rejoiced to hear of the greatness of God in their own language; then they translated the Psalms, the Octoic and other books. But some began to criticize the Slavic books, saying, "No people has the right to its alphabet except the Hebrews, the Greeks and the Latins, as is proved by what

Pilate wrote on the cross of the Saviour." The Pope of Rome, hearing this, censured those who denounced the Slavic books, saying, "Let the words of Holy Scripture be carried out; let all tongues praise God, and further 'All began to prophesy in diverse tongues as the Holy Spirit prompted them.' And if any condemn the Slav writing, let him be cut off from the church till he amend his ways; for such men are wolves and not sheep; ye will know them by their fruits, do not put your trust in them. For you children of God, hear his teachings, and do not depart from the instructions of the church, as has been explained to you by Methodius."

Constantine returned after this and went to teach the Bulgarian people and Methodius remained in Moravia. Then Prince Kotsel appointed Methodius bishop in Pannonia, in the See of Saint Andronicus, the apostle, one of the seventy disciples of the Apostle Paul. Methodius appointed two clever scribes as priests and they translated all the holy books from Greek into Slavic, in the space of six months between March and the 26th of October. Having finished they rendered thanks and glory to God, who had so blessed bishop Methodius, successor to Andronicus; for the apostle Andronicus is the instructor of the Slavic people and he came to Moravia. Similarly, the Apostle Paul taught there; for that is where Illyria is whither the apostle came; and that is where the Slavs were before the arrival of Paul. That is why Paul is the instructor of the Slavic people to whom we Russians also belong; so Saint Paul is also the teacher of us Russians because he taught the Slavic people and left as bishop his successor, Saint Andronicus, to the Slavic people. For the Slavic nation and the Russian nation is one; and although the Poliani had a special name, they also spoke Slavic; for they were called Poliani because they lived in the fields (*polie*), and they spoke the same language as the Slavs.

In this passage in which history and legend are inextricably interwoven we see a tradition, not altogether consistent with the account of Vladimir's conversion, of an earlier Christian influence coming into Russian lands from the west, perhaps even originating in the Papacy and coming through the medium of the Balkan Slavs. Obviously the schism between Pope and Patriarch was not regarded in Slavic lands as final even as late as the twelfth century (the date of the composition of the Chronicle). By the toleration of the Slavic language and ritual, the Papacy endeavored unsuccessfully to detach the Bulgarian and other Slavic churches from the control of the patriarch of Constantinople. But from the beginning of the tenth century,

the Russians, both Norse and Slav, had been increasingly in contact with the new faith. After Oleg, on his first raid against Constantinople, had made a demonstration in force against the city, the emperors agreed to come to terms, promised a payment of "Danegeld," and drew up a tentative treaty with the Russian prince, which was sworn to and recounted in the Chronicle:

They [the emperors] kissed the cross and requested Oleg and his men to take an oath. The latter, according to the Russian custom, swore on their swords, by Perun, their god, by Volos, the god of flocks; and peace was concluded.

In the treaty concluded by Oleg in 912 religious oaths are provided to give sanctity to its terms:

And to confirm this peace beyond all possibility of dispute, this peace between you Christians and us Russians, we have caused this treaty to be written by John on a double parchment which has been signed by our emperor with his own hand; in the presence of the Holy Cross and of the Holy and Indivisible Trinity of your True God, it has been ratified and sent back to our ambassadors. And we have sworn to your emperor who reigns over you by the will of God and according to the law and the customs of our people that neither we nor any of our people will depart from the conditions of peace and the love established between us.

The treaty concluded between the Byzantine emperor and Igor in 945 shows that by this time Christianity has made progress among the Russians:

We Christians, then have sworn in the chapel of St. Elias in the cathedral church on the Holy Cross which was held before us and on this parchment, to observe all that is written thereon and to depart from it in nothing and whoever among us will depart from it, prince or other, baptized or not, may he receive no succour from God, may he be a slave in this life and in the future life, may he perish at his own hand. And the Russians who are not Christians will lay down their shields, will draw their swords and lay them down as well as their brassards and their other arms and will swear that all that is written on this parchment will be observed by Igor and by all his boyars and by the whole Russian people always and forever. If then any prince or any one among the Russian people violate what is written on this parchment, may he perish by his own arms, may he be cursed by God and Perun, for having broken his oath. So long as the Grand Prince Igor will live, he will see that this honourable friendship shall not be broken

and be maintained so long as the sun continues to shine, as long as the world shall last, now and forever.

In describing the confirmation of the treaty, the chronicler writes:

The following morning, Igor summoned the ambassadors and went to the hill where stood Perun; they laid down their bucklers, their arms and their gold, and Igor took the oath as well as those of his officers who were pagans; and the Russians who were Christians took the oath in the chapel of St. Elias which stands by the brook near the Pasinech square and the suburb of the Khazars; it is a cathedral church; for many of the Varangians were Christians.

It is not therefore altogether surprising, after the death of Igor in 945, to hear that Olga, his widow, made the journey to Constantinople and appealed to the patriarch there, and to the emperor, for baptism. The motives that prompted her to take this momentous step can only be surmised. Cunning and ferocity were the dominating traits of her character so far as we can deduce from her recorded acts. But whatever the motives, her conversion was an act bordering on audacity in a society still pagan in thought and habit; and the steadfastness with which she adhered to her new-found faith reveals something of the sincerity with which it was embraced. But she could not shake the conservatism of her son Svyatoslav or of his court.

Svyatoslav's reign, from his attainment of manhood in 956 till his death at the cataracts of Dnieper at the hands of the Pechenegs in 972, was marked by an insatiable desire for conquest. With his eyes ever on Constantinople, he hoped to possess the land of the Bulgarians along the lower Danube and establish his capital at Pereyaslavets (Marcianopolis). He wrested the Oka valley from the control of the Khazars and made its inhabitants—the Vyatiches—his tributaries; he followed up this expansion to the northeast by capturing Bielavieja, one of the Khazar cities, and reducing to subjection the Iases and the Kassogues. But his main efforts were directed to the southwest, where he was consumed with a desire to establish the center of his kingdom among the Bulgars of the Danube. To quote the Chronicle:

The year 6477 (969 A.D.), Svyatoslav said to his mother and his boyars, "I do not like Kiev; I prefer Pereyaslavets on the Danube; for that is the centre of my dominion. Thither wealth is brought from all lands; silver, cloth, fruit, different kinds of wine from Greece; silver and horses from Bohemia and Hungary; furs, wax, honey, slaves from Russia."

In pursuance of his schemes, Svyatoslav set up his sons as his deputies throughout his realm, Yaropolk at Kiev, Oleg among the Drevliani, and an illegitimate son, Vladimir, at Novgorod, while he devoted his own energies to the southwestward expansion in the direction of the Danube. Pereyaslavets was taken. Pushing on across the Danube and the Balkan mountains, the Russians entered the territory of the Byzantine emperor, defeated an army sent against them, and advancing on Constantinople forced the empire to pay them tribute and conclude a treaty of peace (971 A. D.).

According to the terms of the former treaty concluded between Svyatoslav, grand prince of Russia and Svyenald, and John Zimisces, emperor of the Greeks, the treaty written by Theophilus, the secretary at Derester (Silistria) in the month of July, in the fourteenth indiction, the year 6479 (971 A.D.), I, Svyatoslav, Prince of Russia, have sworn, and by the present agreement, I confirm my oath. I desire peace and abiding friendship with all the potent Greek emperors, Basil and Constantine, emperors inspired by God, and with all your peoples, as do all the Russians who are subject to me, boyars and others forever. I will never attack your country, I shall not collect an army, I shall never lead a foreign host against you nor against those who are subject to the Greek government nor against the Khersonese or its cities, nor against the land of the Bulgars. And if any other attacks your country, I shall march against him and attack him. As I have sworn to the Greek emperors, so have my boyars and all Russia and we will be faithful to the present agreement. If, however, we fail to abide by what we have agreed to above, may I and all those who are my subjects be cursed by the God in whom we believe, by Perun, and Volos, god of the flocks; may we become yellow as gold and perish by our own arms. Be convinced of the truth of what we have promised you today and have written on this parchment and sealed with our seals.

On his return from Constantinople, Svyatoslav was forced to winter below the falls of the Dnieper; when he attempted to

pass the cataracts in the spring, he was waylaid by the Pechenegs and killed.

VLADIMIR AND THE CONVERSION OF RUSSIA

On the death of Svyatoslav a struggle for the succession ensued between the several sons—Oleg, Yaropolk, and Vladimir. The first encounter resulted in the death of Oleg and the flight of Vladimir overseas to the old Norse homeland. After some years he was invited by Novgorod to return. He brought back with him a band of mercenaries who became the *corps d'élite* of a polyglot military body with which he made his bid for power. In the ensuing struggle he triumphed over Yaropolk and put him to death, securing the prize of sovereignty—the city of Kiev.


While Vladimir owed his victory in great part to his Norse mercenaries, he had every intention of being master in his own house, and with the first sign of discontent and insubordination among them he dismissed them from his service, allowing them to proceed downstream to Kherson and thence to Constantinople, where they entered the service of the Byzantine emperor, forming the nucleus of the famous Varangian guard.

The reign of Vladimir was a crucial one for the future Russian state. The kingdom on the middle Dnieper was the meeting point of many races; merchants from the Baltic passed Kiev on their way to the Black Sea and Constantinople; Greek merchants found their way up from Constantinople to dispose of their wares and buy the things which the forest lands produced. Doubtless Arabs reached there through Khazar and Bulgar territory. In the west new political groups were forming in the valleys of the Vistula and the Elbe. These groups later became the duchies of Poland and Bohemia. Everywhere the peculiar characteristic of the culture of each was the religion professed. The old paganism of the Slav and the Teuton was on the defensive. The enticements of civilization were at all points making themselves felt among the unlettered population of central and eastern Europe. And with the softer manners came letters and perhaps a yearning for peace and order. The

Roman church, with the traditions of St. Boniface and St. Columban, was everywhere on the aggressive; even in the far northern forests of Scandinavia was now heard the chant of the Christian litany; in central Europe monasteries reared their massive walls like islands amid the forest. The swords of the savage Norse raiders were being beaten into ploughshares. Even the Eastern Church had caught some of the missionary zeal of its western neighbor. In the disputed election of Photius and Ignatius in the iconoclastic controversy, itself a phase of the struggle between eastern and western empire, between Patriarch and Pope, each church essayed to bring eastern Europe under its control. The Patriarch brought Bulgaria into the Eastern Church and advanced vague claims to ecclesiastical authority over the Black Sea region. In the course of the campaign of mutual recrimination, Photius issued an encyclical in which he said, "God be praised for all time to come! The Russians have received a bishop and show a lively zeal for Christian worship." Obviously the whole of eastern Europe was becoming a field for the rival ambitions of Pope and Patriarch, of iconoclast and iconodule, of the eastern and western churches.

The Chronicle records that Vladimir spent the first years of his reign in extending his kingdom eastward into the land of the White Bulgars and westward to the Radimitches, near of kin to the Poles. The Bulgars had recently become Mohammedans (proselytized presumably by the Arabs). The Poles had just adopted Christianity from the Germans. It was but natural that the spread of these rival religious doctrines should have made Kiev a battleground for the conflicting creeds. The chronicler pictures Vladimir as solicited by representatives of various creeds—Islam, Judaism, Roman Catholicism, the Greek Orthodox—to align himself with their respective beliefs. The Mohammedans promised him certain carnal pleasures, but withheld others; the Jews prescribed circumcision, observance of the Sabbath, abstention from pork and the flesh of the rabbit; the Germans, representing the Roman church, held out prospects of an agreeable regime under the mild rule of the Pope;

while a Greek philosopher, sent from Constantinople, alone impressed him with the profundity of Christian dogma. Vladimir, despite the lengthy harangue of the Byzantine, was unable to decide. Even a consultation with his boyars did not resolve the difficulty. At length it was decided to despatch



Brown Brothers.

SPASSKII CHURCH, MOSCOW.

embassies to the seats of the various religions—one to the Bulgars, one to the Germans, and one to Constantinople. The courtesy with which they were received by the emperors Basil and Constantine and the solemn beauty of the Christian ritual as observed in Hagia Sophia completely won them over to the

Greek confession. Their favorable report entirely persuaded Vladimir and induced him to accept the spiritual rule of the Eastern Orthodox Church.

The manner of the conversion of Vladimir was striking and characteristic of the age. Attended by his Varangian mercenaries, he descended on the Greek city Kherson, on the shores of the Black Sea, and after wresting it from its possessors, he threatened (according to the tradition) Constantinople with a like fate, and used its possession as a weapon to wring from the Byzantine emperors a Greek bride. The position of the Emperor Basilius at this time was especially critical, owing to the revolt of Barda Phoka, so that he was the more readily induced to yield to the pressure of Vladimir and, making a virtue of necessity, to accept an alliance with the despised northern prince. The alliance involved the despatch of a Russian force to enable Basilius to reduce the revolting Phoka. One of the conditions attached to the bargain was that Vladimir was to be baptized. The betrothal and marriage symbolized the admission of the Russian people into the family of civilized societies. Vladimir, after wedding his Greek bride, returned to his capital, where he constrained his people, as was frequently the custom of the time, to be baptized wholesale into the Christian faith, requiring this of them as loyal and obedient subjects rather than winning them by persuasion and reason. But the change thus introduced into Slavic culture was none the less effective. Churches on the Byzantine model were built and lavishly decorated with imported works of art. Schools were established and the children of *boyars* and others were required to be initiated into the mysteries of the alphabet. Vladimir, like Charlemagne, whom he so much resembles, seems also to have caught a vision of a new, peaceful, and enlightened Europe and to have labored to lay securely the foundations of a new society, organizing his government along regular and systematic lines and providing for the peace and welfare of his country by a consistent policy whose aim was to promote the building and fortification of cities, especially along the well-travelled highways of commerce. This seems to have been primarily a

military measure. According to the Chronicle, Vladimir

built fortified cities on the Desna, the Oster, the Trubeia and the Sula and he gathered together courageous men from among the Slavs, the Krivitches, the Chuds, the Vyatichi and he settled them in these towns. For he was at war with the Pechenegs and he fought with them and vanquished them.

In the year 6500 (991 A.D.) he founded the city of Bielgorod and settled it with inhabitants of the other towns and brought there a great number of people, for he loved this city.

The above-mentioned places are situated on left-bank tributaries of the Dnieper and were obviously the nucleus of a fortified line intended to secure Kiev and the waterway of the Dnieper from the nomad Pechenegs approaching Kiev from the Volga region by way of the Don valley, in the southern part of the central black earth region. These fortified lines, comparable to a Roman *limes* or the Carolingian Slav frontier, were meant to withstand the menace to which Kiev and the civilization of the whole of South Russia stood exposed. Eloquent testimony is borne to this by Archbishop Bruno who in the year 1008 undertook a missionary journey to the Pechenegs through the territory of Vladimir. He was kindly received by the Russian prince, who endeavored to dissuade him from his mad project:

But since he availed naught with me . . . he conducted me for two days with his army to the frontier of his empire which he had enclosed with a very stout and extensive palisade. He dismounted and I and my companions went ahead while he followed with the leaders of his army. And so we passed through the wall.

The importance of the work of Vladimir for Russia can scarcely be overestimated. Like the almost contemporary Otto, his work was epoch-making in putting an end to a period of anarchy and confusion and laying the foundations of a peaceful and enduring political and social order. His espousal of the Greek princess, Anna, like the marriage of Otto II to her sister Theophanu, introduced into the wilds of south Russia the germs of Byzantine art and literature which were destined to produce lasting results. Greek ikon painters, Greek sculptors, and

Greek architects were imported to build and adorn the churches. Greek teachers instructed the children of the *boyars*. Greek monks and priests spread the gospel teaching far and wide and provided the administrators for the new Slavonic church. The work of civilization and Christianization was superficial and incomplete. Lip service to the teachings of the Prince of Peace could not eradicate the habits and ingrained customs of centuries; beneath the surface veneer of refinement of manner lurked the savage brutality of the ages of barbarism. But despite this drab side of the picture, the world that was to be was in striking contrast with that which had been. Letters and art were to flourish in Kiev and her daughter cities, which had known little but the rude simplicity and squalor of frontier settlements and were barely able to maintain themselves against their savage neighbors. And throughout the northern forests and over the wide steppes were now established stout-walled cities and well-guarded monasteries, wherein the inhabitant was able to dwell secure from the raiding nomad and the roaming bandit, and beneath whose protection the arts of peace could be carried on despite the anarchy and confusion that threatened them from without. The foundations of the Russian state were securely laid.

[5]

KIEVAN RUSS

“IT is indeed marvellous,” says the chronicler, “what benefits Vladimir conferred on the land of Russ by his conversion . . . The people of Russ, mindful of their holy baptism, hold this Prince in pious memory.”

The “pious memory” of the monkish writer may not be altogether unconnected with the solid benefits which Prince Vladimir conferred on the church and, in view of the early licentiousness and the extreme cruelty of that prince, such a view of Vladimir may seem to put a strain on the evidence which is available. But the mundane character of the motives that inspired him and the crude material features ascribed to these events should not blind us to the importance and the lasting character of the results attained. There is more than a distant parallel between the Russian saint of the tenth century and the ruthless Frankish king of the fifth century, under whom the Franks adopted Christianity. Perhaps we may question the loftiness of the purposes or even the sincerity of the conversion of either, but there can be little doubt that Vladimir, like Clovis, realized the importance of linking up his people with the great civilizing agency of the time, the Christian church. The humanizing effect of Christian teaching; the introduction of letters; the importation of works of art that served to draw forth the creative impulse of the Slavonic world; the formation of a Slavonic hierarchy, more or less closely connected with that of the Byzantine world; and the slow but none the less insistent infiltration of milder manners and more humane ideas in the field of justice, all combined to bring the world of eastern Europe into line

with that of the Mediterranean world, which it had lagged so far behind for centuries.

It would, however, be somewhat naïve for us to suppose that the mere adoption of a new religion could call into existence a society that would answer the ideals of the twentieth century. That religion, in the form in which it found acceptance among the eastern Slavs, differed little from that which it replaced, and affected only in the most superficial manner the characters of the classes and individuals that were the moving forces in history. Moreover, other forces were at work that were destined to play a scarcely secondary role in the events of the years that followed. It will be our task to single out these forces, whether destructive or constructive, that were to mold Russian society of the eleventh and twelfth centuries and were to leave a lasting imprint on its institutions.

Perhaps we should endeavor first to gain some idea of the conditions of life in this part of the world at the end of the first millennium of the Christian era. Despite the new forces at work, the country had not yet emerged entirely from its paganism or its primitive political and economic organization. Of the first, there is abundant evidence in the crudity of the moral and religious ideas that survived among the Slavs. With regard to the second, we still encounter evidence that while society was grouping itself around the new commercial and administrative centers, areas remote from commercial intercourse were still loosely organized along tribal lines, with the tacit social concepts involved in this organization. Economically, the country was far behind the rest of Europe. It is true that lines of trade from north to south and from east to west traversed the Russian steppes and ascended and descended the mighty rivers. In the tombs (*kurgans*) of the southern steppes are found various treasures that must have come from the east—jewelry of Sassanid Persia and dirhems coined by the Abbasid Caliphs of Bagdad. No less important in the commercial exchange of the period were the products of the country itself. Most important were the slaves taken in war, wax drawn from the hives of

wild bees, and furs, the securing of which still formed the chief means of livelihood of a large part of the people. None of these attest a high degree of industrial or commercial development. Great supplies of these goods were accumulated by the princes by way of tribute levied directly from the population, and were disposed of by them to the Arabs and other commercial adventurers operating on the Volga, or they were transported down the Dnieper and sold at its mouth, to be taken to Constantinople. The princes seem to have lived a predatory life in which they combined the role of military protectors of the population with that of merchants in disposing of the goods they levied in kind from their helpless subjects.

The political organization of the land which the Chronicle calls "Russ" in the time of Vladimir is revealed in the meagerest outlines. Indeed, till the time of Vladimir, it was little more than the personal ascendancy of a military (and piratical) adventurer with his personal following, or *druzhina*. From this time on it evolves into a regular and well-established political order, though the principles in which it was grounded are somewhat elusive.

The arrangements that Vladimir made for the organization of his kingdom and which appear to anticipate the succession after his death, are outlined in the Chronicle:

Vladimir was enlightened and his sons and his country with him. For he had twelve sons: Vysheslav, Izyaslav, Yaroslav, Svyatopolk, Vsevolod, Svyatoslav, Mstislav, Boris, Gleb, Stanislav, Pozvitzd, and Sudislav. He set up Vysheslav in Novgorod, Izyaslav in Polotsk, Svyatopolk in Turov, and Yaroslav in Rostov. When Vysheslav, the oldest, died in Novgorod, he set Yaroslav over Novgorod, Boris over Rostov, Gleb over Murom, Svyatoslav over Dereva, Vsevolod over Vladimir, and Mstislav over Tmutorakan.

But it was inevitable that this arrangement should collapse on the death of Vladimir, which occurred in 1015. There ensued a struggle between the sons of Vladimir which continued for eleven years. The fratricidal strife was finally terminated in 1026 by the division of the kingdom between the two surviving brothers—Mstislav and Yaroslav, the latter of whom became

sole ruler. To signalize his victory, he took up his residence at Kiev.

YAROSLAV THE WISE

The reign of Yaroslav as Grand Prince from 1036 to 1054 was celebrated as a time of peace and progress for Russ. It was a period on which men of after time looked back with longing and regret. For the moment, the fate of Russ depended on the question of the succession. Yaroslav had grave misgivings on this score, for before his death he is reported by the Chronicle to have said:

"My sons, I am about to quit this world, love one another, since ye are brothers by one father and mother. If ye dwell in amity with one another, God will dwell among you, and will subject your enemies to you and ye will live in peace. But if ye dwell in envy and dissension, quarreling with one another, then ye will perish yourselves and bring to ruin the land of your ancestors, which they won at the price of great effort. Wherefore remain rather at peace, brother heeding brother. The throne of Kiev I bequeath to my eldest son, your brother Izyaslav. Heed him as ye have heeded me, that he may take my place among you. To Svyatoslav, I give Chernigov, to Vsevolod, Pereyaslavl, to Igor the city of Vladimir and to Vyacheslav, Smolensk."

Thus [continues the Chronicle], he divided the cities among them, commanding them not to despoil one another. He laid upon Izyaslav the injunction to aid the party wronged, in case one brother should attack another. Thus he admonished his sons to dwell in amity.

This passage must be read together with the observations of the Chronicle for the year of Vsevolod's death, 1093. After describing the character of Vsevolod, the chronicler recalls the words of the former's father, Yaroslav:

"My son, may God bless you, since I hear of your meekness, and I rejoice that you have rendered my old age peaceful. If God grant that you succeed your brothers upon my throne justly and without the exercise of violence, may you lie beside my tomb where I lie when God takes you from this world, for I love you more than your brethren."

This prayer of his father was fulfilled according as he had said, for after the decease of his brethren, Vsevolod inherited the throne of his father as their successor, though while he reigned at Kiev, he faced greater obstacles than had beset him when he was Prince in Pereyaslavl.

Down to the time of Yaroslav, sovereign power in Russ had remained in fact, whatever it was in theory, concentrated in the hands of one prince. In the case of the sons of Vladimir this had been brought about by the elimination of all but the one survivor of the fratricidal strife that followed the death of Vladimir. Some measure of agreement was more likely to prevail among the sons of Yaroslav, since they were all sons of the one mother, but even here, three of them—Izyaslav, Svyatoslav, and Vsevolod—united in excluding the others from their inheritance. But each of these succeeded in founding a distinct family which retained its separate identity and solidarity in the confusion that followed, with the inevitable result that the Russian state began to fall apart.

THE HOUSE OF VLADIMIR MONOMAKH

In the twenty years that followed the death of Yaroslav, there was a constant interchange of princely domains, owing to friction among the three sons—Izyaslav, Svyatoslav, and Vsevolod—who regarded themselves as joint heirs of Yaroslav; and this was further complicated by the dissatisfaction of some of those excluded from the inheritance. Eventually, in 1087, Vsevolod succeeded to the throne of Kiev and to the suzerainty over the other princes of Russ which went with the Kievan throne. Vsevolod's death in 1095 was a signal for the renewal of the feuds between the various branches of the princely house, which constantly put forth new shoots, each of which fought for its place in the sun. It is customary to regard the line of Vsevolod as continued in the line of his son Vladimir (the second Vladimir is usually known as Monomakh, a name he derived from his Byzantine grandfather). But almost equally vigorous were the collateral lines of Svyatoslav—actually senior to that of Vsevolod, as we have seen—which put forth a cluster of lusty branches—the line of Gleb, David, Oleg, and Yaroslav. The Svyatoslavichi were the stormy element in Kievan politics at the beginning of the twelfth century; they resented what they regarded as the usurpation of the Kievan throne by the family of Vsevolod, and made constant efforts to secure it for

one of their scions, while the lesser branches were to be appeased with the principalities carved out of the parent domain. On the other hand, the line of Vsevolod, continued by Vladimir Monomakh and his sons, were regarded as an influence making for the unity of the princely houses. Thus they became immensely popular in Kiev and in their own ancestral possession of Pereyaslavl. Such a unifying force was badly needed in Russ in the face of the menace of the Polovtsi, which was daily assuming more serious proportions. It is perhaps not difficult to understand why Monomakh and his family established a clear ascendancy over their rivals. But this popularity was little more than personal. The ascendancy of the house of Monomakh was not grounded in the acceptance of any recognized principle of succession. Disputes were continually arising between the various families, and in the hope of terminating these feuds, recourse was had to family conferences.

A series of these conferences was held during the next fifteen years, that of Lyubech in 1097 perhaps being the most important. At this it was arranged that Svyatopolk Izyaslavich should hold Kiev, the heritage of Izyaslav; Vladimir was to hold the domain of Vsevolod, Pereyaslavl; David, Oleg, and Yaroslav between them were to possess that of Svyatoslav; the city of Vladimir was to go to David; Volodar was to possess Peremysl; Vasilko that of Terebovl. The last two named were grandsons of Vladimir, an elder brother of Svyatoslav who had died before he could enter into his inheritance.¹

The second conference was called at Uvetichi in 1100 to settle the internal strife that broke out immediately after the conference of Lyubech, and was occasioned by the blinding of Vasilko. This crime, which was committed at the instance of Svyatopolk, was the outcome of a conspiracy engineered by David Igorevich of Vladimir, a close neighbor of Vasilko and Volodar in the border lands of the west. David, while guaranteed his domain of Vladimir in Volhynia by the treaty of Lyubech, probably resented the monopoly of power and terri-

¹ For a clue to this rather involved story of the quarrels over the grand princely throne, the reader is referred to the genealogical tables.

tory exercised by the line of Svyatoslav and Vsevolod to the exclusion of his own family (that of Igor), saw a chance of increasing his domain by stirring up strife between the two rivals in the hope of adding to his domain of Vladimir the neighboring lands of Peremysl and Terebovl, lying at the foot of the Carpathians. After an involved struggle lasting upwards of three years, Vladimir Monomakh induced Svyatopolk to close the family ranks; David was excluded from his domain of Vladimir, which went to Vladimir's son, while David himself had to be content with two insignificant principalities in the southwest.

Eventually, in 1113, Svyatopolk Izyaslavovich died, thus removing the last obstacle to the succession of Vladimir to the throne of Kiev. He filled this princely office for ten years before his death in 1125. In reality, however, Vladimir Monomakh's policies and spirit had contrived more or less effectively to control Kievian affairs ever since the death of his father, Vsevolod. The filial piety and moderation of that prince had descended in no small degree on his son, and if they did not bring him immediate rewards in power, they eventually brought him a rich reward of esteem of his own kin and of the people of Kiev. This claim on the love and respect of the Kievans and of all Russ was destined to have lasting results in that it constituted a kind of tacitly recognized claim of his descendants to the position of Grand Prince.

STRIFE AMONG THE PRINCES

The result was that in 1125, when Vladimir passed away, there was no opposition to the accession of his eldest son, Mstislav. Mstislav was succeeded in 1132 by his brother Yaropolk, a younger son of Vladimir Monomakh. In 1139 the third son, Vyacheslav, succeeded Yaropolk on the throne of Kiev. The accession of Vyacheslav was the signal for the outbreak of a feud that had long been smoldering. It will be remembered that in 1068 Izyaslav, the eldest surviving son of Yaroslav had, with the consent of his brothers, become Grand Prince of Kiev. It was probably understood at the time that in the normal course

of events he would be followed by his younger brothers, Svyatoslav and Vsevolod. This normal succession, however, had been interrupted by the death of Svyatoslav, in 1076, with the result that the throne, on the death of Izyaslav, descended to Vsevolod. According to custom, the failure of the father, Svyatoslav, to occupy the princely throne had resulted in the exclusion of his sons from the inheritance of Kiev, so that it descended to the line of Vsevolod and Vladimir Monomakh. The sons of Svyatoslav, thus debarred from the grand princely throne, were high-spirited and ambitious. Led by Oleg and David, the brothers rigorously upheld their claim to take precedence over the younger line of the descendants of Yaroslav. It is improbable that they could have made headway against the universal popularity of the line of Vladimir Monomakh had the latter family not been divided by a quarrel between the grandsons of Vladimir Monomakh and their uncles, who by the rather uncertain law of succession had thus lost what they considered their birthright. Vyacheslav was not of the stuff of heroes, and, threatened by his cousin, Vsevolod, the son of Oleg, with the opposition of the united Svyatoslavichi, he withdrew and left the field to the Svyatoslav family in the person of Vsevolod, who thus forced himself on Kiev as prince. Vsevolod II died in 1146 and was succeeded by a brother, Igor Olgeovich. But this time the citizens determined to have some voice in the matter of selecting a ruler. They refused to receive Igor and summoned Izyaslav, the eldest surviving son of Mstislav Vladimirovich.

INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF THE PRINCES OF SUZDAL

As between the rival claims of the lines of Vsevolod and Svyatoslav Olgeovich, substantial arguments might be urged in favor of the elder line. But when the sons of Mstislav, eldest son of Vladimir, succeeded to the throne and threatened to set up a new dynasty within the Vladimir family, there was instant reaction from the uncles of the new prince, cadet members of the Vladimirovichi. At the very beginning of his reign Izyaslav had to deal with a dangerous revolt stirred up by the

Svyatoslav line of princes, and assisted more or less openly by his uncle, George of Suzdal. The rebellion was crushed by Izyaslav, supported by the people of Kiev, who were roused to such a pitch of fury at what they regarded as treachery that they beat to death the unfortunate Igor Olgeovich, who happened to be in Kiev at the time. The intervention of George of Suzdal on behalf of the original conspirators, being the first clear breach in the solid ranks of the descendants of Monomakh, shocked even his son. When Rostislav was ordered from Suzdal at the head of a force to the assistance of Svyatoslav Olgeovich, he demurred, summoned his war council, and addressed them:

"Comrades, whether my father is angry or not, we must ourselves decide whether we march to the help of our enemy. The Olgevichi have been, and will always be, the foes of my grandfather and of my cousin; let us rather join Izyaslav, who will make a grant of land to us."

The young prince then went over to the grand prince and was given the city of Bozhsk and some other towns. The following year, however, Izyaslav learned from the gossip of court that Rostislav was plotting against him, took his possessions from him, and sent him back to his father. Injured parental pride in this case prevailed over the anger he must have felt at the son for his headstrong course, and George took the field at the head of a considerable force, drove his young nephew Izyaslav from Kiev, and occupied the grand princely throne himself.

Following his somewhat easy victory, George attempted to wrest from his rival and nephew all of the territory that went with Kiev on the right bank of the Dnieper. But Izyaslav had formidable allies in the west, whither he had fled: the Hungarians and the Poles under their leaders Boleslas and Henry. The battle that followed (1150) turned in favor of the northern prince, but his rival was still strong and George was induced to purchase peace at the price of leaving to Izyaslav Vladimir and other possessions in the west. George's attempt to reëstablish his brother, Vyacheslav, on the throne of Kiev met with a rebuff at the hands of the Kievans, who would have

neither Vyacheslav nor his brother. The result was that Izyaslav found little difficulty in effecting his return to Kiev.

DECLINE OF KIEV

There followed a long confused struggle between the uncle and nephew in which the blood of the princely house was squandered in feudal warfare. Izyaslav was loyally supported by Kiev and the people of Kievan territory; in addition he called to his support mercenaries from Poland and Hungary. The strength of George lay in the north, now a rising power, and in the southeast, from whence he summoned to his aid the ruthless riders of the plains—the Polovtsi. He had in addition a staunch supporter in Prince Vladimirko of Galich. Izyaslav finally won out and George was induced to make peace and withdraw from the south in 1152. Two years later Izyaslav died and the whole question of the succession was thus opened once more. The throne was first claimed by his brother Rostislav of Smolensk, but the latter, yielding to the opposition which his succession called up, allowed the princely throne to slip from his grasp. In despair the Kievans summoned Izyaslav Davidovich. But the weight of the north was to be thrown into the scales with decisive result. George Dolgorukii successfully forged a confederacy out of the dissatisfied elements of the princely house and moved south in support of his claims. Izyaslav was easily induced to withdraw. George entered the southern capital for the third time in triumph, this time as its prince. But again in 1157 the death of George left the princely throne vacant and the land of Russ a prey to internal strife and invasion. The throne of Kiev and the now purely nominal headship of the princely family fell to Rostislav Mstislavich, who had three years before, by his ignominious flight in the face of danger, weakly surrendered his heritage. But he was left in undisturbed possession of the city. The only potential rival, Andrei,² was far too preoccupied with his possessions in the northeast. Rostov itself had been almost destroyed by fire in

² Andrei Bogoliubskii—son of George.

1160. Ecclesiastical opposition and family feuds endangered his position. But Andrei was strong enough to deal with this by wholesale sentences of exile. In 1168 Rostislav at Kiev died, to be succeeded by his younger brother, Vladimir. The latter was driven out by his nephew Mstislav Izyaslavovich. On hearing of the death of Rostislav, Andrei assembled a formidable force from all his allies in the north and marched on Kiev. Mstislav fled; the city was taken and for three days given over to pillage, church and cloisters being looted without mercy. The city was turned over to Andrei's brother Gleb, and was now ruled as an appanage of Rostov-Suzdal.

The installation of Gleb Yurievich³ at Kiev as prince did not end the trials of that unhappy city. Her territory was ravaged again and again by the Polovtsi. Though Gleb's younger brother, Mikhail, proved a stout crusader, and won more than one resounding victory over the nomads, they continued to be a scourge to the land. There was the added menace that their proximity was a constant temptation to disinherited or dissatisfied princes to invoke aid from them against their rivals. Gleb's lethargy had tempted his relative, the young Mstislav Izyaslavovich, to seize the city of Kiev with the help of these marauders. But the princes of Galich came to the aid of Gleb, and Mstislav retired. The death of Gleb in 1172 gave Andrei an opportunity to install as prince at Kiev the young Roman Rostislavich, grandson of Mstislav. The expulsion of Rurik Rostislavovich, one of the descendants of the elder of the Monomakhichi from Novgorod, and the installation of one of Andrei's sons, led to an alliance with the dispossessed branch of the dynasty of Mstislavovichi. In the confusion, one of them, Yaroslav, son of Izyaslav, and grandson of Mstislav I, seized the throne of Kiev. Roman called on Andrei to reinstall him, but before this plan could be carried out Andrei died in 1175.

Upon the death of Andrei the absence of any direct heirs compelled a choice between the two rival branches of the family

³ George (Greek—Γεωργιος) appears in Church Slavonic as Georgii or Giurgii, modern Russian Yuri. Yurievich—son of George.

of the late Grand Prince. The result was a feud in which Mstislav and Yaropolk Rostislavovich were arrayed against their uncles, Mikhail and Vsevolod. The struggle that ensued was further complicated by friction between Vladimir, the new and rising town on the Kliazma, and Rostov and Suzdal, which boasted a venerable age and treated with contempt the claims of the younger town. The people of Vladimir, long favored by Prince Andrei, had made up their minds that the new princes should be of the line of Yuri Dolgorukii (the younger brother of Andrei), Mikhail, and Vsevolod, with the result that in 1176 the last two were installed in the northern principality, setting themselves up in Vladimir. The following year Mikhail died, leaving the throne in the undisputed possession of Vsevolod.

Vsevolod was the second founder of the house of Rurik and was called, presumably because of his numerous descendants, "Great Nest." His life was one long struggle. In addition to the hatred and jealousy of his nephews, the sons of Rostislav, his northern principality was split by Rostov's and Suzdal's jealousy of their younger rival, Vladimir. Moreover, at Ryazan, Prince Gleb, who was able to draw on the support of the Polovtsi, became troublesome by stirring up the young Mstislav at Novgorod to make another bid for power. In a great battle fought on the river Koloksha in the depth of winter, 1178, Gleb and his allies were overwhelmed. Gleb, his son Roman, and Mstislav Rostislavich fell into the hands of the conqueror, who returned in triumph to Vladimir. In a riot that broke out a short while later, Gleb, Mstislav, and Yaropolk were set on by the mob and blinded, Gleb dying of the operation. Mstislav, however, was allowed to go and was reinstated in his position as prince of Novgorod, though he died the following year. The next year Ryazan (apparently now incorporated in the principality of Suzdal-Rostov) was again in arms against the grand prince, the revolt being the now common one of a struggle for the possession of an appanage. The revolt was quelled and peace was restored by an attempt to satisfy the claims of all.

In 1189 Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich, a prince of the Svyatoslav

line, long faithful to Vsevolod, rebelled and made a bid for the position of prince of Kiev and Novgorod. He succeeded in establishing himself at Kiev and his son Vladimir at Novgorod.

Comparative peace having been restored in Russia, a series of expeditions was undertaken against her foreign foes. In 1184 Vsevolod organized and carried out a successful campaign against the Bulgars, and in 1185 a raid on a formidable scale was undertaken against the Polovtsi, which resulted in a great victory and the annihilation of the Polovtsi forces. During the same year, a group of south Russian princes, most of them of the line of Svyatoslav ruling at Chernigov and Novgorod-Syevskii (Igor of Novgorod-Syevskii; Vsevolod of Trubechesk; and Svyatoslav of Chernigov), carried out a raid on their own account into the steppes. Their initial success induced them to advance too far and they began to suffer from the heat and lack of food and water. They were finally forced to surrender and were held for ransom. The Polovtsi then pushed on, beleaguered, and all but captured Pereyasavl. Prince Vladimir was dangerously wounded in a sally. Meanwhile Igor escaped and, though the Polovtsi were unable to recapture him, they redoubled the guards set over the other prisoners, who apparently never regained their liberty. This minor military operation was the subject of the most famous medieval Russian ballad, *The Tale of the Armament of Igor*.

The trials that Vsevolod now encountered grew out of the principality of Ryazan, where the offspring of Gleb were established. A feud developed among the warlike sons of Gleb. Vsevolod was not altogether successful in the measures of intervention he undertook. The three victorious brothers under the redoubtable Roman, recognizing the danger of incurring the animosity of the Grand Prince, quickly made their submission to him. Trouble developed also between the Grand Prince and Rurik Rostislavich, grandson of Mstislav, who had been installed as Prince of Kiev on the death of Svyatoslav in 1195. The complaints which Vsevolod addressed to Rurik are interesting for what is implied with reference to relations in the princely family:


"You have recognized me" [the chronicle quotes Vsevolod as saying] "as the eldest of the family of Vladimir, and yet you have seized the throne of Kiev; you have left me no share in Russia [i.e., Kievan Russia], which you have divided among your young brothers. If I ought to have no heritage there, very well! Keep Kiev and all of Russia, I have no need of it; but at least see to it that those with whom you have divided it should enjoy their share of it."

Rurik perforce ceded a group of cities in the south to the Grand Prince in order to retain his good will.

This rapprochement between the princes of Kiev and Suzdal was comparatively easy, since all of them belonged to the family of Vladimir Monomakh. The reconciliation represented no more than a closing of the family ranks against their old rivals, Oleg and the members of the house of Svyatoslav. The position of Kiev was extremely precarious, since the newer cities to the west, in the possession of rival family groups, now overshadowed the "Mother of Russian cities." In addition, the Polish princes were in a position to intervene with baneful effects in south Russian affairs, though at this time the troublemaker Roman, son-in-law of Rurik, backed the losing side in the Polish civil war and was compelled, after losing all his following, to make his peace with his father. The death of Svyatoslav in 1195 had removed a dangerous rival of the house of Vladimir in the south and enabled Vsevolod to launch an aggressive policy in that direction, to recover the influence which his house had there lost owing to its removal to the far northeast. But the feud between the rival families had already widened out into a series of international complications. On the one hand, the Olgevichi, the descendants of Svyatoslav, were in close touch with the Polovtsi, always eager for the sake of spoil to intervene in the internal feuds of Russia. To the west, the Poles were encroaching on the lands of the redoubtable Roman, prince of Galich, who had become entangled with his father-in-law, Rurik of Kiev. During the period of his trouble with Poland he expelled Rurik and seized Kiev, from which Rurik ejected him the following summer with the help of the Olgevichi and the Polovtsi, who secured the city and subjected it to prolonged and savage looting. In 1204 peace was finally restored through

GENEALOGICAL TABLE DYNASTY OF RURIK

I RURIK II IGOR III SVYATOSLAV IV VLADIMIR
V YAROSLAV



the mediation of the Grand Prince. To signify the reconciliation within the princely family, a joint expedition was undertaken the following year against the Polovtsi. But the smoldering feud between Roman of Galich and Rurik of Kiev again was fanned to life, and the two princes quarrelled over the division of the fruits of victory. Roman seized Rurik, had his head shaved and forced him into the habit of a monk. Even Vsevolod was unable to requite this act of treachery and violence. Roman then decided to avenge himself for his defeat at the hands of the Poles some years earlier. He succeeded in wresting from them the city of Lublin. Vsevolod Khramoi temporarily took possession of Kiev, from which he was later expelled by Rurik.

An instructive result of this activity of the enterprising Roman was the despatch of an embassy from Innocent III to attempt to win him over to the Catholic Church. According to the Chronicle the Pope promised to surrender to him certain cities and to crown him King of Russia. The papal ambassador assured the prince that the Pope had the power, by the sword of St. Peter, to render him rich. To which Roman is said to have replied, drawing his own sword:

"Is the sword of St. Peter which the Pope holds as good as this one? If the sword of the Pope is like this one, then it is well able to confer principalities; but so long as I have this one at my side, I shall not have to buy cities and will be able to add to the extent of Russia as my fathers have done."

So saying, he dismissed the ambassadors with the requirement that Lublin be conferred on him as his permanent possession.

In the north, Vsevolod III had secured his position against his rivals. He signalized his achievement by despatching his son, Constantine, in 1206, to Novgorod as prince. He proposed further to provide for his succession. He had named Constantine as Prince of Rostov, but insisted that, if Constantine were to receive the title of Grand Prince, and the princely territory, he should yield Rostov to the younger son, Yuri. When Constantine demurred, the father bestowed Vladimir on Yuri. This deed naturally created friction, with the result that on Vsevo-

lod's death in 1212 fratricidal strife broke out between the two princes. Peace was concluded in 1217 on the basis that Yuri should receive Vladimir, while Constantine's son was to receive Rostov as his heritage. Constantine died the following year (1218). Yuri's succession to the throne of Vladimir was not questioned. Yuri occupied the throne for twenty years, during which he was called on to defend the frontiers of the new Russ of the north against the Polovtsi and the Bulgars on the one hand, and the Hungarians and Poles on the other. After a long struggle Yuri's efforts had hardly been crowned with success when a new blow descended on the suffering country—this time from the east. At the time of Yuri's death, in 1237, the Mongols were already at the gates of Vladimir.

The sequence of events which we have chronicled above can give us, on the surface, little insight into the moving forces of Kievan life in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The writers on whom we must rely for our information on this period were men who were in few cases gifted with historical insight. Their views were very often largely clouded by the prejudices of the clerical order to which they belonged; and often their accounts were either unconsciously or deliberately colored by partisanship for one branch or another of the princely house. But we should not run to the other extreme of formulating fanciful theories of Kievan life based solely on political or economic hypotheses drawn from a later period. Our main attempt must be to offer some key to the often complex and baffling events of the time and a clue to the results to which they almost inevitably led.

DECLINE IN IMPORTANCE OF THE VARANGIAN WATER ROUTE

Obviously the Kievan period saw the decline in the significance of the "route from the Varangians to the Greeks" and of the trade with the regions of the Pontus. This decline was directly due to the raids of the Polovtsi against the lower Dnieper invited by the growing anarchy among the settlers. "Soon they will deprive us of the way to the Greeks," one of the princes complained bitterly, in 1170, just after the capture

of Kiev by Andrei Bogoliubskii. The great day of the "Mother of Cities" as an *entrepôt* between the Baltic and the Black Sea, between the gorgeous east and the countries of western Europe, was over. A thin trickle of trade still went out through Kaffa in the peninsula of the Crimea and through Tana at the mouth of the Don and from Novgorod to Wisby and the Baltic. But the princes and their *druzhina* were forced to give up their calling as freebooters and merchants and settled down and became landed proprietors. The peasants, who in an earlier age had sought a livelihood chiefly in the forest, from hunting and bee-keeping, rather than in a stable agriculture, now resigned the chase in favor of pursuits less exciting but, in view of the closer settlement of the country, more remunerative. The older cities, grown rich on the trade in furs, in amber, and in slaves, nevertheless were forced to live off the country. The collection of tithes and tribute became the chief business of the princes.

THE CHURCH

A second significant change is associated with the introduction of the Christian religion. The devotees of the church were less motivated by the propagation of a set of dogmas of a specific creed than with the setting up of an ecclesiastical hierarchy, the founding of monastic institutions, and the securing of an ascendancy over the minds of a simple folk by the elaborate ritual and the spiritual weapons at their command. For Byzantium, on the other hand, the conversion of a new people and their acceptance of a clerical hierarchy under that city's control was but a phase of foreign policy, the raising of a new bulwark against the nomad world and the creation of another sphere of influence. We can detect the reluctance of Vladimir to be brought within the Byzantine orbit in the stern conditions he imposed and the elaborate face-saving devices with which his conversion was surrounded. Even then the new Russian church was not immediately subordinated to the patriarch of Constantinople, but was attached to the archiepiscopal see of Lake Ochride of the Bulgarian church. This association is perhaps natural, considering the affinities of race and earlier

cultural contacts. Even after the tie was broken and the metropolitan of Kiev had become dependent on Constantinople, the autonomy of the Russian church was jealously guarded, and the passionate desire for ecclesiastical independence was a force with which the princes had to reckon.

The efforts of the princes to use the church in their struggle for power was natural in eastern Europe, where there was no Hildebrand to thwart their usurpation. The tithe constituted an important source of ecclesiastical revenue which could easily be diverted from Kiev and Constantinople by the creation of new episcopal sees. Moreover, the passion for the worship of relics, which marked the age in eastern as well as in western Europe, enabled their favorite foundations to attract the benefactions of the pious. Nothing so exhibits the crudity of the age and the secular motive with which the ecclesiastical affairs were handled as the struggle that went on both within and without the church over the question of canonization. The importation of foreign saints was felt as an affront to the native piety; in the drive to secure "homemade" saints, little discrimination was shown. The native sons insisted on including in their calendar such doubtful candidates for divine honors as Vladimir and his two sons, Gleb and Boris, who met death in the fratricidal wars that followed the death of Vladimir. One may say that among the upper classes in the Kievan church there developed a Russian and a Greek party. The princely house itself divided, the descendants of Vsevolod Yaroslavich being pro-Greek, owing to their connection by marriage with the imperial throne, while the scions of Svyatoslav favored the native party within the church. Not till the time of George Dolgorukii did the descendants of Vladimir Monomakh seek a compromise, and reconcile themselves with the Pechersky monastery of Kiev, long the stronghold of the native tradition.

Perhaps the most powerful reason for the princes' seeking the aid of the ecclesiastical authorities was that they alone had literary training and could be used by the princes to sing the glories of the reigning house. Shakhmatov has clearly demonstrated that, beginning with the original chronicle of 1039, later

amplifications and successive editions suppressed or emphasized certain facts in the interests of the patrons of the chroniclers. The coloring of history at its source is by no means a modern art, and the lasting renown of Monomakh and his descendants abundantly testifies that the labor was not in vain.


The increasing dissension within the ranks of the princes was perhaps the chief factor in promoting the slow disintegration of the Kievan state. Though Yaroslav had foreseen and sought to prevent it, though its consequences were bemoaned by the very partisans in the feuds, no force seemed able to arrest this swift descent to Avernus. As among the Merovingians and the Carolingians in the Frankish state, the application of the private law of succession to the state could not but bring disaster. When one studies the age, and essays to unravel the almost hopeless confusion that attends the assumption of power by each successive grand prince, whether by lawful succession or by force, the best efforts to find a clue end in almost hopeless despair. More and more, the ideal of the unity of all Russ and the brotherhood of all the princes of the Russian land fades into the welter of feudal strife. The *volost*, temporarily occupied by the princes as a right due to the place they occupied in the race of Rurik, becomes the *otchina*, the hereditary and inalienable possession of them and their descendants forever. But this very identification of the lot of the prince with his *otchina* imposed severe limitations on his descendants, who were henceforth doomed to find a career within the bounds of the paternal lands; this meant division and redivision till the princes were reduced to the level of the mere *boyar*. The *boyars*, too, who formerly made up the *druzhina* of the prince, left off the role of the prince's sworn companions in arms to become landed proprietors. With few exceptions, the land found its way into the hands of *boyars* or monasteries, or was retained in the hands of the prince. A small minority of the freemen had land they owned and worked with no obligations except minor ones to the prince.

It might be assumed that the feudal regime of western Europe was reproducing itself under another form, in an alien land.

There were the same rights of overlordship, the same tendency to combine the rights of rule with that of proprietorship, the counterpart of vassalage, of commendation, of immunity—in fact, the whole hierarchy of feudal and manorial relations. But there were important differences. In the first place, there was absent that intimate bond of fealty and of personal military service. Secondly, the principle of primogeniture was not recognized in the transmission of the princely domains. On the manors, while the tillers of the soil were partly unfree, they were outnumbered, in all probability, by the free, who, contrary to the practice of western Europe, had still the right to change masters and to move to a new home. Obviously the Slavic world developed along lines somewhat different from the world of the German and the Frank. The traditions of the west that, from the twilight of the Roman world, spread their influence even beyond the boundaries of the old empire, could not penetrate into eastern Europe. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the earliest east Slavic world, that of the Varangians, was a series of posts along a commercial highway where warrior merchants plied their trade by collecting tribute in skins, in honey, and in slaves, which they then disposed of in the markets of the Orient or of Constantinople. As this trade declined in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the princes and their *boyars* became more and more closely identified with the subject class, with which they fused, both alike now drawing their sustenance from the soil, which had become the only source of wealth. The low productivity of their primitive agriculture can have sustained but an indifferent culture, and, apart from the churches reared by the piety of a superstitious founder, their art offered little to compare with that of western Europe.

The meagerness of the results of the east Slavic civilization is attested by the absence of Russian knights in the great crusading movements of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. True, the potential soldiers of the cross were kept at home by the danger from their own warlike neighbors—the Polovtsi. But despite the vigor of the early raids on Constantinople (largely Norse in their conception and execution), there is no such

swarming forth of the armed hosts of Christendom as one sees in the crusading armies in Spain and the Holy Land, in the Norman conquests of Italy and England. The east could not supply nor support disciplined feudal levies like those of the west. The cohesion transmitted to society by a sense of personal loyalty and obligation, the close connection between land-



Adapted from Freeman, "Historical Geography of Europe."
Courtesy of Longmans, Green & Co.

holding and military service, gave western Europe a stability and a compactness that was lacking in the east. Feudal obligations to serve, coupled with primogeniture, produced a generation of younger sons brought up in the school of war and driven forth to seek a career in the profession of arms because the system that had bred them to this life, but denied them a career at home, drove them to distant lands. The impotence of Russia before the coming of the Mongols amply attests its rudimentary social and political development and its complete failure to supply what was so sorely needed, a warrior class capable of gathering in defense of its lands and people.

One force that made for unity, that stands out against the chaos, and that held hope for the time to come was the church. Though the princes made and unmade episcopal sees, though they secured the appointment of their favorites as bishops and thus sought to bring episcopal affairs under their control, thereby aping the cesaropapism of the Byzantine emperors, nevertheless, the church in Russia had one visible head, the metropolitan of Kiev, who ranked with the grand prince. The eastern church, to be sure, lacked Hildebrands and St. Bernards to defy crowned heads with their spiritual thunderbolts. Yet no Russian prince could reduce to a nullity the prestige of the greatest ecclesiastical functionary in the land. And though the landmarks of the old world were blotted out in the confusion of the Mongol invasions, the church was to live on as a sign of the spiritual unity of the Russian people and to play at least some part in their ultimate resurrection.

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THE MONGOL YOKE

BY THE opening of the twelfth century Kiev had already passed into the shadow. Weakened by the perpetual division and redistribution of its component principalities, harassed by the incessant raids of the nomads of the steppes, its population had sought safety by withdrawing into the forests of the north. Here the foundations of a new Russ were being laid in the great triangle between the Oka and the Upper Volga—the future Muscovy. But the outposts of Slavic culture amid the native Finns and related tribes were still thinly held; the population lacked homogeneity, and the new political center of the north had had insufficient time to give any sort of cohesion or strength to the new society. Time and able leaders were needed. Without these, both the new Russ of the north and the old Russ of the south were practically defenseless. Before they could make their defenses secure, the storm out of Asia was on them.

The gathering place of the whirlwind that broke over eastern Europe in the early thirteenth century was far-eastern Asia, the region now known as Outer Mongolia, the rolling, semi-arid grasslands to the north of the Gobi desert that drain northwards through the Orkhon into Lake Baikal and the Yenisei or through the Onon into the Shilka and the Amur. Here, on the banks of the Onon river, there was born in 1162 to Yessigei, a local Mongol chieftain, a son who was given the name of Temudjin. On the death of his father, the boy's inheritance was 40,000 families ranging over a fairly restricted territory. But his unruly subjects would have refused the thirteen-year-old child recognition had not the prompt action on the part of a

spirited mother restored them to their allegiance. His first campaign, in 1196, and his second were on behalf of his father's friend, Wang Khan, but in 1202 a dissension arose between the former allies. Temudjin was worsted in the field and became a fugitive in the Great Khingan mountains on the far eastern frontiers of Mongolia. But Temudjin rallied from his defeat and surprised and overcame his rival. After the murder of Wang Khan, the whole Kerait nation living in the Ordos region in western China became subject to Temudjin, who now officially became Khan and three years later adopted the sonorous title of Jinghiz Khan. In 1217 the maltreatment of some agents of Jinghiz in Khuarezm in Transoxiana infuriated the Mongol chief, and the following year, after assembling the armies of his vassals from far and wide, he launched the first of his campaigns of destruction and death through the oasis country of central Asia and the upland valleys of Khorassan in northeastern Persia. The oasis and city of Merv on the Mergab fell and its 1,300,000 inhabitants were given to the sword. Naishapur, the city immortalized by Omar Khayyam, was blotted out and its 1,700,000 people massacred. Urgendji (modern Khiva) on the Amu Darya was taken. The capture of Herat in northern Afghanistan was accompanied by the butchery of 1,600,000 souls. From this carnival of blood the conqueror returned to Karakorum, his home in the far northeast, where he was to die two years later.

THE MONGOLS ATTACK THE POLOVTSI

It was during the campaign against Muhammed, Sultan of Khuarezm, that Chepe and Subutai (the latter a son of Jinghiz) were detailed in 1221 to pursue the Khuarezmian monarch and hunt him down. The latter perished on an island in the Caspian Sea and his harem was captured. Following up their success, the armies advanced through Tabiristan, Azerbaidjan, and Luristan, levying tribute on the former subjects of the Sultan. Crossing the Caucasus through the defiles of Daghestan, they threw themselves on the Polovtsi, in their native steppes. Dividing their forces, one column went to Astrakhan, on

the Lower Volga, which was sacked; the other proceeded westward, crossed the straits of Kertch into the Crimea and plundered the Genoese city of Sudak, or Soldaia. Passing northward by the isthmus of Perekop, they joined their comrades coming from the east with the loot plundered from As-trakhan. The Polovtsi, meantime, had retired to the Don and sent a frantic appeal to the Russians, their hereditary foes, for aid in their extremity. In answer to this message of despair, Mstislav, with the men of Galicia, marched to their assistance. At the Kalka, on the Dnieper, they encountered the Mongol host. But the Polovtsi were seized with panic, and, fleeing, left the Russians to their fate. As the Chronicle records:

The same year, appeared the pagans; who they are and where they came from, none knows for certain, nor what their faith; but they call them Tartars; others call them Taurmen; others indeed Pechenegs; others say indeed that they are those of whom Methodius, bishop of Patara, testifies that they come out of the wilderness of Etria, which lies between the east and north. For thus Methodius says that at the end of time, they will appear as Gideon drove them out and they will subdue the whole land from the east to Ephrant, and from the Tigris to the Pontus, with the exception of Ethiopia. God alone knows who they are and whence they came; wise men who are versed in books know. But we do not know who they are but we have written here a record of the evil that befell the Russian princes from them. . . . And this Kotyna was father-in-law to Mstislav of Galicia. And he came with the Polovtsi Knyazes with greeting to his son-in-law, Mstislav in Galicia, and to all the Russian Knyazes and brought many gifts; horses and camels, buffaloes and girls; and they gave gifts of these to the Russian Knyazes, saying thus: "Our land they have taken away today; and yours will be taken tomorrow," and Kotyna appealed to his son-in-law, and Mstislav began to appeal to the Russian Knyazes, his brethren saying, thus: "If we, brothers, do not help these, they will certainly surrender to them, then the strength of those will be greater." And thus having deliberated much among themselves, they made themselves ready for the journey because of both the greeting and the appeal of the Polovtsi Knyazes. And they began to organize the forces, each his own province, and they went each having collected the whole Russian land against the Tartars and were on the Dnieper at Zarub.¹

¹ This and the following selections are from the *Chronicle of Novgorod*, translated by Robert Michell and Nevill Forbes, Camden Society, Third Series, 1914.

The Tartars, however, warned the Russians against taking the field on behalf of the Polovtsi, saying:

"We have not occupied your land, nor your towns, nor your villages, nor is it against you that we have come . . . for we have heard that to you also they have done much harm; and it is for this reason we are fighting them."

But the Russian Knyazes would not listen to this but killed all the envoys, and themselves went against them and took stand on the Dnieper, this side of Oloshe.

The two armies came together at the Kalka river:

But the Polovtsi ran away back, having accomplished nothing and in their flight they trampled the camp of the Russian Knyazes for they had not time to form into order against them and they were all thrown into confusion, and there was a terrible and savage slaughter.

. . . This evil happened on May 21, on St. Eremai's Day, and the Tartars turned back from the river Dnieper and we know not whence they came nor where they hid themselves. God knows whence he fetched them against us for our sins.

THE MONGOLS INVADE RUSS

It is probable that the Mongols preferred Bulgaria on the Kama as an object of plunder to Kiev, already stripped of its wealth by the Polovtsi. At any rate they retired across the Volga laden with booty. The death of Jinghiz Khan in 1227, the uncertainty with regard to the succession, as well as the Mongols' preoccupation in the Far East, put an end to the immediate renewal of the offensive in the west. But in 1235 a great *Kuriltai* held at Karakorum decided to send a fresh army westward under Baty, the son of Jinghiz' eldest son, Juji. The Mongols rendezvoused on the frontiers of Great Bulgaria and, after the capture and destruction of the great city of the Bulgars, Baty crossed the Volga, passed through the forests of Pensa and Tambov, and appeared unexpectedly on the borders of the duchy of Ryazan.

That same year, foreigners called Tartars came in countless numbers, like locusts, into the land of Ryazan, and on first coming, they halted at the river Nukhla, and took it, and halted in camp there. And thence they sent their emissaries to the Knyazes of Ryazan, a sorceress and two

men with her, demanding from them one-tenth of everything; of men and Knyazes and horses—of everything, one-tenth. And the Knyazes of Ryazan, Giurgi, Ingvor's brother, Oleg, Roman Ingvorevich and those of Murom and Pronsk, without letting them into their towns, went out to meet them at Voronezh. And the Knyazes said to them: "Only when none of us remain, then will all be yours." And thence they let them go to Yuri in Vladimir and thence they let the Tartars at Voronezh go back to the Nukhla. And the Knyazes of Ryazan sent to Yuri of Vladimir asking for help, or himself to come. But Yuri neither went himself nor listened to the request of the Knyazes of Ryazan but he himself wished to make war separately . . . And then the pagan foreigners surrounded Ryazan and fenced it with a stockade. But Knyaz Yuri of Ryazan shut himself in the town . . . Then Knyaz Yuri of Vladimir sent Yeremei as Vovevoda with a patrol and joined Roman; and the Tartars surrounded them at Kolomna and they fought hard and drove them to the ramparts. And there they killed Roman and Yeremei and many fell here with the Knyaz and with Yeremei. And the men of Moscow ran away having seen nothing. And the Tartars took the town on December 21, and they had advanced against it on the 16th of the same month. They likewise killed the Knyaz and the knyaginia and men, women and children, monks, nuns and priests, some by fire and some by the sword, and violated nuns, priests' wives, good women and girls in the presence of their mothers and sisters.

In the same way, Vladimir fell to the invaders. The Grand Prince Yuri retiring on the city of Yaroslav was overtaken at the River Siti and cut down together with his wife. After this, Moscow, Pereyaslavl, Yurev (Polskii) Dmitrov, Volok Lamsk, and Tver in turn fell to the Mongols and met the same fate as Yaroslav. Torzhok or Novi-torg, the gate to Novgorod, was invaded on the first Sunday in Lent and, after a siege of two weeks, was taken on March 5.

And so, the pagans took the town and slew all from the male sex even to the female, all the priests and monks, and all, stripped and reviled, gave up their souls to the Lord in a bitter and wretched death.

Novgorod was to be the next victim:

And the accursed godless ones then pushed on from Torzhok by the road of Seregeri right up to Ignati's cross, cutting down everybody like grass, to within one hundred versts of Novgorod. God, however, and the great and sacred apostolic cathedral Church of St. Sophia and St. Cyril, and the prayers of the holy and orthodox Vladyka, of the faithful

Knyazes and of the very reverend monks of the hierarchical *Vyeche*, protected Novgorod.

A later tradition records that, a winter thaw setting in, the Mongols found themselves bogged in the swamps that surround Novgorod and gave up the project from considerations of discretion.

The death of Yuri on the field of Siti left the succession open to Yaroslav. The title of Grand Prince, however, was now at the disposal of the Tartar Great Khan. Baty, meanwhile, gave him provisional recognition, but Yaroslav was forced to make the journey to the Great Khan at Karakorum, where he was confirmed in his office in 1242. Again in 1245 he was compelled to make the journey to maintain his claim. He died on the return journey in 1246.

The succession passed to his younger brother, Svyatoslav, who held the title of Grand Prince from 1246 to 1248. Baty, however, had other plans, and the next year (1247) he despatched the two sons of Yaroslav, Andrei and Alexander, to the Great Khan. On their return in 1249, Alexander became Prince of Kiev and the South Russian land; Andrei became Grand Prince and occupied the throne of Vladimir. In 1251 Andrei was denounced (apparently by his brother) to the Great Khan for holding back part of the taxes, and was compelled to fly overseas to Sweden. Alexander (Nevskii) became Grand Prince and, though Andrei returned in 1257 and was reconciled to the Great Khan, he was forced to content himself with the now second-rate city of Suzdal.

ALEXANDER NEVSKII

The services of Alexander Nevskii to Russia merit more than passing notice. As a young man he had been sent by his father, Yaroslav, to Novgorod to replace Michael of Chernigov as prince of Novgorod. He had manifested great activity in strengthening Novgorod against the combined attacks of the Finns, Livonians, and Swedes. In 1240 he won a striking victory over them on the Neva river, whence he derived his nickname "Nevskii." In 1241, Alexander left Novgorod for Pere-

yaslavl-Zaliesskii. In his absence, Novgorod was attacked by the Livonian Knights. Andrei, sent by Yaroslav to organize resistance, failed to save the city from the ravages of the Germans, and the loved Alexander was brought back to win a second triumph over the Germans in the famous "Battle of the Ice" on Lake Peipus. Peace was made with the Livonian Knights in 1245, but the Lithuanians were not checked; indeed, the weakness of Russia, owing to the Mongol depredations, only tempted the Lithuanians to continue their aggressions. The Swedes and the Finns renewed their attacks on the line of the Narova, and it required all Alexander's efforts to hold them in check.

In 1257 the great Baty died. Alexander went to the Horde to be confirmed in his office as Grand Prince. Shortly after his return, in 1259, the Mongols undertook in earnest the subjection of Novgorod to tribute. Like his contemporary, Daniel of Galich, he recognized that the odds were too great to permit resistance. Firmly but tactfully he compelled the Novgorodians to admit the Mongol officials and to allow the latter to complete their task of numbering the houses. Obviously a new policy was being inaugurated for the whole of Russia, and Novgorod's privileged position was at an end. According to the Chronicle:

Evil news came from Russia, that the Tartars desired the *tamga* and tithe on Novgorod; and the people were agitated the whole year. . . . The same winter Tartar envoys came with Alexander and Vasilii fled to Pskov; and the envoys began to ask the tithe and the *tamga* and the men of Novgorod did not agree to this, and gave presents to the Tsar and let the envoys go in peace.

But the Great Khan was in earnest. Two years later his envoys arrived, backed up this time with a military force:

The same winter Mikhail Pineschinich came from the Low Country with a false mission saying thus; "If you do not number yourselves for tribute, there is already a force in the Low Country." And the men of Novgorod did number themselves for tribute. The same winter, the accursed raw-eating Tartars, Berkai and Kasachik, came with their wives and many others and there was a great tumult in Novgorod, and

they did much evil in the province, taking contributions for the accursed Tartars. And the accursed ones began to fear death; they said to Alexander; "Give us guards, lest they kill us." And the Knyaz ordered the sons of the *Posadnik* and all the sons of the *Boyars* to protect them by night. The Tartars said; "Give us your numbers for tribute or we will run away." And the common people would not give their numbers for tribute but said; "Let us die honourably for St. Sophia and for the angelic houses." Then the people were divided; who was good stood by St. Sophia and by the true faith; and they made opposition; the greater men bade the lesser be counted for tribute. And the accursed ones wanted to escape, driven by the Holy Spirit, and they devised an evil counsel how to strike at the town at the other side, and the others at this side, by the lake; and Christ's power evidently forbade them and they durst not. And becoming frightened, they began to crowd to one point, to St. Sophia, saying, "Let us lay our heads by St. Sophia." And it was on the morrow, the Knyaz rode down from the *Gorodishche* and the accursed Tartars with him, and by the counsel of the evil they numbered themselves for tribute; for the *Boyars* thought it would be easy for themselves but fall hard on the lesser men. And the accursed ones began to ride through the streets, writing down the Christian houses . . . And having numbered them for tribute and taken it, the accursed ones went away and Knyaz Alexander followed them, having set his son Dmitrii on the throne.

Alexander, in addition to winning battles, could persuade his people to make terms with circumstances.

The great Alexander Nevskii died in 1263 and was succeeded by his brother Yaroslav Yaroslavich of Tver, who had already in 1255 successfully challenged the right of his brother to transmit his inheritance in the direct line by claiming and receiving the position of prince of Novgorod. In 1259, however, Alexander had replaced him with his son Dmitrii. In 1264 Novgorod recognized Yaroslav, who had already (in 1263) made the journey to the Horde and received recognition as Grand Prince. The reign of Yaroslav is memorable for the great victory of Yaroslav's brother, Svyatoslav, over the Lithuanians at Rakovor in 1268. Two years later, 1270, there was a great revolt in Novgorod against Yaroslav, who threatened to bring a Tartar force to restore its citizens to their allegiance. Peace was only restored by the mediation of the Metropolitan, Cyril.

Yaroslav Yaroslavich made the journey to the Horde in 1271 but, shortly after his return, was taken ill and died. He was succeeded by his brother Vasilii Yaroslavich, who had already intrigued with the Horde against him and had induced the Khan to withdraw the military forces with which Yaroslav was threatening Novgorod. The Novgorodians chose Dmitrii Alexandrovich as their prince, but after some months repented of their choice. The latter was then compelled to make way for the Grand Prince, who was proclaimed Prince of Novgorod as well as of Vladimir.

Vasilii Yaroslavich Kostromskii died in 1276. Dmitrii was immediately chosen Grand Prince and a year later became also Prince of Novgorod. Four years later he was supplanted by his brother Andrei Alexandrovich Gorodetskii both as Grand Prince and as Prince of Novgorod. But Dmitrii made a successful appeal to the Horde and was reinstated by Tartar aid to his former post, which he held for eleven years. Then, in 1294, Andrei turned the tables on him. Dmitrii was driven out and died the same year in Volok, leaving his brother in undisputed possession of the throne of Novgorod.

Andrei's otherwise undistinguished reign was marked by an expedition against the Swedes, who had erected a fort on the Neva at the mouth of the Okhta to control traffic bound for or from Novgorod. He defeated the Swedes and destroyed the fortress "Landskrone." Two years later Andrei Alexandrovich died.

The death of Alexander was the signal for a sharp and prolonged struggle between two branches of the house of Alexander Nevskii, those of Tver and of Moscow. In 1247 Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich, on assuming the title of Grand Prince, is said by the Chronicle to have "settled his sons on the cities" or, as we should phrase it in English, "settled the cities on his sons." This settlement may have included the creation of an independent principality of Tver, which was apparently settled on his nephew, Yaroslav Yaroslavich. The latter became Grand Prince in 1263 and died in 1272, leaving his *otchina* Tver

to his son Michael. Perhaps Moscow became a separate principality in the same way and at the same time. It was probably conferred first on Michael Khrabryi, who became Grand Prince in 1248 on the death of Svyatoslav for a brief reign, since he met his death at the hand of the Lithuanians. Later Moscow passed to Daniel, the younger son of Alexander Nevskii. Daniel of Moscow, as well as Michael of Tver, were formidable rivals of Andrei Alexandrovich, Daniel being the brother of the last named, and Michael being his cousin. Daniel succeeded in securing possession of Pereyasavl in 1303. The Chronicle records that the following year, "in 1304, passed away Daniel Alexandrovich in Moscow, his *otchina*." Moscow, his *otchina*, as well as his acquired possession of Pereyasavl, he transmitted to his son, Yuri; likewise his claims to the title of Grand Prince. But Michael of Tver anticipated Yuri in securing the prize by prompt suit and by munificent gifts to the Khan of the Golden Horde. Indeed, Yuri was told at the Horde that if he could be more generous than his rival, Michael, he would secure the appointment. Money was becoming a major factor in the political rivalry of the princes, and, judging from the increasing interest in Novgorod, the Hanseatic trade provided the Grand Princes with the sinews of war. Michael of Tver held the position of Grand Prince and that of Prince of Novgorod, usually associated with the former, till his death in 1319 at the Golden Horde.

Michael's successor was Yuri, who had evidently profited by the advice given him in 1304 by the Tartar grandees when he failed in his ambitions for the position of Grand Prince. He was named Grand Prince in 1319 and retained the post till 1322, when he was displaced by Dmitrii Mikhailovich. His death was perhaps due to an intrigue of Dmitrii Mikhailovich, who had gone previously to the Khan. Dmitrii was named Grand Prince in 1324. He captured and put to death his rival on November 30, 1324, but in 1326 he met the latter's fate, himself being put to death at the court of the Khan. His brother Alexander succeeded him.

IVAN KALITA, GRAND PRINCE OF MOSCOW

But by this time a new and forceful character had appeared on the scene—Ivan Danilovich, brother to Yuri, Prince of Moscow. Already in 1322 Ivan had shown himself active when he had been dispatched from the Horde to Russia with a military force to carry out, at the behest of the Khan, a punitive expedition directed against Yaroslavl. A revolt in Tver in 1327, in which a Tartar emissary met his death, provided Ivan with a heaven-sent opportunity to supplant the hated house of Tver. Alexander fled to Pskov and, for the second time, a scion of the house of Moscow sat on the Grand Princely throne.

The new Prince, commonly referred to as Ivan Kalita, is usually considered as the founder of the Muscovite dynasty and of Muscovite greatness. His policy is to be inferred from his nickname, Kalita, which means scrip or moneybags. He accumulated, by all possible means, money with which to buy his way to power. He managed to keep his hands on Novgorod, which he prized as the readiest source of revenue. The Chronicle records under the date of 1339:

But to Knyaz Ivan, they (the people of Novgorod) sent Sylvester Volosevich and Fedor Avramov with the tribute. And the Knyaz sent his envoys requiring another tribute; "and in addition give me the Tsar's demand, what the Tsar had demanded from me." And they said: "That has never been amongst us since the beginning of the world, and thou hast kissed the Cross to Novgorod on the terms of the old Novgorod dues and according to Yaroslav's *Gramota*."

The same year, Alexander Mikhailovich was enticed to the Horde and there put to death. On the latter's death, Ivan despatched an expedition to Tver which took possession of the town and brought back the great bell of the *Vyeché* of Tver, thus signaling the subjection of Tver to Moscow. The long duel between Tver and Moscow was at an end. Ivan died two years later, in 1341. It was during the reign of Kalita, when Kiev became untenable, that the headquarters of the church were transferred first to Vladimir on the Klyazma

but, within a few years, at the instance of Ivan, finally moved to Moscow. This event was not without its effect on the new dignity that Moscow was acquiring among the principalities of Northern Russ.


The next eighteen years span the reigns of two princes whose designs, whatever they might have been, were cut short by untimely death. Simeon the Proud, the elder son of Ivan Kalita, succeeded to a throne already firmly established. Though the patrimony might be divided, separate *udely* were not created and the city of Moscow was held by the princes in common. Simeon received the *Yarlik* as Grand Prince, an office that now bade fair to become hereditary in the house of Moscow, whose overlordship of the Russian princes was henceforth scarcely questioned by the Khan. One danger alone threatened, that of the rising principality of Lithuania in the west. But the death of Gedymin in 1240 left his kingdom to be divided among his sons, a condition that inevitably led to strife among the brothers. The victor was Olgerd, who now formed the design of an alliance with the Khan Dzchanibeg with a view to a concerted attack on Moscow. But Simeon acted promptly. He appealed to old treaty arrangements with the Khan. As a result, the latter handed over to Simeon one of Olgerd's brothers sojourning with the Horde, as a prisoner, and Simeon compelled the Lithuanian Prince to make peace.

In 1353 Simeon fell a victim to the plague that had ravaged eastern Europe for some years and that appeared in England in 1349 as the Black Death. A brother, Andrei, and two sons also perished. The throne then passed to a younger brother, Ivan II, a colorless character, little fitted for the responsibility. Fortunately Simeon had, in his testament, committed his youthful son to the care of Alexios, Bishop of Vladimir. Alexios was highly regarded at Constantinople and at the Horde, where he had restored the sight of Dzchanibeg's wife and thus was enabled to strengthen the position of the Muscovite Prince at court. When Ivan died in 1359, the inheritance of the Grand Prince was divided as at Kalita's death. Fortunately the share of the widow at her death returned to the sons. And when the

second son, Ivan, died six years later, the territory of Moscow was concentrated once more in the hands of the Grand Prince, in the person of Dmitrii, known to history as Dmitrii Donskoi.

DMITRII DONSKOI

The accession to the throne of a ten-year-old child threatened to have serious consequences for the Muscovite dynasty. The



Prince of Suzdal, Dmitrii Konstantinovich, was preferred by the Khan to his young rival. But the dissension that had arisen in the Horde provided scope for Muscovite diplomacy. The *boyars* of the young prince were quick to change sides, if need be, to secure the coveted *Yarlik*. Eventually, after four years of waiting, Dmitrii of Moscow was rewarded by receiving the *Yarlik* naming him Grand Prince. Dmitrii Konstantinovich did not give up his claims, which he prepared to support by force. His efforts were successfully resisted and, after contracting a marriage alliance with Moscow, the house of Suzdal gave up its pretensions for ever.

The life of Dmitrii was complicated by the determined rise of Lithuania. But the more immediate danger to Moscow was from Michael Alexandrovich of Tver. A quarrel having arisen between Tver and Moscow over the disposition of the lands of the late Prince Simeon Konstantinovich, the Prince of Tver appealed to the Lithuanian Prince Olgerd. To meet the danger, the Muscovite had recourse to questionable diplomacy. Michael Alexandrovich of Tver was invited to a conference in Moscow. When he demurred at walking into the lion's den, the Metropolitan, Alexios, pledged his word of honor that his life would be safe. Nevertheless, on his arrival he was isolated from his followers and put in solitary confinement. He succeeded, however, in making his escape. His flight was sure to mean vengeance. His appeal to Olgerd was not left unanswered. Before Moscow could set its defenses in order, the Lithuanian warrior was on them with his devastating horde. There was little for Dmitrii to do but to shut himself up in the Kremlin and to look on while Muscovite territory was ravaged far and wide.


On the retreat of its foes, Moscow replied to their violence with a like violence, burning and pillaging through the lands of Tver and Smolensk. The counter-stroke of Olgerd went awry because of the mild winter that compelled him to retire to his principality. Michael then appealed to the Horde and came back with an emissary of the Khan and a *Yarlik*, naming him Grand Prince. But Dmitrii refused to recognize the transfer and took an oath from the citizens of Vladimir and other cities not to recognize Michael of Tver. He then made a journey on his own account to the Horde. He came back with an order of reinstatement and with the young son of Michael, whom he had ransomed from the Khan and held as a hostage. Meanwhile Michael came into collision with Novgorod over their boundaries and the treatment of the nobles of Novgorod who had come over to Tver. He therefore captured and sacked Torzhok, making the breach with Novgorod a permanent one. On the return of Dmitrii from the Horde in 1373, Olgerd again came to the assistance of Michael, though he had

now contracted a matrimonial alliance with the house of Moscow. Dmitrii, who in 1375 had succeeded once more in securing the Khan's *yarlik* as Grand Prince, now summoned all his vassals and prepared for a fight to the finish with Tver. He invaded the territory of Tver and, since Olgerd had failed to come to his assistance, Michael had no alternative but to sue for peace and to accept the position as vassal and subject of Moscow and to promise to assist the latter against Moscow's enemies, even the Horde.

Meantime an alliance of Olgerd and Mamai, the claimant to the khanship of the Golden Horde, set in motion an apparently powerful coalition against Moscow. The two armies came together on the Vosha to the south of the Oka, and the result was a brilliant victory over the forces of the Horde. Mamai determined to take revenge. For this purpose he collected from far and wide the warriors of the Horde. In 1380 they invaded Russia, while the Russian army of Dmitrii mustered and proceeded into the steppes to encounter them and prevent them laying waste their own lands. On September 7, 1380, the Russian forces crossed the Don and attacked the Tartars on the banks of the stream Kulikovo, which has given its name to the battle. The fight was long and doubtful, and was only decided by reserves held in hand till the last minute. Mamai's army broke into panic and fled homewards. Here they encountered the forces of Tochtamysh, Mamai's rival, who had profited by his absence to install himself on the throne of the Golden Horde.

Tochtamysh, having disposed of Mamai, who fled to the Venetian city of Kaffa, gathered his forces to punish the stubborn Muscovites. In the spring of 1382 he invaded Russia. The precipitation of his onset made defense impossible. Dmitrii abandoned Moscow incontinently to the mercy of the Tartars. Tochtamysh, unable to storm its walls, achieved by guile what was denied to force. The gates of Moscow were opened, the Mongol army poured in, and for hours the city was given over to fire and sword. Twenty-four thousand corpses littered the streets or were stacked in the churches and other public buildings. Thousands of captives were marched away

into slavery. The Tartar wagons groaned under the booty gathered in the sack of the city. But Dmitrii was safe in the forests of the north at Kostroma. Only after the last of the Tartar forces had pillaged the last of the city and drawn away did Dmitrii return to the city, devastated as it had not been since Baty's day, and begin the work of cleansing and restoration. Then, with all the Muscovite princes, he made his way to the Horde, to which he made his submission. He purchased peace



*Adapted from Freeman, "Historical Geography of Europe."
Courtesy of Longmans, Green & Co.*

by a gift of 8,000 roubles made by Dmitrii's son Vasili. Though the victory of Kulikovo was almost forgotten in the fearful sack of Moscow that followed it, actually the battle marked a turning point in Muscovite history. Henceforth the Tartars no longer appeared at Moscow as overlords. Their visits now took on the appearance of raids of mere marauders that became less and less frequent as time went on.

Dmitrii still had a reckoning to make with Novgorod, some of whose minions had availed themselves of the disorder to en-

gage in freebooting expeditions along the Middle Volga and the Kama. Dmitrii found himself strong enough, with the help he could command from the rivals of Novgorod, to seize the approaches to the city and lay their outlying regions waste. Novgorod submitted and agreed to pay 8,000 roubles for the damage done. Pskov also found itself more and more straitened between Moscow on the east and Lithuania on the west, into whose orbit it seemed destined to be drawn.

Fortunately Michael of Tver had learned his lesson and did not, during these troublous times, renew his fight for the throne of Grand Prince, but turned his attention to the improvement of the internal condition of his principality. One valuable possession of Moscow, however, was lost at this time. The union in 1386, according to which Olgerd's son Jagiello had married the Polish Princess Hedwiga, was a turning point in the history of eastern Europe. A feud between Skyrigailo and Polotsk, in which Smolensk intervened, gave the pretext for Lithuanian reprisals against Smolensk. Its Prince Svyatoslav was defeated and slain in battle. Smolensk was restored to his son Yuri, but solely on the condition that he become the vassal of Jagiello. Thus the city of the Upper Dnieper passed out of the orbit of Moscow and orthodoxy into that of Poland and the papacy.

Ryazan, also under its Prince, Oleg, was reduced to the position of a "younger brother," a term that apparently designated it as a satellite of Moscow.

Dmitrii died on May 19, 1389. Though his reign and life were not undistinguished, it was a time of misfortune and want. The Black Death, which had robbed Dmitrii of his father, reappeared in Russia in 1387 with tragic results. Poor crops and crop failures spelled hunger and distress to the population again and again. These conditions, combined with the long feud with Tver and the prolonged struggle with the Horde culminating in the vengeance exacted by Tochtamysh for Dmitrii's over-confident defiance of the Khan, brought the country to the brink of ruin. Dmitrii was not the man to wrestle with these evils. Where his own dignity or the homage of Tver was

concerned, he acted astutely enough and, on the whole, with success. But the marshalled might of the Khan appalled him. Even at Kulikovo he is related to have clothed a subordinate in his princely robes and himself to have been found hiding after the battle. The sack of Moscow soon brought him to his knees before the Khan and, at the end of his reign, he was content to leave to posterity the task of seeking release from the Mongol yoke.

The thirteenth century had brought two perils to Eastern Europe. One was the Mongol invasions, which had fastened on Russia the Tartar yoke. The second was the appearance on the Baltic coast of the Bearers of the Sword, or the Livonian Knights, sworn to win the pagan Lithuanians to Christ. The Order, as it is frequently referred to, was not a direct challenge to Russian power or influence. It nevertheless constituted, as it turned out, a potential menace to the whole Slavic borderland and particularly Polotsk, Pskov, Novgorod, and other centers through which Russia carried on trade with the west. The activity of the Order called into life a strong Lithuanian national movement which in turn menaced the Russian princes already weakened by the Mongol invasions. Of the two foreign masters, the Lithuanians preferred the Slav, who was little concerned about their spiritual welfare, so long as they continued to pay his tribute. Partly by force, partly by diplomacy, a Lithuanian-Slavic combination was formed which for the next two centuries first checked, then turned the tide of German aggression.

THE RISE OF LITHUANIA

The founder of Lithuanian independence was Mindowe or Mindovg, a local prince, the seat of whose government was Kernow. He succeeded, during the years of confusion that followed the Mongol invasion, in annexing Black Russia and making his residence in Novogorodok.² But he found himself menaced not only by other rival princes among the Lithuanians, the Samaiti, and the Yatvagi, but by the Livonian Order in the

² The region of the Middle Dnieper lying north of Kiev is called "Black Russia."

north and by Daniel of Galich in the south. With astute diplomacy he allowed himself to be baptized and entered into alliance with the Order. He secured the support of Daniel by ceding him Black Russia, reserving to himself the rights of suzerain. He brought the western Russian lands under his control and sought to fuse their inhabitants with the native Lithuanian population. So strong did he become that in 1253 he was recognized as king by the Pope and, on the latter's orders, was crowned by the head of the Livonian Order. But Mindovg's policy was dictated solely by circumstances. In 1260, when a native revolt in Livonia altered the situation, Mindovg repudiated Christianity and appeared as the champion of the native Lithuanian heathendom. He achieved complete success, but his triumph was short, for he was murdered by a gang of conspirators from among his Russian and Lithuanian subjects. His kingdom rapidly fell to pieces at his death, torn by the feuds between two parties, the Russian and Christian on the one hand, and the Lithuanian and pagan on the other. Not till the end of the century was there a pause in this process of disintegration.

From among the new Lithuanian feudal aristocracy there arose in 1282 a new leader in the person of Lutuwer. Lutuwer died in 1293 leaving two sons, Witen and Gedymin. By this time the Lithuanians had learned from their wars with the Germans and had a well-equipped and disciplined military force. With this they were now prepared to defend themselves. Witen waged almost uninterrupted war with the Order and with the Poles. In the east Gedymin extended his possessions at the expense of the weakened Russian princes and of the Golden Horde. Moscow was preoccupied with her own troubles and could not dispute this aggrandizement. During the course of the fourteenth century Lithuania gradually absorbed a great part of southwestern Russia, including Volhynia and Podolia (wrested from Galicia), Perekop (taken from the Tartars), Smolensk (with a Russian prince, but under Lithuanian supremacy), Pskov (frequently under a Lithuanian prince, though nominally a part of Novgorod), Polotsk, and Vitebsk on

the Niemen. Gedymin, like Mindovg, saw the advantage to be gained by becoming a Christian and probably allowed the impression to get abroad that he proposed to be baptized. With this bait he was able to win an alliance from the city of Riga. But when the papal mission came to carry out the ceremony, the Prince disavowed the promise that had been given in his name. Probably he feared the consequences of antagonizing the pagan party in Lithuania.

Gedymin died in 1341. For some years the uncertain law of succession allowed the country to drift into anarchy. But in 1345 two brothers, Olgerd and Kestuit, secured the mastery. Olgerd was recognized as Grand Prince with his capital in the east, while Kestuit ruled the west. Olgerd, while probably not a Christian himself, from motives of policy was tolerant toward his Russian subjects. For years the two brothers co-operated in resisting the Order. In 1370 a combined expedition into the lands of the Order resulted in a great battle at Rudau near Königsberg, where the forces of the Lithuanians met a crushing defeat.

Meanwhile, in the east, Olgerd had been active in Pskov and Novgorod. In the case of the former it was possible to install a Lithuanian prince and to bring it into his sphere of influence. In Novgorod, though there was a pro-Lithuanian party, he could not make headway against the Grand Duke Simeon. In the south, the disintegration of Smolensk left that country to be absorbed either by Moscow or by Lithuania. Volhynia was brought under Lithuanian control by making some of its princes vassals of Olgerd. The remainder became subject to Poland. Lithuania pushed down the Dnieper River and secured the Dnieper basin, to its mouth, from the local horde. The Khan of Perekop was forced to cede the Black Sea littoral. Smolensk found in the Lithuanian Prince a loyal ally against Moscow, but was compelled to pay the price of friendship by yielding its outlying possessions, Mozhaïsk and Rzhev, to Olgerd. Briansk was also taken from Chernigov; Ryazan and Murom became independent principalities. The Prince managed to do considerable damage to Moscow without


an open breach. Moscow's feud with Tver finally brought the two into conflict; for Olgerd had entered into an alliance with the princes of Tver. The feud came to a head in 1368 and lasted till 1375, when the alliance with Tver was sundered and the latter fell under Muscovite sway. Podolia was in 1362 taken from the Tartars and incorporated in the Lithuanian state. Olgerd died in 1377 leaving a principality that stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea and from the Oka to the Bug. Much of this territory was inhabited by Russians who had been saved from the Mongol yoke.

The death of Olgerd left his share of the Lithuanian grand duchy to his son Jagiello. The western part had been ruled by Kestuit and his son, Witold. Jagiello managed to dispose of the former by murder; the latter was thrown into prison, but, managing to escape, fled to the Order and became a Christian. Returning later he was reconciled to Jagiello when the latter was baptized in 1386 as Vladislav II and married to Hedwig of Poland. Witold succeeded to the direct overlordship of Lithuania. This close association with Poland completely altered the whole status of the Lithuanian people and their future destiny.

EFFECTS OF THE MONGOL YOKE

The Mongol period saw the slow disintegration and decline of northern Russ. In this new environment into which colonists from the south had moved, it was hard to perpetuate the old political and social order. The position of grand prince, formerly associated with Kiev, now went with the tenure of Suzdal. But of family succession there was an end. The great branches with which the tree of Vsevolod had burgeoned were now identified with their own *otchina*, in which they combined proprietary with governmental rights. Moscow, too, became an *otchina*, which, combined with the principality, gave its holders rights as suzerain. But it was the *udyely* into which the principalities split that gave the age its peculiar character. These appanages, called into existence to make provision for younger sons or brothers, came in time to constitute separate entities, subject, it is true, to the prince as suzerain. This proc-

ess of continuous division and subdivision brought general pauperization to the princes. Politically the country lost the sense of corporate unity of Kievan days. In this general disintegration it needed but the emergence of a family that enjoyed a continuity of succession and that could turn to its own advantage the disruptive forces that were dissolving the other principalities, to establish a new and unifying force. Such a family was that of Daniel of Moscow. Undistinguished by heroism and without the supreme gift of statecraft, its members understood the value of money in the new scheme of things. Turned taxgatherers for the Horde, they became indispensable to rulers and ruled. It was in such a soil that the new principality struck its roots.



Brown Brothers.

THE KREMLIN, MOSCOW, AND THE MOSKVA RIVER FROM THE SOUTHEAST.

[7]

THE RISE OF MOSCOW

FOR the next sixty years the throne of the Grand Prince was occupied by undistinguished scions of the house of Ivan Kalita, both named Vasilii, Vasilii the First and Vasilii the Second (the Dark, or the Blind). That their mediocrity did not bring disaster to the Muscovite realm was due, in the main, to the circumstances that prevailed in eastern Europe.

VASILII THE FIRST


Dmitrii Donskoi, on his death in 1389, bequeathed the Grand Principality of Vladimir to his son Vasilii as his *otchina*. He also admonished him, "Love your *boyars*, give them fitting honor for their services, do nothing without their consent." This advice reveals the established policy of the Muscovite house of basing its power on the good will of its vassals. During the reign of Vasilii the expansion of Moscow continued apace with the incorporation into the state of an ever-widening circle of principalities. That the position of Vasilii as Grand Prince was never challenged during his reign was of inestimable advantage. Throughout his life, however, there was continued friction with Novgorod, particularly in the realm of the Middle Volga and

the Kama, where Muscovite and Novgorodian interests clashed. But the chief preoccupation of the Grand Prince was with the Lithuanian menace on the west and the Tartar on the south. The Tartar world at this time was thrown into great confusion by the intervention of the dreaded Tamerlane, the Khan of Samarkand. Tamerlane had in 1395 invaded the southern steppes to depose Tochtamysh, Khan of the Golden Horde, and in pursuit of him appeared on the Russian frontier some hundred miles south of Tula. But the Asiatic menace spent itself on the Tartar settlements, on the Don, and on the Volga, from which Tamerlane withdrew with vast booty. Four years later the Lithuanian prince, Witold, who had given sanctuary to Tochtamysh, led a crusade of the Christians against the Tartars. But the European army suffered a signal defeat at the Vorskla (near modern Poltava). Yedigi, the Tartar Khan, threatened Moscow again and again in 1408 to remind it of the tribute which was due and whose payment had been suspended. Moscow was evacuated and much of Muscovite territory, even as far east as Nizhnii-Novgorod, was laid waste. Vasilii was compelled to pay a tribute of 3,000 roubles. Some years later he made a trip to the Horde and was confirmed in his possession of Nizhnii-Novgorod.

Relations with Lithuania (now united with Poland) occupied the attention of the Grand Prince. Despite the fact that Vasilii had married a daughter of Witold, relations were strained as Lithuania continued to cast covetous eyes on Novgorod and Pskov. Witold managed to secure the possession of Smolensk. In 1407 peace was contracted between the two powers. Smolensk was confirmed in the possession of Witold and the River Ugra, a tributary of the Oka, was set as the boundary between the two states.

The union of Poland and Lithuania involved an inherent contradiction. The eastern part, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, was to a predominating degree Russian by race and orthodox in belief, while the western region—officially Roman Catholic—was still partly pagan. In 1430, on the death of Witold, Jagiello was recognized as Grand Duke (Queen Hedwig had already

died without issue). In 1410 the Polish state had achieved a resounding victory over the Teutonic Knights at the Battle of Tannenberg. The Order lost Samogitia to Poland. The Teutonic Knights recognized the suzerainty of the Polish King. Three years later at the Diet of Horodlo the relation of Lithuania to Poland became even more intimate when it was agreed that the Lithuanian nobility, if Roman Catholic, would enjoy



*Adapted from Freeman, "Historical Geography of Europe."
Courtesy of Longmans, Green & Co.*

the same political and social rights as the Polish nobility. This measure proved a subtle means of proselytizing the Lithuanian nobility to the Roman Church. The Lithuanian princes as a rule endeavored to maintain an appearance of impartiality in regard to the two churches. Indeed, Witold is thought to have been a pagan at heart, but the orthodox belief of many of the Lithuanians tended to weaken the kingdom and attract it into the orbit of Moscow. This led to the agitation to set up a separate metropolitanate of Kiev. From this center there emanated a move to unite the two churches. The Bulgarian Zam-

blaka was consecrated and despatched to the Council of Constance in 1416 to negotiate this union. This questionable policy led to a move on the part of the Lithuanian nobility to attach themselves to Moscow, so that this change was discontinued in 1419. The religious problem was one of the most delicate in the relations between the two Slavic states, and was destined to lead to many acute crises.

VASILII THE SECOND (THE DARK)

In 1425 Vasilii was succeeded by his only son Vasilii II, an even weaker sovereign than his father. During his reign the confused law of succession led to sharp clashes between the claimants and ultimately caused an outbreak of violence. Dmitrii had left an ambiguous will which seemed to promise the throne to his second son on the death of Vasilii. But this testament which assumed Vasilii's dying childless would hardly apply since Vasilii left a son. The disputed succession was referred by both claimants to the Horde, though no prince had appeared before the Khan for eighteen years. The appeals of the two candidates afford excellent examples of the conflicting principles of the laws of succession and of the effect of Mongol intervention on them. The Chronicle records that Vasilii's chief adviser, the *boyar* Iohann advanced these arguments:

"All powerful Khan, Yuri bases his claim on the old law of Russia; my young prince his, on your gracious favor, in that he craves from you what the other demands. Of what avail are Chronicles and documents against the will of the Lord? Did not the Khan confirm the will of Vasilii Dmitrievich whereby the position of prince descended to his son?"¹

Ulu Mohammed recognized the superior claims of Vasilii and thereby confirmed the new rule of succession by which the son followed the father. Yuri accepted the decision, but slights offered the family and supporters of Yuri led to a revolt in which Vasilii was worsted and taken prisoner by Yuri, who proclaimed himself Grand Prince, Vasilii being banned to

¹ J. von Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte der Goldenen Horde*, p. 287.

Kolymna. But Vasilii's vassals rushed to his assistance. An uprising of Yuri's sons, Vasilii Kossoi and Dmitrii Shemyaka, induced Yuri to change his mind and ostensibly to restore Vasilii with a view to putting down the revolt. But the two sons were secretly supported by their father. Vasilii was consequently defeated, and Moscow surrendered, Vasilii being banished to Nizhnii-Novgorod. He would have appealed to the Horde, but Yuri's sudden death changed the situation. Kossoi claimed the throne, but his own brothers turned against him and he was defeated, thrown into prison, and blinded.

Meanwhile, complications had arisen with the Horde, whose khan, Ulu Mohammed, had been offended by Vasilii and had rebuilt the old Bulgarian city of Kazan. Moscow was attacked in 1445 and Vasilii defeated at Suzdal. The capital was seized and the prisoners of war were held for ransom. The payment of this ransom caused discontent, as did the generosity which the Grand Prince had in the past rewarded the Tartars. Shemyaka aggravated the situation by spreading rumors that Vasilii was about to bestow the whole principality on the Golden Horde. In February, 1446, Vasilii was surprised in the church of the monastery of Troitsa-Sergieï and, despite his entreaties, was blinded and sent off to Vologda. His supporters joined him at Byeloe Ozero. Boris of Tver brought his followers to the assistance of the Prince and others joined the movement, so that Shemyaka was defeated and Vasilii was restored in 1447. The Church supported the claims of Vasilii and the revolt eventually was suppressed. Shemyaka lost his principality of Galich and in 1453 met death by poisoning. Gradually the various appanages were incorporated in the state: Mozhaïsk, Serpukhov, Vereya. The idea of national unity was growing apace and it was coming to be regarded as a mortal sin to dispute the claim of the Muscovite ruler to the position of Grand Prince. In 1430, on the death of Witold, Lithuania was plunged once more in civil strife. This was reflected in Moscow, where factional strife also broke out. But after 1447 Moscow's ascendancy was reëstablished. Toward the end of Va-

sili's reign we find the Grand Prince steadily encroaching on the privileges and territory of Novgorod. The city was compelled in 1456 to pay a tribute of 10,000 roubles and lost some of her territory in the east, Vyatka and Velikii Ustiug.

This period was an important era in the history of the Church. In 1438, on the insistence of the eastern emperor, a council assembled to discuss the union of the churches. It was adjourned to Florence in 1439 and was attended by the Metropolitan Isidore. The council agreed to the union of the two churches and Isidore was raised to the rank of cardinal. But the union was rejected in Moscow and Isidore was driven forth in disgrace. The Pope, Calixtus III, thereupon made Kiev an independent metropolitanate. In 1453 Constantinople fell to the Moslem conqueror Mohammed II and Moscow was definitely cut off from that patriarchate. This severance tended to bring the Metropolitan of Moscow more definitely under the control of the Grand Prince.

The Grand Prince of Moscow, in the course of the fifteenth century, emerged out of the confusion and disintegration as suzerain of the principalities of Northern Russia. The process by which this came about was slow but natural. The continual decrease in the size of the patrimonies, owing to repeated division and subdivision, brought a decline in wealth and power and prevented the holdings, whether *otchiny* (patrimonies) or *udyely* (appanages) from developing the cohesion or the continuity of the great feudalities of western Europe. Moreover, in the matter of succession, the Grand Prince again and again departed from the private law of inheritance and disposed of both his *otchina* and his princely power in the interests of his dynasty. More and more the innovations contained in the testamentary decrees hardened into custom. The preëminence of the grand princes was reënforced by other advantages: the Khan's *Yarlik*, by which they were recognized as suzerain grand princes; their position as taxgatherer for the Horde; and the lordship of Novgorod and Pskov, which brought financial advantages. Once they had acquired the necessary material

force, they were in a position to check the draining away of their resources when princes or *boyars* transferred their allegiance to another suzerain. When this ancient right to change masters had been successfully challenged by the Grand Prince of Moscow, time itself would bring an enormous accession of strength. By this process the foundations of autocracy were securely laid.

[8]

MUSCOVITE RUSSIA

IVAN III, 1462-1505

WITH Ivan III the great principality of Moscow entered on the process by which it was transformed into Russia. The young Prince Ivan, at the death of his father, Vasilii the Dark, was twenty-two years of age, was already married, and had a young son four years old. Physically, he made a profound and indelible impression on persons with whom he came in contact, and the title of "the Great," which after generations gave him, testifies to the general belief in his outstanding traits of character and intelligence. He inherited from his father the recognition by the Great Khan of his position as Grand Prince, to whom all other Russian princes were vassals. But it is not to be inferred from this that his realm was extensive. Much of the older Russia to the west and southwest had been absorbed by Poland and Lithuania. To the south his territory was bounded in the main by the River Oka, beyond which lay the steppes. To the east lay Kazan. To the north lay the territory of Novgorod, beyond Byeloe Ozero and the River Sukhona. Most, however, of the appanage principalities had already been incorporated in the Muscovite state. All that remained now was to assimilate them. Tver and Ryazan still stood aloof in a precarious independence. But the attractive force of Moscow was increasing every year with the result that there was from time to time a wholesale exodus of *boyars* and *boyars'* sons who took their possessions into the Muscovite state. A war in 1484-1485 merely aggravated this emigration, and the large-scale secessions so paralyzed Tver that Ivan had no

difficulty in occupying the city and annexing it. Ryazan suffered a similar fate. The late Prince Vasilii had married a sister of Ivan, and the latter made use of this relationship to intervene in the affairs of the ruling family of that state. On the death of a son Fedor, he secured the city itself by inheritance and later succeeded in bringing the nobility of Ryazan into vassalage to himself. The little appanage of Vereya likewise passed to Moscow under a flimsy pretext. Ivan was equally unscrupulous and ruthless toward his own brothers. He deprived them of all but the meagerest share in his inheritance and showed scant consideration for their rights. In 1480 Boris and Andrei revolted and raised a force of Lithuanians and Tartars. A simultaneous attack from the Golden Horde induced Ivan to make terms, and a reconciliation was effected. But after the Tartars had withdrawn, Ivan succeeded in stirring up strife between the brothers. Once the need for dissimulation was at an end, he acted to rid himself of a rival. In 1491 Andrei's failure to provide him with troops resulted in Ivan's inviting that prince to Moscow, where he was seized. His sons suffered a similar fate. Ivan showed himself utterly ruthless and unscrupulous in the methods by which he effected the extension and consolidation of Muscovite territory.

SUBJECTION OF NOVGOROD

Ivan is chiefly remembered as the monarch who destroyed the freedom of Novgorod. This outpost of the Hanseatic League had been the most prosperous and progressive of Russian medieval cities. It had always maintained rather intimate relations with the grand princes, to whom it was nominally subject. But Moscow had cast covetous eyes on its trade and on its very extensive possessions in the north. The cause of intervention in Novgorod was that the restrictions on foreign trade embarrassed the Muscovite state, and it did not seem proper that Russian commerce should be at the mercy of the Hanseatic League. But in Moscow and Pskov there was the added complication that, lying close to the boundary of Lithuania, they were a constant temptation to the Lithuanian grand princes. Pskov had

already passed under Lithuanian influence and had become practically independent of Novgorod, and in Novgorod itself there was a strong Lithuanian party. The situation was rendered more critical by the ill-feeling between the common people and the dominant aristocracy, as well as by the rival claims of Moscow and Kiev to the control of the church in Novgorod. There had been growing friction with Moscow, but the Grand Prince was at first forced to look the other way, inasmuch as he already had too many difficulties. He had to content himself with fatherly admonitions. The death in 1470 of the Archbishop Jonas led to a contest for the vacant post. Candidates appeared both in Moscow and Kiev, and the ecclesiastical authorities supported the claims of their respective representatives. Fresh difficulties developed when the Grand Prince presented himself in Novgorod, but the Kievan candidate's conduct had brought him under suspicion of treason, and he was roughly handled by the nobility, who drove him away. Ivan confirmed the election of Theophilus, the Muscovite candidate, but in the meantime emissaries from Pskov warned Novgorod that they had reason to suspect Ivan of hostile intentions toward the city. Thus they stirred up a tumult against the Grand Prince. There was a wave of popular indignation which led to an alliance between Novgorod and King Casimir of Poland. Novgorod declared itself free of Moscow and prepared to assert its independence. Ivan assembled the troops of Moscow and of the appanages, and in 1471 took the field, ravaging and burning the country through which the forces advanced. But this time Novgorod made its peace, promised a war indemnity of 15,500 roubles, and agreed to sever all relations with Lithuania. Novgorod lost Perm and all its possessions along the Kama, which were incorporated with Moscow. In 1475 Ivan was magnificently entertained in Novgorod and showered with costly gifts. It was now evident that Novgorod's days of greatness were over. Many of its citizens were leaving the city. Ivan's demand of the recognition of his right to the new title of *Gosudar*, instead of the former of *Gospodin*, brought from the city an emphatic refusal, a refusal that meant war.

The great republic that styled herself "Lord Novgorod the Great" now roused herself to a heroic effort to save her independence, which the Muscovite Grand Prince had decided to end. The *vyeche* was to be suppressed and the great bell that summoned its citizens to meetings was to be silenced. The city, therefore, armed itself and determined to resist to the end. Advances were made to Lithuania and to the Horde, but Ivan's lightning attack forestalled the arrival of aid. The city was occupied by his troops before resistance could be offered, and her freedom was blotted out. Thousands of families were transported from the city into Muscovite territory, and increasing numbers of Muscovites took up their abode in Novgorod. Thus not only did the city's prosperity and greatness disappear, but with the influx of new elements the old Novgorodian tradition died out. The *vyeche* bell was removed from Novgorod. Casimir of Poland had already taken steps to bring belated help to Novgorod and appealed likewise to the Golden Horde. This conduct brought a fresh outbreak in 1479 which compelled Ivan to return to Novgorod with his forces during the following winter. He occupied the suburbs and, by the offer of clemency, induced the citizens to open their gates; but no mercy was shown. Torture and death were the lot of the leaders, and further wholesale deportations banished from the city its most distinguished citizens.

MARRIAGE OF IVAN TO SOPHIA PALEOLOG


An event fraught with momentous consequences was the betrothal and marriage of Ivan to Sophia Paleolog. This was achieved by negotiations carried out by Ivan Fryasin through Venice and the Pope. The Byzantine imperial family was at this time residing in Italy. The plans for the marriage were favored by the papacy in the hope that Ivan could be induced to carry out the terms of the union made at Florence in 1439, which had been repudiated by his predecessor. Ivan allowed the impression to get abroad that he favored the union of the Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches, and the marriage was solemnized in October, 1472. The populace of Moscow re-

sented the presence of Catholic clerics at the ceremony, and it was therefore necessary to withdraw them. No efforts, however, were made to carry out the union of the two churches. Ivan's marriage with Sophia Paleolog was symbolic of the change in the status of the old Muscovite principality. Until the fall of Constantinople, the Grand Prince had maintained an attitude of studious and respectful submission to the Emperor, and the Russian Church had regarded the Patriarch as its head. But with the fall of Constantinople, the situation was altered. Ivan began to regard himself as the successor of the emperors and Moscow as the real head of the Orthodox Church. The Muscovite Grand Prince adopted the coat of arms of the late Byzantine empire, the double-headed eagle, and the title "Tsar," itself derived from the Byzantine "Caesar," became the form of address. As Constantinople had been the second, so Moscow was to be the third Rome. Byzantine customs were introduced into the ceremonies of the palace. It was natural that Ivan should model his court after that of Constantinople and thus set the fashion for future generations. The subjects of the Russian tsar, like those of the Byzantine emperor, were henceforth little better than slaves in the presence of their monarch.

DEFEAT OF THE GOLDEN HORDE

It was Ivan's lot to have a final reckoning with the Golden Horde. For many years Russia's relations with the Tartars had been indeterminate. Actually the overlordship of the Khan was recognized and envoys with gifts were sent from time to time to placate him, but the tribute had fallen into arrears. The attacks of Tamerlane had much weakened the Horde, and it had finally split into three divisions: the Crimean, the Tartar Astrakhan, and that of Kazan. Civil strife further reduced their power. In 1474 representatives of the Golden Horde appeared for the last time in Moscow to demand tribute. They required that the Grand Prince should show the customary deference to the picture of the Khan. The Grand Prince threw it down and trampled it under foot. He also had the emissaries executed, with the exception of one, who was sent back with the

message, "Tell your lord what you have seen and inform him that his lot will be the same if he disturbs me." Nevertheless Ivan opened peace negotiations, but nothing would do except



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
TOMB OF TAMERLANE AT SAMARKAND.

the renewal of the neglected tribute and the appearance of Ivan in person at the Golden Horde. With both of these demands he refused to comply.

In 1480, when Ivan was making his last settlement with Novgorod, Akhmat, the Khan, decided to profit by the occasion to invade the country. Unquestionably Poland was behind the move. The invasion developed along the customary lines, and the city to which Tartar raids were a fearful memory was terror-stricken at the prospect. Ivan despatched an army under Vasilii Nozdrevatyi and a Crimean prince, Nordoulai, put Moscow as far as possible in a state of defense. Ivan himself left the city and joined the army at Kolymna. At the last he lost his nerve and retired westward to Krasnoyeselo. In the meantime the Tartars came northward along the Lithuanian border expecting help from the Polish-Lithuanian ruler. The two armies finally approached from opposite sides of the Ugra. For some time they remained facing one another and actually opened negotiations. The situation was tense, but the Tartars were as nervous as the Russians, and at length, to the utter astonishment of the Russian host, the Tartar army decamped without giving battle, and returned to its home in the steppes. The following year Akhmat was killed by Ivak, the Khan of the Tyumen Horde. The Golden Horde never recovered its power.

Ivan's reign was distinguished by the establishment of Russia's first diplomatic relations with the west. Probably the disappearance of Novgorod was not unconnected with Ivan's desire to open up connections with the western countries. In 1486 Ivan attempted to establish relations with the Empire, and in this year appeared the first ambassador from the German nation, Poppel, the secretary of the Emperor Frederick III. The latter endeavored to secure a suitable match for the Crown Prince, the Markgraf of Baden, in the family of the Grand Prince. One of the inducements held out by the papacy was the offer of the title of King. But the title proved a slight temptation. The marriage projects of Poppel were dropped. He intimated to the Emperor that marriage could be arranged between Ivan's daughter and the Emperor's son, Maximilian. But Maximilian was soon betrothed to Anne, Duchess of Brittany.

In 1490 the Grand Prince opened up relations with Chagatai, the ruler of Khiva and Bokhara, and in 1493 the King of Georgia appealed to the Muscovite ruler for protection. These constituted the first diplomatic relations of the Tsars with Georgia. This period is noteworthy, too, for the establishment of the Turkish dominance of the Black Sea. Mengli-Girei, Khan of the Crimea, had placed himself under the protection of Turkey. He was already in possession of Kaffa and the Genoese



*Adapted from Freeman, "Historical Geography of Europe."
Courtesy of Longmans, Green & Co.*

colonies on the Black Sea. Turkish protection was promised to him if he would accept a position of vassalage to the Ottoman Porte.

In 1492, on the death of Casimir, Poland and Lithuania were divided between his sons, Albert becoming King of Poland, and Alexander, Grand Prince of Lithuania. Ivan thereupon declared war and attacked Lithuania with considerable success. Mengli-Girei at the same time advanced from the south against Lithuania. The result of this advance was a truce between

Lithuania and Moscow, sealed by the marriage of Ivan's daughter Helen to the Lithuanian Grand Prince. The marriage was undoubtedly arranged by Ivan with the hope of aggrandizing Moscow at the expense of Lithuania. Helen was promised the right to practice her own religion. But on the whole, though no effort was made to proselytize her, relations between Ivan and Alexander were far from cordial. In 1500 war broke out. The unfortunate Princess found herself in a sad situation with father and husband in the field against one another. Undoubtedly one of the many occasions for the strife was Ivan's fear that Rome was endeavoring to force his daughter to apostatize and to win over the adherents of the Orthodox church in Lithuania. At length a truce was arranged. Ivan showed his hand by making his first demands for all of the regions in Lithuania that were Russian. Eventually he reduced his demands to include only Smolensk and Kiev, but even here he was unsuccessful.

CONTACTS WITH WESTERN EUROPE

Ivan's reign is remembered for the first conscious effort to bring western culture and techniques to Russia. Ambassadors to the western, especially the Italian, courts were instructed to recruit western artists and artisans. Stone palaces were built for the imperial court. The first of these, the so-called Granovitaya Palata, planned by a Venetian, Marcus, was completed in 1491. The Kremlin was also surrounded by walls. Moscow began to change its wooden, rustic appearance for that of a modern city of brick and stone. The production of metals likewise made considerable progress. Russians, with the help of Italian metallurgists, became partly independent in the manufacture of munitions of war. Owing to the fact that Russia at no point touched the sea, the destruction of Novgorod interfered with the Baltic trade. In the south the trade with Kaffa and the Black Sea suffered from the hostility of the Tartars.

Improvements were made in the system of assessment of land, the unit of taxation being a *socha*. The unit of measurement

was the *chet*. The *socha* consisted of 800, 1,000, or 1,200 *chets*, according to the quality of the land. Russia practiced the three-field systems, hence the number of *sochas* but not of *chets* in a man's possession indicated his wealth. The *sochas* included villages and even fortified towns, *posads*. In order to ascertain the size of the holdings, scribes (*pistsy*) were sent out to ascertain the size of the holdings, and their records were called *pist-souye knigi*. The total production was then computed, and taxes were calculated on that basis. Commerce underwent a variety of forms of impost at various places in the country. Tolls of all kinds on trade and on travel were very common, as in western Europe.

In 1497 a great step forward was made in the publication of the so-called *sudebnik*, the first real codification of the law. Provision was made for the discharge of judicial functions by the representatives of the state, the local elders, or the deputies of the government. Every court had official scribes or *dyaki*. The expenses of litigation were borne, of course, by the litigant, but every effort was made to prevent bribery. In criminal cases torture was practiced, though with some restrictions. Trial by combat and other forms of the ordeal were allowed. Serfdom was not yet recognized, though there was a large class of slaves who either had inherited that status or had acquired it. The *sudebnik* allowed peasants to change their abode only once in the year, during the two weeks at the time of St. George's Day, the 26th of November. This restriction was the beginning of the first step in the development of serfdom.

In 1498 friction broke out between Ivan's son Vasilii, the son of Sophia, and Dmitrii, Ivan's grandson. Intrigue was undoubtedly carried on by Sophia and her friends. Upon its discovery some of the *boyars* implicated were immediately put to death. Ivan acted promptly. He displaced his son and had his grandson crowned. But within a year he had been reconciled with his wife, and in 1498 his son Vasilii was proclaimed Grand Prince and *gosudar* of Novgorod and Pskov. In 1502 Vasilii was proclaimed Grand Prince of Russia. The grandson,

Dmitrii, shortly fell from favor. His name was dropped from the prayers for the princely family. His mother died in prison.

VASILII III

The reign of Vasilii Ivanovich (Vasilii III) is generally regarded as a mere continuation of the reign of Ivan III. In all things, Vasilii trod in the footsteps of his father, insisting on his title of *gosudar* and extending his power in a way that anticipated his son Ivan IV. The chief complications of his reign were with Poland-Lithuania on the one hand, and Pskov on the other. Vasilii was a candidate for the crowns of both Poland and Lithuania, but was rejected. He took up the cause of the rebellious Glinskii, but to no advantage. The war was distinguished mostly by raids of the Tartars, who ravaged Lithuanian territory. Trouble with Pskov developed early in his reign, over complaints against the governor appointed by Vasilii. After the fall of Novgorod, Pskov's position was extremely precarious, and Vasilii took pains to enforce his authority in the city. He arrested all the notables, and many of the foremost families were deported. Their places were taken by Muscovites. Pskov was finally annexed outright in 1511. Negotiations, begun in 1514 by Schnitzer-Pamer, resulted in a concerted effort by the Muscovites and the Hapsburgs to bring about a partition of Poland. When war broke out in 1514, the Muscovite armies were enabled by the use of artillery, directed by a foreign officer, to reduce Smolensk, but shortly afterwards they suffered defeat at Orsha, though Smolensk remained in Russian hands. An emissary of the Emperor Maximilian, Herberstein, was sent to Moscow with a view to arranging peace, but Vasilii demanded all Lithuanian territory inhabited by Russians. The war dragged on for several years. Trouble with the Tartars in 1520-1521 compelled Vasilii to come to terms with Lithuania. An armistice was arranged in 1522 and peace was finally secured in 1526. Herberstein remained in Moscow as agent of Charles V from 1526 to 1533, and has left a memorable account of Russia at this time.

In 1525 Vasilii decided to divorce his wife, Salamonia, and

send her to a cloister. Shortly afterwards he was married to a Lithuanian, Princess Helena. As a result of this marriage a son was born in 1530.

In 1533 Vasilii Ivanovich was taken ill and died quite suddenly at the Troitsa-Sergiei monastery, leaving the throne of the Grand Prince to an infant of three years, Ivan Vasilievich, known to history as Ivan IV.

[9]

IVAN THE TERRIBLE, 1533-1584

THE reign of Ivan IV fell in troubled times. The Grand Prince of Moscow, it is true, had had his final reckoning with the Golden Horde, but was still menaced by the khanates of Crimea, Astrakhan, and Kazan, the three parts into which the Golden Horde had split. In the west there was the ever-present threat of Lithuania and Poland, while in the northwest Livonia and Courland hampered the Muscovite trade with the Baltic and prevented the importation of badly needed commodities. Sweden and Denmark likewise cast covetous eyes on the eastern littoral of the Baltic, and had to be reckoned with as potential rivals for the control of the Baltic trade. Since Denmark and Sweden controlled the Sound, their enmity was the more telling. The disappearance of the Eastern Roman Empire left the Turks established in control of the Straits and of the Black Sea.

Europe was entering on a period of stress owing to the breach made in the Roman Catholic Church by the preaching of Luther and the inauguration of the Protestant Reformation. The sixteenth century was a period of great moment in history. The forces which were at work in western Europe swept away the old medieval order and ushered in a new and unprecedented epoch—an epoch in which political and commercial boundaries were enormously expanded, as were intellectual and religious frontiers. In Russian history the sixteenth century was no less a vital period. The old order was crumbling and a new world was in the making, and it was Ivan IV who was destined to give a decisive turn to events.

On the death of Vasilii the widow Helena promptly seized

power on behalf of her infant son. Unfortunately her marriage with Vasiliï had been unpopular, and she found herself compelled to defer to a group of *boyars* who forced their advice on her and ultimately excluded her from power. The following thirteen years, therefore, were a period of internal disorder and misgovernment, when neither the Prince nor his mother could make head against the truculent defiance of the nobles. The young Prince grew up neglected and disdained, and could not but be influenced by the evil examples of the court circle. The impressions thus received left an indelible mark on his after life.

IVAN ASSUMES POWER

Toward the end of 1546 the young Ivan, now sixteen years of age, announced his forthcoming marriage. The bride was said to have been chosen in the traditional way, by summoning the daughters of well-born subjects from all over the Empire to Moscow, where they were passed before the imperial eyes. The choice fell on Anastasia, the daughter of Roman Yurievich Zakharin-Koshkin, of a family said to have come from Prussia. On the 16th of January, 1547, Ivan had himself crowned Tsar at Moscow and on February 3, 1547, the marriage with Anastasia was duly solemnized. Ivan did not immediately seize the reins of power, but a series of tragic events forced him shortly to assume his rightful place as ruler. A great fire broke out in June and spread rapidly through the city, even threatening the Kremlin. There were hints of sorcery. The public, roused to a superstitious frenzy, got out of hand and cast about for a scapegoat. The first victim was an uncle of the Prince. The violence continued to rage unabated and there were fresh victims. Ivan was compelled to intervene to stop these disorders, which he did effectively. While he did not follow up these activities at once, two years later he began gradually to gather power into his own hands. The instruments that lent themselves to his exercise of power were Sylvester, a priest from Novgorod, and a young noble, Alexei Adashev. The first decisive step that Ivan took was to summon an assembly to meet at Mos-

cow in 1550 to consult on matters of state. This assembly, which went by the name of *Zemskii Sobor*, was probably little more than a gathering of the state functionaries. It became a recognized institution and persisted for the next one hundred years. It can, however, scarcely be regarded as a representative body in the modern sense of the word. But, apparently, from the summoning of the *Zemskii Sobor* an altogether new impulse was given to state affairs by the action of the Tsar. Times were ripe for a change, and while public opinion, as such, did not exist in the Muscovite state, a ferment was at work through the body politic which was inevitably working itself out. The Muscovite state was a heterogeneous conglomeration of separate principalities grouped around, and ultimately absorbed in, the grand principality of Moscow. Princely families had been drawn to the capital and had brought with them their vassals, there entering into relations of dependence on the Grand Prince of Moscow. There was a good deal of give and take in this relationship. The older appanage princes considered themselves entitled to leave the service of the Tsar if they saw fit, and to take service with another master.

This claim, although it was resisted, had never actually lapsed. The lesser nobles were required to serve in some capacity or other, and in return they were usually given grants of land. As these relations were not fixed or permanent, the basis of the central power was extremely precarious. The early experiences of the young Prince convinced him of the necessity of radical reform. One of the earliest steps taken toward his aims was the drafting of a new code to supplement the *sudebnik* of 1497, an endeavor to check the growing lawlessness by a firm and universal system of laws and courts, which the officials were called on to enforce. He undertook to abolish the institution known as *kormlenie*. This was the system whereby the administrative officials and judges derived their revenue from the exploitation of the areas to which they were assigned. Property rights were little affected. Serfdom at this time had not come into existence, but there was some effort to mitigate the horrors of slavery, which was still in existence. Parents


were forbidden to sell their children into slavery. Inheritance was regulated and some effort was made to the end that justice should be more accessible and impartial, but little was achieved in this direction.

In 1551 there was called an ecclesiastical council to pass on certain matters affecting the Church. The Church in Russia was under state control, and the government, as a rule, jealously maintained its privileged position. One of the things the council endeavored to do was to check the accumulation of the land in ecclesiastical hands. A printing press was likewise introduced, though it was hard to reconcile the backward people of Moscow to so radical and perilous an innovation. Reforms for the most part, however, dealt with matters of secondary importance. The religious enthusiasm that had spread to Russia from Mount Athos with Maxim Grec had little to do with what was ordinarily regarded as spiritual, and spent itself on observances of ritual and asceticism. The decisions of the council were embodied in the so-called *Stoglav* or Book of a Hundred Chapters, which for long was the authority appealed to in support of claims to orthodoxy in ritual and observances.

KAZAN CAPTURED

In 1552 Ivan headed a campaign against Kazan. This city, lying near the junction of the Kama with the Volga, perhaps founded originally by the White Bulgarians, had fallen under Mongol control. After the destruction of the Golden Horde by Tamerlane, Kazan had broken away and formed a daughter-state whose importance was based largely on the control of the Volga and the Kama, which gave access to the Tartar khanates of Siberia. The city was frequently embroiled with Astrakhan and the Nogai Tartars. It was this discord among his enemies that enabled the Russian Tsar to intervene. Moreover, the waterways gave easy access to these remote regions. Of all the Tartar states, it was, therefore, the most vulnerable. Ivan found a pretext for interfering in the civil discord consequent on a disputed succession, and though he was not able to install his *protégé*, he did erect a rival city on the Volga to com-

pel the subservience of the neighboring tribes, the Mordvians, Chuvashes, and the Cheremissi. The pillaging of Kazan at



Brown Brothers.

POKROV CATHEDRAL (COMMONLY KNOWN AS VASILII BLAZHENNYI), FACING THE RED SQUARE, MOSCOW. Built by order of Ivan IV (the Terrible) to commemorate the capture of Kazan.

the hands of the Nogai Tartars, just previously, indicated the helplessness of the city. In 1552 Ivan gathered a force of 39,000 men, of whom about 15,000 were armed in the western way,

although the whole force probably presented the appearance of a feudal rabble. On March 23 the siege of Kazan was begun, and on October 2 a general assault was made. The city fell before the energetic attack of its assailants, though it is questionable whether Ivan personally contributed anything to the success of the enterprise. Ivan followed this up two years later by despatching a force down the Volga against Astrakhan. This city was not formally annexed, but was brought within the Russian sphere of influence and under Russian control.

The victories of Ivan in the east had immeasurable results. They opened up to the Muscovites the navigation of the Middle and Lower Volga, thereby giving access to the Caspian and the most direct route to Siberia, up the Kama and its tributaries to the Tobol. Russian Cossacks and traders were destined to traverse and occupy this route within the next generation.

LIVONIA AND POLAND

Ivan now turned his attention to the Baltic. Here the two districts of Livonia and Courland presented a tempting prospect to the Tsar. The Hanseatic League, once so powerful in the Baltic, was now on the decline. The Livonian Knights had in the fourteenth century established their control of Courland, Livonia, and Esthonia. Denmark retained only a few fragments of her former possessions here. In 1410 the Teutonic Knights, combined now with the Livonian Knights, met a disastrous defeat at the Battle of Tannenberg (Grünwald). This defeat left Poland supreme in the Baltic. The Protestant Reformation accelerated the Order's decline. The last master of the Order, Albert of Brandenburg, secularized the estates of the Order and was confirmed in possession of them by the King of Poland, whom he recognized as suzerain. The Livonian Order split off from the Teutonic Knights and endeavored to protect its interests by negotiations with Moscow. The whole country sank into decay and offered an easy prize for any of its enterprising neighbors, Sweden, Moscow, Denmark, or Poland, who would take the trouble to occupy it.

The Baltic region lay to some extent outside of the Empire,

though the Emperor had formerly made some claim to the overlordship of the Teutonic Knights. Novgorod having been incorporated into the Muscovite state, there was friction over the control of the commerce with Moscow. In 1557 Ivan summarily repulsed a Livonian deputation which appeared in Moscow. Subsequently he loosed on Livonia the unbridled soldiery recruited among the Cheremissi. The country was overrun and given up to pillaging in 1558. A truce was asked and granted, and Livonia appealed to Moscow for terms. But negotiations broke down and Ivan proceeded to force the country into submission. Dorpat was besieged, taken by storm, and pillaged. Reval held out. But in 1559 a great victory was achieved by Kurbskii. It appeared that resistance was on the verge of collapse when the indomitable Grand Master, Kettler, appealed to the powers in turn for help, and the war continued to drag on. In 1557 the new King of Sweden, Eric XIV, was drawn in on the promise that he would be given certain coastal towns. In 1558 the King of Denmark put up the candidature of his brother for the title of King of Livonia. Poland in the meantime demanded the submission of Livonia to Polish suzerainty. It was evident that the country had become a European problem, and that both Moscow and Poland would have some voice in the final settlement. For some years matters hung in the balance, Ivan oscillating between the Swedish and the Polish alliances. Anastasia having died in 1560, Ivan proposed to marry one of the sisters of the Polish king, Sigismund Augustus. He probably had ulterior motives, hoping in some way to advance the Muscovite claims to Lithuania. In any case, the scheme fell through. Ivan then turned to Eric, King of Sweden, but here again a marital bargain was tied up with the proposed agreement. Ivan desired the hand of the Duchess of Finland, Catherine, sister-in-law of Eric. In 1563 the diplomatic seesaw left Sweden isolated and the King was forced to come to terms. He signed with Ivan the Treaty of Dorpat, though the treaty was never ratified. But in 1568 Eric was deposed and his brother John, Duke of Finland, became King. John's wife, Catherine, was the princess on whom Ivan had cast his eyes. John imme-

diately entered into diplomatic negotiations with the other powers involved, and in 1571 a treaty isolating Ivan was signed at Stettin. Ivan showed his resentment to Sweden by arresting and imprisoning the Swedish emissaries.

In 1571 Russia experienced a terrible raid by the Tartars, which came to the walls of Moscow. In 1570 Ivan offered the throne of Livonia, under Russian protection, to Magnus of Denmark, but the latter showed himself incompetent and ultimately abandoned his adventure and took refuge in Moscow. In 1572 Sigismund Augustus, King of Poland, the last of the Jagiellos, died. Some provision had immediately to be made for a new king. The result was an election in which Ivan was named a candidate. But in 1573 the Diet chose Henry of Valois, who married a Swedish princess. But Henry's time in Poland was short, for after a brief residence, he left the country. A new election took place in 1575. Ivan again was a candidate, but he was at no pains to conciliate the Polish nobility, and in fact adopted a rather high-handed attitude in his negotiations. The result was that the choice fell on Stephen Bathory, a young Transylvanian who had been put up as candidate by the Sultan. There was talk of a new election, and Ivan hastened to make terms with the Ottoman Empire with a view to promoting his own candidature once more. But no election was held, and Ivan therefore decided to secure what he could, in this case the rest of Livonia. Pernaul, Lode, Fikel, and Hapsel were taken and in 1577 Reval was besieged. Here the Russians were driven back. Magnus endeavored to take advantage of the situation to secure recognition as king, but he did nothing except to draw on him the fury of Ivan, who drove him across the frontier. In 1577 Bathory, having secured his position in Poland, prepared for a struggle with Ivan. With this period a new era in the relations of Russia and Poland was ushered in.

INTERNAL CONDITIONS

During the early part of his reign Ivan was much under the influence of the priest Sylvester and the noble Adashev. Their positions were those of counsellors, but it was inevitable that

they should become involved in the intrigues with which the person of the Tsar was surrounded. In 1553, during an illness of the Tsar, when the question of succession was raised, Ivan thought that he detected some lack of enthusiasm on the part of these associates in defending the succession of Ivan's own son. Other events, too, seemed to have conspired to bring the favorites under the Tsar's disfavor. Little is known of the circumstances, but it was hinted later that they had been privy to a plot to poison the Tsar's wife. Eventually Sylvester appears to have been relegated to some distant place of confinement. Adashev was thrown into prison and was executed after two years. His fall involved many of his friends and relatives.

One of the most disquieting developments of Ivan's later reign was the wholesale flight of nobles. The appanage princes and even the *boyars* had, during an earlier period, maintained the right to transfer their allegiance to another suzerain. It was by exploiting this right that the grand princes of Moscow and of Lithuania had succeeded in building up their principalities, but the same tendency could bring these principalities to ruin if the process were reversed. One subject of the Tsar who acquired notoriety during this reign was Prince Andrei Mikhailovich Kurbskii. Kurbskii was a descendant of Monomakh belonging to the elder branch of the Rurikovichi, among whom were the former princes of Smolensk and Yaroslavl. He had taken part in the Livonian campaign and had fallen under suspicion in court circles at that time. Relations became more and more strained, and eventually Kurbskii availed himself of the right of free emigration to flee to Poland, where he was welcomed by the King and given honor and preferment. In his retreat he began a literary career by writing a history of the times of Ivan and engaging in a spirited controversy with his former suzerain. His letters, the animated replies of Ivan, which have contributed much to our knowledge of the times, and the above-mentioned controversy throw an interesting light on the relations of the *boyars* with their sovereign. Much of the material in this controversy is irrelevant, and seems at this distance trivial, but it indicates a very deep resentment on the

part of the nobles and an equally great exasperation on the part of the Tsar.

THE OPRICHNINA

The final breach came at the end of 1564, when the Tsar withdrew from the capital to the little village of Alexandrov. From here he issued a manifesto recounting his bitter experiences at the hands of the clergy, *boyars*, officials, and secretaries, accusing them of dereliction in the defense of the Tsar, the state, and Christendom, and announcing his intention of abandoning his realm and residing whither Providence should call him. The effect of this proclamation was startling. The city of Moscow and the state functionaries of the capital decided to send a delegation headed by Pimen, Archbishop of Novgorod, begging Ivan not to forsake them, but to return. The Tsar acceded to their request, but indicated that he would impose his own conditions. In February, 1565, he returned and announced them. The first was that in future he would be free to banish from court all who were disloyal or disobedient. His second condition was that he should be free to execute certain persons and to confiscate their property. In these matters his decisions were not to be questioned. In addition, the Tsar proposed the formation of an institution to be known as the *oprichnina*, to consist of a separate court with its own *boyars*, retainers, officials, and courtiers. A special part of Moscow was set aside for their residence. The owners of that section of the city were to be summarily evicted to make room for them. Outside of the city some twenty towns and districts, as well as certain *volosts*, were assigned to the *oprichniki*. The former occupants were to be given holdings elsewhere. These first evictions took place during the depth of winter, and great hardships were endured by the evicted nobles, who had to travel long distances to the new holdings assigned them. Though the *oprichnina* did not constitute a compact area, it was concentrated to a certain degree in the northern and central districts. The remainder of the state, with its local military and judicial functions, was assigned for administrative purposes to

certain *boyars* known as the *Zemskie-boyare*. This part of the state was known as the *zemshchina*. The administrative departments continued to operate as before and to report to the Tsar. The state was thus divided into two halves and constituted a sort of dyarchy. Its administration bore a remote resemblance to that of the Roman empire as organized by Augustus, who divided authority between the Emperor and the Senate.

Ivan gave the new institution an elaborate organization and set it apart as far as possible from the rest of the state, which still continued to function under the direction of the *boyars*. He thus had an enormous (and the wealthiest) part of the state and its population under his direct control. It is true that he at first named as head of the *zemshchina* a converted Tartar, the Khan Yediger Simeon, and later another proselyte from Islam, Sain Bulat of Kasimov, rechristened Simeon Bekbulatovich, and conferred on the latter the title "The Tsar and Prince of all Russ," to whom he himself made obeisance. The *oprichnina* eventually became simply the *dvor* or court, and its *boyars* and officials the *dvorovye lyudi*, or courtmen. It seems probable that the institution was designed to safeguard the security of the Tsar and to provide him with a sanctuary from the violence of his *boyars*. Following this subdivision of the state, Ivan seems to have pursued a definite policy of rooting out recalcitrant members of the *boyar* class from their privileged places in society and depriving them of their holdings in land, banishing them to distant regions where they would be shorn of political power and cease to be a menace. The result was a reign of terror which set in and raged throughout the latter part of Ivan's life. The terror was a deliberate effort to liquidate the old nobility. In the new areas to which they moved they were brought under direct control. Ivan substituted for the old system of *votchina*, or allodial land, the *pomjestie* system, a conditional land tenure in return for service. In this way the old hereditary noble class found its position increasingly undermined by the new class of serving people who were drawn from the lower ranks of society and who came to occupy the best

regions of Muscovite territory and to hold the preferred positions in the state. Everything was done to promote the development of one and to hamper the development of the other. This policy was to have immeasurable results in the future.

FIRST COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND

A new chapter was opened in Muscovite history with the arrival in the winter of 1553-1554, in the Bay of St. Nicholas in the White Sea, of an English vessel, *Edward Bonaventure*, under the command of Sir Richard Chancellor. This ship was one of three fitted out on the suggestion of Sebastian Cabot by "The Governour of the Mysterie and Company of the Merchants Adventurers of the Citie of London, for the discovery of Cathay and other divers regions, dominions unknown." Two of the ships came to grief, but Chancellor landed and was welcomed cordially by the inhabitants, who induced him to proceed to the capital, where he arrived and presented the Tsar with the credentials with which he had been entrusted by King Edward. He was eagerly welcomed by the Grand Prince, who wished to establish diplomatic relations with the western powers. Chancellor was induced to take back with him an ambassador to the English court. The ship later returned but it was wrecked off the coast of Scotland. Chancellor was drowned, but the Muscovite ambassador who had been sent back by Ivan in Chancellor's company was saved and proceeded to London, where an exchange of diplomatic courtesies took place. The Tsar's motives in opening communications were mixed. He desired to secure from the west artisans and skilled workers, of which Russia stood in so much need; and he also wished to learn more exactly of the various industrial inventions with which the western world was equipped, especially those which related to military affairs. He appears later to have been anxious to arrange a matrimonial alliance with the English court. His various requests were only partly met by the English government. Elizabeth did not take his claims seriously and appeared to entertain them only to induce him to give privileges to English merchants. Negotiations dragged on for the next

twenty years on a somewhat unsatisfactory basis until finally Ivan's patience was exhausted and he sent the English ambassador, Horsey, from his court and broke off diplomatic relations. The effect of this was not so bad as might have been supposed. But in general the failure of England to profit by these advances proved to the advantage of their rivals, the Dutch, who were already on the ground and tried to establish a monopoly on trade in the White Sea. Nevertheless for the next two centuries English merchants continued to be active in Russia, but the Russian empire was regarded by them only as a means of approach to Persia and Central Asia. It was the trade with these distant regions that they most highly prized. The foundation for this trade was securely laid by the establishment, in 1553, of the Muscovy Company, which has endured down to the present.

THE LIVONIAN WAR

Toward the end of Ivan's reign the Polish question was again revived. On the death of the last of the Jagiellos, Henry of Valois had been elected King but, since he left the country precipitately, a second election was required. Ivan was a candidate in both elections, but in the second, in 1575, Stephen Bathory, a Magyar noble, was the successful candidate. The latter had served under the Sultan as Hospodar of Transylvania. He became King of Poland at a crucial time in the relations of the Poles with their eastern neighbors. The Polish kingdom had absorbed the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 1569, but this part of Poland was still almost exclusively Russian and Orthodox. Among the Lithuanian nobility there was a general move towards Polonization, and the Orthodox were more and more tempted into the Roman fold. The Counter Reformation, launched by the Council of Trent, was now under way, and the Jesuits had become active in the east. The old practice whereby nobles transferred their allegiance from sovereign to sovereign was already producing a crisis in Russia, where Ivan was coming to grips with the nobility. But so complex was the situation and so diverse the forces at work, that almost anything

could happen. Western Christendom was making desperate efforts to bring a decision in its favor.

Ivan had already been a candidate for the Polish throne. In case of his success Poland would have been incorporated with Moscow. But what was to prevent the opposite taking place—the incorporation of Moscow in the state which was already half Russian? Stephen Bathory decided to make the attempt to subjugate Moscow to Polish rule. He gathered an army together for this purpose, partly of Polish and partly of Hungarian and of western European elements. A rendezvous was fixed at Svir, May 4, 1579, and war was declared on Moscow.

Ivan had a formidable force to oppose the troops of the King of Poland, but, except in artillery, its training and equipment were beneath contempt. His intelligence service was also poor. Consequently he massed his forces at Pskov, expecting a Polish incursion into Livonia. Unfortunately Bathory had decided to thrust directly at the heart of Muscovite territory and marched eastward to Polotsk on the Dvina. The city was defended with great spirit and was well supplied with artillery, but was compelled to surrender. The whole of the valley of the Upper Dvina fell into Polish hands. Ivan's position was gravely menaced. Negotiations for peace languished, owing to Ivan's uncompromising tone. Hostilities were soon renewed. Bathory decided to make a serious invasion of Muscovite territory. In 1580 he resumed his operations. Marching eastward, he occupied Veliye and pressed eastward still further. He cut off the Muscovite force in Velikie Luki and began the siege of that place. Ivan attempted to distract Bathory by resuming negotiations, but on October 24 the place was stormed. This success exposed Livonia and the adjoining Russian territory to invasion. Even Staraya Rusa was burned.

Meanwhile the Swedes took advantage of Ivan's plight to invade Karelia and the Baltic coast of Livonia. Preparations were begun for a third campaign in 1581. But in January of this year negotiations for peace were opened at Warsaw. The Tsar was informed that the price of peace was Livonia. By the opening of the campaigning season Bathory had raised the

price for which he was willing to make peace. He demanded the cities of Novgorod, Pskov, Smolensk, the whole northern territory, Sevyerie, and a war indemnity of 400,000 ducats in addition to Livonia. These were his final terms. They were summarily rejected by Moscow. The war, therefore, continued. The first objective of Bathory was the city of Pskov. On August 25 the Poles arrived before the city and began its siege. The first assaults were unsuccessful and the siege dragged on through the fall and early winter, during which the besiegers were exposed to all the hardships of cold and hunger. The Swedes, in the meantime, pushed their advance along the Baltic coast and occupied a number of towns, finally arriving before Narva. The truculent Tsar was now disposed to be more reasonable in his terms, and the papal legate, Possevino, induced Ivan to begin negotiations with the Polish King. These opened in November. On January 15, 1582, the truce of Yam-Zapolski was signed. This truce was to last ten years; by its terms Ivan surrendered Livonia. Bathory agreed to recognize the Grand Prince of Moscow by his new title of "Tsar."

THE COSSACKS

The close of the sixteenth century is memorable in Russian history for the first steps that were taken toward the recovery for the Russian people of the steppes, which they had lost some four centuries earlier. These events were not unconnected with the great upheavals of the times. In general we may assume that they resulted from a weakening of the Tartar hold in these regions owing to the collapse of the Golden Horde. Various hordes that took its place were constantly at war with one another. These warring groups were in no position to resist pressure from the north. The result seems to have been that the worst menace to which the steppes were exposed was the general lawlessness of marauders, who preyed on exposed settlements, on caravans, and travellers that ventured into these wild regions. There seems to have been some trade with ports on the Black Sea, Kaffa, Azov, and Sudak. The Tartar popu-

lation having ceased to rule the Muscovites and the Poles, they now began to adopt a less active life in regions suitable for agriculture, such as the Crimea. This condition of affairs allowed the Russians to resume occupancy of the steppes. Those who pushed into the steppes were of necessity a wild lot who lived by hunting and fishing. They secured only such rights and protection as they were able to gain by their own efforts. There therefore developed in these regions a population that continually grew with accessions from the north as peasants and nobles,



Brown Brothers.

SOTNIA (SQUADRON) OF COSSACKS. The Cossacks were irregular cavalry, recruited and trained locally on the Cossack lands of the Don, Kuban, Terek, and various regions of Siberia. The Cossacks originated among the frontiersmen who roamed the steppes of the Ukraine and the south during the early modern period. They played an important part in the Time of Troubles and the wars between Poland and Russia, but their political significance declined after the time of Peter.

dissatisfied with their lot, crossed the frontier to begin a life in this no-man's land. About the middle of the sixteenth century the Muscovite state began to plant outposts in these regions to guard the settlements. These settlements were of a purely military character, placed at strategic points to command the southern approaches to Muscovite territory, especially the well-travelled trails followed by the Tartars in their raids. Such outposts were little more than blockhouses and a slender population that secured food by tilling land in the neighborhood.

There was no organized attempt to settle the country, but gradually the blockhouses attracted a population that became more or less stationary. Thus there came into existence a series of military settlements in the valleys of the Upper Don, of the Donets, along the Lower Dnieper and its tributaries. By the close of the reign of Ivan, the Cossacks, as the newcomers were known, were becoming an important factor, not only in the steppes, but in the whole Muscovite state. Along the Lower Dnieper the Zaporozhian Cossacks were already in occupation of the territory beyond the falls of the Dnieper and were shortly to act as a buffer between the Polish-Lithuanian state and the Crimean Tartars. Perhaps no element in the whole of Russian history is so unique as this mixed population, which reclaimed the steppes and extended Muscovite territory into Asia.¹

¹For the story of the part played by the Cossacks in the conquest and settlement of Siberia the reader is referred to the chapter, "Russia in Asia."

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THE TIME OF TROUBLES

THE death of Ivan, at the beginning of 1584, had decisive consequences. His eldest son having died as the result of a quarrel with his father, the throne passed to a younger son, Fedor, the second son, whose ill-health and immaturity rendered him incapable of guiding the state through troublous times. During Fedor's minority, affairs were directed by Nikita Romanovich, the uncle of the young Tsar. On Nikita's death his place was taken by Boris Godunov, brother of the young Empress Irina. Boris proved a competent ruler and carried on the work of Ivan, especially the conquest of the Khanate of Siberia. He also showed considerable military ability when he drove off a great Tartar raid in 1591. He also extended Russia's control in the northwest toward the Baltic. It was under Boris that the metropolitan of Moscow was raised to the rank of patriarch. The rise of Moscow as a power and the fall of Constantinople before the Turks made the Muscovite tsars dissatisfied with the subservience of the Muscovite Church to the Orthodox Church of Eastern Europe. Moreover, the "union" of the churches arranged by the Council of Florence and the rise of an independent Church in Lithuania, which had first achieved its independence and later been taken into the Roman Catholic fold by the Brest Council, was a challenge to the Orthodox Church. Boris induced the Patriarch Jeremiah of Constantinople to assume the position of patriarch of Moscow. The arrangement was not a happy one. Jeremiah was later persuaded to relinquish the post and consecrate the Metropolitan Job of Moscow as Patriarch. Undoubtedly the consent of the other patriarchs of the Eastern Church had been

obtained. Thus Moscow made a definite bid for the position of the "third Rome."

BORIS GODUNOV

It was under Boris that the first definite step was taken toward the imposing of restrictions on the freedom of the peasants. Under Ivan the peasants had been forbidden to leave one landowner and go to another except at certain specified periods. But the government's increasing dependence on the new serving nobility for its military forces made it imperative that these should have a regular source of livelihood. The right of the landowner to leave the Grand Prince had been, as we have seen, abridged in the interests of the security of the realm. But the ability of the landowners to serve the state was now compromised by the increasing mobility of the peasants, now drawn in great numbers to the steppes, where they could escape the demands of landlord and the exactions of the state. The bitter experience of Ivan, who found himself unable to marshal his full military power against Poland, compelled action. In 1592 a new registration of the peasants was ordered. In 1597 a special decree ordered that cases of removal since the beginning of 1592 should be brought before special courts for review, it being understood that peasants who had left prior to that date should be free. The flow of the tillers of the soil away from the central provinces did not by any means cease, but it was checked. The process was begun whereby the peasant was bound to the soil.

In 1598 the Tsar Fedor Ivanovich died without issue. The principle of inheritance would naturally require that the throne should pass to a brother if there were one. There had been born to Ivan and Maria Nagoi a young son, Dmitrii. On the accession of Fedor, he and his mother had been banished to Uglich, where in 1591 he died, apparently as the result of an accident in play. But attendants suspected the local representative of Godunov, Bitiagovskoi, whom they set on and killed. The populace, probably at the instigation of interested persons, generally ascribed the crime to Boris. Thus the death of Fedor

in 1598 was calamitous, especially as the Tsaritsa Irina subsequently turned her back on the world and retired into the Dyevichy monastery. There was no recourse but to summon a *Zemskii Sobor* to elect a successor. This assembly, perhaps under the influence of the Patriarch Job, chose Boris, who seems somewhat reluctantly to have accepted the proffered honor. As Tsar he continued the policies he had been instrumental in promoting under Fedor. He took steps however, to remove possible rivals—such as Fedor Nikich Romanov, who had been his chief rival in the election. Fedor was shaved and forced to enter a monastery. The Shuiskiis and the Golitsyns, scions of the old *boyar* nobility, were got out of the way by being appointed to distant posts.

One crisis that Boris was compelled to face was a famine that ravaged the country during the years 1601, 1602, and 1603. The famine, like so many that have scourged the land, was acute and widespread. Misery was rampant. Boris, out of respect for the public opinion of Europe, tried to keep the victims of the famine out of the sight of travellers by keeping the larger and more accessible markets well stocked with a somewhat ostentatious plenty. The famine was a symptom of a deep-rooted *malaise* that could not be neglected.

CIVIL WAR

The general dissatisfaction came to a head in a curious phenomenon, characteristic of seventeenth-century Moscovy. A contender for the throne appeared who claimed to be the Tsarevich Dmitrii, who, it had been given out, had perished at Uglich in 1591. The "False Dmitrii" appeared at Sambor, in Poland, where he gathered to himself Polish and Lithuanian supporters, as well as dissatisfied elements from Russia. From Sambor he started for Moscow in the fall of 1604, picking up on the way soldiers of fortune from western Europe, Cossacks from the steppes and the frontier posts, *stryeltsi*, and discontented nobles. Driven from Novgorod-Syeveriskii, the Pretender fell back on Putivl, in the steppes on the lower Seim, a tributary of the Desna. Putivl became his headquarters where, because of

his proximity to the steppes, it was possible to recruit reinforcements with ease. From Putivl the Pretender's rabble moved north to Kromy in 1605. Boris Godunov died somewhat suddenly during the siege of Kromy. His young son, Fedor, was acclaimed as Tsar. The older feudal nobility, now that the strong arm of Boris was withdrawn, showed their deep-rooted resentment at the rise to power of this upstart family by calling on the army to refuse allegiance to Fedor on the grounds that he was a usurper. They also pretended to believe the claims of the "False Dmitrii" authentic. Fedor was set on and killed and in June, 1605, Dmitrii arrived in Moscow and was installed in the Kremlin as the true Tsar. The new monarch, though welcomed in Moscow as a descendant of the Rurikovichi and publicly acknowledged as her son by Maria Nagoi (now the nun Martha), found himself extremely insecure. His ill-concealed preference for the Polish and Lithuanian nobility, his betrothal to a woman of Polish nationality, and the swarms of Catholics that followed in his train, aroused secret distrust which he could not dispel by the most rigid orthodoxy or the most ardent devotion to the interests of Moscow. The popular dissatisfaction emboldened the feudal aristocracy to form a conspiracy, to appeal to the mob to rise against the ill-concealed Polish regime, and to assassinate Tsar Dmitrii. Two days later, on May 19, 1606, one of their number, Vasilii Ivanovich Shuiskii, was proclaimed Tsar on the Red Square. In his person the old nobility was once more installed in power.

Tsar Shuiskii was in turn called on to defend the power that he had gained. In the south a new revolt spread northward. The new government found itself menaced by Bolotnikov, a soldier of fortune and an almost professional revolutionary; by a movement consisting of outlaws and led by one who was known as the "Thief;" and by the danger of foreign intervention. The nobles supported Tsar Shuiskii in his struggle with the disorders fomented by Bolotnikov, who, with his patron, Prince Gregory Shakhovskii, was defeated and killed. But the "Thief" summoned to his aid the great floating class of runaway peasants, the "free" Cossacks from the steppes, and the

dispossessed nobles and landowners. He also recruited large numbers of foreigners, including many Poles and Lithuanians. With a formidable force thus assembled he was able to march on Moscow and to occupy the village of Tushino, from which he threatened to establish a complete blockade of the city. He had a number of competent leaders who were extremely successful in rousing the countryside and all but succeeded in securing possession of the capital.

POLISH INTERVENTION

Meanwhile the Tsar had come to terms with Sweden and had surrendered to Charles IX the cities of Novgorod, Yam, Koporye, Orieshek, and Korela in the Baltic regions, in return for which he secured some badly needed trained soldiers. An armistice was also arranged with King Sigismund of Poland. In 1610 Skopin-Shuiskii, the cousin of Tsar Vasiliï and a very capable general, was strikingly successful in checking the forces of the "Thief" and finally compelled him to withdraw from Tushino to Kaluga. But already Sigismund had decided on intervention. In the fall of 1609 he crossed the boundary and began the siege of Smolensk. Skopin-Shuiskii died in the spring of 1610. His place was taken by Dmitriï Shuiskii, a brother of the Tsar, who allowed himself to be surprised on the road to Smolensk, July 17, 1610, by Sigismund's General Zolkievskii. Dmitriï's defeat led to the fall of Vasiliï, who was deposed and forced to enter a monastery. Authority in Moscow now passed into the hands of the *boyars*.

The victory of Klushino enabled Zolkievskii to enter the city and there to demand the implementing of an agreement that had been drawn up at Tushino earlier, according to which a group of dignitaries, including Philaret Romanov, had expressed their willingness to recognize Sigismund's son Vladislav as Tsar, provided he would govern with the aid of the *Boyarskaya Duma* and the *Zemskii Sobor*, the great national deliberative bodies. A gathering of the *boyars* present in Moscow somewhat reluctantly accepted Vladislav, and a grand embassy was despatched to Sigismund at Smolensk. Sigis-


mund had now decided to secure the throne for himself and thus to unite Moscow with Poland. The ambassadors resisted this plan of Sigismund as well as that of Zolkievskii. The latter retired while the Russian dignitaries were arrested and deported to Poland.

Meanwhile the "Thief" had been killed by one of his followers, December 11, 1611, but a movement of revolt had begun around the person of Hermogenes, Patriarch of Moscow. The suspicion that Sigismund and the Jesuits were secretly plotting to win Russia for Catholicism enabled the Patriarch to appeal to the religious prejudices of the people and to put himself at the head of a great national and patriotic movement. Hermogenes was arrested, but the call he sent out resulted in the gathering of a great army outside of Moscow at Easter, 1611. This popular movement was headed by Procopius Liapunov, Prince Dmitrii Trubetskoi, and Ivan Zarutskii, who managed to organize a regular government to take over the administration of the country. But friction broke out between the nobles and the Cossacks, large numbers of whom had joined the movement. In the end the Cossacks assassinated Liapunov, and their allies dispersed to their homes.

NATIONAL REVIVAL

In the fall of 1611, while Sigismund was still in possession of the Kremlin, a popular movement began at Nizhnii Novgorod which fused with that already launched by the ecclesiastical authorities, the Patriarch Hermogenes and the Archimandrite Dionysius of the Troitsa-Sergieï monastery (in the neighborhood of Moscow). There a patriotic citizen of middle-class origin, Kozma Minin Sukhoruk, joined a movement to raise funds for a military force to save Russia from the foreigners. The citizens were induced to make a levy on themselves of a third of their annual income. With the sum so raised an army, commanded by Prince Dmitrii Mikhailovich Pozharskii, was organized. Other cities in the north and east were induced to join the movement, and, with these reinforcements, Pozharskii occupied Yaroslavl, on the Middle Volga, where it

was proposed to call a national assembly to elect a new tsar. In July, to prevent Polish reinforcements from reaching Moscow, Pozharskii moved toward the capital. Coming to terms with the Cossacks, he attacked and defeated the reinforcements and tightened his blockade of the city. On October 22 Kitai Gorod was stormed and captured. Four days later the Polish garrison in the Kremlin surrendered and Moscow was set free.



Brown Brothers.

NIKOLSKAYA GATE TO THE KITAI GOROD, MOSCOW.

Shortly after these events, a summons went out for a national assembly to convene in Moscow. In January representatives of fifty cities, representing almost all classes in the state, gathered at Moscow to choose a new sovereign. Various candidates were considered. The choice finally fell on Michael Fedorovich Romanov, the son of Fedor Nikich Romanov (the Patriarch Philaret). Michael Romanov was extremely reluctant to accept the honor and gave his consent unwillingly.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TROUBLES

The "Time of Troubles" was more than an episode in Russian history. It brought to an end one epoch and ushered in another. Its significance is best summarized in the words of a famous historian:

In analyzing the causes of the Time of Troubles, we have called it the last manifestation of that double crisis through which the Muscovite state passed in the sixteenth century. The political side of this crisis appeared as a struggle between the sovereign power and the feudal aristocracy. The struggle had, even before the Time of Troubles, completed the ruin of the princely aristocracy and established the courtly nobility. In the first period of the Time of Troubles, the courtly nobility exhausted its own powers in the struggle for the throne, and fell a victim to civil strife. The fall of the leading families of the court circle allowed the remains of the feudal nobility, led by the Shuiskiis, to again rise to power with their quite reactionary program. But the lack of public support and a series of risings overthrew the oligarchic government of the nobility. Then as a result of a compromise between the feudal nobility and the more recently created aristocracy, there was formed the plan for a union with the Polish-Lithuanian state, according to which, power was to belong to the Duma under the presidency of a sovereign of the house of Vasa. But this project brought the fall of the governing class of *boyars*. Repressed by Sigismund and his "confidants," the *boyars* never recovered, and the new dynasty of the seventeenth century, by foresight and diplomacy, and without the use of naked force, were enabled to form their own ruling class on the basis of bureaucratic service and courtly favor. This is one of the chief consequences of the Time of Troubles.

The other side of the crisis of the sixteenth century represents a very complex process in the struggle for land and workers. Governmental practice and ways of life, linked the right of land-holding with the right to serf labor. The discontent of the mass of the workers bound to the soil was expressed in the centre and on the fringes of the state in an accelerated exodus of peasants to newer lands and to the Cossack settlements. The emigration of the population brought with it attempts from the government, and the landowners, to restrict the exodus and retain the population on the private estates. But these efforts only created friction between the representatives of smaller landowners and the greater, and strengthened the animosity of the serfs towards the social order by which they were oppressed. Going off to the steppes, they formed Cossack *stanitsas* or, settling down once more into a position of humiliating

dependence, "the landlord's people" were ripe for revolt against the state. They took advantage of the revolt of the first pretender and supported him, and later, they once more followed Bolotnikov to Moscow now with the frank desire for a social revolution. But they were too weak for that order against which they were in revolt. The Cossacks and serfs were defeated by Shuiskii; but without delay they again came to Moscow in the train of the Thief of Tushino. A second failure forced them to make common cause with the people against a foreign yoke. In the camp under the walls of Moscow, they succeeded in overpowering the serving people and setting up a government on the land. But this very triumph of the "thieves" roused the resistance of the *zemshchina*, who had without delay begun a sharp struggle with the Cossacks and had defeated them; some joined the service of the *zemshchina* in subordination to their power; others left the country. Their leader, Zarutskii, dreamed of founding his own state on the Caspian, established relations with the nomads and with Persia, thought of organizing the Cossacks of the steppes along the Cossack rivers. But a ten-year struggle of the Cossacks with the state had already proved that there was no chance of his coming to arrangements with them. A shrewd observer of events, Isaiah Massa, in August, 1614, wrote home with reference to Zarutskii, "I am quite sure that he will be finished in less than two months." The victory of Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov, over the Cossacks, Massa called one of the Tsar's most important victories. That is what everybody thought. The Don Cossacks did not join Zarutskii. They preferred peaceful relations with Moscow to a new and risky undertaking against that state, and the government succeeded in establishing with the Cossacks relations of unique kind that were neither direct subjection, nor political protectorate. This is the important consequence of the popular victories of 1612.

Thus the Time of Troubles saw the elimination of the old *boyars* and the defeat of the Cossacks. The upper and lower strata of Muscovite society lost, and the middle social classes won out. Their militia controlled Moscow, their leaders directed the country's affairs up to the selection of Michael Romanov. Before the Time of Troubles and during its early stages, the memory of the noble "lords" of the Russian land went back to the "grand and the appanage princes," who were vassals only to the "great lords of Moscow." They were the governing class and gave to society an aristocratic tinge. It was they with whom Ivan the Terrible had struggled. He destroyed them but was unable to erase their memory, and the new nobility created by Ivan strove to emulate in everything except political tendencies these same "lords." They appropriated the forms of their princely land tenure and were ready to inherit their pride and scrupulous regard for "family pride" and honor. The Time of Troubles swept away all these aristocratic relics and brought to

the front the simple noble and the "respectable" burgher. They became the real strength of society instead of the fallen nobility. In a word, there took place a change in the governing class and the last remnants of the ancient social regime disappeared.¹

Lower down in the scale of society, other changes were taking place, by which the old class lines were being obliterated. Slavery was dying out for the simple reason that there was no longer a source from which new slaves could be recruited. Warfare was no longer a local affair, and forays played a role of constantly diminishing importance. In the national wars that were now the vogue, prisoners were frequently exchanged and seldom passed into a servile condition. The ranks of the unfree were now recruited almost exclusively from insolvent debtors. But not all of these remained permanent slaves. A large number of persons entered the servile class by way of the *kabbala*, a status in which the debtor was bound to his creditor for the services necessary to discharge the interest on his loan. But this relation was terminated by the death of the creditor.

Thus the agricultural laborer, though still in the overwhelming majority, technically free, and possessed of the right to leave the land he tilled, was finding his liberty more and more circumscribed. During the course of the sixteenth century, the period during which he was free to change his abode was restricted to two weeks before and one week after St. George's Day, and this rule was made applicable to all Muscovite territory. Contracts had to be renewed or terminated at this time. The government found that the new serving class, unable to exploit its land holdings owing to this instability in the labor supply, was being seriously hampered in the discharge of its obligations to the state. As its demands on the nobility continued to increase, it had perforce to intervene in an effort to compel the peasants to remain stationary throughout the greater part of the working year. Serfdom for the peasant was thus complementary to compulsory state service for the nobility.

¹ S. F. Platonov, *Ocherki po Istorii Smuty v Moskovskom Gosudarstve XVI-XVII vv.* (Outline of the History of the Time of Troubles in the Muscovite State in the XVI and XVII Centuries). 3rd ed., St. Petersburg, 1910, pp. 535-537. (Author's translation.)

The only way in which either could be evaded was by flight beyond the frontier or into the steppes, where the Cossack settlements had begun to take form. Here the population, which lived mostly by hunting and fishing, and only to a small extent from agriculture, or from pastoral pursuits, took its chances with the Tartar raiders and robbers who shared the occupation of the steppes with it and with whom it was liable to be confused.

[11]

MICHAEL ROMANOV, 1613-1645


THE statues of Minin and Pozharskii that stand on the Red Square in Moscow before the Cathedral of Vasiliï Blazhennyi, erected by "a grateful country," testify to the relief with which the liberation of Moscow from foreign domination was greeted by a country that had known almost a generation of anarchy. But, although the Polish garrison of the Kremlin had been compelled to surrender, the foreign yoke had not been entirely shaken off nor had internal security been completely achieved. These tasks were to be the life work of the first two of the new dynasty, and Russia's acquiescence in the Romanovs' rule is largely the measure of their success.

WAR WITH POLAND AND SWEDEN CONTINUES

Russia was still at war with her two chief enemies—Sweden and Poland. The defenselessness of Muscovy had allowed Sweden, by appropriating Novgorod and Nöteborg on the Neva, to lay the basis of a new state under the new Swedish King, Gustavus Adolphus. James I of England sought to mediate between the two powers, obviously with a view to securing the interests of English trade. After protracted negotiations, Sweden ceded Novgorod in return for the fortresses of Ivangorod, Yam, Koporye, and a grant of 100,000 roubles. Thus by yielding up her direct access to the Baltic, Russia secured the return of the treasured city of Novgorod, together with Staraya Rusa, Glov, and Porkhan. The definitive treaty which was signed at Stolbovo on March 10, 1617, was acclaimed

at Moscow as a triumph for Russia, since it brought the recognition by Sweden of Michael as Tsar.

Meanwhile, in January, 1616, as Russia had refused to accept Vladislav as Tsar, and as the Poles had refused to acknowledge Michael Romanov, hostilities had broken out with Poland. Both sides, in the hope of securing allies, began to adopt dilatory tactics. The Muscovite ambassadors succeeded in dissuading the Emperor Matthias from assisting Poland. At Constanti-



*Adapted from Freeman, "Historical Geography of Europe."
Courtesy of Longmans, Green & Co.*

nople the Sultan Akmed was induced to coöperate in the Russian invasion of Poland by sending a force of 20,000 men against the Polish fortress of Khotin. The anticipated assistance was not, however, forthcoming when, in the spring of 1617, Prince Vladislav crossed the Muscovite frontier and began the invasion of Russia. The country had not yet recovered from the demoralization of the Time of Troubles, and the imposing Polish host met with scarcely any resistance. Dorogobuzh fell in September; in October the conqueror entered Vyazma, where he

remained for the winter and from which he summoned the Muscovites to make their submission to him as their lawful sovereign. But the capital had been put in a state of defense and the Pozharskiis, Demetrius Mikhailovich, the hero of the Time of Troubles, and his less famous cousin, Demetrius Petrovich, were sent at the head of the military forces to hold the approaches to Moscow. But Vladislav was able to effect a junction with the Hetman Sahajadiczny and his 20,000 Cossacks on the Oka and, on the night of October 1 (11), 1618, he made a night assault on Moscow which was repulsed with heavy loss. Vladislav thereupon offered to open negotiations for peace, but his terms were rejected. Open defections of their allies brought the Poles to reason and they finally agreed to begin serious negotiations at Deulina, near the Troitsa-Sergie monastery. Two months of negotiations brought mutually satisfactory terms. A truce of fourteen years and six months was concluded. The Poles recognized Michael as Tsar of Muscovy and acquired an extensive tract in the Dnieper valley from Byelaya in the north to Chernigov in the south, including the towns of Smolensk, Starodub, and Novgorod-Syverskii. In accordance with the terms of the treaty, the Tsar's father, Philaret, Metropolitan of Rostov, was allowed to return from captivity in Lithuania. He was thereupon enthroned as Patriarch, a position to which he had been named by "the Thief" of Tushino, though he does not appear to have actually filled either that position or that of Metropolitan, to which the first Pseudo-Demetrius had appointed him. Now, however, in view of his reputation for discretion and in recognition of his experience and the trials through which he had gone, he was allowed to become a sort of joint regent with Michael, with whom he ruled till his death in 1633.

The Peace of Deulina was nothing more than an armed truce to be broken when the first favorable opportunity arose. The two rulers, therefore, used the respite to prepare for such an occasion. Finances were put in order and an effort was made to ensure the prompt and regular payment into the state coffers of taxes, in regard to which there had arisen the most shocking

GENEALOGICAL TABLE DYNASTY OF THE ROMANOVs ROMAN IURIEVICH ZAKHARIN-KOSHKIN.

Nikita Romanovich (Boyar). Anastasia Romanovna (Consort of Ivan the Terrible).

Fedor Nikitich (Patriarch Philaret).

Tsar Michael Fedorovich (1613-1645).

Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich (1645-1676).

Tsar Fedor (1676-1682). Tsar Ivan (1682-1689). Emperor Peter I, the Great (1682-1725) = Catherine I (1725-1727).

Catherine (Mecklenburg). Anna (Courland)

Anna Leopoldovna (Brunswick). (1730-1740)

Ivan VI Antonovich (1740-1741).

Aleksei.

Anna (Holstein).

Elizabeth (1741-1761).

Peter II (1727-1730). Peter III (1761-1762) = Catherine II (1762-1796).

Paul I (1796-1801).

Alexander I (1801-1825). Constantine. Nicholas I (1825-1855). Michael.

Alexander II (1855-1881). Constantine. Nicholas. Michael.

Nicholas. Alexander III (1881-1894). Vladimir. Aleksei. Sergei. Paul

Nicholas II (1894-1917). Michael.

Aleksei

From Platonov, "History of Russia." Courtesy of The Macmillan Co.

irregularities. To enable them the more readily to provide military contingents, the nobility were conciliated by measures taken to prevent the flight of peasants, and by enactments that runaway serfs might be reclaimed at any subsequent date. The restoration of order over the distracted countryside was undertaken by a travelling commission, which inquired into local conditions and was authorized to redress the grievances of the gentry.

The reorganization of the army was begun. Mercenary soldiers schooled in the religious wars of western Europe, and refugees set adrift by religious persecution, were eagerly welcomed into the Muscovite service. The Poles, Germans, and Irish provided the largest contingents, but there were plenty of Scots and Englishmen. These men, many of them hardened professional soldiers, were authorized to train and discipline the motley levies of the serving gentry who made up the military forces of the Muscovite Tsar. But chief reliance was placed on the special contingents, the Cossacks, the *zheldaki*, special corps of light-armed troops, and the *stryeltsi*. The *zheldaki* were recruited from among beggars, but the *stryeltsi* resembled the *Janissaries*, quartered with their wives and families in the neighborhood of the capital or the other towns. Like the urban cohorts of Rome, they acted as police and firemen in time of peace, in return for a fixed salary and special allowances.

WAR WITH POLAND RENEWED

Hostilities were renewed with the Poles in 1621. The occasion for the fighting was the announcement conveyed from Constantinople to Moscow by a special emissary, Thomas Cantacuzene, that the Sultan was about to invade Poland. The Patriarch of Constantinople urged that Russia should coöperate with Gustavus Adolphus in striking a blow for Protestantism against the Catholic powers, including Poland. A *Zemskii Sobor*, convened in 1621, authorized the Tsar to intervene. But, to the dismay of the Russians, the Sultan Osman suffered a signal defeat before the fortress of Chocim on the Dniester at the hands of the redoubtable Grand Hetman of Poland, Jan

Karol Chodkiewicz at the head of an army of 65,000 men. On October 9 of this year the Poles dictated a humiliating treaty to the Turks. The Russians reconsidered their decision and postponed the war, but in 1632 the death of King Sigismund III brought matters to a head. The interregnum that succeeded his death encouraged Michael to break the truce. A *Zemskii Sobor* authorized the recruiting and maintenance of large levies for the campaign against Poland. Foreign artificers and soldiers were imported from Sweden and the west. A strong and well-armed force advanced in the late summer of 1632 to recover territory lost to Poland; Serpyeisk surrendered on October 12 (23); Dorogobuzh on October 18 (29); and at the beginning of November, the siege of Smolensk was begun. But early in 1633 the newly elected King Vladislav, collecting a force of 16,000 Poles and 15,000 Cossacks, marched to the relief of the city. Here in August he stormed two of the Muscovite camps and actually succeeded in blockading Shein's force in his main camp and driving off troops coming up from Dorogobuzh to his relief. Finally, after a siege of six months, Shein was compelled to surrender. The troops were disarmed and dismissed on parole. Shein and Ismailov, on their arrival in Moscow, were arrested, put on trial for their failure, and put to death. But though the Poles had made good their hold on Smolensk, they were unable to capture Byelaya, where they encountered a severe check. They also found themselves menaced by their ancient enemies, the Turks, who were in arms in 1633, but whom they succeeded in defeating at Paniowce. But rumours of the intention of the Sultan to raise a new armament sobered the Polish leaders and led them to welcome negotiations for peace with Moscow, which was finally concluded at Polyanovka in March, 1634. The Poles conceded Michael the title of Tsar, though not with the addition of "of all the Russias," for the simple reason that two of the so-called Russias—Black and Red Russia—were in Polish territory. The Tsar renounced all claim to Livonia, Esthonia, and Courland, and paid a war indemnity of 100,000 roubles.

SEIZURE OF AZOV BY THE DON COSSACKS

In 1637 came one of the most daring feats of arms of Muscovite history. This was the seizure of the Turkish town of Azov, at the mouth of the Don, by a mixed force of Zaporozhian and Don Cossacks.¹ Since the Time of Troubles there had been grave discontent among the Cossacks which had led to outbreaks of violence, robbery, and piracy. The Cossacks had formed the practice of descending in their boats (called *strugi*) the streams flowing into the Euxine, where they had preyed on commerce and even ventured to attack Turkish towns such as Sinope and Iconium. The Muscovite tsars disclaimed responsibility for the acts of these freebooters, one group of whom, the Zaporozhian and Ukrainian Cossacks, were under Polish suzerainty. The Don Cossacks were only nominally under Muscovite rule. The immunity which they enjoyed encouraged them to venture to attack the town and fortress of Azov. The Turks naturally resented the intrusion of Muscovite power into the Euxine, which they regarded as a *mare clausum*. The seizure of Azov was an outrage doubly to be resented. Sultan Ibrahim I set out with a powerful armament to eject these daring outlaws. But the Cossacks put up an extraordinary defense which the Turks could not break down, and, on September 26 (October 7), the siege was raised. The Cossacks thereupon offered the place to the Muscovite Tsar. A national assembly (*Zemskii Sobor*) was summoned to consider the matter in January, 1642. Pressure was brought to bear on Michael to accept the "Greek gift," and he toyed with the idea. Eventually he decided to decline the offer and to instruct the Cossacks to withdraw, which they did after destroying the fortress. Russia's acquisition of the famous port would have been hastened by one hundred and fifty years had it not been for the pusillanimity of the Russian government.

In 1642 a project was broached for the betrothal of Michael's

¹ Azov (the ancient Tanais) had been during the Middle Ages a Venetian *entrepôt* known as Tana. It fell into the hands of the Tartars and, when the latter became vassals of the Ottoman Porte in the fifteenth century, it became virtually a Turkish port.

daughter, Irene, to Waldemar, the young son of the King of Denmark. After one failure the Tsar, by undertaking that Waldemar would not be compelled to accept the Orthodox faith, finally induced King Christian IV to allow his son to set out for the Muscovite court. Upon his arrival in Moscow early in 1644 he was immediately, in violation of the express promise of Michael, subjected to pressure to abjure his faith, a demand which he peremptorily rejected. On his refusal, he was held a close prisoner while ecclesiastical dignitaries, as well as the Tsar, plied him with inducements to apostatize. Waldemar stood firmly by his refusal and, as his confinement became more and more close, he resorted to stratagems and intrigue in the effort to escape from his prison. But all to no avail. He was retained under close guard for more than a year, and even his father's peremptory demands for his release had no effect. But on July 12, 1645, Michael died quite suddenly. The new tsar Alexei, who succeeded Michael, generously allowed the unwilling bridegroom-elect to depart for his native land.

[12]

ALEXEI MIKHAILOVICH, 1645-1676

TO RUSSIA at the middle of the seventeenth century the most vital question in her external affairs was her relations with Poland. The combined Polish-Lithuanian state had profited by Moscow's weakness under the Mongol yoke to expand at Russia's expense southeast into the steppes. Here the rise of the Cossack settlements which acted as a buffer against Tartar aggression brought fresh difficulties. The Cossacks were restive under any restraint, but religious differences rendered them especially impatient of Polish rule. In common with the rest of the Russian population of the Polish-Lithuanian state, they had clung fanatically to the Orthodox faith despite efforts to detach them from their church.

The Council of Trent (1545-1563) had launched the Counter-Reformation. The Order of Jesus played an active part in the effort to recover ground lost to the Protestants. In addition to reclaiming Poland from Protestantism, the Catholic zealots sought to extend papal influence into Orthodox lands. In Lithuania the situation of the Orthodox had always been anomalous. Both Poland and Lithuania had been converted to the western form of Roman Catholicism, to which they were sincerely attached. The grand princes of Lithuania had been tolerant of the beliefs of their Orthodox subjects, despite the fact that their Orthodoxy would naturally draw them toward their Muscovite brethren. Moscow also found this ecclesiastical allegiance, which overleapt state frontiers, somewhat embarrassing. The Russian Church was nominally subject to the Patriarch of Constantinople, and most of its early metropolitans were

Greeks. But, with the growth of Moscow as the new political center of the Russian people, there was a tendency to make it likewise the spiritual center, and to demand that the Metropolitan of Russia should be of Russian origin.

The Orthodox Russians in Lithuania were less inclined to stress the narrow national basis of the Orthodox Church, and usually had put up their own candidate for the metropolitan see. The Council of Florence (1439), which had decreed the union of the two churches, had brought this latent friction to a head. Isidore, the Greek Metropolitan of Russia who had represented the Russian Church at Florence and had approved the union, was repudiated on his return to Moscow. A complete break with Constantinople ensued, and a new Metropolitan of Moscow was chosen by a council of Russian bishops. Constantinople, however, continued the appointment of a metropolitan for the Orthodox Church who resided at Kiev. Thus the Russian Church had been split in two. At first the Kievan Church had recognized the authority of the Pope but, with the fall of Constantinople, Greek influence was at an end and the political forces making for unity within the whole of the Eastern Church were weakened. In the Orthodox Church in Lithuania there was likewise a revulsion against union with Rome, but the result was not in favor of Moscow. Instead, Lithuanian ecclesiastical affairs became subject solely to the King of Poland.

During these years there was a notable spiritual decline which no power could check. Corruption spread among the hierarchy. Suggestion had been made from time to time that, failing to find spiritual support from the head of the Muscovite Church, the abuses could be properly corrected only by union with Rome. This the Counter-Reformation made possible. The Jesuit emissary Possevino, despatched to Moscow as pontifical legate in 1581, had succeeded in arranging the following year, 1582, the truce for ten years between Ivan the Terrible and Stephen Bathory, King of Poland. Unquestionably the ultimate aim of Possevino was to consummate the Union of Florence, which had been in suspense. But whatever the intentions of Ivan, his death in 1584 put an end to this project.

The period of Muscovite history that followed was scarcely propitious for its revival. It was therefore in Lithuania that the next move was made. In 1595 a council of orthodox clergy was summoned at Brest and there it was decided to address to the Pope and the King of Poland a declaration of their willingness to accede to the Union of Florence on condition that their ceremonies and discipline were not to be affected by the change. Delegates were sent to Rome to offer the submission of the Orthodox Church in Poland to the apostolic see. At Brest, in the following year, a synod was held to confirm the union. A strong opposition to the proposal had already developed in Lithuania. At the synod two parties, the Uniate bishops and their opponents, who refused to be drawn into union, solemnly excommunicated one another. The Orthodox Church in Poland was thus severed into two bitterly opposed camps.

BOGDAN KHMELNITSKII AND THE UKRAINE

The other question that deeply affected Russo-Polish relations was that of the Cossacks. Of the Cossack communities in the southern steppes, the most strategically placed was that of the Zaporozhian Cossacks that was established on the Lower Dnieper, with its *Syech* on an island below the rapids. The communities were self-administering, electing their own Ataman¹ and another official, the *starshina*. The Ataman received the insignia of office directly from the King of Poland, but was responsible solely to the *Kosh*, whose general assembly, the *Obshchaya Skhodka*, might review his acts at the conclusion of his year of office. The Cossacks acted as a buffer between the Polish republic and its Tartar neighbors, but they were a source of constant trouble to the state, as the discontented serfs were always being drawn away to join the "free" or unregistered Cossacks along the border. The Council of Brest and the formation of the Uniate Church further strained their relations with Poland, since the Orthodox and the "disunited" Orthodox found in the Cossacks strong champions of their Orthodoxy.

¹ "Ataman" (Ukrainian-Hetman) is probably a Polish corruption of the German "*hauptmann*."

Moreover, the wild, lawless life led by the Cossacks also was constantly threatening to embroil Poland with the Ottoman Porte. After a series of bold raids in 1631 and 1635, the Cossacks rose against the Poles. The revolt was put down and the Cossacks' humiliation was complete. They remained passive when the Tartars carried out a stupendous raid of Poland in 1640. The friction between the Polish government and their restive subjects, and between the truculent Pans and the Russian peasants, came to a head during the later years of King Vladislav when the Cossack Bogdan Khmel'nitskii was goaded into violence by the oppression of a local Polish magnate, Daniel Czaplinskii, an official of Chigorin. Khmel'nitskii was unable to obtain redress from the government but Vladislav apparently hinted that, if Khmel'nitskii took matters in his own hands, he, Vladislav, would look the other way. The result was a widespread revolt of which Khmel'nitskii was the head, in 1648. The registered Cossacks were seduced from their allegiance to the Polish crown. The Polish forces under the younger Potocki were overwhelmed at the battle of *Zheltye Vody*, or Yellow Waters, May 16, 18-19, 1648. Potocki's father retired, but was ambushed at Kruta Balka (or Hard Plank). Some of his men were massacred, while others were taken prisoners. At this crisis King Vladislav died.

There ensued throughout the Ukraine a peasant insurrection of incalculable fury. Polish authority disappeared overnight. Both Poles and Jews were everywhere massacred. Khmel'nitskii then proposed to dictate his terms to the Poles, while the Poles in turn maneuvered for time to reassert their authority. Eventually, on September 23, 1648, a Polish army of 40,000 marched south and encountered the Cossacks near Pilyava. After three days of fighting, the Polish host was scattered. But the victory was not followed up. The new King, John Casimir, recognized Khmel'nitskii by sending him the *bulawa* (baton) and the *baushchuk* (horsehair standard). He was also induced to retire to Kiev, where he set up his so-called court, in which he revelled in barbaric splendor and indulged his uncouth tastes. In 1649 he sought alliance with the Turks, and invaded Poland

when the Poles, under Prince Jeremiah Wisniowiecki, held up the Cossack host at Zborow for a month. The Cossacks and their allies were engaged at Zborow on the banks of the Strypa by the Polish army, now reinforced by John Casimir. The Tartars were bought off and induced to retire. The royal forces then fought Khmelnitskii to a standstill. Both sides were now ready for peace. On August 21, 1649, the compact of Zborow was signed, by which Khmelnitskii was recognized as Ataman of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. He was also granted the *starosta* of Chigorin as his appanage, and the number of registered Cossacks was increased to 40,000. The garrison of Zbaraz was ransomed by 400,000 guldens and an amnesty was granted the Cossacks. Jews, Pans, and Jesuits were excluded from their domains, and all official dignities in the Orthodox palatinates of Kiev, Chernigov, and Braclav were to be held solely by Orthodox gentry. In return for these concessions Khmelnitskii did homage to the King of Poland, and was duly pardoned by the Chancellor of Lithuania.

Meantime the Muscovite state showed alarming symptoms of internal weakness. The Tsar was young and inexperienced, and forces were at work in the Muscovite world that were difficult to control. Increased communication with the western world was bringing swarms of adventurers in search of wealth and position. Contact with strange customs, and the privileges that the outlanders enjoyed because of superior skill and experience in trade and industry, roused the jealousy of a backward people toward their more successful foreign rivals. This ill feeling led to outbreaks in Novgorod and Pskov which the government was in no position to suppress. They were, of necessity, dealt with by conciliatory measures in which the Archbishop Nikon played a considerable role. The government shut its eyes to the treasonable contumacy of the trouble makers in these cities and secured their submission by a proffer of clemency. Some severity was resorted to as a means to enable the government to save its face. Because of the external menace it was not possible to do more. The Cossack revolt had made Moscow's relations with Poland exceedingly delicate.

The immunity enjoyed by Khmelnitskii encouraged the Muscovite government to exploit Poland's difficulties, and a protest was lodged at Warsaw against the abuse of the freedom enjoyed by the Polish press in publishing defamatory books on Russia. The truth was that western cultural influences were coming in through Poland by way of Kiev. The consequent impact of new ideas on a backward people produced a revulsion against these ideas. The Poles were compelled to temporize, however. Vladislav publicly burned parts of the offending publications to appease Moscow. But in July, 1651, the Poles succeeded in defeating Khmelnitskii at Bereshteczko. Moscow's policy thereupon became more conciliatory. Khmelnitskii was left to himself in the Ukraine, from whence he interfered in Wallachia, Moldavia, and Transylvania. He even assumed a condescending attitude toward the Ottoman Porte, whose friendship he courted to use against his enemies, Russia and Poland. In 1652 he inflicted still another defeat on the Poles at Batoka, on the Moldavian frontier. In 1653 Poland decided to avenge this defeat. Armed preparations were authorized for the invasion of the Ukraine. In addition, the Poles summoned Khmelnitskii to sever relations with the Tartars and to send his son as a hostage to Warsaw. This the Ataman bluntly refused to do. He declared his intentions of making his submission to Moscow and called on the whole population of the Ukraine to resist the Polish pretensions. Negotiations were opened at Pereyaslavl in January, 1654, with Moscow. In return for their allegiance, the Cossacks were confirmed by Moscow in all their former privileges and the number of the registered Cossacks was increased to 60,000. Thus began the final struggle between Russia and Poland for the possession of the Ukraine.

WAR WITH POLAND

Negotiations were still being carried on with Poland with reference to the publication of defamatory books. Unable to get satisfaction from John Casimir, the *Zemskii Sobor* decided in October, 1654, on war with Poland. Steps were taken to

prepare for the inevitable hostilities by securing the neutrality of Louis XIV and of the Emperor Ferdinand III. In April the Muscovite troops began their march toward the Polish frontier and in May the Tsar Alexei left for the theater of war. During the summer of 1654, despite the ravages of cholera which raged throughout Muscovy, Russian armies under the leadership of Prince Alexander Nikich Trubetskoi and Bogdan Khmelnitskii were everywhere triumphant in Lithuania; Dorogobuzh, Byelaya, Polotsk, and Mstislavl fell into Russian hands; and in August Prince Radziwill was defeated at Szepielwica. Mohilev passed into Muscovite hands; Smolensk opened its gates in October; Vitebsk was occupied toward the end of the year. Farther south, in the Ukraine, the Muscovite commander, Fedor Buturlin, found coöperation with the Zaporozhians difficult. Moreover, everywhere the unrestrained license of the Muscovite soldiery alienated the sympathies of the very people whose deliverers they professed themselves to be. Muscovite weakness in the Ukraine prepared the way for a disaster when Sheremetev was attacked at Okhmatov by a combined Polish and Tartar army and his force annihilated. But at these dark moments of Muscovite fortunes help came from an unexpected quarter. Charles X of Sweden had been an interested spectator of the duel being waged between the two Slavic powers. In the summer of 1655 he judged the moment opportune to intervene in the struggle. With an army of veterans of the Thirty Years' War he succeeded in overrunning the better part of Poland and in occupying the capital, driving King John Casimir into exile in Silesia. Thus the Russians were enabled in July to occupy Vilna. In August Lublin and Kovno fell while Khmelnitskii ravaged Galicia and threatened Lemberg. Volkonskii harried central Poland, destroying the towns of Davydov, Stolin, and Pinsk, and returned to Moscow in October laden with booty. Poland was prostrate at the feet of the Tsar, who, when he was approached in August, 1655, by Polish emissaries, revealed that his demands knew almost no limit.

But Charles, nominally an ally, was really a dangerous rival. On October 10, 1655, he formally took the Estates of Lithuania

under Swedish protection and warned the Tsar to refrain from interference in Courland. Radziwill went over to Sweden and received the sonorous title of the "Grand Hetman of the Swedish Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Palatinate of Vilna" under Swedish protection, to the intense indignation of the Russians. Charles also made advances to Khmelnitskii. Thus at one blow he alienated not only Moscow, but also Vienna and Constantinople. Emperor Leopold I therefore entered into an alliance with John Casimir on May 27, 1657, and both Austria and Poland then made advances to Moscow looking to an alliance. The result was an armistice with Poland to enable Moscow to turn against Sweden. July 26, 1657, Tsar Alexei, at the head of the Muscovite forces, invaded Livonia.

Russian achievements were, however, mediocre in Livonia. Düna-burg on the Dvina was taken, and Kokenhausen also fell to Muscovite arms. But Riga resisted all attempts at capture. Alexei therefore had to content himself with the seizure of Dorpat. Meanwhile Polish-Russian coöperation was wearing thin. The Poles were unwilling to make any but the most modest concessions to conciliate Moscow. Finally the half-hearted negotiations were broken off without having achieved their object. A resurgence of national feeling in Poland, inspired largely by religious feelings, was changing the whole nature of the struggle. The Russians' age-old distrust of Poland now began to reassert itself. The Moscow government decided to placate its Swedish enemies for a reckoning with Poland. Afanasii Lavrentievich Ordyn-Nashchokin was entrusted with the task of buying off Swedish opposition. In 1658 he succeeded in negotiating a truce for three years whereby Russia was, for the time being, left in possession of her Livonian conquests. In 1661 an effort was made to convert this into a permanent peace. But by this time Sweden had composed her quarrel with Poland by the treaty of Oliva (1660). The Tsar was thus stampeded into concluding peace in undiplomatic haste. Over the protests of Ordyn-Nashchokin, who resigned rather than consent to its terms, a treaty was concluded at Kar-dis on July 2, 1661, confirming the peace of Stolbovo (1658),

whereby Moscow ceded all her conquests on the Baltic sea-board to Sweden.

With her hands thus freed, Russia was in a position to prosecute the war with Poland with unrelenting vigor. Khmelnit-skii died in 1657 and his place as Zaporozhian Ataman was taken by Vygovskii. The latter went over to Poland in 1658 and, combining with a Tartar force, annihilated a Muscovite army under Prince Alexander Trubetskoi at Konotop in the Ukraine, July 8, 1659. But Cossack unity was destroyed by factional strife as a result of which Bogdan Khmelnitskii's son Yuri was elected Ataman. This election brought no advantage to Moscow, as Yuri deserted to Poland and, in 1662, supported by his Polish allies, captured the Muscovite army under Sheremetev at Czudnow, as a result of which Kiev, Chernigov, and Pereyaslavl had to be abandoned by Moscow. Yuri Khmelnitskii shortly thereafter retired to a monastery. Moscow and Poland, respectively, then succeeded in electing their own atamans of the eastern and western sides of the Dnieper.

Poland was regaining lost ground. In the autumn of 1661 Ordyn-Nashchokin and Khovanskii were defeated at Zeromsk with a loss of 19,000 men, 10 guns, all their standards, and a miraculous ikon of the Mother of God. Grodno, Mohilev, and Vilna were recaptured by the Poles, and Lithuania was cleared of Muscovite troops. But Poland's failure to repossess the eastern side of the Dnieper in 1663 led to negotiations for peace, which opened in 1664 at Durovicha. Despite the difficulties experienced by his government, Alexei was reluctant to surrender any of his conquests of territory inhabited by members of the Orthodox Church. Poland at first was inclined to take a high hand, but rebellion at home and trouble with the Cossacks of the Dnieper, who, with Tartar aid, ravaged Poland far and wide in 1665, led to a renewal of negotiations at Andrusovo between Smolensk and Mstislavl. Finally, on February 11, 1667, a thirteen-year truce was agreed to. Vitebsk, Polotsk (on the Dvina), and Polish Livonia were surrendered by Muscovy: Poland was to cede Smolensk, Novgorod-Syeverenskii, Chernigov, and Kiev for two years. The whole of the eastern

bank of the Dnieper passed into Russian hands. The Cossacks of the Dnieper were to be under the joint administration of Moscow and Poland, whose territories the Cossacks were called on to defend. The territory thus surrendered by Poland was never again lost by Moscow. The treaty was recognized at the time as a great personal triumph for Ordyn-Nashchokin, who was raised to the rank of *Blizhnyi Boyarin* and put in charge of the *Posolskii Prikaz*, or Department of Foreign Affairs, on his return to the capital.

THE PATRIARCH NIKON AND THE SCHISM

In her external affairs, Russia had dealt with her great opponent. She was now facing a crisis in her internal affairs. The seventeenth century was a period of great intellectual ferment. In ecclesiastical matters there were two tendencies which now came into conflict. One clung to the old religious ceremonies and observances that had been formulated in the *Stoglav* of Ivan the Terrible. The other was a passion for a purification of these and a restoration of the traditional church forms which had recently become obscured and overlaid by innovations. The reform movement, which marked a return to purer traditions, was in part the outgrowth of the new philosophy and theology that came in from Kiev and southwestern Russia, and was in a considerable degree tinged with the scholasticism of the west. But through Kiev the Slavic world was also brought into touch with Constantinople, Jerusalem, and other centres of the Eastern Orthodox Church. By this means Russia was introduced to the purer and more authentic traditions of the church. The head of the new movement was Nikon (born Nikita Mina at Valmanovo, near Nizhnii-Novgorod) who had been first a parish priest, later a monk, and who had lived on the Solovetskii Islands. Later he served in a monastery at Novgorod, and in 1646 made the acquaintance of Alexei, by whom he was finally elevated to the position of patriarch. Nikon put himself at the head of the reforming group, which included Simeon Petrovskii Sitianovich (known as Polotskii because of the place of his birth), Epiphany Slaven-

itskii, and Arsenii Satanovskii, all of whom were known for their great erudition in scripture and church tradition. Patrons of the new movement were to be found among the ruling classes, especially Fedor Mikhailovich Rtishchev, a chamberlain at the court of Alexei, Afanasii Ordyn-Nashchokin, and Artamon Matveyev, the last two the ablest and most enlightened of the ministers in the service of Alexei. But standing in the way of reform was a group that came to be known as the party of the *protopops*, who drew their inspiration from the Muscovite past, to whom western scholasticism as well as Byzantine erudition were equally suspect, and who swore by the *Stoglav* of Ivan the Terrible. This group outnumbered the reformers ten to one. Among the illiterate and ignorant masses they found unquestioning support. Such men were Neronov, parish priest, first at Nizhnii-Novgorod, and later at the Kazan Cathedral of Moscow, Daniel, *protopop* of Kostroma, and Login, *protopop* of Murom. Their most redoubtable champion was Avvakum, son of a drunken parish priest of Gregorovo near Nizhnii-Novgorod, and Nikon's junior by some fifteen years. He had early made a reputation for his zeal, austerity, and sublimity of faith, but was possessed of a narrow and conservative outlook. He stood squarely opposed to all attempts to modify the traditional usages of the Church. He was an able preacher. He soon won a wide influence by his popular appeal and made the acquaintance of the leading men of the Church.

The stage for the epic struggle between the two ecclesiastical groups within the church was set by the visit of a number of eastern ecclesiastics to the court of Moscow shortly after the accession of Alexei. These highly educated men, including Paisios, Patriarch of Jerusalem, persuaded the Patriarch Nikon of the errors that had crept into the Russian Church and suggested the need for correcting these abuses. Nikon, with characteristic energy, set about the task by inviting the Kievan scholars to Moscow to teach and by calling a synod to consider the revision of the service books. Unexpected opposition developed in the synod. On the recommendation of Dionysius, Patriarch of Constantinople, a second synod was called, which

was attended by some of the non-Russian Orthodox clergy. At this synod the revision of the service books was entrusted to a committee consisting of Slavenitskii and a Greek monk, Paisios. This accomplished, Nikon, fortified by the support of the Patriarch of Constantinople, prepared to overbear all opposition. Neronov made his peace, but Avvakum stood out boldly for the "law and the prophets," or, in this case, the canons of the *Stoglav*, including the *dvuperstie* (making the sign of the cross with two fingers) and *sugubaya alleluya* (the two-fold alleluia). Another controversial matter was that of the ikons, into the making of which many innovations had crept from the west. Nikon proposed to purge the Church. He likewise secured the reluctant support of Alexei, and proceeded to break down all opposition. Avvakum was condemned to exile in Siberia, whither his wife was permitted to accompany him. He was first domiciled at Tobolsk and later ordered to Yeniseisk. He accompanied an expedition against the Daurians on the Amur. The journey by way of Lake Baikal was a *via dolorosa* for both Avvakum and his family, who accompanied him on his wanderings. In 1662 Avvakum was allowed to return. He plunged afresh into the religious life of the capital, from which he found his ancient enemy, Nikon, had just departed. Avvakum took up the fight where he had left it off and refused to be drawn into any kind of a compromise. The result was a fresh exile, this time to Mezen on the White Sea. Two years later, in common with other schismatics in exile, he was summoned by Alexei to Moscow to make his peace with the Church. But he was as defiant as ever, and in 1664 he was again sentenced by a Church court, condemned to lose his tongue (this punishment was remitted by the Tsar), and exiled to Pustoozersk on the Pechora. Here in exile, he continued to lead the opposition to reform. Down to his death, in 1681, he fulminated against those who had led the Church into what he thought to be the ways of error.

From the time of his elevation to the office of Patriarch, Nikon had emulated the role of Philaret, of the preceding reign, and presumed to act as co-regent to the monarch. But though

an able and enlightened administrator who commanded the respect and affection of the Tsar, his ostentation, high-handedness, and want of tact won him many enemies who finally succeeded in undermining his influence at court. In 1658, various slights to which he was subjected indicated his fall from favor. His reply was to divest himself publicly of his patriarchal vestments, and to retire to the Voskresenskii Monastery, leaving the Metropolitan of Krutisk as *locum tenens* for the patriarchal duties. A synod was summoned in 1660 in Moscow to select a new patriarch, but without result, as the Tsar did not dare to supersede Nikon. The Tsar temporized, as did Henry VIII in like circumstances, by consulting foreign ecclesiastical dignitaries. He hesitated to make permanent the breach in the Russian Church by any rash act. Not till 1666 did he take the decisive step of summoning an oecumenical council to which non-Russian dignitaries of the Eastern Church were invited. Nikon, perhaps encouraged by powerful friends, attempted to influence the proceedings of the council by presenting himself ostentatiously at the Uspenskii Cathedral in the Kremlin. Remonstrated with, he insisted on an audience with the Tsar. This was refused and he was ordered back to his monastery. On December 12 (O.S.) he was found guilty by the council of having reviled the Tsar and the Church, and of having abused his authority as Patriarch of the Muscovite Church. He was sentenced to be deprived of his sacerdotal functions and to be known henceforth as the monk Nikon. He was thereupon sent off to the Therapontov Myeloozerskii Monastery.

The council that deposed Nikon at the same time confirmed all the Nikonian reforms and anathematized all who rejected the revised liturgies and authorized observances, such as the *troeperskie* (making the sign of the cross with three fingers). The *Stoglav* also came in for denunciation. Thus the issue was fairly joined between the reforming party and the party of the *protopops*. Avvakum had already suffered for his faith, but he had left behind numerous followers, inspired like himself to undergo martyrdom rather than renounce one jot of what they

regarded as fundamental to their faith. Foremost among these disciples were two sisters, Theodosia Prokopievna Morozova and Evdokia Urusova, who, on account of their high birth and powerful connections, were selected for examples. The government felt that if it could break the leaders, the followers would apostatize. No torture, deprivation, or punishment could turn these heroic fanatics from what they considered the truth. After fruitless efforts to induce them to confess their errors, they were finally banished to Borovsk in the province of Kaluga, where both shortly succumbed to their sufferings. But though relentlessly pursued by the wrath of the Tsar and the government, they carried with them the affection and love of countless thousands who knew little of the issues of the controversy. Even their enemies could not withhold admiration for their boundless courage.

Thus was the break in the Russian church made final. While reform, backed by all the power of the government, was for the moment triumphant, an undying hatred of all alien innovations in the field of religion filled the hearts of great masses of the believers, whom no exercise of coercive power was able to overawe. Schism had henceforth become a factor to be reckoned with. The Church was for two centuries to know no truce in its struggle with the schismatics (*raskolniki*).

STEN'KA RAZIN

In the year 1669 there appeared a peculiarly Russian phenomenon, an outlaw of the most daring kind, who, despite his excesses, or perhaps because of them, acquired a wide popularity and prestige that enabled him to shake the foundations of the state. Sten'ka (Stephen) Timofeyev Razin, a Cossack of the Don, of the stanitsa of Zimova, and his brother, Frolka, began to gather around them a band of desperadoes for a buccaneering raid. Their original intention had been to descend the Don to Azov. But Razin, whether out of respect for the defensive measures taken by the Tartars after the great Cossack raid of 1637, or whether dissuaded from his project by the Ataman of the Cossacks, gave up the scheme for the more prom-

ising one of an expedition down the Volga, which was, at least nominally, throughout its length under Russian control. With the breaking up of the Golden Horde, the Tartar menace here was less severe than farther west, where the Nogai and Crimean Tartars preyed on Muscovite territory. Moreover, the land was not so suitable for settlement as the Ukraine. The Muscovite government, therefore, contented themselves with holding a defensive line (*cherta*) running west from Simbirsk (on the Volga) to Alatyr, Saransk, and apparently linking up with the Cossack line on the Sura, the eastern limit of the Cossacks of the Don. Along the Volga were located advance posts held by small garrisons at Samara, Saratov, and Tsaritsyn, while Astrakhan on the Volga delta was held in force. The climate of the lower Volga did not invite settlement. The chief interest, then, as now, in this region was its fishing industry and the trade across the Caspian. A few Tartars shared its limited resources with Kalmyks and Bashkirs. The Volga waterway was of exceedingly great importance, connecting, as it did, the capital with the Caspian Sea and the Kama River, and through them provided communication with Persia and Siberia. Moreover, a rising of the native population of the Middle Volga could easily threaten the capital.

The government had taken insufficient measures to secure the river line. It did keep watch at Chernyi Yar, on the famous portage or *volok* by which one could pass from the great eastward bend of the Don to the westward-flowing Volga near Tsaritsyn, but there were other routes by which the Cossacks could reach the river or the Caspian. Moreover, the state had deliberately encouraged the lawless propensities of the Cossacks that they might be a scourge to the Tartars. But those same Cossacks might as readily turn their arms against their masters and become an equal scourge to the Muscovites. They had always been an unruly lot, and the recent wars with Poland, in which they had been used, provided them with grievances against Moscow. After the conclusion of the war hard times tended to aggravate a special grudge Razin had against the Moscow government in the person of Yuri Alexeyevich Dol-

gorukii, because of his harsh treatment of a brother of Razin's while on active service. In any event, the traditional lawlessness of the Cossacks had been encouraged by the too ready indulgence with which the Tsarist government varied its customary severity, as in the case of Yermak Timofeyevich, who had redeemed a life of crime by his conquest of Siberia. Razin, in the spring of 1667, crossed over with his followers to the Volga and seized and plundered the barges that had wintered in the lower river and were waiting for the breakup to resume their interrupted voyage.

Thus began Razin's career of crime. His preliminary success encouraged him to continue it, and, fortifying a position at Pan-shin in a desolate marshy region of the Lower Don from which he could observe the Volga, he successfully defied efforts to dislodge him and found easy prey in the flotillas descending the river. He finally assembled a formidable armada, with which he slipped past Tsaritsyn down the Volga to the delta, passed Astrakhan, and crossed the Caspian to Yaitsk (at the mouth of the Yaik or Ural River), which he captured by a *ruse de guerre*. He successfully evaded the Muscovite efforts to apprehend him and, in the spring of 1668, sailed across the Caspian. Profiting by Persian weakness under the Shah Suleiman, the unworthy successor of Shah Abbas, he captured and plundered the cities of Derbend, Baku, and Resh. As a result the Persians thoroughly distrusted him, and when he became involved in difficulties he was compelled to seek refuge on a lonely island in the Caspian. Here, during the winter, his men suffered untold hardships. Though they successfully defended themselves against the Persians, eventually the exhaustion of their supplies compelled their return to Astrakhan. Here Razin was presented with a pardon from the Tsar. The booty and the prestige which his successes had brought him enabled him to live like a prince.

The events that followed the return of Sten'ka Razin from Persia are merely proofs of the ineptitude of the government, which alternately tried to cajole and threaten him. Having been granted immunity at Astrakhan, he later ascended the

Volga to Tsaritsyn, where he defied the local *voyevode* who attempted to put restraint on him, crossed over to the Don, and, with the host of followers that his fame now brought him, he actually disputed the authority of the Ataman of the Don Cossacks by setting up a rival administration. Reinforced by another scoundrel from the Don, Vas'ka Us, and his followers, he returned to the Volga and induced the garrison of Tsaritsyn to surrender the city to him. He then descended the river, secured possession of Chernyi Yar, and arrived before Astrakhan on June 23. On the 24th they secured possession of the city, murdered the commander, Prozorovskii, and those of the garrison who resisted, and plundered the various bazaars of the city. Here the Cossacks held a *vyeche*. A month later Razin made ready a flotilla to ascend the river and secure the various forts. As a result Samara and Saratov surrendered. Razin thereupon proceeded to secure Simbirsk. At the latter place, a stout resistance was put up by Miloslavskii, the local *voyevode*, who, after the loss of the blockhouse, held out in the local Kremlin and sent couriers to summon help. Prince Boryatinskii, the commander of government troops in this area, was attacked on the way, but managed to maintain his position. The following day, October 3, the combined forces of Boryatinskii and Miloslavskii fell on Sten'ka Razin and inflicted a crushing defeat. The blockhouse and the ruined city were recovered. Many of Sten'ka's force fell, while many others were made prisoners. The Cossack leader himself fled down the Volga.

On setting forth up the Volga in the early summer, Sten'ka had found his fame had travelled before him. Followers came to him from far and wide. The unlettered soldier, intoxicated by his triumph, began to play the role of a Messiah come to free his people from oppression. Emissaries were despatched throughout south Russia, to the Middle and Upper Volga, and even to distant Karelia as far as the Solovetskii Islands in the north, to raise the country against its oppressors. Razin wished it believed that the Tsarevich Alexei Alexeyevich, reported to have died in 1670, was still alive, but that he was held in hiding by the *boyars* and was now in the camp of Razin; likewise the

former Patriarch Nikon, who had been deposed and relegated to a monastery. He was careful to assert that the Tsar was in secret sympathy with him, but was unable to show that sympathy openly, as he was under constraint from the *boyars*. The result was that disorder spread like wildfire over the countryside. The peasants rose against their lords, burned, killed, and ravaged, and thousands either joined or tried to join the Cossack leader. In the Middle Volga the Finnish tribes, the Chuvash, the Cheremessi, and the Mordvians, recently brought under the Muscovite yoke, were ripe for revolt. The uncivilized nomads of the Lower Volga and the Yaik found the situation to their liking and hastened to profit from the weakness of the government.

The recovery of Simbirsk gave the government its first breathing spell. The prestige of Razin was gone; his hold on the line of the Volga was broken; and slowly the government began to recover the lost towns and fortresses. The success at Simbirsk had freed the line of the Simbirsk, stretching from the Volga to the Sura. After some vacillation the government named Prince Ivan Dolgorukii commander-in-chief with Shcherbatov to command a force around Lomonov and Penza; Vasilii Panin was named commander at Alaty; a third force under Leont'ev was quartered around Arzamas; and a fourth detachment took the field under Princes Daniel and Yuri Boryatinskii.

Throughout the winter these troops were called on for a persistent campaign against the now scattered detachments of Razin. Gradually the settled regions of the Middle Volga were pacified; the Ukraine and the Cossacks of the Don were brought once more under control; and Nizhnii Novgorod, in the heart of the country of the Chuvash, the Mordvians, and the Cheremissi, was recovered. Razin had taken refuge in his stronghold of Kagal'nik and could not be run to earth. In March of 1671 the Patriarch Ioasaf excommunicated the Cossack leader and denounced him as a "thief who openly and secretly made war on the Holy Church." He was placed under the ecclesiastical anathema. Finally loyal Cossacks surrounded and burnt Kagal'nik. Here Sten'ka and his brother Frolka

were seized and sent off to Moscow in chains and irons. After a trial he was condemned and executed with the customary barbarity, being deprived of his right hand and left leg before being decapitated. His brother on the scaffold availed himself of the customary appeal, "*slovo i dyelo*," as a result of which his execution was postponed. But the revelations which he promised were either trivial or false and he met a fate similar to that of his brother.

The death of Sten'ka and his brother did not lead to the immediate pacification of the country. Disturbances broke out again at Astrakhan. The Cossacks and their leader, Vas'ka Us, held command of the town and terrorized the population, already half disposed to anarchy and revolution. The news of the failure at Simbirsk and the capture of Sten'ka Razin merely seemed to aggravate the trouble. Violence broke out at Astrakhan, where the Cossacks openly accused the Metropolitan of intriguing against them and striving to keep the Cossacks of the Don, the Terek, and the Grebennye Gory from joining their brothers at Astrakhan. In order to carry out the grandiose schemes of Sten'ka Razin it was decided to enter into treasonable correspondence with the Khan of the Crimea, who was asked to coöperate in an attack on Moscow. Reinforcements were summoned from the Upper Volga and the Don. With the government victories there was a rush, not of reinforcements, but of fugitives, especially after a second unsuccessful attack on Simbirsk under Fedor Sheludak. As their situation became more and more critical, the Cossacks became even more daring and menacing. Finally their rage against everyone in authority ran so high that they stripped the Metropolitan of his sacred vestments and, after subjecting him to indignities and torture, put him to death. But the sands of the Cossack republic were running out. With the reduction of the Don, the government was in a position to turn its attention to Astrakhan. After the death of Vas'ka Us, Sheludak assumed command of the rebel forces. Early in September, 1671, Miloslavskii arrived with a force inadequate, as it proved, for the task of reducing the city. But reinforcements were at hand, and the

Cossacks realized that the game was up. The townsmen saw the hopelessness of resistance and on November 27, 1671, the city was finally surrendered. A general amnesty was granted. After four years of anarchy the last rebel stronghold was occupied and Cossacks and townsmen renewed their oaths of fidelity to the Tsar.

INCREASING CONTACTS WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD

The reign of Alexei was distinguished by a ferment of activity in all branches of Muscovite life. Russian explorers and colonists were pushing across the Urals into the depths of the Siberian wilderness and across Siberia to the Pacific. Diplomatic negotiations were for the first time opened with the Manchu court at Peking. Contacts of all kinds were being established with the peoples and courts of England, France, Spain, Venice, and the Papal court. Many of the amenities of western civilization were introduced for the first time, theaters and articles of private luxury. The isolation in which Muscovy had for centuries been immersed had broken down. The tide of western influence was rising.

Foremost among the influences making for westernization were the two ministers of Alexei. The first of these, Afanasii Ordyn-Nashchokin, was elevated for his diplomatic services and remained throughout the reign a representative of enlightenment and progress. He served the sovereign in many capacities and did much to foster commerce and shipbuilding. His greatest achievement was the negotiation of the Peace of Andrussovo (September, 1669-March, 1670). He shortly after retired to a monastery, where he lived as an inmate until his death in 1680.

His successor was Artamon Sergeyevich Matveyev, the son of an obscure *dyak* who, on the retirement of Ordyn-Nashchokin, was made head of the *prikazy* of Little Russia and of foreign affairs. Matveyev had married a Scottish woman. His home was a center from which western influences radiated. Eventually he attained the rank of *boyarin* in September, 1674. It was Matveyev who arranged Alexei's second marriage in 1672 to

Natalia Kirillevna Naryshkina, the mother of Peter the Great. Undoubtedly it was under the guidance of Matveyev that serious efforts were made to transplant to Russia the spirit of refinement and luxury of western Europe that found its greatest expression in the royal palace at Versailles.

The chief concern of the closing years of Alexei's reign was the outbreak of trouble with the Ottoman Porte, largely occasioned by the weakness of Poland. The latter country was in 1672 invaded by a Turkish host which succeeded in occupying the frontier fortress of Kamieniec, the key to Podolia. On October 17, 1672, by the Treaty of Budziak, Poland ceded the Polish Ukraine and Podolia, together with the fortress of Kamieniec, and agreed to pay an annual tribute to the Porte. The threat to the Russian Ukraine brought Moscow into the field. The death of the weak King of Poland, Michael Wisniowiecki, November 10, 1673, allowed the crown Hetman, Jan-Sobieski, to be a successful candidate to the throne. Tsar Alexei tried to organize a united European front against the Turk and sought unsuccessfully to induce the Pope to preach a crusade. In October, 1675, Sobieski, by victories obtained over the Turks, was enabled to make peace with the Porte at Zorawno. Most of the Polish Ukraine was returned, though Kamieniec remained in Turkish hands. Moscow did not make peace till 1680, when a treaty was arranged on the Alma in the Crimea. As a result, both sides agreed to keep the peace for twenty years. Turkey received control of the western bank of the Dnieper.

Alexei died on the night of January 29-30, 1676. He had recommended as his successor his eldest surviving son, Fedor. Artamon Matveyev sought to secure the succession to Peter, the son of Natalia Naryshkina. But the Miloslavskiis (the relatives of Alexei's first spouse) and the *boyars* refused to hear of this. Fedor was allowed to succeed.

His short reign (he died within six years) was marked by few decisive events. One of these was the abolition of *myest-nichestvo*, the immemorial system of strict precedence which had determined rank. The famous *Razryadnye Knigi*, or

books of ranks, to which Muscovite boyars were accustomed to appeal in support of their claims to precedence, were destroyed. The foundation was laid for a nobility in which rank was determined solely by service to the state.

THE ULOZHENIE OF 1649

The early years of Alexei were memorable for the codification of Muscovite law in the *Ulozhenie* of 1649. It was ostensibly prepared in response to popular demand. The composition was entrusted to a committee of five bureaucrats. This committee drew its material from the *Kormchaya* (which included the codes and laws of the Byzantine Emperors); previous Muscovite *sudebniki* (e.g., that of Ivan the Terrible); supplementary *ukazy*; and former *boyar* decrees (emanating from the *Priказы*). The laws were combined into one report and presented to the Tsar and the *Boyarshkaya Duma* for their revision. On September 1, 1648, representatives of the official classes and of the towns were summoned to Moscow. On October 3 the new *Ulozhenie* was read before the Tsar, the Holy Synod, and the *Boyarshkaya Duma*. It was then ordered that the report should be read to the assembled deputies. It was to be ratified by the higher clergy and the members of the *Boyarshkaya Duma*. Distributed to the Muscovite *priказы* and the provincial governors, it served as a general guide in judicial matters. The *Ulozhenie* did not attempt an excursion into the theory of jurisprudence. Fundamental laws were not defined. Though the law was to apply equally to all classes, the idea of class and privilege was emphasized throughout. One provision was of transcending importance. The time limit for the recall of absconding peasants was abolished. Thus the chains of serfdom were riveted firmly on one class, that of the peasants. The old class of *zakladchiki* or pledged persons found its status definitely fixed but not relieved. There was, however, some glimmering of accountability of all to the law, and regularity of judicial procedure. Though fragmentary and incomplete, and in no sense rivalling the great codes of history, the *Ulozhenie* represented an important landmark in Russian jurispru-

dence and held the field till it was succeeded by the *Svod Zakonov*, which was prepared by Speranskii in 1833.

OTHER INTERNAL REFORMS

The seventeenth century was a period of experimentation by the state with all kinds of imposts and financial devices designed to meet the huge demands of the treasury. One of the devices was inflation of the currency, which began in 1656 with the end of the first war with Poland. The state having no gold or silver for coinage, it began experimenting with the recoinage of foreign money at figures in excess of the intrinsic value of the metal. The value was advanced till the state was receiving a profit of fifty to sixty per cent. Officials of the mint and their friends, seeing these handsome profits, began to dip into this ultra-profitable business. The result was the disappearance of silver money, which was driven abroad by the inflated copper money. Prices rose seriously. Finally, in 1662, came outbreaks. At Kolomenskoye a mob gathered to protest against this chicanery. They forced their way into the presence of Alexei and threatened vengeance on the favorites who were responsible for the shady financial transactions which were bringing distress on the population. After the dispersal of the mobs the outbreak was repressed with great violence. It was said that some 7,000 people were punished for this revolt.

The finances of the state were immediately dependent on the system of taxation. The taxation of the peasants formed the most important item. During the sixteenth century the ordinary tax was on land under cultivation. But the depopulation of the land and the consequent passing of much of it out of cultivation during the Time of Troubles led to a radical readjustment. The peasants found ways of evading the tax by limiting the amount of their own land and surreptitiously bringing under cultivation wild or neglected land which was not liable to taxation. The government tried to meet this evasion by substituting the *chetvert* (5.4 acres), a fraction of the *Socha*, assigning eight or more families to the *chetvert*. But gradually the peasants and their lords began to substitute for this arbitrary

system the more direct and simpler form of taxing the *dvor*, or household, records of which were kept in new registers. It is interesting to note that in a census of 1678 the *perepisnye knigi* show the following records of peasant households:

Households belonging to the free peasantry.....	92,000
Households belonging to the Church.....	118,000
Households belonging to the imperial court.....	83,000
Households belonging to the <i>boyars</i>	88,000
Households belonging to the <i>duyoryane</i>	507,000

The state's income in the late seventeenth century is estimated at approximately 1,500,000 roubles (about \$10,000,000.00). The indirect taxes constituted 49 per cent; the direct taxes 44 per cent. About one-half of the income was required for military expenditures, particularly the upkeep of the constantly growing body of the *stryeltsi*, for whom a special tax was imposed on all classes of the community. While Russia had to some extent recovered from the disorders and depopulation of the Time of Troubles, the population had increased, and the land had come back into cultivation, there was much hardship and suffering. A great deal of this was caused by the excessive burdens imposed by the state in consequence of its enormous military needs. But the system of taxation and finance was extremely primitive. To add to the miseries of the people, inefficiency and corruption were to be met everywhere. Russia entered the modern world badly hampered by a crude system of administration. But the people, deep in superstition and ignorance, knew no other, and it was only when it was attended with intolerable injustices and cruelty that the long-suffering peasants were wont to rise against the lord or the officials of the Tsar and to appeal in their extremity to the Tsar himself, the fountain of all power and justice.

[13]

PETER THE GREAT

THE Tsar Alexei had anticipated disputes over the succession by naming as his heir his eldest surviving son, Fedor. But six years later, on the death of Fedor, no such precaution had been taken. And in the prevailing uncertainty with regard to the Muscovite law of inheritance to the throne, this failure delivered Russia over to years of anarchy and confusion. The throne was the center of a contest involving not only the opposing claims of the surviving sons of Alexei—Ivan and Peter—but also the feuds of the families from which the consorts of the late Tsar had come—the Miloslavskiis and the Naryshkins. This feud had been dormant for many years. The prompt action of the Patriarch in bringing the matter at once to a head in a gathering of notables raised to the dignity of rule the young Peter, who, by physical and mental qualities, seemed chosen for this role. The victory of the Naryshkins, which the succession of Peter inevitably involved, was not allowed to pass unchallenged by their opponents, who took advantage of the discontent of the *stryeltsi*, which was a factor that enabled them to give a decisive turn to events. The government, lacking a strong head, sought to conciliate these privileged troops in every way and thus made a display of its own weakness in the face of the growing indiscipline and contumacy of the soldiery. They were easily wrought on in the interests of the Miloslavskiis. Before the reign of the infant Peter was four weeks old, mutiny and revolt led to frightful scenes of carnage and outrage. It was at this time that one of the daughters of Alexei, Sophia Alexeyevna, challenged the ascendancy of

Natalia and of the Naryshkins. Nothing could have been more opportune for her cause than this rising. The rebellious *stryeltsi* first demanded that Alexei's eldest surviving son, Ivan, share the throne with Peter. They followed this up with the demand that Ivan assume his rightful place as the elder of the two joint sovereigns and that, both being too young to rule, they should have Sophia as regent. None durst oppose such demands backed up by a determined show of force. Thus, in the space of one month, Peter and the Naryshkins were toppled from their dominant position and forced to share their exalted offices with their hated rivals, while a woman and her favorites were invested with a power which hitherto no woman had ever enjoyed.

THE REGENCY OF SOPHIA, 1682-1689

This unique condition lasted for seven years. During this period, although official documents were issued in the name of Ivan and Peter, real power was concentrated in the hands of the Regent and her ministers. But the weakness and the instability of the government were demonstrated in another quarter when, in the ceremonies attending the double coronation, the *raskolniki*, who were well represented in the ranks of the *stryeltsi*, attended in large numbers and made persistent efforts to discredit their opponents and to bring to naught the reforms in the Church. The government survived this crisis and succeeded in checking the movement. The *stryeltsi* themselves, of whose active discontent the Miloslavskiis and Sophia had availed themselves in their rise to power, were cowed by the execution of their commander, Khovanskii, and his two sons.

It was but natural for Sophia to lean heavily on advisers in her discharge of the duties of state. One of the most important of these was Prince Vasilii Vasilyevich Golitsyn, a noble of high rank who had distinguished himself by his services with the army in the Ukraine during the reign of Fedor, and who had supported the abolition of *myestnichestvo*, the vestigial institution that on more than one occasion had paralyzed the Muscovite army in the field. He had acquired a broad education in

the western European manner and had entertained plans for extensive reforms in Russia. Another adviser was Spafari, a Greek born in Wallachia, who had proved himself invaluable for his linguistic attainments and diplomatic gifts, and who had gone, in the service of Sophia, as an ambassador to the Manchu Emperor of China. Other figures of importance in the *entourage* of the Regent was Medvedyev, a monk who had been trained in the Ukraine and therefore represented scholastic tendencies in ecclesiastical affairs, and Shaklovitii, who proved to be Peter's most uncompromising opponent.

Once installed in power, Sophia devoted most of her attention to foreign affairs. The chief preoccupations of Moscow were with Poland and the Ottoman Empire. Muscovite relations with Poland were bad, for the peace of Andrussovo (1667), by which, among other concessions, Kiev had been ceded to Russia for two years, was little more than an armed truce which both sides were ready to terminate at the first favorable opportunity. Jan Sobieski had, on his election in 1673, terminated the pusillanimous policy pursued by Poland towards the Porte. After a three years' war on Turkey, he forced the retrocession of most of the Polish Ukraine (Peace of Zorawno, October 16, 1675). But Turkish power, revived by Ahmad Kiuprili, was not lightly to be contemned. Within a few years Mohammed IV assumed the offensive against the empire. Austria and Hungary were invaded, and in 1683 Vienna was subjected to a siege which was raised by the heroic efforts of Jan Sobieski and the armies of a European coalition which he commanded. The age of crusades seemed to have returned, and vast armies were raised to crush the infidel. Russia was drawn into the general movement, and there was a demand that her proper role would be to invade the Crimea. She had taken part, in 1677-1678, in a campaign of which little is known save that the fortress of Chigirin had been ignominiously surrendered to the Turks. Poland insisted that the price of her coöperation should be the cession of Kiev. This Sophia steadfastly refused. Not till 1686 did Poland agree to recognize its loss as final. The campaigns of 1687 and 1689 that followed were little short

of disastrous. Golitsyn led his force of 100,000 southward in the summer of 1687. The heat and the difficulties of obtaining water and bringing up supplies were almost insupportable. Retreat was decided upon when the army was at a distance of two hundred *verst*s from the Crimean frontier at Perekop.

The campaign of 1687 failed because of the lateness of the season and the prevalence of the terrible steppe fires which swept the country and deprived the forces of forage for their transport animals and threatened them with destruction. Hence Golitsyn decided to begin his campaign of 1689 in the spring. But while the army of the Muscovites and their Cossack allies finally struggled forward to Perekop, the difficulties of transport and of water supplies again proved insurmountable. Golitsyn at last negotiated a truce with the Tartars by which he agreed to retreat. The defection of the Russians did not materially affect the fortunes of the Holy League, which managed to obtain decisive victories over the Ottoman Empire.

The events that led up to the deposition of Sophia and the succession of Peter in some respects repeated those of 1682, with this significant difference, that they revolved around a Peter who was now mature and confident of himself. Sophia, feeling insecure, had played with a plan to claim the throne for herself and endeavored to ensure the fidelity of the *stryeltsi*, on whose armed support she would rely. But the *stryeltsi* now had no such monopoly of force as they had had in 1682. Peter had gathered around him a group of soldiers of fortune from the *Nyemtskaya Sloboda*, who had been allowed to enroll and train for Peter bands of recruits from the estates around Preobrazhenskoe. The dilettantism with which this training seemed to be conducted was merely on the surface. Actually, the troops received a serious grounding in the rudiments of the latest European tactics. On these troops Peter knew that he could confidently rely. But even within the *stryeltsi* he did not lack adherents, won by his own grace of person and his distinguished bearing. Time was obviously on the side of Peter. He had already begun to challenge his sister's authority when, on the morning of August 7, fear of an impending attack on his

life impelled him to fly from Preobrazhenskoe to the friendly walls of the monastery of Troitsa-Sergieï, the customary asylum of Muscovite monarchs in distress. Here the last act of the drama was played out. The monastery, now become the second capital of the Empire, drew to it an ever increasing number of those in search of a career or of imperial favor. A bid was even made for the support of the *stryeltsi*. With the winning over of Patrick Gordon, many of the higher officers swam with the tide. Last of all to make the journey to Preobrazhenskoe were Shaklovitii and Vasilii Golitsyn. The former was executed; the latter owed his milder sentence to the interposition of his cousin Boris, now high in the counsels of Peter; he suffered only deposition and banishment to his estates. Sophia, deprived of her lover, was curtly dismissed to a monastery. After a fruitless journey to Troitsa, she gloomily bowed to her fate. The curtain was thus rung down on the chequered fortunes of her regency and rung up on the momentous reign of Peter.

PETER ASSUMES POWER

The revolution of 1689 in Moscow ostensibly terminated the regency of Sophia and installed in power her two brothers, hitherto treated as minors. In view of the mental and physical deficiency of Ivan, and of Peter's immaturity, this meant the rise to power of forces that grouped themselves around the young Tsar. The years of Peter's obscurity he had turned to account by frequenting the *Nyemtskaya Sloboda*, the foreign quarter of Moscow which lay convenient to his own village of Preobrazhenskoe and gave him the companionship of men skilled in the things that were of consuming interest to Peter. These were primarily the arts of navigation and war; in these Peter received instruction at the hands of soldiers of fortune cast adrift by the wars of the seventeenth century and of the merchants and seamen who had wandered to Russia in pursuit of commerce. Until 1689 these acquaintances were not of especial moment, but during the crisis of that year Peter had succeeded in attaching to himself one who was to play a significant

part in after events—Patrick Gordon, a Scottish Catholic whose family had espoused the royal cause and had been exiled in consequence. Gordon's birth, attainments, and a wide experience fitted him in a peculiar manner to be a guide and mentor to Peter during his adolescent years. Another figure hardly second to Gordon was Franz Lefort, of Swiss origin, who rose to favor somewhat later and wielded a commanding influence on Peter's life. Besides acting as friends and boon-companions, these two men were the mediators through whom Peter became acquainted with European culture and statecraft. And it must be borne in mind that their influence was reinforced by scores of others, less intimate with the sovereign, but whom he found scarcely less indispensable in the administration of his realm.

These early years of Peter's power were years of preparation, but at the same time, they saw the first faltering steps in the exercise of his power. The "play" regiments which Peter had formed at Preobrazhenskoe were expanded into something like a force of regulars with carefully selected officers. In addition to their routine training, they were exercised in maneuvers. In 1693 and 1694 Peter and his court made the journey to Arkhangel'sk, where Peter lived for considerable time, making excursions on the White Sea, mixing with foreign sailors, and accustoming himself to a life at sea. Naval maneuvers on the Lake of Pereyaslavl gave the young sovereign the opportunity to indulge this taste somewhat nearer home. These exercises provided practical training for his later years.

CAPTURE OF AZOV

In 1695 these activities issued in what can be characterized as the first serious project of the new reign—the capture of Azov from the Crimean Tartars. This city, formerly the Genoese merchant city of Tana, had come under the control of the Crimean Tartars. Its position at the mouth of the Don gave them effective control over the trade along the Black Sea and in the interior. But Muscovite relations with the Tartars were further complicated by the position of vassalage in which the latter stood to the Turks and by the wars, ostensibly Crusades,

which since 1684 had been continuously waged against them by the Holy League. The League was anxious to draw Russia into its camp and lost no opportunity to press on Peter his duty to assist in the crusade against the infidels. Eventually, in 1694, preparations were made for an attack on the Crimea. The costly experiences of Golitsyn in 1687 and 1689 warned of the difficulties of a direct attack across the steppes to Perekop. It was therefore decided that the offensive should be directed against the eastern and western extremities of Crimean territory—the fortresses at the mouth of the Dnieper (including Kasikerman and Tagan), and Azov at the mouth of the Don. Sheremetev was to command the regular forces directed against the Dnieper, while the newer formations were to proceed down the Don to occupy Azov. Despite the efforts to maintain secrecy, they were not able completely to surprise the Turks, who had restored the fortress and subsequently maintained a stubborn defense. The Russians had their old difficulties with transport. Their utmost efforts led only to minor successes. Kasikerman and Tagan, in the west, fell to Sheremetev, but he failed to exploit his success. In the east, after a preliminary success at Kalantchi, the siege of Azov had to be abandoned.

The effort was repeated the following year on a much larger scale. This time Peter proposed to blockade the fortress from the sea. For this purpose naval superiority was requisite. To achieve this, he planned to build a fleet of modern vessels at Voronezh on the Don and to use them to transport troops and supplies and to close the seaward approaches. Engineers, artillerymen, and other artificers skilled in the prosecution of siege warfare were brought from western Europe. In conception the campaign differed little from that of 1695. Sheremetev and the Cossacks under Mazeppa were to operate against the mouth of the Dnieper, while the main army, under a board of practical officers and accompanied by Peter, was to attack Azov. This time the siege was conducted with greater success. The closing of the channels leading to Azov from the sea and the effective bombardment of the city decided its fate. On July 17 the Turks agreed to surrender. Despite the somewhat

amateurish execution of the investment of Azov, its occupation made a profound impression on Europe. The victory over a race hardened in war as were the Turks was a startling revelation of the power of Muscovy when armed with western technique and guided by western military principles.

The capture of Azov was to Peter a jumping-off place for even greater achievements. But its chief significance is that from this event appears to have ripened in the mind of Peter the resolve to make a tour of western Europe. Peter's general outlook on life and his conception of the place of Russia and himself in the world had been strongly influenced by his intimate relations with foreigners. In these contacts he showed more interest in crafts and practical arts than in statecraft. Peter seemed during these early years to hold himself aloof from high politics as such, and preferred to emulate the skill of the handworkers. This preference of his was owing to his belief that arts were to play the major role in the future progress of his people.

PETER TRAVELS ABROAD

The project of undertaking a journey abroad is usually ascribed to the influence of Lefort, but in a general way the whole previous experience of Peter had brought him to his decision. Be that as it may, on December 6, 1697, the Tsar announced that he proposed to despatch a mission to the Emperor, the Kings of England and Denmark, the Pope, the United Provinces, the Elector of Brandenburg, and the Republic of Venice. The circumstances seemed to indicate that the plan was not unconnected with the Eastern question, which had been Russia's chief concern for many years. The mission was to be under the general conduct of Franz Lefort, with Golovin and Voznitsyn as assistants. It was to number some two hundred persons. Nothing was said publicly of the Tsar accompanying it, but it was arranged that a certain "Peter Mikhailovich" was to go along in a humble capacity. There was no doubt in Moscow who this "Peter" was, and after the embassy had reached Riga all pretence at secrecy was abandoned,

though the fiction of an incognito was revived whenever it served Peter's convenience.

The party travelled by way of Riga, Mitau, Libau, Königsberg, Pillau, and Koppenbrügge, partly by land and partly by sea, and after an arduous journey reached Amsterdam. On the way Peter had met the Elector of Brandenburg. The two discussed matters of state. But Peter's absorbing interest was in trade and shipbuilding, and it was to Amsterdam, as the center of the Dutch shipping industry, that his Netherlands friends urged him to go. Arriving here, he sought the society of merchants, shippers, shipbuilders, engineers, and craftsmen of all kinds and endeavored to profit by what these men could teach. No calling however humble was beneath him. From Amsterdam Peter moved to Zaandam that he might personally take part in the actual construction of a vessel. His practical labors were interrupted by his official duties, by visits to famous places and learned men, and by the characteristically coarse relaxations in which Peter indulged. Peter's passion for the acquisition of practical knowledge was insatiable. Peter left for England after having reached the conclusion that shipbuilding as practised in Holland was entirely too much a matter of rule-of-thumb and not grounded in fundamental principles. In England the young Russian sovereign made the acquaintance of many distinguished members of English society, the Houses of Parliament, and the Royal Society. He was particularly delighted with English nautical skill. He eagerly seized the opportunity to learn shipbuilding in the shipyards of Deptford, where he passed much of the time. From England he returned to Holland and then journeyed by Cleve, Leipzig, Dresden, and Prague, and finally reached Vienna in June. His sojourn in Vienna bore more of a political character, because Peter and the Emperor were allies in their war with the Turks. Leopold plied the Muscovite Tsar with elaborate festivities and entertainments, with an eye to perpetuating their alliance. Meanwhile plans were laid for a visit to Venice toward the end of July. But hardly had this resolution been taken when news arrived of the revolt of the *stryeltsi*. All


plans were cancelled and the young sovereign and his mission immediately departed on their homeward journey. After passing through Cracow, Peter met the Polish King at Rawa, then proceeded through Samoisk to Brest Litovsk and arrived in Moscow on August 25 (O.S.).

REFORMS BEGUN

Peter's return in August, 1698, coincided with an acute crisis in Muscovite affairs. For a century and a half the commerce of England and Holland had kept Russia in contact with western Europe. So the eastern Slavic world, drawn first into the Byzantine orbit and later into the Asiatic world of the Mongols and Tartars, had slowly become aware of its cultural affinity with Europe and, turning away from her Oriental teachers, had endeavored to overtake the more advanced Christian countries of the west. To achieve this it was vital that Russians should journey abroad and become acquainted with the world of which they were coming to form a part, and it was no less essential that foreigners should be induced to enter the Russian service to act as purveyors of the sciences and arts that had given the western world its cultural hegemony. This twofold movement had begun far back in the Muscovite period. These international contacts multiplied during the seventeenth century. Even without Peter, it would have transformed the old Russia. But the young sovereign and his associates of the *Nyemtskaya Sloboda* had helped to swell the lifegiving streams of western ideas. Later, Peter's own journey to the capitals and centers of learning of western Europe changed the influx of ideas into a tide that now swept away the old inertia of custom. The ensuing cataclysm, for good or evil, obliterated forever the world of the old Muscovite tsars.

Time and increasing contacts with the west might, if left to themselves, have wrought this transformation. But the young monarch, whose vivid mind was afire with the vision of a new world in the making, could not patiently wait for the slow if more natural waking of the Muscovite giant. He himself would wake the giant by rude shocks, if need be. And these

shocks Peter proceeded to administer before the shouts of welcome of the crowds had died away. First came the complete prohibition of the wearing of the old Muscovite costume and the substitution of the dress of western Europe. Then came orders that all beards should be cut off. In neither case could



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PETER I

the government effectively enforce these laws. But it required all soldiers, officials, and diplomatic representatives travelling abroad to appear in European dress. Beyond the capital and the official world, the arm of the government hardly reached out to the remote villages. But the country folk who came to Moscow or the provincial capitals could be forced to conform to the new order of things. And as a last resort, the government could reap a fiscal advantage from those who refused to conform by placing a tax on beards and the Muscovite dress. Peter gave his wholehearted support to these changes, to which he attached great significance. He regarded them as a part of a scheme for radical reforms, by which social intercourse was to be freed from the rigid conventions of Muscovite life and would be led to emulate the ease of cultured life in western Europe. Not only would the old, stiff ceremonial of court and of society give way to the graceful courtliness of Versailles, but he also sought to abolish the old *terem* of the Muscovite household in which the women were confined. Its former inmates were to venture out into the world and seek relaxation and pleasure in the free association with men, of whose society they had formerly been deprived. Of more practical import was the creation of new organs of administration to serve the government as agents of reform. Of scarcely less significance was the reform of the calendar. Russia, by the adoption of the Julian calendar, for the first time brought herself into line with most, if not all, the countries of western Europe. A further significant reform was the suppression of the office of patriarch, made possible by the death of Adrian in 1700.

These violent changes seriously disturbed Russian society. The first symptom of grave unrest was the discovery, shortly before the Tsar's departure in 1697, of a plot against the person of the monarch. Peter had personally directed the investigation and trial of the chief conspirators which led to their condemnation and death on March 4 at Preobrazhenskoe. A number of the *stryelitsi* having been implicated in the plot, the guard


of *stryeltsi* was withdrawn from the Kremlin and its place taken by sentries drawn from the new European troops.

THE STRYELTSI DISBANDED

Disquieting rumours had reached the ears of the Tsar on his travels abroad during 1697 and 1698. Mutterings of discontent were heard among the *stryeltsi*, who, during the spring of that year, showed themselves mutinous to the point of rebellion. Stern measures were adopted by the authorities. The real outbreak came during the summer, when the *stryeltsi* broke all bounds, threw off all restraint, and finally decided to converge from their stations along the frontier on the capital, where they proposed to make short work of the existing government and its foreign instruments, to depose Peter, to summon the Tsarevna from her cloister, and to undo the reforms that were the chief cause of the unrest. The regiments eventually gathered near the monastery of Vozkresensk for an advance on the capital. Here they were intercepted by Patrick Gordon, who endeavored to reason with the *stryeltsi* and induce them to return to their allegiance. When they proved recalcitrant, Gordon answered force with force. At the first volleys the *stryeltsi*, deprived of their officers, were no match for the disciplined levies under Gordon's command. They broke and fled. There followed the rounding up of the broken fragments of the army, which were made prisoners and reserved for imperial justice.

The inquiry instituted by Peter after his return opened in the middle of September and was personally directed by the Tsar, determined to probe the causes of the movement and fix the full responsibility. It is questionable whether he actually discovered any deeply laid plot or well-organized party behind it. Vague references were made to communications between the conspirators and Sophia, and mention was made of a manifesto she was said to have issued to them. But beyond the facts that she was mentioned as a possible successor to Peter and that she was bound to sympathize with their aims, her guilt was not established. She was, however, finally compelled to

take the veil as the nun Suzanne in the Novo-Dyevichyi convent, where a guard of one hundred men was perpetually maintained over her. The trial itself became frankly "political" and the conviction and sentencing of those found guilty were less a matter of justice than of retribution on Peter's political enemies and a warning to those elements of the population that stood



Sovfoto.

COURTYARD AND CHURCH OF NOVO-DYEVICHYI NUNNERY, MOSCOW.

opposed to the reforms and entertained a deep-lying animosity against foreigners. The examination of accused and witnesses had been conducted with all the customary barbarities of torture of the seventeenth century. The Patriarch ventured to enter the presence of the Tsar with an ikon in his hands and to protest against this savagery. Peter turned on him with a characteristic rebuke:

Why do you come here with the ikon? Does your office require you to appear here? Remove yourself from my presence and take the ikon where it can receive due respect. Believe me, I love God and the Holy Mother as well as you. But my high duty and my piety enjoin on me to protect the people and before all to punish the disorder which would lead to the ruin of the people.

Some thousands of *stryeltsi*, together with a few obscure persons and clerics who had encouraged the revolt, were sentenced to death and executed immediately. But the trial dragged on and other executions followed over a period of years. Peter was reported as having taken a personal part in this butchery, but the evidence on which this charge rests is merely hearsay. Peter determined to have done once and for all with the *stryeltsi*. In June, 1699, a decree went forth disbanding their regiments. Their members were forbidden to carry arms or to enlist in the new army. An attempt to do so under an assumed name was punishable with a sentence of forced labor. None of the former *stryeltsi* or their families might live in the capital.

But while the dissolution of the *stryeltsi* eliminated the possibility of armed revolt against the government, it did not remove the general discontent aggravated by opposition to the reforms and the prevalent ill will against foreigners and foreign influence. After the disappearance of the *stryeltsi* this discontent took a characteristically Russian form. The religious ferment, which was a heritage of the days of the schism, spread with redoubled intensity. It aggravated the general discontent of the lower classes, which met with the severest repression at home, and greatly accelerated the flight of the peasants not only from the southern provinces but even from the center and

north. The hand of Peter's government lay heavily on all classes, but the fresh exactions imposed by the administration, the increased severity with which they were collected, and the burden imposed by compulsory military service, all exasperated the peasants to the limit and disposed them to armed revolt. The only possible theater for a revolt was the steppe region of the south and southeast, where the memory of Sten'ka Razin still lingered on. Increasing lawlessness along the Volga and the Caspian warned the authorities of a dangerous situation. The dispersal of the *stryeltsi* served to fan the flames, as the *stryeltsi* and their dependents, banned from the capital, withdrew to the outlying parts of the realm. Astrakhan, already a refuge for criminals and outlaws of all kinds, thus received fresh and dangerous recruits. Rumours that swept through the ignorant population like wildfire played no small part in bringing on a crisis. The report that the Russian authorities proposed to forbid marriages for a period of seven years precipitated an orgy of hasty mass weddings to forestall this measure. In the widespread disorders that ensued, the authority of the government of Astrakhan quite disappeared. The local *voyevode*, Rzhevskii, was murdered and deputies despatched to Moscow to put their grievances, both just and unjust, before the Tsar. In the meantime Peter despatched Sheremetev with a force of regulars to restore the authority of the government in Astrakhan. The temper of the rebels on the approach of Sheremetev precipitated a battle in which the regular forces were the victors. The forces of the government entered the city in triumph. Wholesale arrests and executions followed, and the revolt was stamped out in blood.

The outbreak in Astrakhan was liquidated in March, 1706. It was followed in 1707 and 1708 by two other convulsions—the mutiny of the Bashkirs and the revolt of the Don Cossacks. The former embarrassment speedily disappeared when the Bashkirs clashed with the Kalmyks and thus both ceased to be a menace. But the trouble on the Don was of a more serious character. It was bound up with all the social, political, and economic discontent of the Russian masses, whose most desper-

ate characters congregated here in large numbers. Moreover, the activity of the government in this area, the institution of shipyards at Voronezh, and the fortification of Azov, had concentrated here great masses of peasants and soldiers, who were engaged in forced labor and who proved a fertile field for agitators. The ringleader of the movement was Kontradii Bulavin, an ataman of the Don Cossacks who, in the autumn of 1707, gathered around him an armed force with which he fell on and massacred the command of Prince Dolgorukii, which had been despatched to the Don by the government to bring about the return of runaway serfs. But there were compensations. Bulavin did not have his way altogether. Loyal elements arose among the Cossacks and compelled him to take refuge among the Zaporozhians. But he was tireless in his efforts to combine the discontented elements everywhere. His manifestoes combined appeals to religious fanaticism and enticements of a more physical kind (as those of Sten'ka Razin's had been). They found a ready response far to the south along the Kuban. Like Sten'ka, he proposed to form an independent state, to sever the Cossack connection with Muscovy, and throw in the Cossacks' lot with that of the Ottoman Porte. Peter found himself in trouble both at home and abroad. The regular troops went over to the insurgents on more than one occasion. But Peter never faltered. He insisted on Azov and Taganrog being held, and despatched a force under Dolgorukii's brother against the rebels. Dolgorukii took energetic measures for the defense of Azov and repulsed an attack of Bulavin on the city. The latter committed suicide (July) and on August 23, 1708, the forces of Dolgorukii and Chavanskii routed the last remnants of the rebels at Panshchin on the Don.

DEATH OF ALEXEI

The most critical domestic events of Peter's reign were those concerned with members of his own family in which the forces that made for reform and those of conservatism came into most violent conflict. Shortly after the revolution of 1689, at the age of seventeen, Peter had been betrothed by his mother

(Natalia Naryshkin) to Evdokia Lopukhina. Little is known of the Tsaritsa or of her relatives, but it is evident that her family was of obscure origin and that the consort herself was of undistinguished personality and appearance. To the young sovereigns were born two children, Alexei, born in March, 1690, and Aleksandr, born in October, 1691, the latter surviving but seven months. If any child was born unto sorrow, it was the unfortunate Alexei. Even under the happiest auspices, Peter must have been an exacting parent. But Peter was more than a parent. He was a sovereign with vast designs for his people. In his schemes his son figured as an instrument of his own policy and as its future perpetuator. But Peter, from want of leisure, had neglected to provide the necessary training for the young Prince, who grew up in the company of the women and the clerics of the court, while his father was absent abroad or on his campaigns. The instructors provided were either incompetent or, if competent, other duties were soon found for them. On his return from abroad in 1698, Peter endeavored to take seriously in hand the upbringing of Alexei, who was taken from his mother and turned over to tutors. But experience with these having proved unsatisfactory, Menshikov was given the general oversight of his education. Friction developed between the favorite and the son, and by 1705 Peter had become aware that unless stern measures were taken, trouble would ensue. In this year Peter issued to Alexei his first warning that unless he proved a worthy son, he would be deprived of the succession. But no effort was made to make amends for the past or to turn Alexei's mind into more fruitful channels. His interests were drawn to ecclesiastical, rather than to secular matters. He was rooted in the old obscurantist Muscovite past with its superstitions and barren formalisms. Efforts to draw Alexei into the discharge of practical and useful duties proved unavailing. In 1712 he was betrothed and married to Charlotte, Princess of Wolfenbüttel. Of this marriage was born in July, 1714, a daughter. On October 12, 1715, occurred the birth of a son, the future Tsar Peter II. The mother was taken ill and died on October 22, 1715.

At this time Peter decided on action and addressed what was practically an ultimatum to Alexei, either to show himself competent to govern his people, or to give up his right to the throne. Shortly after this a son was born to Peter and Catherine. Alexei seems to have agreed to surrender his rights as heir-apparent, and even appears to have consented to become a monk, but for the moment the matter was left undecided by Peter, who was preoccupied with preparations for a journey abroad, and who, on his departure, gave Alexei time to think over his resolve. But from Copenhagen he wrote to the prince ordering him either to enter a monastery at once or to present himself to the Tsar. Alexei appeared to accept the latter alternative and giving out that he was on his way to join his father, he disappeared. On receipt of the news of this Peter despatched agents in all directions in the effort to locate his son. He was discovered in hiding, having been for some time under the semi-official protection of the Austrian court, first in Vienna, later in the Castle of Ehrenburg in the Tyrol, and finally at St. Elmo near Naples. The efforts of the Austrians to deceive Peter were unavailing and they were compelled to take Alexei into custody. Alexei was, as a result of pressure, prevailed upon to return to Russia and throw himself on the mercy of the Tsar. The deciding point was a letter from Peter granting immunity from punishment if he came back and bowed to the will of his father. Alexei then began his homeward journey, during which he was adroitly separated from his mistress, Afrosina, who had accompanied him in his flight to Vienna.

On the return of the Prince in January, 1718, there began an examination of the unhappy heir. Peter allowed none of the significant details to escape him. On February 3 there occurred a solemn ceremony in the Kremlin in which Alexei, stripped of his sword, renounced his rights to the throne. At the same time appeared a manifesto recounting the sins of the Tsarevich, and explaining that though he had merited a sentence of death, he would be pardoned provided he renounced the throne. But this apparent clemency was, as Alexei discovered, to be contin-

gent on his revealing the names of his confidants and accomplices in what the Tsar chose to regard as a conspiracy. These revelations were to be wrung from the fallen Prince and his associates by the direst forms of torture. But little was achieved, though Peter was vouchsafed a glance into the temper of the people and of the court. Certain individuals had hoped for the death of Peter and the accession of Alexei. But when Afrosina was questioned she revealed other, more significant things, told her in confidence, that sealed Alexei's fate—his avowed intention of undoing the work of his father in case he succeeded Peter. The tortures which were inflicted on Alexei gave some color to these utterances. His unfortunate admissions that he had discussed with certain persons the eventuality of a possible violent death of his father were distorted to mean that he had actually conspired with rebels to seize the reins of government during his father's lifetime. Thereupon Peter summoned the ecclesiastical and state dignitaries in a solemn session to consider Alexei's fate. The clergy pled that it lay outside their competence. The Prince was then brought before the Senate. Later he was consigned to the Fortress of Peter and Paul in St. Petersburg to await torture. On June 21 he was subjected to twenty-five lashes with the knout, after which he admitted having acknowledged in confession that he had desired the Tsar's death; and on the 22nd he admitted having had treasonable conversations with the Emperor with a view to receiving armed support from the latter. On June 25 he was condemned to death by a court of one hundred and twenty-five persons. For some reason, not explained, the torturing continued on June 26. On the evening of that date he succumbed, according to the official report, to his injuries. Whether this is correct or whether he was executed may never be known.

Much sympathy may be felt with the unfortunate prince who asked nothing in this world but peace and the right to live his life in his own way. But fate had called him to an entirely different lot, from which he could not escape. The duel between Alexei and Peter was not an ordinary feud between father and son, but a clash between two entirely opposed

views of life and civilization. Alexei represented the old Muscovy with all its strength and weakness, but that world was an anachronism and had to yield place to the new world of modern Europe.

PETER'S FOREIGN POLICY

When Peter took over the reins of government, Moscow's chief concern was with Poland, Sweden, and the Ottoman Empire. Despite the weakness of the early Romanovs, Russia had acquired nominal sovereignty over Little Russia (the Ukraine). But she had been unable to wrest from Sweden a coveted foothold on the southern shore of the Baltic. It was natural that Peter should be drawn into the crusade waged by the Holy League against the Turks from 1684 to 1698. Peter's contribution had been the campaign against and capture of Azov, 1696. His mind at this time was filled with the purpose of driving the Turks from Constantinople. But events were not subject to Peter's control. The battle of Zenta, in which the forces of the League were overwhelmingly successful, disposed both sides for peace. Envoys were despatched by the Porte to meet representatives of the powers at Carlowitz, on the Danube. Here Voznitsyn, the Muscovite ambassador, found himself isolated, and the Treaty of Carlowitz (January, 1699) was negotiated without his participation. All that Russia secured was a two-year truce with the Porte.

Meantime Peter pushed on with feverish haste preparations for the renewal of hostilities. He built a string of fortresses in the neighborhood of Azov and constructed, with the aid of so-called "companies," a fleet of 80 vessels (among them eighteen warships) which were floated down the river from Voronezh in the spring of 1699. Peter, persuaded of the need of the Turks for peace, despatched Ukraintsev as ambassador to Constantinople. He was to be conveyed on a warship from Azov. Peter personally piloted the squadron, ship by ship, through the tortuous channels of the Don delta. The squadron accompanied Ukraintsev across the Sea of Azov to Kertch. This unexpected demonstration of Russian naval power in the

Black Sea overawed the Turkish authorities. They gave way and allowed the ambassador's ship to proceed by sea to Constantinople. Its appearance here created no little consternation. The old legend that the Euxine was a pure and stainless maiden, unapproachable to all save the Turks, was rudely shaken.

On July 3 there was finally signed a thirty-year truce between the two powers. Kasikerman and the other fortresses on the Dnieper were to be razed and their sites restored to the Turks. Azov and the newly erected fortresses in the neighborhood were to remain in Russian hands. The payment of tribute or the rendering of gifts to the Tartar Khan by the Russians was at last abolished. A broad stretch of land between Russian and Tartar territory was to be left uncultivated and empty.

THE NORTHERN WAR


The fertile mind of Peter was already at work on another vast design, nothing less than the challenging of the dominance of Sweden in the Baltic. But the plan must be kept secret till peace was concluded with Turkey. To this end, the Tsar had no scruples against practising dissimulation. Meantime it was necessary to find allies. Peter relied on King Augustus, the Saxon Elector whom Peter had in 1697 succeeded in raising to the position of King of Poland over the votes of the French and Swedish candidate, Prince Conti. Peter had met the Polish King on his return from Vienna and found him favorable. He also succeeded in drawing the King of Denmark into the alliance. Even before the conclusion of the treaty with the Porte, Peter's allies took the field. Saxon and Polish troops attempted to carry Riga by a *coup de main*, but the Swedish King succeeded in parrying the blow. After the conclusion of the Turkish treaty, Peter took the field with a force of 40,000 men. In September he arrived before Narva, the Swedish port at the mouth of the Narova river. On his way he had ascertained, through his intelligence service, that Charles XII had landed at Pernau with 18,000 men to come to the relief of the greatly outnumbered garrison of Narva. During this time the Russians were finding difficulty with transport and supplies.

Quite unexpectedly on November 18(28) Peter turned the command over to the Duke of Croy and left for the Pskov-Novgorod area, where he considered his presence necessary. Charles XII, then with greatly inferior forces, attacked the Russian position and routed the Russian army, which retreated in great confusion on Pskov and Novgorod. Esthonia was abandoned to the enemy, but Peter prepared to resist any Swedish attempt to penetrate Russian territory. Two months later, in February, 1701, Peter and Augustus met in Birsén to concert their plans. The fortunes of war turned against the Polish King. But in southern Livonia the Russians managed to hold their own and were ordered to begin a campaign of wholesale devastation of the country to deny its use to the enemy. Only Pernau, Reval, and Riga were left untouched. In 1704 Sheremetev wrested Dorpat from the enemy. On August 9 of the same year, Field Marshal Ogilvy took Narva by storm, and a week later Ivangorod, across the river, fell into Russian hands.

After the battle of Narva, Charles XII had turned his attention to Poland in the belief that Russia could for the moment be neglected. He defeated Augustus at Steinau on the Dvina on July 9, 1701, and on July 19, 1702, he won a resounding victory at Klissov. As a result, Cracow opened its gates to Charles. Peter had neglected to effect a conjunction with Polish troops. He made, however, desperate efforts through Patkul to keep Augustus loyal. But Augustus found his position impossible. Poland was slowly drifting into chaos. The triumphs of Charles enabled him to depose Augustus and to secure the election by the Polish Diet of Stanislaus Leszczyński as King of Poland. Augustus endeavored to maintain the unequal struggle, but in 1706 the King of Sweden invaded Saxony and finally compelled King Augustus to abdicate. Peace terms were arranged at Alt-Ranstadt. Augustus was still with the Russian army and actually took part in the battle of Kalisz, in which the Swedes were defeated. But on November 30, 1706, he threw off the mask, left Warsaw secretly

for Saxony, and after a personal interview ratified the treaty of Alt-Ranstadt, recognizing his deposition as a *fait accompli*.

Both sides had long been weary of the struggle, but no way had been found of concluding the war. Peter had taken advantage of Charles' preoccupation in Poland and Saxony to open hostilities against the Swedes in Ingermanland and Kare-



Brown Brothers.

PANORAMA OF ST. PETERSBURG (NOW LENINGRAD).

lia, where the fortress of Nöteborg lay at the point where the Neva leaves Lake Ladoga. At this spot Novgorod had centuries before built the fort of Oryeshchek. The place was taken by storm on October 11, 1702. On May 1 the fortress of Nyenshchanz, farther down, capitulated to Sheremetev. The Swedish squadron that arrived too late for its relief was beaten off. On May 16 Peter laid the first foundations, on the islands at the mouth of the River Neva, of the Fortress of Peter and Paul, which later became the city of St. Petersburg. A church was built in 1704, and residences for Peter, Menshikov, and

others of the Tsar's *entourage* were constructed. The first buildings were of wood, but gradually they were replaced with stone structures. Thus an imposing city began to rise from the marshes of the Neva.

Russian arms continued to advance. Yam and Koporye fell in July, 1703, Kotlin Ostrov (modern Kronstadt) in the late autumn. In November of that year the first merchant from the outside world arrived in St. Petersburg; the fortress of Kronschlott was founded; and the first Russian ships built at Olonets appeared on the Gulf of Finland. In 1704 the Admiralty, the center of the new Baltic fleet, was created. The Russians beat off all efforts of the Swedes to dislodge them. It was evident that Russia had come to the Baltic to stay.

Apart from the Finnish theater of war there was but desultory fighting. Both sides were weary of fighting. They turned to the arts of diplomacy to secure their triumph. Here the victory lay for the moment with the Swedes, who had disposed of Augustus and Polish assistance in 1706 with the Peace of Alt-Ranstadt. Charles XII now girded himself for the invasion of Russia, which began in August, 1707. At the beginning of January Charles entered Grodno two hours after Peter had evacuated it and begun his retreat. Charles pressed forward relentlessly. On July 5 (16) he attacked and defeated Sheremetev at Golowczyn. He followed this up by the occupation of Mohilev on the Dnieper. He attacked the Russian forces under Peter at Drobroye and compelled their withdrawal. But Charles was beginning to suffer from lack of provisions and ammunition. Löwenhaupt, proceeding from the Swedish base in the north with a vast train of supplies, was directed to circumvent the Russian forces and to press forward to a junction with Charles. Unfortunately he was intercepted at Propoisk on the Lyesnaya and his whole train captured, though he himself escaped and joined the main Swedish army. Charles, for want of supplies, was compelled to turn southward into the Ukraine, where he hoped to draw reinforcements from the rebellious Cossacks and the Khan of the Crimea as

well as to recoup his own forces with the abundance of the countryside. Here he entered into correspondence with Mazeppa, the Ataman of the Ukraine, to induce him to throw in his lot with the Swedes. After resisting many attempts to seduce him, Mazeppa wavered in his allegiance to Peter. When Menshikov, warned of this, summoned Mazeppa to meet him, and when Mazeppa pled illness, the former proceeded south into the Ukraine. Mazeppa fled in terror to the camp of the Swedes and sought to arouse the Ukraine in behalf of Charles. But Menshikov was too quick for him. He attacked and captured Baturin, the capital of the Ukraine, with all its supplies. Mazeppa was deposed and placed under spiritual ban. A new Ataman, Skoropadskii, was appointed. Stern measures were taken against all who attempted to rise for the Swedish king. In March the *Syech* of the Zaporozhian Cossacks was taken by storm and levelled with the ground. By these prompt steps Menshikov succeeded in restoring order in the Ukraine.

In May, 1709, the Swedes proceeded to blockade the town of Poltava. Peter and Menshikov hastily brought up the main Russian forces to relieve the town. Preparations were made by the Russians for a general action. On June 27 there was fought the Battle of Poltava, in which the Russian arms were completely victorious. The Swedes retired on the Dnieper, where three days later they were overtaken by Menshikov. Charles escaped with some few of his followers to the right bank. But lack of boats isolated the main forces on the left bank. On July 1, the rest of the Swedish army under Löwenhaupt capitulated. Twelve hundred officers and seventeen thousand men fell into the hands of the Russians. Charles fled across the frontier into Turkish territory.

The triumph at Poltava completely altered the diplomatic situation. The great powers who had shown themselves cold toward Peter now were ready to bestow their friendship on him. Peter took advantage of the lull in the south to press his campaign in the north. In 1710 the Russians succeeded in capturing Viborg. Vorgä, Åbo, and Helsingfors were abandoned by

the Swedes. During the winter following, a serious defeat was inflicted on the Swedes at sea by the Russian Baltic fleet at Hangöudd.

In July, 1710, Riga, after a prolonged siege, capitulated. Peter then pressed forward to harry Sweden in her possessions in northern Germany. Dolgorukii had already formed an alliance with Denmark, which coöperated with the Russians. Stralsund was blockaded, Friedrichstadt and Stettin fell into Russian hands. Stettin, Rügen, Stralsund, and Wismar, were, after capture from Sweden, to be sequestered to Prussia. Stralsund finally capitulated in 1715. After a series of prolonged diplomatic negotiations and a visit to Paris in 1716, Peter succeeded in forming an alliance between Russia, Prussia, and France, by which France agreed, on the expiration of her present agreements with Sweden (1718), not to undertake fresh obligations.

The construction of a Russian fortress at Azov and the appearance of Russian vessels on the Black Sea at the turn of the century had filled the Turkish government with consternation. During the troubled years that followed there was every danger that Turkey would take advantage of Peter's preoccupation to open hostilities. But vacillation and indecision reigned in Constantinople while Russian interests were ably protected by the subtle and indefatigable Tolstoi. After the battle of Poltava, Tolstoi managed to secure an agreement with the Turks according to which Charles was to be escorted to the Turkish frontier and turned over to the Russians. But before this could be done there was a change of Viziers. The new incumbent induced the Sultan to refuse to keep his promise, and war with Russia was decided on.

WAR WITH TURKEY.

In the coming struggle Peter expected to secure allies in the Balkan dominions of the Sultan. In the assurance that he would be joined by the latter's rebellious subjects, the Tsar set the Russian armies in motion toward the Danube frontier. Jassy was occupied by Sheremetev. The Turks moved back

toward the Danube. Peter joined his forces on the Dniester and took the rash step of crossing the Pruth to Jassy to raise the Christian inhabitants of Wallachia on his behalf. But the hospodars, Brankovan and Thomas Kantakuzin, who claimed to represent the Christian population of that region, proved unreliable allies. The Russian armies soon found themselves short of supplies, which the treacherous hospodars could not or would not deliver to them. On July 8 the Russians were attacked on the Pruth by large numbers of Turks. After a violent but indecisive struggle, negotiations were stealthily opened. Peter, desperately striving to extricate his army from an impossible situation, was compelled to agree to the harsh terms of the Turkish government. On July 12, 1711, Shafirov signed the humiliating terms, which Peter approved. Azov was to pass into Turkish hands; Taganrog and other forts in the neighborhood were to be razed; the Russians agreed not to intervene further in Polish affairs; and the King of Sweden was to be allowed to return home without interference. In return for these concessions, the Russian army was to be permitted to retire without molestation.

In May, 1718, peace negotiations with Sweden were begun, Ostermann and Bruce conducting them on behalf of the Russian government. The death of Charles XII in December seemed to favor chances of success; but for three years they continued fruitlessly. Finally a definitive treaty was signed at Nystadt, in 1721. After long wrangling among the representatives, Sweden was at last forced to agree to the terms of Peter, who demanded the surrender of Livland, Estland, Ingermanland, and a part of Karelia (with Viborg). Finland was restored to Sweden. In return for these cessions, Russia was to pay the sum of 12,000,000 thalers.

The Treaty of Nystadt rang down the curtain on Russia's long struggle for a foothold on the Baltic. By the Treaty of Pruth, 1711, Peter had surrendered his port on the Black Sea. But the peace that ensued in 1721 opened the way for an advance in another direction. In 1722 Peter turned the expansive forces of Moscow toward the southeast. Here he compelled the

Shah of Persia in 1723 to recognize the loss of Derbend, Baku, Ghilan, Mansanderan, and Asterabad. These successful aggrandizements of Russia were recognized by the Ottoman Porte on condition that she be allowed compensation by appropriating Persian territory in the interior.

The enormous growth of Muscovite territory and power was signalized by the adoption by Peter in 1721 of the title "Imperator," though it was long before the new designation received the formal recognition of all the European powers. The last years of Peter's life and reign were devoted to the exploitation of the successes gained in his wars by assuming for Russia her position as one of the foremost European nations. Peter endeavored to regularize his relations with the former Lithuanian peasant girl, Skavronskaya, whom he had privately married in 1707, by raising her to the rank of Tsaritsa, under the name of Catherine. But these efforts to provide for the succession came to naught, for the sons of this union died in infancy, two daughters only, Anne and Elizabeth, surviving.

REFORMS

Peter's energies and attention were distracted from domestic affairs by the momentous struggles he was called on to wage with Sweden and Turkey, but these preoccupations were actually the chief occasions of his reforms, however much they may have seemed to act as a brake that retarded them. Without the ever-pressing military and political objectives he placed before himself, it may be questioned whether Peter, practical person that he was, would have embarked on the vast projects which called for the organization and ordering of the country's productive forces. In the course of his reign Russian society and the Muscovite state underwent a process of transformation as a result of which much that was old and venerated disappeared and gave place to what was novel, foreign, and unproven.

Peter decided to carry out his general scheme of making service universal and at the same time fixing rewards in accordance with that service by instituting the well-known Table of Ranks (January 24, 1722). By this the various forms of

service—military, civil, and court—were arranged in an ascending series of steps (the Russian word is *chin*). It was provided that members of the serving class should pass through these stages, but it was expressly stipulated that the nobility had no monopoly, that any person might rise through these steps. The effect of this law was to open to all classes the ranks of the nobility, which in practice became identified with the upper eight categories of officials. This meant an enormous increase in the numbers of the nobility and was perfectly in accord with Peter's plan that privilege should depend upon service to the state. He had exemplified this in his own career when he had insisted on serving in the ranks of the military forces in a capacity for which he was qualified. (For instance, at Azov he fought as a bombardier.) But the new regulations brought down on Peter the reproach of the upper classes that he consorted with people of all ranks and birth, and that many of the persons he advanced to the highest positions in the state were from the lowest ranks of society.

Peter's reforms of the army were dictated by the demands of his campaigns, and the new order emerged from the old by a process of orderly transition. Peter had begun his campaigns with the regiments left over from the previous reign. The *stryeltsi* and the levies of the *dvoryanin* were maintained on a peace footing, but were capable of being mustered for active service. But these troops were disbanded or permitted to fall into decay. Peter had therefore to have recourse to volunteers and levies of freed slaves and peasants enrolled from the seigniorial estates in proportion to the number of homesteads. It was with such a force that Peter fought and lost the battle of Narva. During the following years the Tsar bent his energies to enlarging, training, and improving the army. Increased numbers were achieved by extending to all classes the right to volunteer and the obligation to serve. Thus a universal compulsory service came into existence under which all single men between the ages of fifteen and twenty, and married men between the ages of twenty and thirty, were liable for service and underwent training in improvised cantonments under at

least partly-qualified instructors. From here they were drafted into the regular units to replace casualties that might occur on active service. Annual conscription was begun in 1705 and continued until 1709. The regular proportion was one recruit for twenty tax-paying homesteads. The Swedish war was won by a force that had been raised in this way. The army contained about 300,000 men out of a total population of 14,000,000. In 1708 there was provision for an establishment of 113,000 men in addition to the Cossacks, who provided about 100,000.

For the permanent army Peter more and more fell back on the method of laying on all classes the obligation to provide recruits proportionately to the population. This meant that there had to be a stock-taking throughout the country. The first step toward this was an *ukaz* that went out on September 26, 1718, requiring landlords to take a census of all their male "souls." The returns received from this the first "revision" in 1722 gave the country's peasant "souls" as 5,000,000. On the basis of these returns, officials were despatched into the provinces to institute a detailed investigation of the number of these actually available for military service, but this step was delayed until 1724. The same officials who undertook to correct these lists were likewise authorized to provide billets for the troops in suitable localities. This obligation to provide recruits went hand in hand with the obligation to pay taxes, which was also based on the figures for "revision." The registration, it is to be noted, covered not only the seigniorial but also the court peasants, and the state *odnodvorsti* and the urban payers of *tyaglo*. The registration also covered all intermediate classes, and all those persons of whatever status associated with the Church. The tendency was to reach out and to sweep into the state's system of recruitment and tax-paying all persons of undefined status, even freemen, and to put them in a definite obligation either to the state or to an individual landlord. One of the results of this was the disappearance of the status of bondsmen, the *kholops*.

The net result of all of these changes was that the status of the seigniorial *krestyanin* with the *kholop*, or bondsman, and

the *volnitsa* became enlarged in one great class of serfs called the *kryepostnie lyudi*. The effect was to transform Russia into a social hierarchy in which there existed three stages: the state; the landlords, now all on the *pomyest'e* basis, and owing obligations in service and money payments to the state; and the peasants, who now had definite and fixed obligations, in money payments and in labor, to the landlords and, through the landlords, to the state. In addition, all state and monastic peasants, as well as peasants of the imperial court and family, were made subject to the soul's tax. Seigniorial peasants still had to discharge their special obligations toward their masters.

The very considerable expansion of the fighting forces of the state compelled Peter to face the question of public finances and to take steps to increase his revenue. The Tsar's first instinct was to have recourse to new forms of direct taxation, which multiplied many fold during the early years of his reign. To these was added the crop of monopolies (such as the salt monopoly) which sprang up in the wake of the new industrial expansion. But these somewhat casual and fluctuating sources of revenue did not provide a sufficiently broad and stable basis to support the huge structure of the state which Peter had raised. He therefore turned to the direct tax, which at this time was computed by the *dvor* or homestead. This was an endeavor to adjust the tax burden of the people to their productive capacity. It had been laid not only on the peasants but also on the townsmen. But for many reasons this tax had ceased to render what it had formerly returned, largely because the number of homesteads or *dvory* decreased at the same time that the population had increased. Therefore, in 1718, Peter ordered that there should be a revision or registration of "souls" in addition to a computation of the number of *dvory*, and decreed that there should be laid on each "soul" a levy of 95 kopeks (reduced later to 74). An additional levy of four *grivny* (40 kopeks) was laid on the state peasants to make their taxes equal to those which seigniorial peasants were required to pay their masters. Here, however, it was difficult to do justice to the seigniorial peasants, for their lords had it in their

power to increase the regular obligations as well as the *obrok* (money dues) and the *barshchina*, or tax payable in kind. It is to be noted that the "soul" was a hypothetical unit that did not correspond to the connotation "man," in that with the periodic redivision of land the number of souls provided a more accurate clue to the productive powers of the village and was a truer indication of its tax-paying capacity than the number of its inhabitants.

Peter from the first found himself hampered in the achievement of purposes he had taken in hand by the cumbersome, inefficient, and thoroughly corrupt state machinery. By 1708 he had made up his mind that drastic reforms of the central government must be undertaken. The partner of the Tsar in the administration had been the *Boyarskaya Duma*. Various circumstances had combined to lower its prestige and to assign to it purely administrative functions. The need was felt for a body which could not only carry out the Tsar's instructions on administrative matters, but which could also deliberate and decide questions during his frequent absences. In 1711 there was instituted the Administrative Senate, composed of officials to whom Peter could look to carry out his policies and to consider matters of state while he was away. It was purely an *ad hoc* improvisation to function during an emergency, but more and more it came to be a regular part of the administrative machinery. It had complete supervision of the state finances and was expected to keep irregularities in check. To hold it to its onerous tasks, the Tsar had recourse to a special officer who supervised its deliberations. In 1722 this officer was given the title of Procurator-General. As executive functions were not at this time separated from the judicial, it was inevitable that the latter should become the head of the legal system. The raising of a body of purely administrative officials to the dignity of the chief deliberative body in the realm sounded the death knell not only of the *Boyarskaya Duma*, but also of the whole class of *boyars* that had managed to cling to privilege and preferment so long as these were in some way connected with birth. When service became the only road to

advancement, the *boyars* finally lost their identity in the new class of *dvoryani*, all of whom were reduced to one common level of state servitors. Conditional *pomyestye* and hereditary holdings now became in practice identical.

The second great change to which Peter put his hand was the reform of central administrative organs. The removal of the capital to St. Petersburg with only a part of the *prikazy* and chancelleries, and the frequent absences of the Tsar for long periods disorganized the whole administration and paralyzed its effectiveness. Peter, therefore, began as usual by assembling information on the central institutions of foreign countries, especially Sweden and Germany, to which he despatched Fick and Luberas. They were instructed to collect all available information on this subject and to engage foreigners who could put into practice any schemes that might be borrowed. After several tentative beginnings, the result in 1718 was the reorganization of the central organs from which evolved the nine *Collegia*, based on the Swedish model, to supersede the older institutions. The new institutions were the College of Foreign Affairs, the Department of State Revenue, the Department of Justice, the Exchequer of Income and Expenditure, the College of War, the College of the Admiralty, the Department of Trade, the Department of Mines and Manufacture, and the Chief Pay Office. Though all were not endowed with the name of *Collegium*, they had two characteristics in common: first, in the application to all of the collegial principle. That is, supreme authority was not vested in a single head, but in a board. Second, the territorial element which had lain at the basis of the older *prikazy* was entirely excluded from the new colleges. The authority of the colleges extended territorially to all parts of the empire, each college being restricted, however, in its functions to its own special field of competence.

The third great change had to do with local government. Again it was fiscal considerations that drove Peter along the road to reform. Financial needs, problems in connection with his army and navy, the industrial and commercial expansion on which Peter had set his heart, and the incessant need of workers

for his great construction projects, made it imperative that he have at his command efficient organs through which the central government could act on the mass of the people, and which could, to a certain extent, assume some of the cares of the central government. He cast about for various solutions, and experimented continuously. To meet particular contingencies, Peter had to create as early as 1717, special administrative districts to which the name *guberniya* was given. This device had been gradually extended and in part had superseded or subordinated the old system of *voyevodes*. The *guberniya* were merely the largest of a series of intermediate institutions and it was necessary to create smaller local administrative units to provide means through which the central government could act. These various subordinate units were modelled after institutions to be found in some cases in the Baltic states, and involved a curious medley of self-government and of subordination to the administrative center. The net result was administrative chaos which not only hampered the working of Peter's main designs, but provided an admirable field for the incessant peculation of dishonest officials. Eventually it was decided to draw on Sweden, the same repository of political wisdom which had served as a model for the central administration. The *guberniya* of Peter's experiment was retained, though it had no Swedish counterpart. It was the territory tributary to some important provincial town. For administrative purposes, the *guberniye* were divided into *provintsii* and *distrikti*. The *provintsii* enjoyed a considerable measure of autonomy in local matters. The *distrikti* were especially charged with the collection of taxes. It is noteworthy that the lowest unit of the Swedish system, the parish, was not adopted inasmuch, so the Senate concluded, "as our *krestyane* (peasants) of the *uyezdi* include not sufficient men of able wit."

A judicial system was erected to correspond somewhat loosely with the hierarchy of administrative units, though, as we have seen, there was no separation of judicial from administrative powers. But the government allowed itself considerable latitude. These institutions were based on western

models and did not quite meet the needs of the great mass of the population, whose legal concepts were grounded in common law and who did not readily adapt themselves to imported codes. The result was to introduce a certain amount of friction between local authorities and the central College of Justice, which never was completely eliminated.

One of Peter's most momentous reforms was in the relation of Church and state. Peter had already in 1700 abolished the position of patriarch. This was followed some years later by the creation of the Holy Synod, a board under the presidency of a layman called the Procurator, to administer the ecclesiastical organization. Thus the Church was brought under effective state control. Peter himself was disinclined to theological discussion and any extreme form of religious fanaticism, and his influence was in the direction of tolerance, especially towards Protestants, though he was inclined to regard the Roman Church with suspicion as a rival.

Peter did much to foster education; here his reforms were dictated by practical needs, that is, the necessity which he felt to raise the level of efficiency among the class of state servants. Particularly noteworthy was his creation of the Academy of Sciences (which came into existence just after his death), modelled after the Royal Society in England.

Another great project begun by Peter was the exploration of Russia's vast Asiatic possessions. This project was undertaken to form an estimate of the natural resources of the empire. Peter did not live to carry this through, but it bore fruit in the voyages of Bering, the explorations of Steller, Gmelin, and Pallas, the researches of Müller, and the work done by a host of others by whose efforts the wealth of Russia's heritage in Asia and northwestern America stood revealed and which opened the way for their exploitation. In these designs Peter anticipated much that has come to fruition only in our own times.

Peter drew his ideas from a world that was still mercantilist. While his fiscal and economic measures were a reflection of these ideas, they were on a vast scale and displayed a boldness

rare in that age. But they were frequently magnificent improvisations. In his struggle to parallel on Russian soil the industrial system of western Europe, he borrowed only the narrow technical ideas, which he tried to fit into a Russian *milieu*. There being no middle class to undertake the mining and smelting of iron and steel, the manufacture of munitions, and the making of textiles for his army, many industries were made monopolies and granted to members of the nobility. To provide them with labor, large numbers of serfs were bestowed on them to serve as workers. Thus came into existence the so-called "possessional" organization of industry, so characteristic of the eighteenth century. Monopolies of tobacco, spirits, and other articles were given to private individuals. The result of these measures was to produce an economic system on a rather insecure basis, so that its functioning was spasmodic. Lacking roots in the life of the people, it required the constant intervention of the central power to keep it running.

The titanic figure of Peter brought the former Muscovite state to an unprecedented height of power and glory, and as was afterwards so fittingly said, "opened for Russia a window on Europe." But it likewise caused great hardships and intense suffering among his subjects. Military service, heavy taxes, impositions of all kinds, the devastation inseparable from war, the compulsory service necessary for the construction of public works, such as canals, and of the new capital, as well as a thousand vexatious regulations and prohibitions, lacerated the feelings and exhausted the energies of all classes. Even the nobles hated the new order and felt the heavy hand of the government in all the numerous duties and obligations which were involved. But a new Russia emerged which continued for nearly two hundred years to dominate Europe's diplomacy and which expanded at an unprecedented rate into the empty continent of Asia. Whether for good or ill, Peter had wrought an enduring work.

[14]

THE SUCCESSORS OF PETER

PETER died unexpectedly at five o'clock on the morning of January 28, 1725, and at eight o'clock there assembled in the palace the Senate, the Synod, and all the higher functionaries of the state (called "the generality"). The purpose of the conference was to determine the succession. There were five possible candidates for the throne: Catherine, the widow of Peter; her two daughters, Anna and Elizabeth Petrovna; their cousin, Anna Ivanovna, the widowed duchess of Courland; and the young Peter, son of the unfortunate Alexei, who had perished in 1718. However, at this time the idea of feminine sovereignty had not taken root in Russia. Apart from the regency of Sophia Alexeyevna, Russia had had no experience with women rulers. The majority of the members of the council were probably predisposed in favor of the young Peter; the question at issue was merely who should be chosen as regent. Whether Catherine would have received their votes we shall never know, for, in the midst of the deliberations, one of the young officers, whose presence none could explain, detached himself from the group, approached the window, and gave a signal to those outside. The roll of drums that came from below apprised the debating state dignitaries that matters had passed from their hands and that military force had decided the issue. Preparations had been well made. The acclamations of the guard announced to the nation that the new sovereign was to be Catherine I, the first woman autocrat of all the Russias. Her title was secured not by popular acclamation nor by testamentary decree, but by military force. Even the Dolgorukii's and the Golitsyns bowed to *force ma-*

jeure and took the oath of fealty to the new sovereign. The demand that they comply with this formality was met by some of the recalcitrants with the scornful taunt that since a woman had become the sovereign it was to the women that she should look for faithful subjects. But the application of torture, added to ingrained habits of discipline, overcame this reluctance. There was no organized opposition to the accession of Catherine.

The acclamations that greeted the new sovereign can be said to have hailed the dawn of a new epoch for Russia—the era of gynocracy. During the next sixty-seven years, save for one brief interlude, five women wielded the scepter that fell from the hand of the dead Peter. The reformer had died before the completion of his work. Peter knew that the opposition he had aroused would not fail at his death to endanger his work unless suitable provision were made for the succession. Hence his harsh and brutal treatment of his son, in whom he had seen a rallying point for the forces of obscurantism among the Russian people. But fate played a cruel jest on Peter in that none of the sons born to Catherine survived to manhood. Of the two daughters that survived, Anne was married to the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp and had been relegated, it was hoped, to the seclusion of a married life. Elizabeth was at the time of Peter's death a frivolous girl of sixteen. Catherine, despite the courage with which she attended Peter in the field and comforted him at home, had neither the training nor the inclination to carry on his work. And the coarseness of her nature gave little assurance that when his dominating personality was withdrawn she would give proof of any capacity to rule. Of the subordinates, Menshikov had shown the greatest ability, but it was purely that of a subordinate. For the initiative he had looked to Peter. The next in importance, Ostermann, was a typical bureaucrat with little capacity save for the intricacies of diplomacy and intrigue. The truth was that the great machine of government which had been evolved in the Russian Empire required the control of a master mind. Its *boyars* and serving nobility, animated by jealousy and bitter rivalry, could be

welded by a Peter into a useful tool; his hand withdrawn, their feuds and intrigues bade fair to wreck the state.

The first necessity was the provision of an adequate base for the theoretically strong, but actually moribund, autocracy. Such a base was found in the Supreme Privy Council, consisting of nine members, which came into existence in accordance with the *ukaz* of February 3, 1726, under the terms of which this new body took over the direction of affairs both external and internal. Its creation tended to lower the prestige of the Senate, that supreme body called into existence by Peter to take the place of the *Boyarskaya Duma* of Muscovite times. Though a decree of February 9 ensured to the Senate its former competence and its former title of "governing body," its authority was henceforth rather in the realm of legislation, since supreme police and executive powers were usurped by the new organization. Though the new body may have been a creation of Menshikov, inasmuch as it was a compromise and included a number of the higher nobility, the members of the higher nobility used it to clip the wings of the favorites whom they detested, even Menshikov himself.

Catherine was beginning to suffer from poor health as a consequence of her excesses. Hence a series of complicated manoeuvres to secure the succession began around her person. The Empress succumbed on May 6, 1727.

A meeting of the Supreme Council, the Senate, and the Generality (a group of the three highest ranks of functionaries) was immediately summoned and a will was read which left the throne to the young Peter, but reserved the rights of Anne and Elizabeth Petrovna. None showed surprise, though Sapiaha, who had been constantly at the bedside of the Empress, testified that no will had been signed by her. Makarov announced the accession of the new monarch with a great flourish: "According to the will of the late Empress, a new Emperor has been elected in the person of the heir to the throne, His Highness, the Grand Duke Peter Alexeyevich."

Since the time of Peter the Great, Russia had played the role of a first-class power among the European states. By means

of tortuous diplomacy and a maze of intrigue, there were three stakes for which she played—Poland, Courland, and Schleswig. At Peter's death Europe had been split into two opposing camps. Austria was in league with Spain against England, while England had formed a combination with Hanover, Prussia, and France, and had guaranteed Schleswig to Denmark. Both sides endeavored to draw Russia in. Ultimately, in 1725, the decision of Russia to attack Denmark brought the English and French fleets into the Baltic, and the Russians had to keep their fleet under the protection of shore batteries. Sweden was enticed into the combination hostile to Russia since she wished to thwart the aspirations of the young Duke of Holstein for the Swedish throne. Eventually Austria was won over to the cause of Russia and of her protégé, the Duke of Holstein. In July, 1726, a treaty was signed between the two countries. In October, an Austro-Prussian convention was signed at Wusterhausen. These diplomatic moves reversed the roles of the powers. By allowing herself to be drawn into the net of Austro-Prussian intrigue, Russia surrendered to these powers the initiative she had formerly exercised. The combination was a thinly veiled menace to Poland, in which all three powers had a vital interest.

The accession of a new monarch in Russia also brought a change in the affairs of Courland. In 1709 Peter had arranged the marriage of Anna Ivanovna, his niece, to the young Duke of Courland. The sudden death of the bridegroom resulted in the installation of the widowed Anna as Duchess of Courland. The hand of Anna, with which went the Duchy of Courland, provided a tempting prize for eligible men. Augustus II of Poland sought to win Anna for Prince Maurice of Saxony, his natural son, but Maurice encountered the rivalry of Menshikov, who, fearing for his position under the new dispensation, endeavored to provide for his future by advancing his own candidature. He was, however, discomfited by his rival, whose handsome person and gallantry bade fair to carry off the prize. But at the last moment Anne's ardour cooled, and Catherine formed other plans. But the death of the Empress Catherine

broke the thread of negotiations. At a word from the capital, Lacy invaded the Duchy and unceremoniously hunted Maurice across the frontier. During the lifetime of Peter, Anna had been left to the solitary enjoyment of her appanage. Fourteen years later, on the death of Anna, Maurice of Saxony was to revive his project. This time the new Empress was selected as the object of his matrimonial intentions. But Elizabeth's coquetry did not deceive him. He realized it was assumed for purposes of diplomacy only, and the disappointed Prince left Moscow forever, to return to the scenes of his exploits on the battlefields of Bohemia, while Elizabeth consoled herself for the failure of her venture in the foreign matrimonial market by installing in the family circle the simple and unambitious Alexei Razumovskii.

PETER THE SECOND

What was Muscovy to hope for from this young heir to the throne of the Romanovs? The large eyes, his childish face, his attractive ways were thought by many to be outward indications of a sensitive and noble nature. He was devoted to Menshikov, who soon established a complete ascendancy over his as yet immature mind. But a boy of eleven years is extremely susceptible to all influences, and others soon entered the charmed circle. His sister, Nathalie, and his aunt, Elizabeth Petrovna, won their way to his heart and inevitably strove to supplant Menshikov, whose illness in July, 1727, and whose consequent absence from court loosened his grip on the Emperor and his government. Peter had already begun to chafe at Menshikov's assumption of authority and to resent his betrothal to the young Maria Menshikov, which had been forced on him.

In August the Emperor withdrew from the Menshikov household, where he had been domiciled since the death of Catherine, and installed himself in the summer palace. In September, Menshikov was placed under arrest, and on the 9th a decree of the Tsar was drawn up by Ostermann by which he was exiled to his estates in the province of Ryazan. He was deprived of his positions, his titles, and his orders, and he was forced to give

a written undertaking not to have correspondence with anyone. His daughter was involved in his ruin and was henceforth omitted from the public prayers for the imperial family. Further humiliations and persecutions followed, and in November he was sentenced to the loss of his property and exiled with his family to the town of Berezov, in Siberia, where he died in November, 1729. His daughter Maria shared his banishment and, according to tradition, also died in Berezov.

In January, 1728, the court moved to Moscow, where the coronation took place on February 24. Peter now entered on a new life. Under the tutelage of Elizabeth he had been initiated into the pleasures of riding and hunting. A year was spent in the steppes far to the south, from which the young monarch could be induced to return only at infrequent intervals to Moscow for the despatch of urgent public business. During these months the influence of his beloved sister, Nathalie, and even of his aunt, Elizabeth, began to yield slowly to that of the Dolgorukii family, some of the members of which accompanied him on his expeditions. The death of his sister in November, 1728, further confirmed this tendency.

From the introduction of Peter's reforms, Russia had been split into two opposing parties—the party of reform and the party of reaction. With the removal of the guiding hand and the tumultuous driving power of the great reformer himself, the movement lost momentum. The forces of reaction revived, and its representatives, the Golitsyns and the Dolgorukiis, sought to lead the feet of Peter into the old ways. The removal of the court to Moscow strengthened these influences. The new institutions, not yet deeply rooted, fell into confusion. The Supreme Council gradually usurped the various functions of state. There was, however, little positive progress beyond the suppression of the infamous *Preobrazhenskii Prikaz* and the reestablishment of the position of Hetman of Little Russia. Some customs duties on exports were lowered and monopolies of salt and other commodities were abolished. But the proposed codification of the law came to nothing. The only projects that had any prospects of success were those in which

Ostermann himself was interested. The army and navy, in which he declined to intervene, fell into neglect. The triumph of the old aristocracy meant the triumph of the old Muscovy; everywhere the forces of obscurantism and superstition raised their heads once more. Only the career of Bering, who was beginning his great explorations in the Pacific, carried on the tradition of Peter the Great. The weakness of the government is abundantly attested by the abatement deemed necessary in its demands on the people, the removal of the capitation tax, and the abolition of compulsory military service. But the reduction of the government's income meant a decrease in its activity and a decline in its efficiency.

The final triumph of the Dolgorukiis and the forces of reaction was signalized by the betrothal at Moscow, on November 30, 1729, to Peter of Catherine, the daughter of Alexei Grigoryevich Dolgorukii. The subsequent betrothal, on December 14, to Ivan Dolgorukii, the prince's boon companion, of Nathalie Borisovna Sheremeteva, proved the apogee of Dolgorukii power. The sudden illness of the sovereign in January filled them with consternation. There was hurried talk of consummating the marriage of Catherine; rumour has it that one of the family was prepared to forge the Emperor's signature to a will designating her as empress. But Ostermann was on his guard, and a favorable opportunity could not be found to secure Peter's signature. The would-be forger's courage failed him. The monarch's death took place on January 18, before provision had been made for the succession, which was left on the lap of the gods.

[15]

THE EMPRESS ANNE

ON THE death of Peter, everyone looked to the Privy Council for guidance in the new crisis. But at this moment the political ambitions of the Golitsyns began to clash with those of the Dolgorukiis. Each family sought to extract for itself the maximum amount of advantage from the situation. Each side was, therefore, disposed to pool its own special interests with those of the nobility in bestowing the succession on terms advantageous to their class. Prominent in this intrigue was Dmitrii Mikhailovich Golitsyn, a member of the Privy Council (Supreme Council). Dmitrii Mikhailovich was an aristocrat passionately attached to the traditions of his family and the old Muscovite past. He was also cultured and widely travelled. Educated in Italy, he had been ambassador in Constantinople and governor of Little Russia. His governorship had given him an opportunity to link himself with the flourishing intellectual life of Kiev. The library at his family seat at Arkhangelskoe, near Moscow, contained Russian translations of Macchiavelli, Grotius, Locke, and Puffendorf. He had given evidence of great courage and independence in criticizing Peter's treatment of the Tsarevich Alexei.

Such a personality was fitted to be an instrument of the *Zeitgeist* of the eighteenth century. The ferment caused by the English revolution was working actively in men's minds; though constitutional projects, afterwards so popular, were still a novelty. Sweden had set a precedent in 1718-1719 at the accession of Queen Ulrica-Eleanora by adopting a constitution. With Dmitrii Mikhailovich Golitsyn the interest of his family and of his class went far to reënforce the more idealistic motives

that impelled him to espouse the cause of constitutional reform.

These families, the Golitsyns and the Dolgorukiis, dominated the Supreme Council. They resolved to use the disputed succession as a means of forcing political concessions for the nobility, which had suffered under Peter. What was more natural than that they should seek from the weakness of the autocracy to secure a guarantee for privileges sought as a source of political power for themselves? It was peculiar to the eighteenth century that it was necessary to cloak under the form of a constitution the effort to secure such special advantages. On the morning after Peter's death the Supreme Council took steps to call a meeting of the Senate, the Synod, and the Generality. It was the intention of the instigators of this move to put forward a candidate for the imperial throne, Anna Ivanovna, in preference to her cousin, Elizabeth Petrovna.

It was necessary to proceed cautiously. The reasons that dictated this choice were disclosed by subsequent events. The Golitsyns and the Dolgorukiis proposed to exact conditions for their support of Anne. These conditions were embodied in a document despatched by special courier to Anne for her signature. In accepting these she bound herself:

1. to work for the spread of the Orthodox faith;
2. not to marry nor to name an heir;
3. to keep the Supreme Council, composed of eight persons, whose consent would be necessary for
 - a.* the declaration of war;
 - b.* the conclusion of peace;
 - c.* the introduction of new imposts;
 - d.* the appointment of anyone above the rank of colonel;
 - e.* depriving members of the nobility of life, property, or honors;
 - f.* the bestowal of estates or villages;
 - g.* the summoning of Russians or foreigners to court on charges; and
 - h.* the employment of the resources of the state for private use.

To allay possible suspicion that the new sovereign's authority was to be limited by conditions imposed by the aristocracy, the conspirators endeavored to make it appear that Anne accepted these limitations of her own sovereign will. This action led, therefore, to a double misunderstanding.

Anne assumed that the terms had been agreed upon by the Supreme Council, the Senate, and the Generality. The public in Moscow believed that they emanated from Anne herself. Meanwhile a silent but none the less stubborn opposition had been developing to this thinly disguised effort to establish a constitution. Hundreds of the nobility had been pouring into the city and great excitement reigned in the old capital. The arrival of the delegation sent to secure her acceptance only added to the ferment. The Council, whose real leader, Vasilii Lukich Dolgorukii, had been assigned as special courier to Anne and was temporarily absent from the city, tried to prevent discussion of the terms of acceptance. In spite of this they were freely criticized, and changes were suggested. Anne arrived in Moscow on February 10, 1730. The Council made every effort to isolate her from influences hostile to themselves. In spite of this, the Duchess managed to establish cordial relations with members of the guard; the young officers and the lesser nobility to which they belonged resented the so-called constitutional project, which savored too strongly of an oligarchy of a few favored families. Cherkasskii asked leave to submit an alternative project of reform on February 25. During the discussion that arose in Anne's presence she discovered the fatal secret that the "conditions" to which she had attached her signature had emanated from the Supreme Council only. Acting on a swift intuition, Anne summoned the nobility to discuss the various projects of constitutional reform and to come to a decision. The great families, represented in the Supreme Council, and the lesser nobility, who had gathered in hundreds, were closeted together in conference. This assembly constantly swelled as numbers of young officers slipped in unobserved. Among these the scheme to curtail the power of the monarch found no favor. The efforts of Anne and her support-

ers, Kantemir and Loewenwolde, had attached many others to her cause; and the arbitrary stand that she took indicated her growing self-confidence. Gradually, as the afternoon wore on, the constitutional projects were watered down until they included nothing beyond the abolition of the Supreme Council, the resumption of its former powers by the Senate, and an impracticable scheme for the election by the nobility of the senators, the presidents of the administrative colleges (corresponding to modern ministers), and the governors of the provinces. This scheme as modified was then submitted to the Supreme Council with Anne presiding. Its full capitulation inspired Anne with even greater confidence. She called for the charter, signed in January at Mitau, and tore it in shreds. With an air of complete triumph, Anne invited the Council and the delegates to dinner. The would-be revolutionaries, crestfallen, followed her humbly into the banquet hall. With sardonic humor, Dmitrii Mikhailovich Golitsyn remarked as he left the palace that "the real feast to which the higher nobility had invited the Russian people has gone untasted because they were unworthy to partake."

It was inevitable that Anne's triumph should be followed by revenge on those whose purpose it was to abase the imperial power. Her hand fell heaviest on the Golitsyns and the Dolgorukiis, who were sentenced to banishment to Siberia and whose property was confiscated. Ivan was interrogated under torture at Tobolsk in an effort to wring from him a confession that he intended to forge the will of Peter II. He was later pursued with the most vindictive savagery and finally sentenced to breaking on the wheel and decapitation, a sentence that was carried out in 1739. The ruin of Ivan involved that of his wife, Nathalia, whose melancholy fate left a profound impression on the Russian public.

The Empress Anne was supposedly the daughter of Ivan Alexeyevich (the half-brother of Peter the Great) and Praskovia Saltykov. But inasmuch as Ivan was physically and mentally defective, the presumption is that the father of Praskovia's children (there were three) was Basil Yuchkov, a noble-

man who filled the post of chamberlain at the court of Praskovia. Anne had been born in 1693 and was at the time of her accession thirty-seven years of age. Her training and education had been of the most casual nature. She had been betrothed and married at seventeen to the Duke of Courland; probably *un mariage de convenance* by which Courland, according to Peter's plans, would be detached from Poland and fall to the lot of Russia. Her husband dying within a few weeks of the marriage, Anne had lived at Mitau in somewhat shabby grandeur, always harassed by straitened circumstances and watched with suspicion by the St. Petersburg court. She was a curious combination of the old Muscovite squire's dame, of the provincial potentate, and of the absolute monarch. Her monarchical powers enabled her to indulge her ill-assorted and barbarous tastes. A late riser, she discharged her public duties without enthusiasm or distinction. For relaxation she fell back on the questionable domesticity of the Bühren couple. For excitement her taste ran to story-tellers and the buffoonery of a heterogeneous *entourage* of court fools, misshapen dwarfs, and courtiers forced to act as clowns for the pleasure of the Empress. As time went on, she came to find an outlet for her energies in equitation and in marksmanship. Though she stood on the threshold of the age of enlightenment, she remained untouched by any of its cultural manifestations.

THE ASCENDANCY OF BÜHREN

But Anne's reign was to be distinguished in after times by the rise to power of a favorite, one of the relics of her Mitau days. Ernst Johann Bühren had been born in 1690, the second of three sons of a retired officer in the Polish service. The family was German of Westphalian origin, and had settled in Courland, where it owned an estate by the name of Kalm-Zeem. Though Bühren had some claim to nobility in Courland, it was only with the greatest difficulty that Anne could secure his recognition by the great families of the Duchy. Bühren had studied at Königsberg, where he had been distinguished by youthful escapades. In 1714 he had sought his fortune in St.

Petersburg in the retinue of Sophia Charlotte of Wolfenbüttel, the wife of Alexei Petrovich. He later entered the service of Anne, where he was employed in the chancellery by the master of the court, Peter Mikhailovich Bestuzhev. Coming to the notice of Anne, he was made her secretary and, later, gentleman of her bed-chamber. He accompanied Anne to St. Petersburg to the coronation of Catherine I, and won the imperial favor by his extraordinary knowledge of horses. Anne arranged for him a marriage with a certain Benigna von Trotta-Treyden. He accompanied Anne when she arrived as Empress in 1730, and though at first he held no official title at the court, he became the favorite and availed himself of his influence at court to take a hand in high politics. In 1737, on the death of the Duke Ferdinand, he succeeded in securing his own election by the diet as Duke of Courland. He administered his Duchy from St. Petersburg. He secured all but royal honors abroad, receiving from the Emperor Charles VI the rank of Chevalier of St. Alexander and St. Andrew. The Biron of France, through the head of their family, Armand Charles de Gonant, recognized him as a member of that family. Unquestionably he used his position to enrich himself and his relatives. Whether justly or not, his name became synonymous with overweening pride. This Russian Sejanus outlived his benefactor and actually retained his privileged position for a short time under Anne's successor.

Anne's first act—the abolition of the Supreme Council established by Catherine I—seemed to presage a return to the system of Peter the Great. But her Council of Ministers, which could act in the absence of the sovereign, even in legislative matters, was but a reincarnation of the hated Supreme Council.

The new government was conducted largely through Bühren in collaboration with Ostermann as vice chancellor. With a view to curbing the arbitrary power of the provincial governors or *voyevodes*, they were required at the end of a two-year term of office to return to St. Petersburg to give accounts of their stewardship. The collection of the head tax was taken from their hands and entrusted to the landed proprietors. Exten-

sive colonization in the region between the Dnieper and the Dniester meant the redemption of a land long given over to desolation and solitude, consequent upon the wars with Turkey. But otherwise the reign was characterized by few fundamental changes in the law and but negligible progress in other lines. The law courts continued to be distinguished by their dilatoriness, their corruption, and their inefficiency. Brigandage was rife and was recognized as endemic. Law-enforcing officers often compounded with felons for the latter's protection. Beggars roamed everywhere in the cities. The failure of the state to make provision for the support of convicts led to the swelling of the ranks of the professional mendicants. Law was still regarded, as in medieval times, as a source of profit to the authorities; a sense of accountability to the state or any higher authority was wanting among officials. There was still much of the old Muscovy in the new Russia.

Further examples of the backwardness of Russia as compared with western Europe are to be seen in the system of public finances. Magnan, the French agent, reported that of a yearly budget of 8,500,000 roubles, one half was realized from the poll tax instituted by Peter. This tax was paid in full. But there was the greatest difficulty in collecting the full amount due from other sources, such as the customs and the public houses. Large amounts were held back by the *voyevodes* or stuck to the fingers of subordinates. The resulting deficit did not, however, paralyze the system of government. For one thing the army was usually quartered on the local population; while the expense of provincial administration was in great part borne by collections in kind, which did not appear in the budget. The government continued, as under Peter, to manufacture on its own account and exercised a number of profitable monopolies. As one would expect in an age of mercantilism, the government did not hesitate to resort to the regulation of prices and the restriction of the profits of the middlemen, and reserved to itself the right of unlimited exploitation of its subjects. That this exploitation was severe is amply attested by the heavy emigration of the peasants to Poland, where the exactions, though rigorous, were still less burdensome than in the homeland.

The regulation of the army had been one of Peter's chief cares and it still continued to exercise the minds of the government heads. Peter had made the peasants liable to military service in the ranks, but they had been allowed to choose a recruit to represent them. This privilege unfortunately led to a system whereby groups coöperated in the purchase of serfs to perform their service. The serfs so purchased were, as one might expect, rascals, drunkards, or physical weaklings. In the same way the nobility, which supplied the officers, made every effort to evade compulsory service. The less enterprising, and younger sons inadequately provided for, furnished the quota; the more ambitious of the remainder preferred to go into trade. The schools founded in 1736 for the nobility were ill-equipped and inefficient and it was difficult to attract and to hold the young nobles in them. It was decided to mitigate the hardships of enforced service by a law that allowed parents the privilege of retaining at home one of two sons. Orphans were given the right to draw lots to determine who would manage the interests of the brothers on service. The hardships of active service and the heavy casualties of the Turkish war proved a great drain on the supply of officers. Hence this law was suspended. It was also decreed that service should begin only at the soldiers' twentieth year of age. Positions in both military and civil services were awarded by examinations. Those who failed at the examinations entered the navy. The exigencies of service and the laxity in the enforcement of the obligation to serve resulted in there being 20,000 deserters from the army in 1732.

The pitiable condition of the navy was amply demonstrated by its ineffectiveness at Danzig in 1734; it was only saved by the weakness of its opponents and the stout fight put up by the military forces. In 1737 the government found that the ships of the Don Flotilla had fallen into neglect. The construction of a new fleet did little good. The Turks, having little respect for Russian naval power, attacked the Russian squadron. Only one ship was stoutly defended by its captain, who, finally in despair, blew up his ship. The rest fell into the hands of the Turks and were burned. The one hero on this occasion was a

Frenchman. The truth was that the constant scarcity of funds paralyzed the navy, and pay was always in arrears. The general torpor which had come over the government spread to the fighting services. Nautical skill was not to be found among native Russians. This lack was scarcely made good by the appointment of Ostermann as Admiral, whose profession was diplomacy and not the quarter-deck. The authorities eventually gave up the struggle and abandoned their naval efforts on the Dnieper and Desna. Shipyards were henceforth maintained only at St. Petersburg and Arkhangel'sk.

The military school founded in 1731 was little more than a school of preparatory instruction for the sons of gentlemen. It cost the government only 30,000 roubles per year. Its curriculum included the catechism, military exercises, and arithmetic; other subjects were optional. It is instructive to note that of the languages studied, German was chosen by 237, French by 51, Latin by 15, and Russian by 18. Thirty-six were engaged in studying dancing. Public chastisement was the rule for venal offenses. The state of education in Russia may be gauged by the fact that the total expenditure on public instruction was 49,373 roubles.

In matters of religion the reign of Anne was marked by a struggle between the Lutheran and Catholic trends within the Church, culminating in the trial and imprisonment of Gregory Dashkov, the Archimandrite Marcel Radychevskii, Lotatinskii, and his rival, Feofan Prokopovich, Archbishop of Novgorod. But the charges and countercharges of heresy and the ecclesiastical intrigues did not obscure the fact that a small group of nuns and monks drawn from noble families (14,000 in all) held over 750,000 serfs and disposed of the higher positions in the Church and the emoluments that went with these offices. The Church was torn by feuds over heresy, repelled Lutheran and Catholic tendencies alike, and persecuted the *raskolniki*, yet could itself not escape the charges of greed and servility to those in power.

Russia's relations with her neighbors turned on the question of Poland. In 1720 the candidate of Peter, Augustus of Sax-

ony, was accorded recognition as King of Poland. Owing to the latter's advancing age the question of the succession was bound to come up for decision. But with the Polish succession was associated the Austrian succession. In 1730 the Emperor Charles VI had succeeded in winning the adherence of Spain and England to the Pragmatic Sanction, which secured the succession of the Hapsburg lands to his daughter Maria Theresa. A trump card played had been the threat that a corps of 30,000 Russians would appear on the Rhine to back up the imperial demands. In 1732 the favorite, Bühren, made advances to the French agent, Magnan, dangling before him the prospects of a French alliance provided the customary financial inducement were forthcoming. But Bühren had no means of fulfilling his part of the contract, for foreign affairs were really in the hands of Ostermann, whom the favorite found no means of dislodging from his position. And the Polish succession effectively barred any understanding with France. For Louis XV was bound to support the claims of his wife's father, Stanislaus Leszczyński, against the Russian candidate, Frederick Augustus of Saxony, the son of Augustus II, neither of whom Prussia would support. A third candidate, Dom Emmanuel of Portugal, whom the King of Prussia put forward in the hopes of securing the Duchy of Courland for his second son, was quietly withdrawn under pressure from Saxony.

WAR WITH POLAND, 1733-1735

Meanwhile the death of Augustus brought matters to a head. The French partisans of Leszczyński wrote urging him to present himself at the forthcoming diet, which assembled outside of Warsaw on August 25 in the enclosed fortifications at Praga, which served as a senate house. On September 9 Leszczyński was duly elected as King Stanislaus. A group of nobles hostile to the Primate and his French partisans had withdrawn from the diet and, after coming out for Frederick Augustus, appealed to the Empress for Russian aid. This was immediately granted and Lacy, with 50,000 men, entered Poland and advanced on Warsaw, where he installed Frederick Augustus as

King. Stanislaus fled to Danzig, which a Russian force under Lacy was thereupon obliged to blockade. A small French squadron with an insignificant force was sent to assist the French candidate. Russia despatched her best general, Münnich, to take command. The latter drew his lines tight around the city and forced it to capitulate. The French force was unceremoniously bundled off to St. Petersburg. This was an un-called-for humiliation to France, since the terms of capitulation required the force's return to France. Stanislaus had managed to slip away during the siege and turned up at Königsberg. The appearance of a Russian force in central Germany under Lacy had a sobering effect on the French court. Louis and his ministers adopted a realistic view and withdrew their opposition to the Russian and Austrian candidate. He was thereupon proclaimed in 1735 at Warsaw as Augustus III, King of Poland.

Hardly had the Polish problem reached a settlement when war broke out with Turkey. The advance of Russia toward the Black Sea against the Crimean Tartars could not fail to embroil Russia with their overlords, the Turks. Peter himself had encountered Turkish might on the Pruth in 1711, and had been forced to come to terms. Russia had, however, two frontiers against Turkey. Peter had dreamed of taking his revenge in the Caucasus. The situation was complicated by the presence in Constantinople of the redoubtable Villeneuve, the Turcophil ambassador of France. The Russian envoy, Vyechniakov, kept inciting the Russian court to a war of prevention, for the Sublime Porte was already taking alarm at the Russian encroachment on Poland, which threatened the destruction of that kingdom. Ostermann was persuaded, against his better judgment, to anticipate a Turkish offensive by launching an attack. Münnich was put in command and an expedition was set on foot against the Crimea.

WAR WITH TURKEY

In March, 1736, Münnich began his advance from Kiev across the steppe, despatching Lacy against Azov. The campaign was marred by the bickerings of the chief officers, Münnich, Lacy,

and the Prince of Hesse-Homburg, each of whom was jealous of the others. Lacy captured Azov, while Kinburn in the west fell to Leontiev. Münnich, after storming the lines of Perekop, pushed on to the Crimean capital, Bakhchisarai, which he burned together with the palace of the Khan. Unable to maintain their lines of supply, the Russians withdrew from the Crimea. The operations were attended with heavy losses due as much to the want of supplies as to battle casualties.

Meanwhile the Turks had sent the troublesome Vyechniakov home from Constantinople. The Austrians prepared to implement their treaty of alliance with Russia and, after vain attempts to compose the quarrel, proceeded to invade Turkish territory in the Balkans in 1737. The war therefore continued. Münnich marched on Okhsakov, a powerful fortress lying across the Dnieper from Kinburn. After a desperate assault the city fell.

Austria, however, met with reverses in the Balkans. In 1737 Ostermann offered to make a separate peace; but the Turks failed to press their advantage, and instead the mediation of France was accepted. Though the Russians made every concession, the Turks refused the Russian terms and the war went on in 1738. Münnich attempted to pass his army across the Dniester, but his slow and overburdened transport hampered his movement. The advance was attended with great suffering which led to desertions. Exceptionally heavy casualties compelled the Russian army to retreat. Meanwhile the Austrians lost Orsova, on the Danube, to the Turks, who now threatened Belgrade.

In 1739 Münnich moved in force across the Dniester and entered Moldavia. Approaching Khotin, which blocked the passage of the Pruth, Münnich out-manuevered the Turkish army and stormed its position at Steurichenak before Khotin. Two days later the city was captured. The whole of Moldavia thus passed into Russian hands. Meanwhile the Austrian general, Wallis, had been repulsed on the Danube with the loss of 20,000 men. His successor, Neyberg, evacuated Wallachia and Serbia together with the two fortresses of Orsova and Belgrade. Though Münnich urged that the war be continued, Ostermann

insisted on peace. To purchase it, Russia had to agree to the destruction of Azov. Russia suffered an additional humiliation in the refusal of the Porte to recognize the imperial title of the Tsaritsa.

The war with Turkey encouraged the anti-Russian party in Sweden and revived the talk there of a Turkish alliance. The activity of the famous Villeneuve at Constantinople, the interchange of courtesies between the Sublime Porte and the Swedish Court, and the appearance of a French squadron in the Baltic increased the fears of Bestuzhev, at Stockholm, and others to a frenzy. In this atmosphere of alarm it was not difficult for either party to commit excesses. The Swedish courier, St. Clair, on his way to Constantinople through Poland and Saxony, was set on by two presumed agents of Bühren, Captain Kutler and Major Levitskii, and murdered. In the first revulsion of horror, everyone hastened to disavow the act, but there were strong suspicions of the complicity of the Russian government. The fact that Bestuzhev burnt his archives at Stockholm leaves little room for doubt that he was the original instigator.

Toward the end of Anne's reign Poland appeared tranquil. The anti-Russian party recognized the inevitable and made their peace with the pro-Russian monarch. In 1737, on the death of Frederick of Courland, the Empress saw to it that Bühren was elected duke by a servile diet. But the general diplomatic situation was far from stable, since England and France both angled for a Russian alliance. The death of Frederick William of Prussia in 1740, however, set up a train of events that brought a completely new alignment of the European states.

Anne took to her bed October 5, 1740, never to rise again. The question of the succession was uppermost in everyone's mind. The inner circle that had surrounded Anne—Bühren, Cherkasskii, Alexei Bestuzhev-Ryumin, and Münnich—agreed among themselves to draw up a document naming as Emperor the nine-months-old Ivan Antonovich, the son of Anna Leopoldovna (Anne's niece) and of Anton-Ulric, Duke of Bruns-

wick. Bühren was to be regent. Anne was apparently induced to sign it, though there were no witnesses to the signature. On October 16 she died and Bühren took full charge.

But Bühren had made the fatal mistake of alienating too many persons. He had excluded from the regency both the parents, Anton-Ulric and Anna Leopoldovna, and it was openly rumored that they would be sent abroad. Moreover, the other members of the government, particularly Münnich, were jealous. It was a comparatively simple matter to bring about a concerted movement among them and secure the services of a small military detail of the Preobrazhenskii regiment consisting of three grenadiers and three lieutenants, of which Münnich was commander. With these they proceeded to the apartments of the regent at the palace, where the arrest was carried out with despatch. Bühren was hurried to the Schlüsselburg fortress, in which he was confined for six months. At the court of inquiry before which he was called, he was accused of various crimes, of deciding matters of state on his own responsibility even during the life of the Empress, and of engineering the accession of Ivan Antonovich. He was condemned to death by quartering, but this sentence was commuted to permanent exile in Siberia. Bestuzhev was given his liberty, while Gustav Bühren passed into exile. Bismarck (an ancestor of the famous Iron Chancellor), Bühren's coadjutor, accompanied his former benefactor (and brother-in-law) into exile at Pelym, Siberia. Twenty-two years later, on the accession of Peter III, Bühren was released, but was not allowed to return to his Duchy of Courland till he was restored in 1762 by Catherine II.

ANNA LEOPOLDOVNA

The conspiracy having triumphed, Anna Leopoldovna was declared regent for her infant son, Ivan Antonovich, or, as he is usually known, Ivan VI. The new regime was little improvement on the old. Anna was a mere girl, had little ability for public affairs, and in addition was indolent and self-indulgent. Beyond making a distribution of the offices and a per-

functory consultation with their holders, she did little to keep the affairs of state under control. Moreover, few of those who had participated in the revolution were satisfied. Anton-Ulric was little pleased with the secondary role assigned him by his wife, whom he suspected of wishing to advance the interests of her lover, Lynar. Münnich treated him with scant respect, but secured him the purely honorary title of Generalissimo. Ostermann felt that in the distribution of offices he had been passed over. Instead of being assigned to the post of vice chancellor (which went to Cherkasskii) he was named Grand Admiral, an honor which no one else wished and for which he was quite unsuited. He therefore began to pay assiduous court to Anna Leopoldovna. It proved easy to undermine Münnich and thus recover his influence in foreign affairs. When Münnich in a moment of pique offered his resignation, it was accepted. It was given out at court as grounds for his retirement that, without the authority of the regent, Münnich had shown undue partiality for the interests of Prussia.

But the removal of one disturbing element failed to restore tranquillity. The court remained in a state of uneasy equilibrium. Juliette Mengden, one of the Empress' maids of honor, and the future wife of Lynar, now became the center of intrigue, and spun her web not only about the members of the court, but also around the ambassadors of foreign governments.

Bühren had in 1740 entered into a treaty with Prussia (for which he, as well as Juliette Mengden, had received an ample reward). His removal was hailed as a victory for Austria. The Prussian treaty underwent a drastic revision. Nevertheless, Frederick II, who had just succeeded to the throne of Prussia, spared no effort to prevent an Austrian alliance, and Anna, under the influence of Ostermann and Juliette Mengden, again blew cold on the Austrian friendship. At this moment the attitude of Sweden became particularly menacing. There were whispers in Stockholm of an imminent rising in Russia in favor of Elizabeth. Prussia at that moment endeavored to effect a *rapprochement* with France. The terms of their secret agreement required France to incite Sweden to make war on

Russia, and thus prevent Russian aid to Austria. Frederick pressed for the immediate execution of this condition, and Sweden declared war on July 28, 1741, alleging as pretext the violation by Russia of some of the terms of the Treaty of Ny-stadt. Though Russia's forces, ably led by Lacy, Keith, and Wrangel, managed to check the Swedish advance, and inflicted a defeat on the Swedes at Vilmanstrand, Lacy soon informed the government that, for lack of provisions, Russia could not face the winter campaign which the Swedish commander Loewenhaupt was said to be contemplating. Efforts for peace were renewed, first through Frederick, who skilfully declined the task without disclosing his hand in stirring up the trouble. Anna then turned to England, a new English ambassador, Finch, having just arrived. A defensive alliance between the two powers was the result, with a special secret clause compelling Russia to come to England's assistance if other powers intervened in the war then raging with Spain. But when Shcherbatov, in London, appealed for the assistance for Russia which the terms of this treaty seemed to imply, the English government pointed to terms which apparently the Russian ministers had neglected to read, according to which England was relieved from fulfilling her obligations as an ally till the hostilities should be concluded with Spain. To add to the diplomatic discomfiture of Russia, Turkey assumed a menacing and bellicose attitude, while Persia decided to profit by Russia's temporary isolation to recover lost territory. The Russian minister at Constantinople was compelled to buy off Turkish hostility by signing a convention agreeing to the destruction of Azov, a disagreeable condition of the late treaty with Turkey, whose fulfillment Russia had so far managed successfully to evade.

Meanwhile in St. Petersburg the sands of the ill-fated Brunswick couple were running out. The threads of the conspiracy by which Elizabeth was to be raised to the throne extend back to the arrival at St. Petersburg in 1739 of a new French ambassador, the Marquis de la Chetardie. La Chetardie was not the only instrument of French policy on the Neva. The French

also made use of Baron Nolcken, the Swedish ambassador, as well as Davesnes, an obscure agent of their own. The support of Sweden and the Swedish ambassador was purchased by the offer to restore the Baltic provinces lost to Russia in the reign of Peter the Great. By raising Elizabeth to the throne, and binding her beforehand by a promise of restitution of these lands, Sweden could turn to her own advantage the internal strife in Russia. France was serving her own diplomatic purposes by thus embroiling Russia with Sweden and so preventing Russia from aiding Maria Theresa. The negotiations dragged on, owing to Elizabeth's natural indolence and excessive caution, but the contact established with La Chetardie was never lost. Elizabeth refused to commit herself with reference to the Baltic provinces, though she continued to countenance the intimacy of La Chetardie without compromising herself. Even the advance of Swedish troops across the frontier did not stir Elizabeth into action. Cardinal Fleury and Secretary of State Amelot, apparently better informed on the extent of the conspiracy, now pressed La Chetardie to act, though the French conspirators were niggardly with financial assistance. It would seem that success was not to be achieved if reliance were to be placed only on the French ambassador.

Two things, however, eventually stirred Elizabeth to action. One was the rumor reported to her that Anna proposed to immure her in a convent; the other was the intelligence that the Preobrazhenskii regiment, which had been won for her cause, was to be despatched to the front, a move in which she saw the hand of Ostermann. Her mind was quickly made up, and she was now ready to listen to the counsels of her agents, Schwartz and Lestocq, that the time had come for decisive action.

ELIZABETH SEIZES POWER

At this critical moment the French government refused to lend the money she needed. Elizabeth, however, by pledging her jewels, raised the funds necessary for a final largess to the soldiery. At eleven o'clock on the night of November 24 she

met her confederates, Razumovskii, the three Shuvalovs—Peter, Alexander, and Ivan—Michael Vorontsov, the Prince and Princess of Hesse-Homburg, Vasilii Saltykov, her mother's relatives, the Skavronskiis, the Efimovskiiis, and the Gendrikovs. Elizabeth donned a cuirass for the occasion, took her seat in a sled, and, accompanied by her confederates, set out at a gallop for the barracks of the Preobrazhenskii regiment. Here all was in readiness. The officer of the day at once summoned the soldiers. Elizabeth's direct appeal for their support drew forth the united protestations of officers and men that they would follow her to the end. Before starting, however, she exacted a promise that no blood would be shed. The soldiers then formed a column and, with Elizabeth at their head, set out for the winter palace. Elizabeth being unable to keep up with the soldiers, the soldiers picked her up and carried her along on their shoulders. As they approached the palace, an officer on duty gave the alarm, but was immediately surrounded by scores of angry soldiers, from whom he was with difficulty saved by the intervention of Elizabeth herself. The guard was quickly disarmed. A grenadier was despatched to the imperial apartments where the unfortunate couple—Anton-Ulric and Anna Leopoldovna—had a rude awakening. The little Ivan was summoned from the nursery. Taking him in her arms, Elizabeth resumed her seat in the sleigh and made her way back along the Nevskii Prospekt, this time amid the clamorous rejoicing of the population, which was now apprised that a new reign had begun.

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THE REIGN OF ELIZABETH

THE reign of Elizabeth that began thus violently on November 25, 1741, and lasted till her death in 1762, was a distinct epoch in Russian history. Hailed as a return to the regime of Peter the Great, it terminated the obscurantist and reactionary tendencies of the recent reigns, though without making a complete break with them. But it was distinctly a period of transition and marked the threshold of the age of enlightenment, which culminated under Catherine.

The first problem that faced Elizabeth was what disposal she should make of the Brunswick family, that is, Anna Leopoldovna and her husband and children. It was proposed originally to despatch them abroad as pensioners of the imperial government. But consideration induced the Empress to change her mind. A pretext was found to detain them at Riga, where they were kept until 1744, when they were moved to the north with the purpose of finding them permanent quarters at the Solovetskii monastery on the White Sea. Because ice conditions made the crossing impossible, the prisoners were quartered in the bishop's house on the mainland at Kholmogory. Death freed Anna Leopoldovna from her prison in 1746. Her husband survived her by twenty-eight years. The young daughters were then allowed, at the solicitation of their aunt, the Queen of Denmark, to leave Russia. The son Ivan, who had sat on the throne of Russia for a few weeks in 1741, had long since been isolated from his family and confined in the fortress of Schlüsselburg. Here he dragged out his life till 1764, when, in consequence of a conspiracy to free him, he was strangled by his jailer.

The vigilance and suspicion of Elizabeth with reference to these claimants was given some color of justification by the unmasking of two alleged conspiracies. The first of these, in 1742, involved a lackey and two members of the guard. The second was a petty intrigue revolving around the Lopukhin family and Anna Bestuzheva, the wife of Mikhail Bestuzhev and the sister-in-law of the vice chancellor. These were not mere palace intrigues, but moves in a diplomatic game of several European powers—Prussia, France, and Austria—to compass the ruin of Alexei Bestuzhev, the vice chancellor, and his pro-English policy. Even the Austrian ambassador had countenanced the conspiracy, offering his aid in the restoration of Anna Leopoldovna. The discovery of the plot which implicated the Austrian ambassador, Marquis Botta d'Adorono, led to his recall and to a distinct coolness between the two courts. The two women involved, Lopukhina and Bestuzheva, were found guilty and received sentence of death with the customary Muscovite mutilation. At the last moment, by imperial favor, the sentence of death was commuted to life banishment. The mutilation was reduced to cutting out their tongues. Elizabeth was constitutionally averse to the infliction of physical torture or capital punishment and, on this occasion, seized some pretext for absenting herself from the capital when sentence was carried out. Her persistence in the face of her humanitarian sentiments amply attests her apprehension that she might in turn be unseated by a repetition of the *coup* which she had carried out on November 25, 1741.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Foreign affairs in Russia during the first years of the reign of Elizabeth afforded a battleground for the two systems of alliances—the Franco-Prussian and the Anglo-Russian combinations. The court intrigues were but curtain-raisers to the main act. Frederick II, of Prussia, and his French ally found themselves blocked at every turn by the astute Bestuzhev, who secured an English alliance. The events of 1742-1743 had not gone in favor of Prussia or France, until the alleged complicity

of La Botta and the consequent estrangement of Austria gave Frederick grounds for hope. Immediately after her elevation to the throne, Elizabeth had summoned from Kiel the young Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, the son of her beloved sister Anna, with the evident intention of making him her heir. At once began a series of maneuvers to make diplomatic capital out of the young Prince's marriage, Bestuzhev seeking to arrange a matrimonial alliance with Princess Marianne, the daughter of Augustus III of Poland, while Frederick countered with a scheme for betrothing him to the young Princess Sophia Augusta Friederike of Anhalt-Zerbst, whose mother, Johanna Elizabeth of Holstein-Gottorp, was a sister of the Swedish heir apparent and an aunt of the young Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, Carl Ulric. Frederick by his "shower of Danae" won out. In 1744 the Princess Johanna Elizabeth of Anhalt-Zerbst was invited to bring her young daughter to Russia and was furnished with the necessary *viaticum*. The resulting betrothal, which took place in June, 1744, was a diplomatic triumph for Frederick and a corresponding defeat for his enemies.

The young couple whose marriage was to terminate so tragically twenty years later were but pawns in the game of high politics played by Frederick the Great and Maria Theresa. "On your efforts," Frederick had written to Mardefelt, "depends forever the fate of Prussia and my house." No financial outlay had been allowed to stand in the way of securing the marriage. Once the marriage had been definitely arranged, Frederick felt himself secure as far as Russia was concerned. In his usual spectacular way he at once began his second invasion of Silesia. Through his agents he bent every effort to bring about the downfall of Bestuzhev; and the elder Princess of Zerbst lent herself to the promotion of this purpose. But the plot of Nathalia Lopukhina and Anna Gavrilovna Bestuzheva did not affect the vice chancellor, though his brother, the Grand Marshal and the husband of Anna Gavrilovna, had to relinquish his post, being given in exchange that of ambassador in Berlin. The high-handed and questionable methods used to discredit

Botta because of his alleged complicity angered Maria Theresa. The result was the estrangement of the two courts.

But the attack of the armies of Frederick on those of the Queen of Hungary in Bohemia cooled the anger of Maria Theresa, and she sent a special envoy to St. Petersburg to compose the quarrel. The moment had been chosen by Bestuzhev for disclosing to the Empress the correspondence of La Chetardie, his most active opponent. The despatches, which had been intercepted and decoded by order of the Vice Chancellor, revealed that the French ambassador, in his comments on the Empress, was anything but flattering. La Chetardie had not been duly accredited and was not therefore protected by diplomatic immunity; hence he was expelled, to the confusion of the Francophile camarilla. Six weeks later, Bestuzhev was raised to the office of Grand Chancellor, with Vorontsov as his Vice Chancellor. Elizabeth not only refused to countenance Prussian aggression, but she also declined the proffered Prussian alliance. The Prussian occupation of Saxony, which followed the seizing of Bohemia, spurred Bestuzhev on to greater efforts. He made every endeavor to secure an alliance with England. The task was difficult, since George II was reluctant to move till Hanover was threatened. But Frederick's threats, his display of open contempt for Elizabeth, made the rupture final. A defensive alliance with Austria was concluded on June 2, 1745. Meanwhile the victories of the French General Marshal Saxe in the Austrian Netherlands, with their threat to Holland, brought England around, and by the Treaty of St. Petersburg, signed December 9, 1747, the Empress bound herself to maintain on the Courland frontier a corps of observation, 50,000 strong, at the disposal of England, for which Russia was to receive a subsidy of 100,000 pounds sterling per year. In return for England's and Holland's undertaking to pay another 300,000 pounds, Russia was to send a corps of 30,000 troops to the Rhine. Their expenses on the march were likewise to be secured. The approach of this corps of Repnin's to the French frontier induced France to accelerate peace negotiations. On April 30, 1748, a preliminary convention was signed between

the court of Versailles and the maritime powers at Aix-la-Chapelle. The definitive peace was finally agreed to on October 18. Austria and her allies, including Russia, reluctantly acceded to the treaty.

The reign of Elizabeth had begun while a French-inspired war with Sweden was under way. Russia had disappointed the hopes of her foes and won the war. As a result of her triumph she had dictated the peace of Åbo (August 7, 1743) and secured from Sweden the southern part of Finland lying east of the River Kymmene, the concessions including the fortresses of Vilmanstrand and Fredrikshamn. Henceforth France sought by open diplomacy, coupled with secret intrigue in Russia, to paralyze Russia's efforts against Prussia. But these active measures to embarrass Elizabeth merely succeeded in inducing the Empress to seek new allies. She had already bound herself in a defensive alliance with England (December, 1742). Early in 1745 the maritime powers, England and Holland, had joined Austria and Saxony in the Treaty of Warsaw to secure the partition of Prussia. In May, 1746, Elizabeth finally concluded a treaty of alliance with Maria Theresa for twenty-five years, a treaty that was mainly a revival of the alliance of 1726 against the Turks. But this treaty came only after Frederick had in 1745 come to terms with England, and, by the over-running of Saxony and the capture of Dresden, had wrung from his foes the Peace of Dresden, which left him undisputed master of Silesia and the fortress of Glatz. But the death of Fleury in France had left Frederick without the support of the French government, since Louis XV and many of his court were opposed to the Prussian alliance. In any event, France was preoccupied with her war with England, from which she had not managed to extract a single advantage. Even on the continent, her brilliant victories had not done more than embroil her with England, Austria, and Sardinia. Complete exhaustion predisposed all the combatants to conclude peace on any satisfactory basis.

With the negotiations for peace there sprang up a fresh crop of conspiracies, at the center of which was Count L'Estocq.

The Empress' physician, L'Estocq was of Huguenot ancestry, but had been born in Germany and had distinctly Prussian sympathies. He resented the persistence of the Chancellor in his pro-English and anti-Prussian policy. He had openly alleged that the despatch of Russian troops to the Rhine was a mere threat with no serious intention behind it. But his crowning offense was his entering into secret communication with Frederick and urging him to prevent Russia's taking part in the peace conference. His arrest immediately followed, his property was confiscated, and he himself was exiled to Velikii Ustiug. Even Vorontsov, who had connived with him, fell from favor.

In Russia a new source of anxiety was the unfortunate behavior of the heir apparent, the Grand Duke Peter Fedorovich. As a son of Elizabeth's favorite sister, the Duchess of Mecklenburg, and in his own right the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, he was closely related to two courts, that of Sweden and that of Russia. A fundamental complication was the long-standing dispute of Holstein with the court of Denmark over the possession of Schleswig. Even before his arrival in Russia he had acquired a passion for things Prussian and idealized particularly Frederick the Great. His Prussianism, together with his violent determination to use his position as emperor to square accounts with Denmark, was a clear warning that he would direct Russia's foreign policy, if possible, to satisfy his own personal ambitions. His marriage with the young Sophia, Countess of Anhalt-Zerbst, now the Grand Duchess Catherine Alexeyevna, had not proved a happy one. Peter was physically and mentally immature, and in addition to his predilection for everything Prussian, and his contempt for everything Russian, he had failed to develop any higher interests than those of the drill sergeant. To gratify this passion, he drafted servants and nobles into a corps somewhat after the manner of Peter the Great, and was allowed to import a regiment of Holsteiners. He had developed no intellectual interests and was a child in statecraft. On the other hand, Catherine early evidenced a love of reading. As the gulf widened between herself and Peter,

she withdrew more and more into herself and gratified her taste for books. Peter had already acquired an active dislike for her and had been attracted by the Countess Elizabeth Vorontsova. It was perhaps pique for this slight that led Catherine into her first *liaison* with Sergei Saltykov in 1749. It may have been of this union that her son, Paul Petrovich, was born, as Catherine herself alleges, though there is some doubt of this. During the Seven Years' War this unfortunate domestic tangle was to make more difficult the already complicated diplomatic situation.

ATTEMPTS AT REFORM

The relatively short period between the two wars, that is, from 1748 to 1756, enabled the government to turn its attention to domestic affairs. The internal condition of Russia had steadily become worse. While Peter's reforms had disturbed Russia's lethargy and had set her feet in the path of western civilization, the habits of centuries proved too stubborn to be thus easily uprooted. Backward economic development, misgovernment, corruption, were constantly thwarting the purposes of the state. This thwarting was evidenced particularly in the collection of the famous "soul tax" of Peter the Great, which had taken the place of the older *tyaglo* and had become one of the most important sources of income. Its collection had fallen into arrears, so that Elizabeth, in 1747, felt compelled to remit some two and one-half million roubles. But as there had been no revision of the lists of peasants since 1724, there was a strong suspicion that many were evading the tax. In addition it was discovered that there was a good deal of evasion by removing the names of persons who were still living, as having died. Besides, the flight of peasants to the southeast and to Siberia, in order to escape the tax, continued on so vast a scale that it could not be punished. The revision undertaken in 1747 showed the total population of peasants liable to the tax as 6,615,000, instead of the estimated 5,795,000, and the income from this source was estimated at 5,335,000 roubles rather than the earlier 4,688,000. The total state revenue was somewhere between

nine and ten millions, a sum which would have seemed considerable compared with that collected in earlier times had it not been for the enormous demand of the government services, more particularly those of defense. There was a constant lack of ready money, a circumstance which paralyzed all the government services and caused the serious neglect of both army and navy. To meet the deficit of 3,000,000 roubles in 1748 the government had recourse to inflation of the currency.

Many difficulties were the result of the extraordinary complexity of the system of taxation. Local, provincial, and state taxes frequently overlapped or conflicted with one another and always imposed heavy restrictions on trade and industry. Such taxation was characteristic of eighteenth-century Europe. Thoughtful persons were endeavoring to find some way out of the labyrinth. Peter Shuvalov proposed the imposition of increased, but uniform, indirect taxes on salt and other native products, his chief aim being to eliminate smuggling and so protect the salt industry, which suffered from a shortage of skilled laborers. But the state's interest was affected, for the spread of the salt trade into the southeast had led to friction with the Kalmyks, the Bashkirs, and the Kirghiz, and had resulted in a series of violent outbreaks in which the authority of the government was challenged and the lives and property of the Russian settlers were menaced. The trouble was not brought under control until Neplyuev built the new fortress of Orenburg on the Yaik (Ural) and, under military protection, the caravan trade with Khiva and Bokhara was at length resumed. On the southwestern frontier the difficulty of regulating trade was enormous in view of the close ties that bound these regions with Poland and because of the difficulty of establishing a definite tariff frontier. The greater part of Russian trade was carried on with western Europe through St. Petersburg. Although the trade was on a modest scale, it had yielded a favorable balance. But the growing taste for foreign goods was in the process of reversing the balance of trade.

Internal trade suffered from the many petty local exactions, instead of which Shuvalov proposed the imposition of uniform

import duties payable in currency and therefore more useful to the state than the excise duties payable in kind. Shuvalov also secured an increase in harbor and frontier dues.

Shuvalov attacked the problem of the increasing social disorders and proposed a series of measures dealing with such evils as the flight of peasants, vagrancy, the irregularity of military requisitions, and, the most alarming of all, the recurring famines that brought with them great distress among the peasants and that led to frequent and violent agrarian disturbances. Education was the chief weapon with which he proposed to combat this evil. But he placed hope also on raising the standard of living among the peasants and on the replacing of the swarms of corrupt and venal functionaries with a corps of officials carefully selected and trained. The establishment of a merchants' bank and a nobles' bank to lend money at moderate rates of interest was also a vital feature of his plan. The holdings of the peasants were to be surveyed to eliminate the incessant squabbles over the boundaries of their lands. Efforts were made to check brigandage, which had become almost universal. Restraint was put on the lawless depredation of the Zaporozhian Cossacks by the revival of the Hetmanate of the Ukraine, which was bestowed on Count Cyril Razumovskii. But the country continued to suffer from agrarian disturbances, some of which were occasioned by the rigor with which the ecclesiastical establishments administered their estates. Uprisings were frequent in the south, where peasants were forcibly taken from the land and assigned to industrial undertakings. Unfortunately straitened finances prevented all but a few of the reforms of Shuvalov from being adopted.

Religious differences presented a serious problem. Elizabeth's superstitious reverence for the Orthodox Church led to her revival of the persecution of the schismatics (*Raskolniki*). Pressure was also brought to bear on the Mohammedans and the Jews, and in some cases their conversion was brought about by force which recalls "the days of St. Vladimir." This rigorous policy precipitated a series of racial and religious disturbances that had to be put down with severe measures that fore-

shadowed the policy of enforced religious and cultural unity adopted during the nineteenth century.

Elizabeth deserves credit for her efforts to secure a codification of the Russian laws. Since the *Ulozhenie* of the Emperor Alexei (1649) the work of redaction had been neglected, and the statutes had become full of inconsistencies and contradictions. Elizabeth personally issued instructions to the Senate in 1754 to draw up a plan for the drafting of a new civil and criminal code on the basis of suggestions to be submitted by a congress of elected representatives to be summoned from all parts of the empire. The death of Elizabeth interrupted this work, which was left to her successors to complete.

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR

Meanwhile the international relations of Russia were becoming more strained and more involved. The success with which Frederick had defended his conquests in the first and second Silesian Wars, the quite unsatisfactory and provisional settlement reached in Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, did not make for stability in Europe. Moreover, there was the problem of Poland and the Polish succession, which was sure to cause discord in the courts of Europe. Russia's growing influence in Poland and her persistent policies of protecting the Orthodox Church in Lithuania and checking the flight of peasants from Russia into Poland, boded ill for the future of the latter country. Here influence was exerted through the Czartoryskis and their party, while the Russian government put itself forward as the champion of the *liberum veto* of the Polish Diet.

Relations with Sweden had cooled since the Treaty of Åbo (1743), and Sweden was necessarily drawn into the camp of Russia's foes. Russia's influence in Sweden was directed toward the maintenance of the aristocratic constitution against the efforts of the King to establish the monarch's absolute authority, which he considered the situation of the country rendered necessary. There was, therefore, a close parallel between the cases of Sweden and Poland. Denmark, at loggerheads with Sweden, would have gravitated toward Russia had it not

been for the expressed determination of the Grand Duke Peter to wrest from her the province of Schleswig.

Friction arose with Austria over the question of the right of Serbians to emigrate from the Banat of Temesvar across the frontier, into the territory recently acquired from Turkey. This right had been conceded by Maria Theresa at the behest of Russia, but the exodus had assumed such proportions that it alarmed the Austrian authorities. They felt that Russia had taken undue advantage of their generosity to fill up (at Austria's expense) the empty spaces of Volhynia and Podolia. However, Russia's and Austria's common detestation of Prussia was sufficient to keep the two allies from falling out. Bestuzhev bent his efforts to securing a definite alliance with England. The general belief that Frederick coveted the Hanoverian possessions of the King of England also facilitated his plans.

Russia's interests in Prussia were less considerable than in Poland, which was directly in the path of Russian expansion westward. The immediate object of Moscow was to detach Courland from Poland and to maintain Russian ascendancy in the Polish republic. In 1755 a new English minister, Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams, fell in with the plans of Bestuzhev and proposed a convention whereby, in return for a yearly subsidy of half a million pounds sterling, Russia would set on foot a force of 55,000 men. Elizabeth hesitated to ratify the treaty.

Anglo-French hostilities had broken out in the Ohio Valley in America. England had also taken the initiative in Vienna to secure an alliance against France in the Netherlands, but the Viennese court held back until the Anglo-Russian treaty should be signed. In the meantime negotiations had been opened between France and Austria for a military alliance against the King of Prussia. However, the first move was made when the English ministry in January, 1756, startled the world by the negotiation of the Treaty of Westminster, whereby, in return for the guarantee of the integrity of Hanover, England promised Frederick a subsidy in case of hostilities with Austria. This *volte face* of England was a prelude to the so-called "Diplomatic Revolution" whereby France transferred her allegiance

from Frederick to her former Austrian rival in a treaty signed at Versailles in 1756. The new English minister, Williams, endeavored to prove that the action of his government was not a defection from its alliance with Russia, but Bestuzhev's pro-English policy now proved a source of serious embarrassment which gradually lessened his influence. Williams tried to keep the Anglo-Russian alliance intact, but Elizabeth decided on the exceptional course of summoning a special conference of ministers to consider foreign policy. Their decision was to support Austria at all costs, and to endeavor to draw France into the war. An effort was made to keep Turkey and Sweden neutral. A force of 112,000 men was to be provided, 73,000 to be concentrated at Riga with a protective screen along the land bridge between Dvina and the Dnieper. A force of 10,000 was to be moved from St. Petersburg to Courland, and another force, in readiness to embark, was to be assembled at the capital. A field army of 86,000 men was to take the offensive. Austria, however, announced that she was unprepared to begin war in 1756, though Elizabeth urged strongly that her plans should be speeded up. Frederick was informed of the negotiations under way, and in August, 1756, he suddenly launched his troops across the Saxon frontier and defeated the army of Frederick Augustus. The Seven Years' War had begun.

The beginning of the war coincided with an internal crisis in Russia. In 1755 the Empress' health gave grounds for alarm, and the question of the succession began to disturb her and to occupy the thoughts of the court as well. The Empress wept over the unworthiness of the heir apparent, but there was no other possible candidate for the succession. Peter, besides his disgraceful conduct toward his wife and his aunt, had rendered himself extremely unpopular. Catherine, on the other hand, had bloomed and her charming personality had won her friends on every hand. She was unquestionably anxious for the future. To ascend the throne as the consort of Peter would expose her to the unpopularity which he had achieved. The ill will with which he regarded her gave some grounds for be-

believing that he would use every effort to have her relegated to oblivion in a convent. Catherine had taken counsel, in a very guarded way, with a few whom she trusted. The English ambassador, Williams, was a congenial spirit who sought to secure England's interest by ingratiating himself with a possible ally. Catherine had replaced Saltykov with a new favorite, Stanislaus Poniatowski. Bestuzhev had made advances to Catherine, though with extreme circumspection. He foresaw, in addition to other complications, the danger, from Peter's succession, of a wanton war with Denmark over Schleswig. He proposed to counter this possibility by a plan according to which, in the event of Elizabeth's death, Peter would succeed but Catherine would be named co-regent. Each party to the intrigue veiled his acts with such secrecy that Bestuzhev himself was not aware of the *liaison* between Poniatowski and Catherine until 1756. Williams played on the ambition of Catherine to induce her to acquiesce in Russia's virtual withdrawal from the anti-Prussian combination. Thus the interests of Catherine would coincide with those of her husband.

The government, despite the intrigue, stood firmly by the Austrian alliance and tried to keep France to her new allegiance. The conspirators seem to have tried to paralyze Russia's military effort by intriguing with the commanders in the field to save Frederick. Ivan Shuvalov, among others, lent himself to the scheme. Frederick skilfully spread a rumor that a scheme was on foot to raise to the throne the ex-Tsar, Ivan, now sixteen years of age. The result was the sudden removal of the unfortunate prisoner from his residence at Kholmogory to the fortress of Schlüsselburg. Cyril Razumovskii, another friend of Catherine, was sent off to the Ukraine, and Saltykov, a pronounced enemy, was put in command of a corps of troops to be stationed on the frontier. Elizabeth was resolved that nothing should stop her. To the threat of Vorontzov that Ivan might be used by Frederick, she replied that if a move were made she would have Ivan executed. Meanwhile Poniatowski, who had been sent abroad, came back as Poland's representative in Russia. His conduct from this time on was rash and

insolent, for he flaunted his relations with Catherine before the world. The outraged husband, stung to jealousy, was not in a position to avenge his honor and had to accept the situation. Williams returned to England to die of his own hand two years later. Catherine appears to have drawn closer to Bestuzhev and to have entered into treasonable relations with him. He now became her confidential adviser on matters of state. When, however, Russian troops crossed the Prussian frontier, events moved beyond the realm of diplomacy to that of the sword.

An offensive alliance between three powers—France, Austria, and Russia—was finally concluded at the beginning of 1757. France was to put 100,000 men in the field and provide financial resources to the amount of 12,000,000 *gulden*. Both Austria and Russia agreed to set on foot 80,000 regular troops. Russia was also to furnish fifteen to twenty battleships and to receive annually from France the sum of 1,000,000 roubles.

Frederick had spent the winter of 1756-1757 at Dresden, the Saxon capital. He compared himself with Orpheus pursued by the Maenads—the two empresses and the Polish queen. At the end of April the Russian troops crossed the Western Dvina. The Prussian frontier was not passed until the middle of July with their arrival at Wirballen. The Russians then advanced, the right wing under Fermor marching through Tilsit and Memel, the main body under Apraxin crossing the Pregel and advancing southwest on Allenstein. Lehwaldt, the Prussian commander, also passed the Pregel and attacked the Russians at Groszjägersdorf, where the Russians won a soldiers' victory, to which the high command contributed nothing. But to everyone's astonishment, after their victory the Russians turned and retreated, suffering during their retirement from lack of supplies, sickness, and the severity of the weather. Eventually the Niemen was passed and the army continued its retreat, through Memel, to its winter quarters in Courland.

There were murmurs of discontent within the army at the purposeless surrendering of the fruits of victory. Immediately a flood of criticism arose in the Russian capital and a storm of

censure assailed the government at Vienna. Charges of treason were freely bandied about at home and abroad. The unfortunate Apraxin, already harried by a conflict of higher authorities at home, encountered the full weight of opprobrium.

The fact is that Apraxin, who had been named commander-in-chief in November, 1756, was little more than a court soldier. His service in the field consisted of participation in the campaign of Münnich against Okhsakov. His appointment he owed to the influence of Bestuzhev, Razumovskii, and the Shuvalovs. But even had he been a Hannibal in action, his position would have been all but impossible. The views and aims of the Viennese and St. Petersburg courts were in direct conflict. Moreover, the government at the capital undertook to lay down the plan of campaign for Apraxin before he left and to interfere in operations during the course of hostilities. Apraxin was hampered by an antiquated and cumbersome system of supply. In order not to antagonize the Prussian population and to foster the belief in the humane methods by which Russia made war he had been forbidden to live off the country. He was therefore tied down to his bases and could maintain his lines of communication only with the greatest difficulty. Enough has been gathered from what we have said to indicate that even at court, conflicting views were held as to the thoroughness with which the war against Frederick should be prosecuted. Apraxin, to save his own hide, had taken care to keep in touch, through Bestuzhev, with the Prussophils. But the enemies of Bestuzhev, in league with the envoys of Austria and France—Esterhazy and l'Hôpital—were quick to take advantage of him. The Empress had suffered a stroke. The story was that Bestuzhev had apprised Apraxin of this, whereupon the latter had resolved to retreat. By order of the Empress he was arrested at Narva. A search of his house revealed letters from the Grand Duchess. In February, 1758, Bestuzhev also was arrested and subjected to search, but he apparently managed to destroy any incriminating evidence, for the commission of inquiry could find nothing against him. He was relieved of his appointments and ordered to retire to one of his estates.

The position of Catherine was precarious, even though she had not actually been incriminated; her friends were removed and disgraced; while her husband, though more pro-Prussian than she, would have been glad to see her fall from favor. After an agonizing interval she learned through Elizabeth's confessor that the Empress would receive her. At this meeting all her resources, diplomacy, histrionic skill, and courage were needed to carry her through. She stoutly maintained her innocence, but declared herself ready to return to her native land and leave her son to Elizabeth's care. Elizabeth charged her with intriguing in political matters, hinting that she had been compromised by Bestuzhev. To this Catherine's retort was a downright denial, her best course in view of the fact that the intercepted correspondence with the commander-in-chief was of a most innocuous kind. Her spirited defense, her assumed humility, and Peter's overeagerness to bring about her downfall, rallied the Empress' support. The stormy interview ended with assurances from the sovereign that Catherine need have no apprehensions, provided she refrained from interfering in politics. Thenceforth Catherine devoted herself to her books, her correspondence, and her lovers.

During the winter Apraxin died of a stroke. His place was taken by William von Fermor, the former second-in-command. Königsberg fell at the beginning of the campaign. Fermor was made Governor-general of the occupied Prussian territory. The intention was to push on and make effective the occupation of all Prussia, including the city of Danzig. But the occupation of Danzig would have been a serious blow to Russia's enemies, who rallied to its support. With the assurance of Dutch and French support, the city refused to yield. It was therefore left undisturbed. The plan of campaign for the year was for a part of the Russian army to make a feint against Pomerania while the main body under Fermor crossed the Vistula and marched down the valley of the Netze and the Warthe into the heart of Frederick's dominions. The threat to interfere with his operations against Sweden, in the neighborhood of Stralsünd and Rügen, drew Frederick into the

field against Russia. A great battle was fought at Zorndorf on August 25, 1758, stubbornly contested as usual by the Russians, who lost some 20,000 men. The battle was indecisive. Next day both armies remained on the field, but the following evening Fermor set his forces in retreat toward Landsberg, thus tacitly admitting his defeat. Despite the protests of Vorontsov and Elizabeth, he remained inactive and allowed Frederick to march into Saxony to the help of his brother Heinrich, while Daun pursued his operations against the Swedes in Pomerania without interference. Mutual recriminations among the various courts continued to embitter their relations, already somewhat taxed by the vicissitudes of war. Fermor was finally superseded as commander, his place being taken by Count Peter Saltykov. Fermor remained as divisional commander.

The campaign of 1759 opened with a series of attacks by Frederick on the Russian magazines in Posen. A thrust against Daun, at the foot of the Riesengebirge, induced Saltykov to attempt a union with him. To forestall this attempt the Prussian army, under Dohna and Wedell, hurried forward to the village of Kay, where, on July 23, 1759, a great battle was fought. Like Groszjägersdorf, it was a soldiers' battle. It resulted in a complete victory for Saltykov, the Prussian army recrossing the Warthe and the Oder. After the battle at Kay, there was indecision in the allied councils as to whether the offensive against Frederick should be pushed or whether Saltykov should coöperate with Daun in the reduction and occupation of Silesia. Meanwhile Frederick once more crossed to the right bank of the Oder and forced the allied generals to battle at Künersdorf August 12, 1759. Here Frederick was defeated, but the pursuit was not pushed beyond the Warthe and the Oder. The Prussian King was now plunged in the depths of despair. He saw the end of his life's work and the dissolution of his kingdom. He managed to place his forces between Hadyk and Berlin. For the present unmolested by his foes, he was able to make the effort to restore his shattered fortunes. Saltykov entered Silesia, where, though offered battle by Frederick, he declined it. Like his predecessors, he retired to win-

ter quarters, on the Vistula. The fruits of the victories of 1759 were again allowed to slip from his grasp.

The winter of 1759-1760 saw determined efforts to arrange a peace conference. The striking victories of Pitt's generals in America, England's unbroken control of the sea, and the financial exhaustion of France strongly disposed the latter power in favor of peace. Frederick also found himself at the end of his resources, though he was still firmly resolved not to yield an inch of his recent acquisitions. In England the political intrigues of Pitt's enemies coincided with the efforts to secure a separate Anglo-French peace. An Anglo-Prussian statement that issued from the Hague toward the end of 1759 was shortly followed by a fresh military disaster to Frederick, the capitulation of the forces of General Finck, who had been despatched against the rear of General Daun. Frederick redoubled his efforts to isolate Austria from her allies, while his opponents, more particularly Elizabeth, strove as zealously to keep the alliance intact and to detach England from her Prussian confederate. The result was that the peace efforts proved abortive and the war was to continue for at least another year.

The operations of the year 1760 were confined for the most part to Silesia, where Laudon inflicted a crushing defeat on General Fouque's corps. There was much show of activity on the part of the allies, but little determination, so that when Frederick attacked Laudon on August 15 at Breslau, both Daun and Saltykov allowed their ally to be defeated without making any effort to come to his assistance, though both of them were close at hand. This blow led to suspicions and mutual recriminations. The morale of both allied armies suffered severely. Elizabeth took advantage of Saltykov's illness to supersede him by Count Alexander Buturlin. Some compensation was found for Frederick's successes by Fermor's dash on Berlin while he was in temporary command. With the city in their grasp, the Russians received word of Frederick's approach and had perforce to retire. In the north the force besieging Kohlberg was roughly handled by the Prussians and lost its artillery. When the new commander-in-chief arrived at headquarters, his one

act was merely to lead the Russians back to winter quarters on the Vistula.

At the close of the year peace maneuvers started afresh. France and Austria were both anxious for peace. Russia, fearing that they would desert her, held over their heads the threat that if they attempted this she would forestall them in making peace and leave them to secure what terms they could from their enemies. The firm stand of Elizabeth in the face of her allies' weakening held the coalition together and convinced its foes that no acceptable peace could be won save by waging another campaign. In the meantime George II had died. With the new reign began the personal government of George III, Bute being his choice for Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Pitt found himself caught in the net of an anti-war intrigue. France had still one trump card to play. She had secured another family compact with the Bourbons in Spain and, with the immediate prospect of Spanish intervention, hope revived. The allies therefore took fresh heart.

The new campaign was to be carried forward with the united forces of all the allies based on Kohlberg, which was first to be secured. Their armies were to be thrust across the Middle Oder in the direction of Berlin; another drive was to be directed against Küstrin. Austria was to be left free to recover Silesia.

Actually the campaign began otherwise; Buturlin entered Silesia and Laudon was assigned to coöperate with him. Daun was on the defensive in Saxony. But Buturlin failed utterly. He hesitated to attack Breslau. When at last he joined Laudon at Jauer, Frederick entrenched himself strongly at Bungenwitz, near Schweidnitz. Though the assault on the fortified Prussian camp was agreed upon, the plans broke down and Buturlin marched off to Liegnitz. When the Prussians threatened his rear and burnt magazines at Kalisch and Posen, Buturlin, despite the strict injunctions of the government to take the offensive, retired into Pomerania. Laudon, with one corps of Russians under Chernishev, stormed the Prussian camp at Schweidnitz. In Pomerania the fortress of Kohlberg fell to

General Rumyantsev. Despite Frederick's brilliant successes, he was at the end of his material resources and found his enemies slowly closing in on him. With the threatened withdrawal of the English subsidy, he resolved to stake his success during the coming year on a projected alliance with the Sublime Porte, which would loose crusading hordes on Frederick's enemies. During the winter Frederick was alternately buoyed up with hope and plunged into despair when he saw the chasm that opened before him. But on Christmas Day (O.S.) Elizabeth died in St. Petersburg. Within a few days a courier, despatched by the Grand Duke Peter, announced her death and his own succession. "Heaven be praised," wrote Frederick with unassumed joy to Finckenstein, "our rear is safe." The sudden death of Elizabeth had indeed saved Frederick and his kingdom from a tragic fate.

The death of the Empress Elizabeth on Christmas Day, 1761, can be said to have terminated one era and opened another. Elizabeth had endeavored to revert to the system of her father and to have her country play a role commensurate with its seeming greatness, but with all her high spirits and courage Elizabeth lacked the patience and the energy to carry on the work of her great father. The greater part of her time was taken up in court functions, pilgrimages, and the pleasures of the chase. For months at a time she had absented herself from meetings of her ministers. All but the most pressing business was left to subordinates. The evils of autocracy therefore multiplied. Intrigue, corruption, and inefficiency hampered the workings of the administration and paralyzed the army. The navy fell into neglect, from which it was rescued by Catherine. Elizabeth has to her credit, however, the introduction of European fashions in art, literature, music, dress, and court etiquette, all in imitation of the court at Versailles. Her administration of foreign affairs was marked by clarity of insight and by a great determination, but she utterly lacked the ability to select proper tools. Hence what Russia gained in the Seven Years' War was not commensurate with her sacrifices.

THE REIGN OF CATHERINE THE SECOND

ELIZABETH had been much disappointed during her lifetime with the heir apparent to the throne, but had never been quite able to make up her mind to alter the succession which had been arranged after the arrival of her nephew in Russia in 1743. When, therefore, the senior senator, Prince Nikita Turbetskoi, appeared in the doorway of the imperial apartments to announce the death of Her Majesty, he coupled with this announcement the words, "God preserve our Most Gracious Sovereign, the Emperor Peter the Third." The following day the formal proclamation of the succession was made, and Peter immediately despatched to Frederick the Great a courier with an announcement of his succession, which, considering his pro-Prussian sympathies, foreshadowed a reversal of Russia's foreign policy.

The accession of the young Grand Duke was a comparatively simple matter, so that it is doubtful whether he was aware of the difficulties he would meet in retaining his crown. He was half German and entirely devoted to his native Holstein. The Russian court was torn by feuds and intrigues in which, of necessity, Peter and his wife were involved. He had also expressed a well-nigh idolatrous admiration for Frederick the Great and his Prussian army, and though this fact had not acquired wide publicity, at court his pro-German sympathies made him the object of a natural distrust. His attitude toward Catherine had not yet come to the knowledge of the public and was hardly suspected even in court circles. The situation was full of grave possibilities. Much depended on his ability to

disarm opposition by tact and discretion, neither of which qualities the young prince possessed.

Peter's first public act as Emperor was to despatch instructions to the various commanders in Prussian territory to halt where they were and to refrain from all hostilities. He then opened negotiations with his allies looking toward peace. When the latter demurred, he took matters into his own hands, summoned the Prussian envoy, and offered to conclude peace. Consideration for his allies was not allowed to stand in the way, and a treaty was finally drawn up and signed by Peter on April 25, 1762. By this document the two powers pledged one another their assistance, Prussia, in return for peace, agreeing to help Peter to recover the Duchy of Schleswig from Denmark, to place Prince George of Holstein upon the throne of Courland, and to support the *status quo* in Poland. The Russian armies had already been withdrawn and East Prussia evacuated. The precipitate action of Russia forced the others to conclude peace, and Frederick the Great, who had been in dire extremities at the close of the year 1761, was enabled to emerge victorious from the war.

This complete reversal of Russia's policy estranged the powers that had been her allies during the Seven Years' War. It also outraged the feelings of Peter's own subjects, who resented Russia thus being made a cat's paw of Prussia. In Russia itself the new Emperor endeavored to recover popular favor by a series of reforms and a general amnesty. Political exiles who had been the victims of persecution in Elizabeth's reign were recalled. Among those who returned were Münnich, Bühren, Nathalia Lopukhina, and the Lilienfelds. The only exception to the general amnesty was the fallen Bestuzhev. On January 17 a *ukaz* was signed reducing the salt tax, and a month later it was decided to abolish the so-called "Secret Chancellery" (really the torture chamber). The use of secret informers was discontinued and steps were taken to insure that arrests would not be made until after a careful examination of the charges. The dissenters were allowed to return from Poland and other countries to which persecution had driven them, and they were

granted freedom of worship. The most significant, however, of these changes was that whereby the nobility were freed from their obligation to serve the state and were given full liberty to travel abroad. This last reform was received with great joy by the nobles, but it was not accompanied by the grant of any corresponding relief to the peasants, an omission which was to have momentous results.

A more questionable reform, from a political point of view, was the secularization of church property; the land thus sequestered was to be placed under a special department of state. It must be borne in mind that Peter had been brought up as a Lutheran and, despite his adoption of Orthodoxy, he had nothing but contempt for the Slavonic ritual, and was suspected of a fanatical hatred of the Orthodox Church.

In his negotiations with Frederick, Peter had announced his intention to settle his score with Denmark by recovering the Duchy of Schleswig. Frederick had tried, without success, to dissuade him from this course. He was perfectly aware that to use Russia's military resources in a private quarrel with Denmark would not render the Emperor popular at home. But Peter went on throughout the summer with preparations for war. Russian forces were concentrated at the fortress of Kohlberg, which had been secured by them during the war and which had been retained in the temporary possession of Russia, after the rest of Prussia had been evacuated, to serve as a base of operations. Denmark's action in forcing a loan from the city of Hamburg was the overt act that provided Peter with a pretext for a declaration of war. But events were on foot in St. Petersburg that altered the course of events. The position of Catherine after the accession of her husband had been a very difficult one. Their estrangement had raised a barrier between them, so that Catherine was neither consulted nor informed on public matters and was to some extent barred from court functions. She also seems to have been subjected to harsh if not violent treatment from her husband, though we lack convincing proof that this was a settled practice.

The familiarity of Peter with Elizabeth Vorontsova further

exasperated Catherine. But it is questionable whether this in itself would have induced Catherine to take matters into her own hands. She had a strong sense of reality, and before many weeks had passed she was oppressed with a feeling of impend-



Brown Brothers.

CATHERINE II

ing disaster to Peter and, therefore, herself. Only her own exertions could save her. During the last years of Elizabeth's reign she had maintained confidential relations with a few close intimates, though even with these she guarded herself against any overt indiscretion of word or act. It was not until after the death of Elizabeth that she apparently made the bold decision.

Peter's neglect and contempt for the Russian army had put a weapon in Catherine's hand which the example of her predecessor naturally prompted her to use. She began to establish cordial relations with some of the younger officers of the guards, chiefly the Orlovs, Gregory and his four brothers. Equally intimate was the Princess Dashkova, sister of Elizabeth Vorontsova, a young matron at court. A third was Nikita Ivanovich Panin, a *protégé* of Bestuzhev, who had represented Russia abroad under Elizabeth. Among them it had been decided at the appropriate time to raise the regiments of the St. Petersburg garrison for Catherine, and of course, the threatened despatch of some of these troops to the frontier had already prepared the field for her.

CATHERINE IS RAISED TO THE THRONE

The time had been set for the departure of the Emperor to the front when the sudden arrest of one of the conspirators on June 27 precipitated events. Alexei Orlov, upon hearing of this incident, dashed to Peterhof, where Catherine was staying. It was necessary to rouse Catherine from sleep. She immediately dressed and, along with the other conspirators, entered the carriage to be driven back to the capital. Arriving here the party made the rounds of the regiments, from which Catherine received protestations of loyal support. In this way all of the regiments were won over and St. Petersburg really secured. In the morning Catherine proceeded to the palace, where the Senators were in session. They accepted these events as a *fait accompli* and drew up a manifesto announcing the accession of Catherine on the grounds that she was to rescue Russia from bondage to a foreign power.

Catherine then proceeded to secure the naval base of Kronstadt. Two naval officers were despatched thither. Messengers were then sent to the army in East Prussia to inform the commander, Rumyantsev, that he had been superseded by General Peter Panin. Catherine then set out in the direction of Peterhof to secure the person of the Emperor.

Peter and his court were quartered at Oranienbaum. On the

morning of June 28 it was proposed that the court would move to Peterhof to be entertained by Catherine at her palace. On their arrival, to everyone's astonishment and consternation, it was found that the Empress had disappeared. General confusion ensued. After much bickering the suggestion finally emerged that some trusted officers should be despatched to St. Petersburg for news. The men chosen were Prince Trubetskoi and Count Shuvalov. They set out for the capital, but on their arrival there the sight of the Empress among her troops and the cheering nobles outside of the palace convinced them that the Emperor's cause was lost and that there was nothing to do but to make their peace with Catherine. This they did without taking the trouble to send word back to Peterhof. Peter waited all day for news, but none arrived save the wildest rumors. Action of some kind was imperative. Various rescripts were drawn up and despatched, but no serious move was made until eleven o'clock that night, when the suggestion was adopted that the Emperor should go to Kronstadt. But Kronstadt had already been taken over by Catherine's officers. The imperial flotilla, as it approached Kronstadt, was challenged and turned back with the threat that it would be fired on. Peter was forced to return to Oranienbaum, only to find that his courtiers had already abandoned him. Giving himself up at last he decided to appeal to Catherine with an offer to share the throne with her. Receiving no reply, he made a further offer to abdicate and return to Holstein. This Catherine accepted and Peter was compelled to execute an act of renunciation.

On the morning of June 29 (July 10) a detachment of Husars occupied Peterhof. The Empress arrived at eleven o'clock, and between twelve and one the ex-Emperor was brought back from Oranienbaum. Alone he entered the château, where he was divested of his sword, his decorations, and even his uniform. He was subjected to the humiliation of remaining unattended and even only partly clad. At the end of the day he was removed to the country house, Ropscha, in the neighborhood. Here he was to remain until final disposition could be made of him, the intention being to remove him to the fortress

of Schlüsselburg. Peter's experiences during the next two weeks are shrouded with mystery, although he is known to have been ill and to have asked for medical attention. On Saturday evening, July 18, Alexei Orlov arrived at St. Petersburg in a distressing condition. He was not allowed to see the Empress but managed to send her a letter in which he announced abruptly and without explanations the death of Peter and begged for her protection. This letter Catherine suppressed, though she placed it in a private casket which was not opened until after her death. She affected to believe that Peter had been poisoned and ordered a *post mortem*, but no poison was found in his stomach. A proclamation was issued ascribing the ex-Emperor's death to a fit of colic. His body, from which the evidences of violence were carefully removed, was publicly exhibited. The new Empress was disposed to deal moderately with her erstwhile opponents. The majority of them therefore were allowed to retire into private life. The amnesty of Peter was extended by recalling Bestuzhev from his private estates but without restoring him to his former position.

In foreign affairs Catherine had to liquidate the Prussian alliance. One of the main counts against Peter that she had made in the proclamation of her accession was the Prussian alliance, to which Russian interests had been sacrificed. Nevertheless, Catherine was not one to be embarrassed by a slogan, once it had served its purpose. She agreed to maintain the alliance and offered to mediate between Frederick and his enemies, using the presence of Russian troops in Prussia to bring pressure to bear upon Frederick to make terms. The Prussian King was too shrewd to be thus taken in. He immediately took advantage of the retirement of Russian troops ordered by Peter. Even Saxony was retained, despite Catherine's protest. The Peace of Hubertsburg was arranged between Frederick and his enemies without Russian mediation.

The next problem with which Catherine dealt was that of Courland. Courland at this time was little more than an appanage of Poland, but the fact that the Empress Anne had been Duchess had opened the way to Russian influence. After

the fall of Bühren, Courland had gone to the son of Augustus III of Poland, but Catherine peremptorily ordered the Diet to depose Charles and reëlect Bühren as Duke. The nobles had no option in the matter. Bühren, therefore, just recently returned from Siberia, passed his declining days in his former Baltic possession.

After an unpromising beginning, the relations of Catherine and Frederick the Great continued to improve. Not only were they kindred spirits in many ways, but each apparently thought he could use the other for his own profit. The first twenty-one years of Catherine's reign therefore marked a period of amicable relations between the two. This was a time of great anxiety for the Empress. She was too shrewd not to know that the example of violence that she had set might be emulated by others. It must be remembered that the Brunswick family, that is, the family of Anna Leopoldovna, was still in Kholmogory, Ivan himself being an inmate of the palace of Schlüsselburg. Catherine's safety, she knew would depend largely on prompt action being taken to suppress conspiracies and to conciliate public opinion by politic measures. Shortly after her accession Catherine ordered the continuation of the policy of Peter for the secularization of the ecclesiastical estates. This announcement aroused the regular clergy against her. One ecclesiastic, the Bishop of Rostov, Arsenii Mazeyevich, openly defied the Empress by publicly anathematizing the spoilers of the Church, especially those who laid hands on Church property. Judicial inquiry led to his arrest, trial, and degradation. Finally he was confined in a monastery. Even here he continued to agitate against the government. It was necessary to remove him to Reval, where he was imprisoned under a false name, remaining unknown until his death in 1772.

In 1764 the anticipated attempt to liberate Ivan was made by an officer named Mirovich, who had a grievance against the government for the loss of his family's property in the revolt of Mazeppa in 1709 and proposed to avenge himself by reinstating the former Emperor. His attempt to free Ivan came to naught. Instructions had been issued to the guards that in case of an

attempt of this kind the prisoner should be killed forthwith. Mirovich was arrested and his trial was carried out with despatch and in public. Catherine would not allow torture to be used, but the conspirator nevertheless was found guilty and sentenced to death.

During the Turkish War a female pretender appeared at Leghorn, Italy, who announced herself as the daughter of Elizabeth and Razumovskii. As she was patronized by Russia's enemies, it was an awkward situation for Catherine. But Gregory Orlov, at this time cruising in the Mediterranean, enticed the girl on board the Russian fleet and spirited her away to St. Petersburg, where she was tried and sentenced to prison. Here she passed the rest of her life in solitary confinement. The various inconsistencies in her story do not warrant our believing she was more than an adventuress.

History has a pronounced grudge against Catherine for having brought about the partition of Poland. Without attempting to excuse the role played by the Empress, it may be said that the disappearance of Poland as a state was the culmination of forces long at work. To the eighteenth century, Poland was a land of futile institutions and religious fanaticism. Although Poland was nominally a republic, accustomed to electing a king, political power was exercised only by the lesser nobility, the *Szchlachta*. The bulk of the population was in a state little above that of bondage. Its kings were helpless in the hands of their Diet, and the country was torn with constant civil strife. Friction with Russia was due to the presence of a large number of the Orthodox faith in White Russia and other regions bordering on the Muscovite state. The relation between the Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic had always been strained. Since the Reformation, the Orthodox Church had been friendlier to the Protestants than it had been to the Roman Catholics. Moreover, the fanatical intolerance of the Poles toward both the Protestants and the Orthodox in Poland allowed Russia to appear before western Europe as the champion of tolerance against religious fanaticism. The age of en-

lightenment, therefore, approved of the extinction of the Polish state.

Even before the succession to Courland had been decided, the illness of Augustus III, the Polish King, threatened to put the state of Poland to a hazardous test. It was assumed that France favored a member of the Czartoryski family. It was possible that Austria would support the claims of the Saxon house. But Catherine had already decided on Stanislaus Poniatowski. Once her mind was made up, Catherine made every effort to secure his election. Frederick was too overjoyed at escaping from the perils of the Seven Years' War to question her course. A determined stand at Vienna assured her of the acquiescence of Austria. France, lukewarm in the cause of her nominee, was compelled to give way. On the death of Augustus III, therefore, on October 6, 1763, the Polish Diet saw no possibility of evading the issue. Poniatowski was duly elected. The remarks of Catherine, made years afterwards, are worth quoting:

Russia put up Count Poniatowski as candidate for the Polish throne because, of all the claimants, he had fewest rights; so that he was under obligation to Russia more than any other candidate would have been.

There can be no doubt that the Empress had gauged the situation correctly. Catherine had determined to bring Poland entirely under her power. The new King of Poland therefore was in such a position that he was unable to protect the interests of his own state when these interests clashed with those of Catherine, who let it be known that she expected implicit deference to her wishes.

The presence of the dissidents in Poland, as that of the Orthodox population in the Balkans a century later, proved a powerful weapon in the hands of Russia when she wished to intervene. The other powers soon correctly anticipated Catherine's designs but did nothing to checkmate her. The French government was informed by its representatives at Moscow that Catherine's tenure of the throne was precarious and could not last. Frederick, however reluctant, was compelled to acquiesce because of the alliance recently entered into with Catherine,

but he expressed the fear that a precipitate act on the part of Catherine might lead to a European war. The initiative, therefore, remained with Catherine, who prepared the ground through her able and energetic minister at Warsaw, Count Repnin, to whom she entrusted the protection of the Protestant and Orthodox minorities in Poland. Catherine also came out as the champion of the Polish constitution, whose cornerstone was the *liberum veto* of the Polish Diet, and had informed Stanislaus that there was to be no tampering with this.

By a curious turn of events the fate of Poland was involved with that of the Ottoman Empire. Since the latter's fierce attack on the Hapsburg realms in the late seventeenth century, the tide of Ottoman conquest had receded and the Turkish Empire had entered on a decline. Whereas Poland had been the menace to Turkey in the seventeenth century, it was Russia in the eighteenth whom the Ottomans feared. The election, therefore, of a vassal of Russia to the Polish throne was regarded as a threat to Turkey as much as to Poland. The Ottoman court was likewise a scene of great activity among the western diplomats during the eighteenth century. Even Frederick had used the influence he had at Constantinople against Russia during the Seven Years' War. It was inevitable, therefore, that Constantinople should be used by the western powers as a diplomatic approach to Russia. When, therefore, Catherine openly championed the cause of the religious minority in Poland and this was met by the organization of the Confederation of the Bar, the Turkish government began to bestir itself, if not to protect Poland, at least to secure its own interests against the western advance of Russia.

It must be borne in mind that at this time Russia was cut off from the Black Sea by the Crimean Tartars, whose Khan was a vassal of the Sultan. Any threat, therefore, to Poland would almost inevitably bring Russian troops into conflict with the Tartars and would threaten the northern boundaries of Turkey. The Turks took alarm at the military measures of Russia, and issued an ultimatum in 1767 that the Russians withdraw their troops from the Turkish frontier, that the Polish province of

Podolia be evacuated, and, finally, that Russian troops be entirely withdrawn from Poland. The terms of the Turks were summarily rejected and war broke out. The war that followed lasted from 1768 until 1774. Catherine girded herself for the contest, which was unquestionably caused by her aggressive and determined policy. The fleet, which had fallen into neglect, was her first care. A special board was created whose duty it was to equip and render it seaworthy. The army likewise had been much neglected. The regiments were incomplete and all supplies were deficient. The Turkish army was little better, so that Frederick compared the war to the "struggle of a one-eyed man with a blind man." But Russia had the advantage that her administration was directed by a woman who knew her own mind and who lacked nothing in determination.

Before the preparations were complete, Russia suffered from the invasions of the Tartars. This was the last occasion on which this scourge swept in from the steppes. The Russian forces under Rumyantsev crossed the frontier and marched against the fortress of Okhsakov. They were incompletely equipped with artillery and were compelled to retire. It was not until the tenth of September that the forces succeeded in occupying the Turkish fortress of Choczym. On December 26 the troops entered the Moldavian capital of Jassy, and Catherine assumed the title of Princess of Moldavia. The hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia fell into Russian hands. In the south the troops of Rumyantsev pushed on in the direction of Bender and occupied Azov and Taganrog on the Lower Don. It was proposed to put a fleet in the Black Sea and thus secure the whole of the north shore as far as the Caucasus. At the same time another scheme was set on foot to despatch a fleet into the Mediterranean to rescue the Christian population of European Turkey. The first squadron was made ready to sail in July, 1769; in September another, under Lord Elphinstone, sailed; in the spring of 1770 a third squadron. In the meantime emissaries were despatched by Russia to Greece and the Balkans urging the population to rise against Turkish authority. These national risings were of little avail, though the Russian

fleet under the command of Orlov passed through the Mediterranean and anchored in the harbor of Navarino. Setting sail from here, Orlov sought and found the Turkish fleet off the Island of Chios and won a victory. Two days later he overtook the Turks in the Bay of Chesme and burned their vessels to the water's edge. Turkish sea power had disappeared. The Russian forces under Rumyantsev had won a great victory at Kagul, a victory that was followed by the fall of Bender. A whole series of frontier posts passed into Russian hands—Ismail, Kilya, Akkerman. The following year little progress was made on the Danube, but in the south Dolgorukii captured Perekop, Eupatoria, and Kertsch.

All 1771 and 1772 were occupied in settling the Polish question, as a result of which the partition took place. In 1772, therefore, the government was able to turn its attention to Turkey. The Ottoman Porte was ready to enter into peace negotiations, which began at Fokschany. An armistice had already been signed in May of this year. A first proposal was for the independence of the Crimea. To this proposal the Turks refused to listen and the peace congress of Fokschany broke up. The second congress at Bucharest had no more success and the war continued. Rumyantsev pushed on to the Danube, where he attempted to capture the fortress of Silistria. The French ambassador at Constantinople endeavored to save the Turks from a continuance of the war, but was not successful. In the meantime the Pugachev revolt broke out on the Volga. Both sides therefore were now willing to make peace. On July 10 a congress was held at Kutchuk Kainardji, where the peace was arranged on the following terms: the Crimean Tartars were to receive their independence; Russia received Kertsch, Yenikale, Kinburn, and the whole steppe between the Bug and the Dnieper. She also received Azov, Greater and Lesser Kabarda, the valley of the Kuban, and the valley of the Terek, with the additional advantage of the right of free navigation on the Black Sea. The principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which were granted religious freedom, were to pay a moderate tribute, and it was further stipulated that the Christian popu-

lation should have considerate treatment from the Porte, Russia reserving the right to intervene in their behalf through their representatives to the Porte. A war indemnity of 4,500,000 roubles, to be paid Russia, completed the terms of the treaty.

THE PUGACHEV REVOLT

During the Turkish War the internal peace of Russia was violently shaken by the revolt of Emilian Pugachev, a Cossack of the Don. While the Empress had done little for the lower classes, she had shown at least some interest in their lot by forbidding the sale of peasants without land as well as by releasing them from the most severe of the exactions of recruiting. But there were not wanting signs of deep-seated discontent among the rural masses just after the beginning of the war. In 1771 trouble broke out in Moscow and, toward the end of the year, the cholera spread up to the old capital from the theater of war in the south. The capital was visited by the plague. Mobs of homeless orphans attested to the severity with which it raged in Moscow. As usual the plague was the occasion for the outbreak of violence against the doctors and the authorities that attempted to cope with it. The trouble was put down only by throwing in troops. It was at this time that a new factor in the situation appeared in the person of Emilian Pugachev.

Pugachev, a Don Cossack, born in 1726, had entered the service as a Cossack and had taken part in the Seven Years' War and in the war against the Turks. After his convalescence from a long illness, he had, in 1772, at the age of forty-six, gone to the Middle Yaik with the purpose of inducing the Cossacks there to move to the Kuban or the Terek. He gave himself out as Peter III, but his plan was betrayed and he himself was thrown into prison. After his release he appeared in Simbirsk, then in Kazan. Here he assumed the role of an "Old Believer" who had suffered for his faith. From here he returned again to the Yaik.

The whole of the Lower Volga as well as the Yaik was ripe for revolution. Bands of Cossacks roamed at will over its vast

expanses, though the state was now reaching out its long arm to bring them under control. A special Cossack detachment had been formed under Anne to bring the line of the river under control. The rigorous discipline, the training, roused the resentment of the common soldier, who was likewise suspicious of a government that was conspiring with his *starshinas* to deprive him of his heritage and his freedom. Moreover, the Orenburg command had just been created to make military control of this area effective. Natural dissatisfaction of the population of this area was swelled by the arrival of large numbers of *raskolniki*. In addition to the Great and Little Russians, there were in this region many natives, the Bashkirs, the Kirghiz (north of the Caspian and the Aral Sea). South of Astrakhan were the Kalmyks, besides the Cheremessi, the Chuvashes, and Mordvians of the Middle Volga. Here Asia and Europe jostled one another; through this area had come the nomads of an earlier day, and in addition to racial differences there was the feud between Islam and Christendom. Into this polyglot area had intruded in Peter's time miners bent on obtaining the mineral resources of the Urals and neighboring regions, while metallurgical enterprises were begun with the use of the "possessional" peasants.

In September, 1773, Pugachev issued his first manifesto for a revolt. The result was an immediate response from the half-nomad, half-robber population. With a motley array he set out for Orenburg, the military center of this area. His appeal to the workers in the mines and metallurgical establishments met with instant response. The peasants rose in thousands at his call. Likewise on the agricultural estates there began the plunder of the manor houses. The movement quickly spread up the Volga to Samara, and later to Kazan and the whole region of the Kama.

Pugachev, partly in emulation, and partly in mockery, created an imperial court reproducing all the personages and the ceremonial of the capital. The incompetent Carr, who had made no head against the rebels, was removed and Alexander Bibikov took his place. The latter and his subordinate, Michelson,

inflicted serious defeats on Pugachev east of Samara, but Pugachev escaped. After finding his way to the Bashkirs he succeeded in raising them against the government. Offa on the Lower Kama opened its gates and the way to Kazan was open. But Bibikov succumbed to sickness early in 1774, to be succeeded by Shcherbatov. On instructions from Moscow, Michelson enrolled a large contingent of nobles, but they could not prevent Pugachev from storming and capturing Kazan, only the Kremlin of which held out. Much of the city was destroyed. The victor pushed on and took possession of Nizhnii Novgorod. Even St. Petersburg was under direct threat.

But at this moment of danger the Turkish war ended and the Russian contingents were released for service in the interior. Pugachev therefore turned south; the natives (the *Inogorody* of the Middle Volga) swarmed to his standard; the peasants brought their landlords into Pugachev's camp for trial as he passed through Murmish, Alaty, Saransk, and Penza on his way to the Sura in the northern part of the province of Voronezh.

From St. Petersburg Catherine in desperation despatched Peter Panin to take the place of the dilatory Shcherbatov. Panin, with ample forces at his disposal, marched southward to Petrovsk and Saratov, which fell, Pugachev fleeing by Dmitrevsk and Dubovka, the headquarters of the Volga Cossacks, where three hundred Kalmyks joined him. The Don Cossacks, on whom he had counted for aid, passed over to the government and joined the pursuit of the Cossack leader, on whose head there was a price of 24,000 roubles. He was defeated at Sarepta by Michelson. At Yaitskii Gorodok he was set on by his followers, captured, and brought in a cage to Moscow. Here he was executed on January 11, 1775, with some of his companions.

To erase partially the memory of these terrible scenes, the name of the river Yaik was changed to Ural, the name of the army changed to that of Ural, and the Yaitskii Gorodok altered to Uralsk. Thus the last of the great Cossack revolts which had enrolled under its banners the oppressed peasants and the

sullen natives was finally suppressed and the chains of both were even more firmly rivetted.


THE FIRST PARTITION OF POLAND

In Poland the problems of the religious minorities and of the constitution continued to occasion political strife. Rival confederations had come into existence, the Confederation of Bar to protest against the policy of toleration, and the Confederation of Radom, which championed the cause of the dissenters. The former secured a promise of French help. When the Turkish war broke out in 1769, Catherine was seriously embarrassed and was compelled to adopt a conciliatory policy, even superseding Repnin by a new envoy, Prince Michael Volkonskii. Prussia's policy continued to be a source of considerable annoyance to Catherine inasmuch as Frederick was apparently determined to compensate himself for services to Russia at the expense of Poland. Austria's attitude was at first indifferent to the acquisition of further territory, but the court of Saxony had cast covetous eyes on Poland. Matters were precipitated in 1770 when Austria formally annexed the county of Zipps, a district in north Hungary which had been mortgaged by Poland and never redeemed. Frederick was anxious to avoid the antagonism of the Russians, but he was ready to take advantage of their preoccupation in the Turkish war to hurry on with the partition. Catherine therefore was drawn along against her will and felt compelled to give way in spite of the objections of her chief minister, Panin. In 1771 a further step was taken by despatching troops under Suvorov to repress the activities of the confederations. The project of partition was formally presented to the Polish ministers and their sovereign in 1771. The definitive treaty between the powers was completed and signed August 15, 1772. Accompanied by military pressure on the part of Russia, it was presented to the Polish Diet September 18, 1773, and approved. It provided for annexation to Austria of the Palatinate of Lemberg, half of the Palatinates of Cracow and Sandomir, and parts of Podolia and western Galicia. Prussia got the district of West

Prussia, excluding Danzig and Thorn, together with the district of Netze. Russia got Polish Livonia, the Palatinate of Vitebsk and Mstislav, and half the Palatinate of Polotsk and Minsk. The loss to Poland was about one-third of her territory. It is to be noted that Russia's share included only those parts of Poland inhabited by Russians. There was no change made in the constitution, Russia at least refusing any alteration that would tend to strengthen the Polish government.

In the meantime Russia's friendship for Prussia was slowly cooling. Nevertheless, as late as 1776, the visit of the young Prince Paul to Berlin was the occasion for a renewal of the friendship of the two countries. This Frederick used very skilfully in the crisis which developed next year over the Bavarian succession. Catherine played very adroitly the role of mediator between Austria and Prussia, that finally led in 1779 to the dispute being settled by the Peace of Teschen. The increasing part which the young Joseph was taking in public affairs foreshadowed a decisive change in Austrian foreign relations. Catherine and Maria Theresa had never been on good terms; Catherine despised the hypocrisy of the Austrian monarch; Maria looked with disfavor on Catherine's indifference to ordinary moral standards. During the winter of 1779-1780 Joseph visited the Russian court, and his negotiations with Catherine turned out successfully. Frederick sensed the growing coldness of the Russian court and countered by sending his nephew, the young Prince Frederick William, on a diplomatic tour of Russia. The visit, however, failed to produce results, since Catherine and the young Prince had nothing in common. The *rapprochement* with Austria led to a formal alliance to provide for the eventual partition of Turkey. Russia, thus aligned with Austria, proceeded in 1783 to annex the Khanate of the Crimea (declared independent of Turkey by the terms of the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji, 1774). The Turks were further incensed over the activity of the Russians along the common frontier. Extensive fortifications were under construction, and Russian agents showed marked activity among the Balkan subjects of the Ottoman Porte. Moreover, the birth in

1779 of a young prince, Constantine, to the wife of the Grand Duke Paul was the occasion of the proclamation of the famous Oriental project of Catherine, which anticipated a separation of the Balkan states from the Turkish Empire. The Balkan areas were to be ruled by a scion of the Russian imperial family. The new Prince was given a Greek name and provided with a



Adapted from Bain, "Slavonic Europe." Courtesy of The Macmillan Co.

Greek nurse, acts which could not but further arouse Turkish mistrust. The annexation of the Crimea put an intolerable strain on the relations between Russia and Turkey. Finally on July 15, 1787, the Turks presented an ultimatum calling for the cessation of anti-Turkish activity in the Near East, more particularly at Jassy and Alexandria; the withdrawal of Russia's support from the rebellious Heraclius, Prince of the Georgians; and the right to search all Russian merchant ships on the Black Sea. A war, destined to last until 1791, was the inevitable outcome. Immediately on its outbreak Sweden decided to take advantage of the situation to attempt to regain the territory she had lost to Russia. The attempt of Razumovskii to rouse the Swedish people against their sovereign, Gustavus III, served as a pretext. The latter, however, received general support and was able to establish a popular dictatorship that rendered him independent of his nobles. A naval battle at Hogland in 1787 was indecisive, but in 1789 the Russians won a striking naval victory at Swentsund. In 1790 further fighting took place in the Gulf of Finland. The Swedish fleet was blockaded in the Gulf of Viborg, but sailed out and, attacking the Russians, won a complete victory. Both sides were ready for peace, which was concluded at Werelä. The terms were: first, a return to the *status quo* and, second, Russia's promise that she would take no steps to restore the Swedish constitution as it had been prior to 1772.

Meanwhile war had been waged concurrently with Turkey by both Austria and Russia. The Russian armies invaded Moldavia and a great battle was fought at Fokschany, as a result of which the combined forces of Austria and Russia defeated the Turks. Another victory was won at Martineschti. On the Danube frontier the Austrians had occupied Belgrade, while Akkerman and Bender, on the Lower Dniester, and Samandria and Passarowitz, on the Danube, were taken. The Turks opened negotiations for peace, but these broke down over the question of the armistice. In 1790 the Russians continued to make further progress and there was talk of a drive on

Constantinople. In 1791 the Russians were active on the Kuban and their fleet won a naval victory in the Bosphorus. Meanwhile the death of Joseph II had removed Catherine's staunchest ally. Leopold, his successor, was anxious for peace. A congress met at Sistova and adjourned to Jassy, where peace was concluded. The Peace of Jassy (December 29, 1790; January 9, 1791) recognized the annexation of the Crimea, confirmed the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji, and ceded to Russia the area between the Bug and the Dniester. The result was that the whole north shore of the Black Sea became Russian.

THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND

The history of Poland in the period following the first partition records years of marked progress along economic and intellectual lines. The stagnation of town life, which had become proverbial, was broken, and in trade and industry the country, long outdistanced by the states of western Europe, began slowly to overtake them. The culture of the enlightenment was beginning to take root. Devotees of Voltaire and Rousseau were to be found everywhere. Unfortunately there was no accompanying political progress. The paralysis that had come over the government at the time of the first partition still prevailed, and the predominance of Russia prevented any salutary reforms. Only minor changes had come in. A permanent council had been established, which was to have charge of the administration and to give some semblance of central authority. Slight improvements had taken place in finance. These allowed for some increase in the army. A school system provided an education for Polish society, which stood comparison with that of any of the other countries of Europe. But the old constitution, the *liberum veto*, the multiplicity of local diets, and the privileges of the *szlachta* survived.

A series of events that came at the end of the eighties precipitated a crisis in Polish affairs. In 1787 there was consummated the Austro-Russian alliance which had been foreshadowed ever since the visit of Joseph II to the Russian court in the winter of 1779-1780. The purpose of Russia in entering this

alliance was to secure assistance against the Porte. Austria, however, considered it anti-Prussian. The visit of Catherine to the Don and the Dnieper and to the new Russian provinces on the Black Sea alarmed the Turkish government. Within a few weeks the Porte had declared war on Russia. The Turkish war is the background against which most of the diplomacy of the second partition stands out.

The outbreak of a Turkish war came as a shock to the Poles. The preoccupation of Russia in a serious war revived at once their hopes of emancipation from the Russian yoke. A wave of popular enthusiasm swept over the country, stimulated and led by the patriots, the anti-Russian party. The Diet which met at Warsaw on October 6, 1788, was, to judge from the activity that preceded it, pledged to internal reform and to the liberation of Poland from Russia. The first action it took was to increase the taxes and to provide for the enlargement of the military forces. With this rather innocuous measure they might have been content had it not been that right at this moment a new King of Prussia, Frederick William, offered them an alliance as a substitute for the scheme of a possible Russo-Polish *rapprochement*. The immediate result of this offer was to incite the diet to an extreme and fanatical hatred of Russia and to launch them on a course that inevitably involved them in trouble. Thus encouraged, they made short work of the old government and reorganized it in a way that would enable them to make head against their oppressors. They followed the reorganization up by the demand on Catherine that Russian troops should be withdrawn. To their own astonishment the demand was granted. At a single stroke they seemed to have achieved their freedom. In the meantime the formal offer of an alliance to Prussia had been accepted and negotiations were opened. An alliance was drawn up and signed. Poland refused to cede Danzig and Thorn and thus somewhat chilled the newly won Prussian friendship. Almost simultaneously a Prusso-Turkish alliance was concluded.

The logical purpose of a Prussian alliance with Poland and Turkey was to take advantage of the difficulties of Austria and

Russia to strengthen the position of Prussia in the east. Austria's position was compromised by the outbreak of the French Revolution in May, 1789, and by its extension to the Austrian Netherlands, which were thus lost to Austria. Prussia's position was further secured by her alliance with England and Holland. Pitt was at this moment preoccupied with the Nootka Sound controversy, but he might ultimately have been persuaded to take action. Prussia proceeded to make ready for war. In 1790 the forces of Austria and Prussia faced each other from opposite sides of the Riesengebirge. At the last moment, however, the firmness of Austria induced Frederick William to come to terms and, in July of that year, the Convention of Reichenbach was signed between the two sovereigns.

The settlement of the Nootka Sound controversy freed England's hands, and the Triple Alliance was thus once more galvanized into life. Catherine was then approached in the hope of inducing her to accept peace with Turkey without annexations, but she was found anything but tractable. She had not been used to making the slightest concession, and in England public opinion did not support Pitt, so he was unable to secure favorable terms for Turkey. Thus the Austro-Russian combination was left free to dictate its own conditions to the Turks. Meantime in Poland, on May 3, 1791, the Polish Diet, catching the spirit of the National Assembly in France, proclaimed a new constitution, the most important provision of which was the guarantee of an hereditary monarchy. As it was precisely the elective kingship that had provided foreign powers with the pretext for intervention, it was a foregone conclusion that Russia would strongly resist this. The action of the Diet met an instant response. All classes in Poland rallied to the support of the government in the struggle which was seen to be inevitable and for success in which the new constitution gave some measure of hope.

The new charter of the Polish state met with approval from Prussia and from Leopold, the new King of Hungary. Catherine's hands were tied by the situation in the south, so that she was unable to do more than maintain a discreet silence.

The courts of Berlin and Vienna were drawn together by further events in the west, where revolutionary fever was running high. Leopold's death and the accession of the inexperienced Francis, facilitated Catherine's plan to obtain a free hand in Poland by involving Austria in France. Moreover, French émigrés who had left France during the disorders and had suffered losses of property were clamoring at the courts of Berlin and Vienna for redress. The tension was further heightened by the restriction of royal powers, in which the unhappy sovereign was compelled to acquiesce. Steps were taken in anticipation of the rupture of peace with France. These were arrangements for armed intervention and for dividing the spoils which would fall to the prospective victors in the French campaign. The flight of the King and his capture at Varennes in the summer of 1792 accelerated war preparations. Hostilities broke out in the autumn of that year. In the east Catherine maintained silence until both she and her allies had negotiated a treaty with the Turks, then announced that she would not accept the new Polish constitution and ordered the adoption of one drawn up by herself. This proposal not meeting with Polish acceptance, Catherine resorted to the old course of organizing a confederation which appealed to her for intervention. The result was that the Russian troops crossed the frontier and within a month had defeated and cornered the Polish army. The shameful desertion of the Polish cause by the pusillanimous King completed the disaster. The whole army laid down its arms and the government capitulated. In the west Austria and Prussia had finally agreed on the rewards they would claim at the end of the war. Unfortunately France was not to be defeated as easily as they had thought. In fact, their forces were driven back ignominiously across the frontier. At this moment Catherine reopened the negotiations with Prussia for a division of the Polish spoils. During the course of the winter the Prussian King evinced little enthusiasm for the campaign in France to which he had pledged himself. Torn by anxiety over his new Polish possessions, he temporized, promising that he

would lend his army though he himself would proceed to Poland. Later on, even this pretense was dropped and, with scarcely an apology to his allies, he withdrew his forces and marched into the area agreed on in Poland. Needless to say, the Russian forces had already occupied the areas in the east marked out by Catherine. Austria therefore found herself shorn of her possessions in the west, deprived of the support of her ally, and defrauded of any share of the Polish booty.

In the meantime the Russian representative had summoned the Polish Diet to meet at Grodno to approve these two acquisitions. The Diet decided to deal with each separately. With regard to the areas claimed by Russia, Sievers, Catherine's representative, overawed the Diet with his troops and, at the point of the bayonet, compelled acquiescence. The Diet then attempted to haggle with Prussia. Sievers gave the Poles some encouragement, as the Prussians were endeavoring to secure commercial treaties in addition to Polish territory. These proposed treaties were rejected, however, and the same procedure was followed as in the case of Russia. When the members of the Diet refused to vote, the president decided that silence was consent. Two days later on September 25, 1793, the treaty was signed and Poland thus was reduced to a shadow of its former self.

THE THIRD PARTITION OF POLAND

When Poland was overrun by Russian and Prussian troops, large numbers of the "patriots" fled to Germany, particularly to Leipzig. Here they began intrigues for a national revolt in Poland in which they counted on the support of the French revolutionaries. But the French were preoccupied elsewhere, and in any event they distrusted the revolutionaries in Poland as aristocrats. The alliance between France and Poland did the cause of the Poles little good, as it involved them in the odium attaching to the execution of Louis XVI. Kosciuszko, the leader of the movement, was inclined to caution, but a rising among the Polish regiments forced his hand. He there-

fore placed himself at the head of a rising in Cracow in February, 1794, and made heroic efforts to organize resistance to Russia. Peasants and squires both responded and, though inadequately equipped, they did not hesitate to attack the Russians, winning a victory over General Tormasov at Raclawice. The number of forces in the field rose rapidly and the movement spread to Warsaw and Vilna, where the population expelled the Russian troops. Meanwhile Catherine and Frederick William proceeded to coöperate, and the Poles were faced with their combined forces. Defeat came in June at Szczekocine and Cholm. Cracow fell and the forces of the enemy closed in on Warsaw, which was subjected to siege from July 9 to September 26. Kosciuszko subsequently managed to beat off the Russians. A rising in Prussian territory induced Frederick William to withdraw. Preparations were made for an invasion of Prussia by Joseph Poniatowski and Dombrowski. Bydgoszcz was stormed and Danzig threatened, but the approach of the Russians to Warsaw compelled a suspension of this promising offensive. In a great battle outside Warsaw, at Maciejowice, October 10, 1794, Kosciuszko was severely wounded and taken prisoner. Toward the end of October, Suvorov stormed the suburb of Praga, where thousands of noncombatants met their death. The revolt was then crushed with the most ruthless brutality.

Negotiations were already under way for the final partition of Poland. The intention of Russia and Austria to reduce the share of Prussia led to strained relations between the powers, as a result of which negotiations were protracted until the autumn of 1795, when the final treaty was signed. With this new treaty the Polish state disappeared. Prussia received the whole district between the Oder, the Bug, and the Niemen. To Austria went Cracow and the palatinates of Sandomir and Vitebsk. Russia secured the remainder of Poland, including the city of Warsaw. This acquisition was one of the last achievements of Catherine, for she died very suddenly on the eve of November 16, 1796, to be succeeded by her son, Paul.

THE FIRST ARMED NEUTRALITY, 1780

In 1780, at the height of the war of American independence, Catherine had acted in concert with the Baltic states for the protection of neutral commerce from undue interference by belligerents. Out of this had grown a league known as "The First Armed Neutrality," originally consisting of Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, but later joined by Holland, Prussia, Austria, Portugal, and the Two Sicilies. During the Revolutionary War, the League had stalwartly defended the rights of neutrals in the war on the high seas and bade fair to become a force to be reckoned with in international affairs where neutral rights at sea were involved. But the outbreak of war between revolutionary France and its eastern neighbors had led to the gradual dissolution of the league.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Internally the reign of Catherine has fewer achievements to record than in external relations. During her early years Catherine had steeped herself in the ideas that were current in the eighteenth century and was well abreast of the times in intellectual matters. One might suppose from this that she would have been preoccupied with internal reform. To a certain extent it appealed to her, but she had absorbed the Muscovite ideal of absolutism, which filled her with a sense of the greatness of her position as Tsaritsa of all the Russias. In her determination to impress Europe with her own greatness and that of Russia, she was drawn more and more into foreign affairs and away from her earlier plans of reform.

Perhaps her most striking attempt at reform was the summoning of a congress of deputies from the Empire to redraft a code of laws similar to the *Ulozhenie* of the Tsar Alexei in 1649. This problem, as we have seen, had occupied the attention of Elizabeth; but her death prevented its solution. However, by 1767 Catherine felt herself sufficiently secure on the throne to proceed with the interrupted project. The necessary

preparations were made to summon, from all parts of the Empire, a great congress of deputies and representatives of all classes, with the exception of the serfs. In anticipation of the congress, Catherine prepared a classic document known as the *Nakaz*, or instructions, composed by herself and including selections from the works of Beccaria and Montesquieu, together with suggestions made by her advisers. She proposed that all important internal problems should come up for discussion before the commission. The sessions of this legislative body were held in Moscow from July to December, 1767, when they were suspended to be resumed in St. Petersburg in February, 1768.

Perhaps the most important matter considered was that of the laws and of the judiciary, in which Catherine endeavored to impose on the Russian system the ideas put forward by the leading western writers. Catherine was strongly opposed, as Elizabeth had been, to the use of torture, and in this respect she was well abreast of the age. It is noteworthy that she herself never actually allowed torture to be used. In religious matters Catherine strongly recommended toleration, although in this her ideas ran counter to those of the Russians. She referred to the commission the problem of the serfs. Catherine apparently had in mind the drafting of uniform laws by which the nobility of the Baltic provinces and the Ukraine would be brought under the same system. The commission displayed a feverish activity and its deliberations illumined the problems of Russia at the time, but few of them issued in any definite recommendations. The discussion frequently took a direction disapproved by Catherine, with the result that the debate was silenced and a new subject broached for deliberation. Sometimes the discussion was later resumed, but more often it was dropped. The outbreak of the Turkish war in 1768 served as a pretext for suspending the plenary sessions, although a number of subcommittees were continued. Catherine always maintained that the discussions proved valuable. An interesting report of the activities of this legislative commission was

given by Shirley in his despatches forwarded to the English government:

The gathering of deputies is at present a preoccupation of the Empress to the exclusion, as at least it seems, of all other business. The Russians think of nothing else, talk of nothing else. Seeing the representatives of so many of Russia's subject peoples in their capital, they are inclined to imagine that they are the wisest, happiest, and most powerful nation in the world; it is also quite useless to tell them that this gathering has no significance in view of the despotic power of their ruler. But the man who sees clearly how restricted the powers of this gathering are, will realize, particularly when he compares the practise of lands blessed with a mixed form of government, that the representatives of the different districts and different elements of the population in a certain sense are only the advisers of the Empress in the work of legislation and that for the deputies it is a question of privileges that in well-governed lands have no value. As soon as any one touches on a subject that is disagreeable to the Empress, or does not correspond with her views, the General Procurer Vyazemskii immediately gives a warning not to raise this point, since in view of the large amount of material to be mastered, it would appear undesirable to venture on such a subject.

The way in which the deputies have conducted themselves in undertaking the solution of such important difficult questions has impressed me as a farce; it would be absurd, were I to fill several sheets with reports which arouse only our curiosity and cannot claim even our interest. It is the fussy adulation of those who allow themselves to be blinded by outer appearances or who serve their interests by strewing incense before the idol of the vanity of their Empress. To give you a true idea of this gathering of deputies, I pray you to imagine a group of our uneducated small traders or shopkeepers from Great Britain and Ireland, together with some representatives of the American people who are subjects of His Majesty, and finally some gentlemen, gathered together, to whom general principles, which lie at the foundation of every good government, are unknown, then perhaps you will have too favourable a copy of the original in whose power, Russia at present rests. . . .

Even if the views of the Empress originally had been directed to showing that she had only the welfare of her subjects at heart, yet her acts, since they spring from mixed motives, are of little worth; it is like the difference between real and false pearls. . . . If all that I have said, corresponds with the truth, the questions arise, what can we expect from this new code of laws? Can man not assume that this new work will consume more years than is at present assumed? Could Russia,

even if the Empress were the greatest genius that had been born, to bring light into the world, hope at some time in the future, to be well governed by just, fair, and solid laws? Would not, even if these laws attain a certain degree of completeness, the lack of a respected and unselfish class of officials, hinder the working of these laws?

One cannot but pity these Russians who seem to themselves so wise, so powerful, while they are still so far from the happy position achieved by some of the European nations.¹

The Pugachev rising had been a rude shock to the Empress and impelled her to make greater use of the nobility in maintaining the security of the country. She endeavored to promote this policy by her "Constitution of the Provinces," which gave the provincial nobility a corporative organization and the right to elect their own "marshals" and "captain *ispravniks*" in their districts (*Uyezdy*). There was also set up in the provinces a whole new system of courts of lower, middle, and higher degree, in which the nobility played the chief role. This system was intended to offset the exemption from service granted by Peter III by encouraging the nobility to render service in their own communities. Catherine would probably have gone further and have instituted a reform of the *collegia* and have created a chamber of deputies somewhat like the Estates General in France, but the disorders in France at this time caused her to pause, and she found a suitable pretext for cancelling her projected changes in the outbreak of the second Turkish war. Thus the question of reform was left to her successor.

It remains to add that with reference to Russia's more pressing problem, that of the peasantry, Catherine's reign showed no improvement. Theoretically, the Empress was in favor of ameliorating their lot as in keeping with the vague principles of humanitarianism which she held, but in practical affairs Catherine was a realist and could not afford to antagonize the Russian nobility, by whose assistance she had risen to power. She therefore left on the statute books the edict of Peter III releasing

¹ *Sbornik Imperatorskago istorichestago Obshchestva* (Collection of the Imperial Historical Society), XII, pp. 304 ff.

the nobility from compulsory service to the Tsar and refused to abate their privileges. Moreover, under the economic conditions that prevailed in Russia in the eighteenth century, the principal means at the disposal of a sovereign for rewarding favorites and faithful ministers was the bestowal on them of lands withdrawn from the imperial holdings, together with the services of the peasants, which went with that land. Thus, large holdings of imperial land were alienated for this purpose and many peasants were transferred from dependence on the court to dependence upon private landowners. Efforts were made, it is true, to curb the caprice and violence of the landlords in the treatment of their serfs. Catherine disapproved of the dispersion of families by sale. Actually, however, there was little to show in the way of improvement in the lot of the peasants, and the problem, rendered more acute by developments during her reign, was transmitted to her successor unsolved.

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
PAUL

THE Emperor Paul had been born on September 20, 1754. Although Catherine herself states that he was the son of Saltykov, there seems no reason to doubt that he was legitimate. His early childhood was passed in most unfortunate surroundings. The relations between his mother and father were constantly strained to the breaking point and they had little or no domestic life. Paul himself was taken by the Empress Elizabeth to be brought up in her own court. Here he was overwhelmed by the attentions of a group of *Kammerfrauen* whose ideas of rearing children were not only old-fashioned but extremely prejudicial to the boy's health. Little attention was paid to his diet. As a baby he was kept smothered under piles of bedclothes, over which was usually spread a fur rug. Catherine protested, but the infant was left to grow up into a sickly childhood. The atmosphere of Elizabeth's court was little conducive to his normal development. The time of the Empress was entirely absorbed in festivities, business, and the preparation of her toilet, and she had little time for the child, whom she saw not more than once a week. The uneducated attendants with whom he was surrounded contributed nothing to his training. Whether the boy would have developed into a normal individual in the right environment it is difficult to say, but he was badly handicapped from the first.

He was eight years of age when the *coup d'état* of June 28, 1762, occurred. His mother had taken pains to secure him on her arrival in St. Petersburg, and he appeared on the balcony of the winter palace with her to receive the plaudits of the

crowd. The sensational and startling events of those few days left on his immature mind an indelible impression that was much enhanced by the sudden death of his father two weeks later. The effects of these early experiences must not be lost sight of in estimating his character.

Some of those who took part in the conspiracy had quieted their consciences by persuading themselves that they were acting in the interests of the heir apparent. Catherine had



Brown Brothers.

FORMER IMPERIAL PALACE AND GARDENS AT PETERHOF.

allowed the impression to get abroad that she was acting on her son's behalf. But from the first she grasped the tiller of the ship of state with every intention of ruling in her own name. There is no sign that she ever proposed being a mere regent. In the meantime she saw to it that Paul would be provided with the best education possible. A beginning had already been made. After one or two experiments the Empress Elizabeth had finally selected Nikita Ivanovich Panin, who was advanced to the rank of *Oberhofmeister*, so that he discharged the two-fold duties of tutor to the Prince and of minister in the service

of the Empress: Panin had been one of the strongest adherents of Catherine in her bid for the throne and continued for some time to enjoy her confidence. The boy made progress under the eye of Panin, though there were indications that he was abnormally sensitive and of a somewhat morbid nature. In 1768, at the age of fourteen, he began the serious study of affairs of state under Poroshkin, and, by taking part in military maneuvers, he began to acquire some knowledge of the army.

His health had improved under the care of the English doctor, Dimsdale, so that he had shaken off some of his earlier weaknesses. In 1772 he had reached the age of eighteen. The easy assumption made by his supporters that Catherine would yield him her place was soon belied. She let it be known that she had no intention of being set aside; although at the time the prince made no protest, later he came to resent her refusal to stand aside for him. His resentment was played on by various members of the court. In 1774 he was married to Princess Wilhelmina of Schleswig-Arnstadt, who took the name of Nathalia Alexeyevna. The marriage was very unfortunate. The Princess was imprudent and committed a great indiscretion in making certain financial requests to the French ambassador which aroused in Catherine the suspicion that she was intriguing against the Empress. Nathalia died in childbirth in 1776.

A new marriage was arranged for Paul almost at once with another German princess, Sophia Dorothea of Wurtemberg, who took the name Maria Fedorovna. The latter was a great favorite with Catherine. Hopes ran high that the imperial domestic circle would be a happy one; but circumstances were against it. The young Prince Alexander, born of this marriage, was almost immediately taken away from his parents by Catherine, to be brought up according to her own ideas. The second child likewise, the young Constantine, caused a rift. Catherine could not understand what she considered the morbid demonstrations of the parents at being deprived of their child. But more serious things occurred to widen the rift. In 1780 Russian foreign policy took a new turn when Catherine

gradually drew away from Prussia and turned toward Austria. The Grand Duke Paul had inherited his father's admiration for the Prussian system and was much courted by Frederick the Great and his representatives. He therefore was strongly opposed to this change. Paul also resented the rise of successive favorites who were admitted to the intimacy of the imperial family by Catherine. As time went on Catherine was disappointed at the slight evidence of capacity that she saw in her son, who not only disagreed with her on vital questions but in other ways disappointed her expectations. He disapproved of a partition of Poland, and when the French Revolution broke out he was all for preserving the rights of the sovereigns against their rebellious subjects. He seemed incapable of understanding any of the major issues in politics. Catherine thought seriously from time to time of setting him aside in favor of her grandson Alexander. This attitude must have alarmed Paul, who perhaps did some intriguing on his own account and thus brought down on himself and his supporters the ill will of the Empress and her ministers. During the last years of Catherine's life the Grand Ducal family lived in constant fear of the arrival of detachments of troops to seize them and take them away to prison. All of these circumstances combined to give a morbid direction to the development of Paul's character in the years before he ascended the throne. His attitude in the years before his accession is summed up in a conversation he had with the Countess of Rosenberg in which he said: "I will never be allowed to reach the throne and I do not expect to, but if luck has it that I should, you need not be astonished about what I will do. You know my heart but you do not know those people [meaning the Russians] but I know how to manage them."¹

The sudden death of Catherine before she had made other arrangements for the succession freed the Grand Duke from his gloomy forebodings and he was duly proclaimed Emperor on November 7. The first impulse of Paul on ascending the throne was to undo everything that Catherine had done and

¹ N. K. Shilder, *Emperor Paul I*, (St. Petersburg, 1901), p. 436.

thereby to revert to the conditions as they had been before June 28, 1762. For the first few days he was concerned with the details of the state funeral but found time to dismiss most of Catherine's ministers and courtiers and to introduce to the court a new group. Almost all of the helpers with whom Catherine had surrounded herself followed one another into obscurity and a host of newcomers took their place. Some of these were men of ability, but the Emperor showed unfortunate dislike of high ability and of faithful service, and his favor was given and withdrawn on somewhat capricious grounds. In a general way his acts indicate a great lack of political sense. For instance, it was decided at the start that in addition to the upper classes the peasants should also be required to take the oath to the new Emperor. The immediate effect of this decision was a rumor that the Tsar had emancipated the serfs and that they now owed allegiance only to the Tsar and not to their lords. Efforts to return them to their service proved useless until severely repressive measures were employed.

The Emperor's heart was set on the reorganization of the military forces. He had already formed a personal corps at Gachina. On his accession he therefore determined to extend to all the military forces the uniforms, equipment, and organization of the Gachina corps. He also militarized the court and not only did he insist on military precision in mounting guard and stationing sentries, but the guards and sentries were personally inspected by himself. He also interested himself in the details of the military garrison of the capital and, in fact, in the whole army organization. There was a constant going and coming of officers, clicking of heels, and saluting. It was in striking contrast to the rather easy-going, but no less effective, administration of the preceding reign. In all of this, however, Paul refused to take advice. He himself designed the uniforms and equipment. He even reached out into the private life of the civilians, and forbade the wearing of the round hat, which had come into fashion in the capital.

His antipathy toward his mother was evidenced by his insisting on moving the remains of his father from the monastery

of Neva and interring them alongside of Catherine in the Church of Peter and Paul. While this filial devotion may have been approved by the citizens, it was the slight to his mother which caught the public attention.

The coronation took place at Moscow in the spring of 1797 and was attended by a magnificent display of the military forces and officials of the Empire. The festivities were also the occasion of lavish grants to the new favorites, Count Bezborodko, Count Elmpt, Count Musin-Pushkin, Kamenskii, Rostopshchin, Arakcheyev, and Kutaisov. From Moscow the Emperor journeyed leisurely back to the capital, making the return the occasion for a tour of the central and western provinces.

His attitude toward the Poles was revealed by his liberal treatment of Kosciuszko. Hearing that the Polish patriot was in poor health, the Emperor visited him in prison, promising him he could emigrate to America and offering him a grant of sixty thousand roubles. Paul, however, did not hold out any hope for a revival of the Polish state, so his act did little to conciliate the Poles and much to estrange the Russian public.

The net result of the feverish changes in the administration—the reorganization of the army and the capricious exercise of the imperial autocratic power—was to reduce the government to chaos. A measure of Paul's which might have had a salutary effect was that setting a limit to the compulsory service which the landlords could require of all their peasants. The edict limited this to three days per week. Inasmuch as two days was the prevailing limit in the Ukraine, it was there interpreted by the nobles as a bestowal of the right to increase the service, which obviously ran counter to the spirit of the edict. It was almost incredible that a provision of such far-reaching consequence could have been adopted without an effort being made to ascertain its probable effects. It remained, however, an important landmark in the history of the emancipation of the serfs.

In 1798 diplomatic affairs took a turn by which Russia was ultimately drawn into war with France. In 1796 Napoleon

Bonaparte, in command of the army despatched into Italy by the Directory, achieved an unexpected success in his campaign in the Ligurian Alps, and followed up his victories there with a series of lightning thrusts that drove the Austrians out of Italy and compelled them to accept the Peace of Campoformio (October 17, 1797), by which the Netherlands were renounced and a new distribution of Italian territory was agreed to. Bonaparte then prepared his expedition against Egypt. On the way to Egypt he took possession of Malta, which was pusillanimously surrendered by the Grand Master of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, in whose possession the island had been for centuries. It so happened that the Emperor Paul had become interested in the Order, of which he had become a member. He later took it under his protection and, upon the deposition of the Grand Master, as a result of his surrender, Paul had been named to succeed him. He allowed himself for a trivial cause to be drawn into a struggle with which Russia had little or no concern. Pitt at this time was endeavoring to revive against France the coalition which had come to grief in 1795. Paul, therefore, lent a ready ear to the pleas for an alliance with England and Austria, which was completed at the beginning of the year 1799. A request was sent from Vienna that Count Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov, the hero of Rymnik and Ismail, should lead the armies of Austria and Russia in Italy.

Paul consented to this request and Suvorov left for Vienna in the middle of February, 1799, to assume command of the allied armies in Italy early in April. He had under his direct command about 55,000 troops, besides detachments scattered through northern Italy. His task was to move through Lombardy to attack and drive the French from northern Italy across the Alps and Apennines. With characteristic energy he concentrated his forces around Verona. He maneuvered the French General Scherer from his defenses and compelled his withdrawal to the Adda River to cover Milan. Here followed a series of engagements as a result of which the allied armies forced the crossing of the Adda and took possession of Milan,

which the French had evacuated. The French leaving the plain retired, some across the Alps into the southwest, and some southward across the Apennines in the direction of Genoa.

Meanwhile the Archduke Charles, operating from the upper Rhine, advanced westward, and in a pitched battle took the city of Zürich, defeated the armies of the Republic under Massena, thus clearing northern Switzerland. The hard-pressed Directory, therefore, urged the French commanders in Italy, Moreau and MacDonald, to resume the offensive. Suvorov, anticipating that they would break across the Apennines from Genoa, marched from Turin, where he had his headquarters, to meet them, concentrating his forces at Alessandria, south of the Po. But here he learned that MacDonald was moving northward from Pisa to cross the Apennines with the intention of advancing westward through Piacenza to attack him on the flank, while Moreau left Genoa a week later to make a simultaneous attack in the south. Suvorov therefore decided to take advantage of his inner lines to attack his enemies and annihilate them. When he heard that MacDonald had already debouched into the valley of the Po, he turned his back on Moreau, whose forces were still struggling in the mountains, and marched eastward. At Tidone he encountered the French and in a great three-day battle drove them back to the Trebbia. Here he finally completed the defeat of MacDonald and eliminated his army as a fighting force. He then moved westward to meet Moreau. But the latter, although he won a victory over the Russian General Bellegarde, decided, upon hearing of the defeat of MacDonald, to put the mountains between himself and his formidable antagonist, and retired southward to Genoa.

In the adjustment of affairs in Italy that followed the expulsion of the French, Suvorov came into conflict with his Austrian superiors. The latter were intent on securing as much of Italy as possible to compensate for their loss of the Netherlands. They therefore were not desirous of seeing the restoration of the Sardinian monarch or the emancipation from foreign tutelage of the Italian population. Suvorov had, however, proclaimed

the restoration of the former regime, and the Austrian attitude irked and disgusted him.

Méantime the armies of the Directory had been collected and reorganized behind the protection of the Alps and the Apennines. In August they were set in motion under the command of the impetuous Joubert. Debouching from the Apennines, they moved northward and took up a position at Novi. Here an attack by Suvorov followed on the 16th of August. After a desperate battle the French were compelled to retreat following the loss of their leader and about one-third of their effectives. The victory, though not pressed, was decisive. Italy was thus cleared of the republican armies. Suvorov would have followed the retreating French across the Apennines, but he heard within a short time of the defeat of the Archduke Charles in a group of simultaneous operations, as a result of which the French secured the Simplon and the St. Gotthard passes. Suvorov was, therefore, compelled to remain inactive and to devote himself to rounding up the remaining French troops and wresting from them the few cities still remaining in their possession. Meanwhile the plan was set on foot in Vienna for an ambitious series of campaigns in Switzerland on the upper Rhine. The Austrian government proposed, by moving the Archduke Charles into the Low Countries, to recover their hold on the Netherlands. The Austrian forces in Italy were to strike out northward and, reinforcing the allied detachments in the northern cantons, to drive the French out of Schwyz and Zürich and down the Rhine. There was some toying with plans for an invasion of France through the pass of Belfort; but with the withdrawal of Archduke Charles such a venture was rendered impossible. In fact the French took advantage of the withdrawal of the Austrians to reinforce their troops on the upper Aar, so as to prevent the closing of the pass, and debouched into the Rhine valley. Suvorov regarded the Austrian scheme with misgivings, but felt constrained to conform to his instructions. He therefore concentrated his forces at Bellinzona, in the upper Ticino Valley, preparatory to a march across the St. Gotthard pass. He left behind him his baggage and

most of his artillery and prepared to take a train of mules loaded with food enough for a few days, trusting upon reaching northern Switzerland to secure food in abundance. His intention was to move on Schwyz and join hands with Korsakov and Hotze. Unfortunately the French forestalled him. Massena concentrated troops in the Aar and, marching on Zürich, defeated Korsakov and almost annihilated his forces. Further troops were pushed south to Schwyz, so that Suvorov's plans were already defeated before he had ascended the pass. Advancing up the Ticino he commenced the ascent of the St. Gotthard pass, which he secured by a determined attack combined with movements to outflank the French. These flanking movements were skilfully carried out by his subordinates. Moving down the Reuss River he again and again attacked the French and drove them before him, although his men suffered severely from the lack of food and the weather. But on the 28th, when they had struggled over the entrance into the Muotthol, Suvorov was appalled to hear of Korsakov's defeat and his retirement on Schaffhausen. His plans had completely miscarried. His army was isolated in a forbidding and desolate wilderness without food, without baggage, without transportation, and almost without artillery, with all the natural exits closed to the north. An immediate decision had to be made. A council of war was called.

It was decided to abandon the march on Schwyz and Zürich, and to return east over the Pragl Pass to Klonthal and Glarus with the chance of uniting with what remained of the forces of Hotze on the Linth and of Korsakov on the Rhine. The march was begun on August 30. That afternoon the advance guard reached the Klonthal, where they were compelled to engage the troops of the enemy posted along the lake. These they dislodged with the customary outflanking movement. In the meantime the rear guard had to resist a menacing thrust from Schwyz under the personal direction of Massena, but this was beaten back by Bagration and the main body was allowed to descend into the Klonthal unmolested. But at Glarus the

same problem presented itself as at Muottenthal, whether to proceed northward to the Linth or to cross over to the upper Rhine. Suvorov, discouraged by the weakened morale of his troops, decided not to risk an engagement with the French under Molitor, but to ascend the Linth and cross over the Panixer Pass to Ilanz. This passage they made under the most appalling weather conditions and by exhausting physical strain. The troops spent the whole of one night bivouacking along the mountain roads above timber line. On September 8 they reached Chur, on the Rhine, at which point they were free from molestation and could rest and recuperate from their sufferings. The Russians thus set a record for sheer triumph over physical obstacles seldom equalled and, despite their own losses at Chur, they emerged with 1400 French prisoners. The Emperor was delighted with the successful extrication of the army from complete annihilation and extended the highest honors to Suvorov. But the result of the venture was the end of the campaign and the termination of the alliance, for all were now disillusioned with Austria's policy and aims. Suvorov and his troops were therefore recalled. His return to Russia through central Europe was a triumphal progress, but he lived only a few months to enjoy it, passing away on May 17, 1800.

THE SECOND ARMED NEUTRALITY, 1800

The spread of the area of military operations and the growing intensity of the war at sea from 1796 onward had raised once more many of the old questions involved in interference with neutral commerce by the belligerent powers. The Baltic powers, particularly Denmark, resented this interference by Great Britain, and continued friction between Great Britain and the Baltic powers led these powers to make advances to the Tsar, already exasperated by England's refusal to evacuate Malta. This situation was skilfully exploited by Napoleon, who fanned the indignation of the northern powers against England. The result was the revival of Catherine's league of neutrals in the "Second Armed Neutrality" to resist Great Brit-

ain's alleged infringement of neutral rights. This naturally opened a rift in the Second Coalition and prepared the ground for peace between Russia and France.

Almost immediately the Emperor put out feelers to the French with a view to securing peace. His purpose in joining the second coalition was to restore order and the monarchical regime in France. Apparently France was now guaranteed an era of peace. Paul's ministers, however, declined to coöperate, but the occupation of Malta by the English and their refusal to restore the island to the Order enabled him to overcome their reluctance to seek an alliance with Napoleon against his former allies. In 1800 the First Consul led his forces across the great St. Bernard Pass and, after defeating the Austrians at Marengo, forced them to sign the Treaty of Lunéville. This feat left Napoleon free to deal with England. He skilfully suggested to the Emperor Paul a diversion of troops across Central Asia to strike at England in India. Orders were despatched to the Ataman of the Don Cossacks on January 12, 1801, to assemble forces at the earliest possible moment and to begin the advance. Only the sketchiest instructions were given, since even maps were lacking for the country east of the Volga. At the end of February over 20,000 troops finally set out from the Don. They were held up at the Volga by the condition of the ice and only managed to cross that river on March 18. Their advance into the Kirghiz steppes and the beginning of their long trek across the wastes of Central Asia would undoubtedly have tried their morale, but events at the capital intervened to put an end to this folly.

The winter of 1801 was an extremely gloomy one for Russia. Paul's break with his allies and the *rapprochement* with Napoleon Bonaparte had been decided on in the face of the objections of his ministers and were counter to the wishes of the majority of the nobility. Paul, therefore, found no support for his policies in administrative circles. He apparently had some popularity among the lower classes and perhaps in the army, but this could not avail him. His temper, which had never been even, suffered from this atmosphere of suspicion and dis-

trust. He lacked the firmness of character needed to persist and made bids for popularity by recalling some of his former ministers whom he had banished. It was apparently among this circle that a plot finally took shape to bring about the Emperor's abdication. Its details are somewhat obscure, but it apparently had wide ramifications. The French suspected the English ambassador of having secretly encouraged it, and it is possible that the Empress herself was privy to it. At any rate the young princes, Alexander and Constantine, almost certainly acquiesced in it. Paul as a father had by his harsh and capricious treatment alienated all members of his family. The Emperor had recently installed himself in the castle of St. Michael, where he assumed himself secure. He relied on the fidelity of Count Pahlen, the commander of the St. Petersburg garrison, who apparently became the center of the conspiracy. His activities were so obvious they were even reported to the Emperor, who finally confronted him with the statement that his implication in the plot was known. After his first start of astonishment Pahlen recovered himself and admitted that he had joined the conspiracy, but alleged that his relationship with the conspirators was intended to discover their plans with a view to forestalling the plot. Incredible as it may seem, the Tsar was won over and thereby put himself entirely in Pahlen's power. The latter then was able to complete his preparations without interference. The circle was drawn closer. On the night of March 11-12 (23-24), 1801, a group of conspirators including Pahlen, Bennigsen, and Platon-Zubov were admitted, with the connivance of the guard, to the imperial apartments, where they penetrated to the Tsar's bedchamber, roused him, and presented him with a document of formal abdication. The Emperor refused to sign, and in the struggle which ensued the conspirators struck him again and again. Finally his scarf was drawn around his neck and he was strangled. Issuing from the apartments the conspirators then appeared before the Empress and the heir apparent, and announced the Emperor's death. Almost indescribable scenes ensued in the palace. The imperial family, although they had seemed

to acquiesce in the plot, were horrified at the turn events had taken. Fortunately all this was hidden from the eyes of the public. Pahlen appeared on the balcony and announced the death of the Emperor from apoplexy. Alexander was induced to hide his real feelings and to allow a manifesto to be issued proclaiming the death of the Emperor and his own succession. He appeared before the nobles and ministers and indicated that they were to take their oath of allegiance to himself as Emperor. As in the case of Paul's father, Peter, there was no investigation. The Emperor was quietly interred and, although the public was not allowed to see the remains, it accepted without question the official explanation and the acquiescence of the imperial family as evidence of a natural death.

Paul's death was a blow to Napoleon, whose plans for the isolation and humiliation of England were definitely blasted by it. He vented his spleen in an item in the *Moniteur* that announced at the same time the appearance, in the Sound, of the English fleet and the death of Paul, and added significantly, "History will disclose to us the relations that probably exist between these two events." The first act of the new sovereign was to recall the Cossack regiments and to demand that Napoleon come to terms with his enemies. The First Consul recognized the handwriting on the wall and on October 1 signed preliminary articles which ultimately led to the Peace of Amiens, March 26, 1802, by which Europe was assured of a general peace for the first time in ten years.

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ALEXANDER THE FIRST

THE Emperor Alexander I was the eldest son of Paul and the Empress Maria Fedorovna. He was born December 12 (23), 1777, and thus was in his twenty-fourth year at the date of his accession. He was separated from his parents at an early age and was brought up in the court of the Empress Catherine. In 1784, on attaining the age of seven, he left the nursery, and his education seriously began under a number of tutors previously selected for him by Catherine. The one who exercised by far the greatest influence was Frederick Caesar Laharpe, a citizen of Switzerland, and a stalwart champion of republican ideas, who was employed to teach the boy French. That Catherine would select a radical and an opponent of monarchical institutions attests the liberality of her ideas and the breadth of her views. Laharpe soon acquired over his young pupil a strong ascendancy which led to his communicating to the young Alexander his enthusiasm for liberal institutions. Laharpe occupied this position of favorite teacher down to Alexander's marriage in 1793 and continued subsequently in the role of confidential adviser for another two years. Strictly speaking, the education of the Grand Duke had by this time come to an end. Although Laharpe remained aloof from politics, in one respect he played a decisive role in the affairs of the Grand Duke. Toward the end of her reign Catherine had played with the idea of passing over Paul in the succession and settling it on Alexander. To do this it was necessary to secure the consent and coöperation of Alexander. To get this it was necessary to win over Laharpe, who had very decided views on this matter. Whether from political or per-

sonal convictions, he refused to lend himself to this scheme. For this he was relieved of his appointment and allowed to leave Russia on a government pension. He did his best to reconcile the young Grand Duke to his father and, although Paul hated the tutor for his republican convictions, he came afterwards to recognize his debt to Laharpe for his efforts to restore harmony to the imperial circle.

Alexander was betrothed and married in 1793 to Princess Louisa Augusta, a daughter of the heir apparent to the throne of Baden. His consort took the name of Elizabeth Alexeyevna. This landmark in his life marked his entrance on his official career, and he, along with his next older brother, the Grand Duke Constantine, assumed to a certain extent the duties of heirs apparent to the imperial throne. On the accession of his father in 1796 all the grand dukes were drafted into the services of the Emperor and, as the latter was primarily interested in military affairs, Alexander was thus introduced to the rigors and discipline of the soldier's life. He seems to have inherited none of his father's passion for the parade ground, but despite his protests he performed his duties very scrupulously. It was during these years that he formed the acquaintance of Arakcheyev, a Georgian who had been raised by imperial favor to the highest position in the army. This would suggest that Alexander's avowed distaste for military duties was not altogether genuine and gives us something of a clue to his later role as a conqueror in the wars with Napoleon. More and more, as Paul made his influence felt in political affairs, Alexander and Constantine found their position increasingly irksome. It was not only the strictness of discipline and the scrupulous exactitude demanded in the performance of all duties that tried the patience of the heir apparent so much, but in addition there were his father's capricious impulses and outbursts of almost savage anger which created an electric atmosphere in the official circle. Alexander turned during these years to the society of friends whose acquaintance he had made during Catherine's life. These were Prince Adam Czartoryski, Count K. A. Stroganov, N. N. Novosiltsov, and V. P.

Kochubei. But, as the views of his friends were colored with eighteenth-century liberalism, they were regarded with suspicion at court, and everything was done to discourage this association.

In the events that preceded the death of Paul, Alexander's part is not very clear. He apparently distrusted his father's foreign policy and especially its sacrifice of national interests to policies adopted as a result of personal whims. His *rapprochement* with Napoleon Bonaparte and his expedition to India raised profound dissatisfaction in Russia. Paul's close relations with the Order of the Knights of St. John and his familiarity with the Jesuit priest Father Guber alienated the Orthodox element. Alexander shared this general distrust. But it was his personal fear of the Emperor that probably induced him to lend himself to the conspiracy as described above. This fear caused him to be caught almost against his will in the intrigue that resulted in the death of Paul. At any rate the full horror of it was not brought home to him until he was called on to receive the crown from the blood-stained hands of the murderers. It was now too late to retreat, but the memories of those terrible days remained with Alexander to the end of his life.

Alexander's reign may be conveniently divided into three periods: the first, lasting from 1801 to 1810, was rather definitely a period of isolation during which policies both foreign and domestic were taking shape; the second, the period from 1810 to 1816, covers the years during which Russia was locked in a life and death struggle with France; the third period, lasting from 1816 to 1825, embraces the period of the congresses and an effort to maintain the *status quo* in Europe.

The manifesto announcing the accession of Alexander was published on March 12, 1801. Immediately the young Emperor proceeded to take charge of affairs of state. His first task was to revise many of the acts of his father that he considered harmful. This provided for the liberation of many who had been in prison and the abolition of certain odious police measures. Many of Paul's officials were dismissed and

successors were appointed. There was an immediate relaxation of the censorship, and the importation of foreign books was resumed. The government also suppressed the edict that forbade foreign travel. These somewhat precipitate measures cleared the ground for a program of more deliberate reform, to prepare which a special committee was gathered together from among Alexander's confidants. These were Count Stroganov, Prince Czartoryski, Novosiltsov, and Kochubei; Laharpe was summoned from abroad and, although he did not sit with the committee, his opinions on their recommendations were submitted to them. Laharpe, who had left Russia in 1795, had been sobered somewhat by experience. On the whole his influence with Alexander was in favor of a policy of moderate reform.

The committee first considered the condition of the Russian Empire. For this purpose a survey of it was submitted by Novosiltsov. The committee's first act was to draft a declaration of rights in accordance with eighteenth-century practice, by which the autocrat set bounds to his own autocracy and endeavored to provide for a constitutional regime. It then proceeded to administrative reforms. Its first act was the abolition of the old colleges of administration and the creation of eight new departments of state, each under an executive who bore the title of Minister. These were the ministries of land, military forces, maritime forces, foreign affairs, justice, internal affairs, finance, commerce, and public education. The ministers were subject to the senate, to which they were bound to submit annual reports on the conduct of their departments. To secure coöperation between individual departments, a Committee of Ministers was founded. In securing the officials to act in this capacity the sovereign drew on his non-official committee, all the members of which were drafted into the new organization.

The position of the senate was redefined in the following terms:

The senate is the supreme organization in our empire, having under it all existing organs; it is the upholder of the laws, sees to the universal maintenance of justice. It looks after the collection of imposts and the

state disbursements. It has oversight of the means of meeting the needs of the people, the maintenance of public peace and order, and the restraining of all acts of lawlessness in all the organs that are under its control . . . the power of the senate is limited only by the power of His Imperial Majesty. It has no other power above it.

The implication was naturally that all legislative or administrative measures could be reviewed by the senate. But in practice it proved no light task to break the habits of a century. A test case arose in 1803 when the senate undertook to request the revision of an edict of the Emperor which had been issued on December 5 on the recommendation of the minister of land forces. The measure had to do with the service of nobles as non-commissioned officers. It touched intimately on the rights of the nobles, and a resolution was submitted and passed that the matter be reconsidered. Alexander was approached, and despite the precise wording of the decree that defined the senate's rights, he was loth to allow interference by that body. He finally agreed, and the objection was submitted to a special conference. Alexander listened to the deputation coldly and then dismissed it curtly with the remark that he would issue an edict on this matter. On March 21 he announced that in case of inconsistencies or conflicts in laws that had been issued, the senate was empowered to make recommendations to himself. In the specific case, however, Alexander maintained that the matter was solely a question of the jurisdiction of the war department, and as it involved no conflict with existing legislation there was no purpose in reviewing it. The senate therefore suffered a distinct rebuff, and its powers granted in theory, were in practice severely curtailed.

With a view to bringing Russia the peace she so much needed, Alexander's first act in his foreign relations was to recall the force despatched against the English power in India. Napoleon, much taken aback at the defection of his ally, was compelled to adopt a radically different position. The atmosphere, which had long been lowering, began to clear. Prospects of peace seemed bright as negotiations were set on foot by the great powers. Napoleon, as usual, preferred to deal with

each of the powers separately and concluded a treaty with Russia on September 26, 1801. To this treaty was attached a secret convention. Under the terms of this treaty France and Russia reserved the right to concert measures for the division of the territory which was to return to the princes who had been deprived of their possessions on the left bank of the Rhine; to arrange matters in Italy; to reward the King of Sardinia and the Duke of Bavaria, the Duke of Württemberg, and the Markgraf of Baden. Russia undertook the role of mediator between France and the Ottoman Empire. Other clauses affected Egypt, the Ionian Islands, and so forth. Russia and France thus assumed the role of arbiters of the destiny of Europe.

In the distribution of offices arranged in 1801 Kochubei assumed the position of minister of foreign affairs. His appointment brought about a reconsideration of the question of foreign policy. The members of the committee supported the view of Kochubei that Russia should revert to the policy of Catherine, which was that in foreign affairs the interests of Russia as a whole should be paramount. Alexander agreed to this national policy, but in working it out great difficulties were met inasmuch as the Emperor was subject to personal influences. The first problem that arose was the proposed alliance between Russia, France, and Prussia. Kochubei strongly suspected that the King of Prussia was angling for Russian support. He was known to be already treating with France. Every effort was made in the non-official committee to block this move; but in the summer of 1802 Alexander was entertained by Frederick William of Prussia at Memel, where a magnificent military review took place. While there were no immediate political consequences, Alexander was much impressed with the Prussian display and was won over by the cordiality of the royal pair, particularly the charming Queen Louisa. In the meantime events in Europe moved toward a fresh outbreak of war. Obviously the Emperor's protestations of pacific intentions were not sincere. The events of 1802-1803 confirmed this suspicion. On March 9, 1804, the young Duc d'Enghien was seized by a French band on the territory of

Baden and taken back to Vincennes, where he was tried and shot. This deed horrified Europe. Immediately Alexander broke off relations with the French and prepared for war. There followed at once the formation of the third coalition, directed against Napoleon. It was sealed in treaties of alliance between Russia, Austria, Great Britain, and Sweden during the summer of 1804.

At once steps were taken to mobilize the Russian forces for war. At this time there was in Poland a force of 50,000 men under General Golenishchev-Kutuzov, another force on the northwestern frontier of 90,000 men under Michelson, and a force of 16,000 men based on Kronstadt in preparation for a landing to be made at Stralsund. The attitude of Prussia made it necessary to reckon with the possibilities of her intervention on the side of France. On September 9 Alexander set out for the army. In Poland, he was entertained by the family of Czartoryski at Pulawy. He held out to them high hopes of future benefits to be conferred on Poland. Shortly afterwards, upon receiving news that the French army had violated Prussian territory, the Prussian King gave his consent to the passage of Russian troops through Prussia. Alexander cut short his visit to Warsaw and went straight to Berlin. There a somewhat ambiguous convention was signed providing for the ultimate entrance of Prussia on the side of the coalition. Frederick William, however, was still flirting with Napoleon for the possession of Hanover. The former insisted on a secret clause providing Russian support for this claim. Obviously Prussia would not enter the coalition unless she got her price. A curious incident occurred when the two monarchs, with Queen Louisa, entered the tomb of Frederick the Great and swore eternal friendship and loyalty to one another for the ultimate liberation of Germany. Alexander then rode off to the army headquarters of the allies, which were at Olmütz. Meantime, however, the Austrian commander Mack had capitulated at Ulm with all his forces. Napoleon marched rapidly down the Danube on Vienna, which he entered. Then he turned north into Bohemia. Alexander, under strong pressure from Czar-

toryski, appointed Kutuzov commander-in-chief, but determined to remain with the army. His presence proved an unfortunate handicap on their operations. A last-minute effort was made for an understanding with Napoleon, and Dolgorukov was chosen to meet the Emperor at the advance posts of the French army. Napoleon, infuriated by the self-confidence and frivolity of this dandy, broke short the negotiations with the words, "Well, then, we will fight." Once the decision was taken, Alexander instructed Weirotter to draw up a plan for the combined attack on Napoleon. The scheme provided for an elaborate outflanking movement carried out in the face of the enemy and requiring most careful synchronization. Kutuzov refused to discuss the plan. He conformed to it only out of deference to the Emperor. He held his troops until the last minute on the heights of Pratzen before joining the columns of moving troops. Within a short time Napoleon had led his troops up to the heights that had just been evacuated. Early in the day he attacked the moving columns. Their efforts to form line and recover the heights proved useless. They were pressed back in confusion. Toward evening the whole force was in disastrous retreat toward Hungary. Alexander rode with his beaten troops, overwhelmed by the scenes of carnage through which he had passed, and took refuge for the night in a peasant's hut, where he lay on a straw couch. The retreat continued through November 22 and 23 (December 2 and 3), and there was no remission until the beaten Russians crossed their own frontiers. Alexander was in a condition of near-prostration, and it was with difficulty that he managed to stay on his horse to keep pace with the retreating columns. He reached St. Petersburg on December 9, 1805. The forces of the Russians that came back were not more than 25,000 out of the 50,000 men with which they had faced Napoleon. The Emperor Francis with the consent of Alexander opened negotiations with Napoleon, and peace was concluded at Pressburg by which the Holy Roman Empire was finally extinguished.

Alexander was much shaken by his experience at Austerlitz. His boyish confidence and optimism were gone; his frank and

open nature, which had made him a victim of the intrigues and of the incompetence of his staff, left him. Henceforth he was less sure of himself, more inclined to caution and even suspicion. He now entered on his duties with a grim earnestness very different from the easy self-confidence of his early years.

AFTER AUSTERLITZ

After the battle, Savary was despatched to Russian headquarters with word that the French troops had received orders to protect the Russian retreat. In return Napoleon demanded no more than the simple word of the Tsar that hostilities would not be renewed. With the other defeated member of the coalition—Austria—an armistice was forthwith arranged in a personal interview with the Emperor Francis on the night of December 4 at Schönbrunn, and peace negotiations were at once set on foot. They were entrusted to Talleyrand, who opened *pourparlers* at Vienna, afterwards transferring them to Pressburg, where peace was finally concluded on December 26, 1805. Under the terms of the treaty Austria was to lose her possessions in Italy, the Tyrol, and South Germany, while the imperial power was reduced to a mere shadow of its former self. But it was Prussia that was the source of the greatest anxiety to the Emperor. His vast designs for establishing French security on the continent necessitated a solid anti-English *bloc* in central Europe. The three great powers with which Napoleon must reckon were Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Austria and Russia had been defeated (though Russia's power was still intact), while the forces of Prussia, not having been involved, might prove, in alliance with England or Russia, a serious menace to France. Napoleon had reason to suspect the existence of a secret understanding among these potential enemies, and in a stormy interview with Haugwitz at Schönbrunn, he tried desperately to lift the veil of silence to secure confirmation of his suspicions. But the Prussian minister parried his thrusts with admirable adroitness and finally succeeded in reassuring Napoleon as to the intentions of Frederick William. Then with one of those swift decisions of which he was

master, Napoleon resolved to use an understanding with Prussia to bring pressure to bear on Austria. An offer to the Prussian king was made and accepted on the spot: Prussia to receive the possessions of the King of England on the continent—Hanover (and to make certain territorial concessions in Germany in favor of Napoleon). Frederick William, fearing a Greek gift, ratified the treaty but attached conditions requiring England's consent to the cession of Hanover. When Haugwitz returned with the amended treaty on February 1, Napoleon chose to regard it as void and insisted on drawing up a new treaty stipulating that, in return for his concessions to Prussia, Prussia should enter an anti-English alliance and close her ports to English goods. Haugwitz signed, since he felt himself and Prussia under duress, and the treaty was ratified by the King on February 26. But simultaneously the King of Prussia began, through Brunswick at St. Petersburg, negotiations for an understanding with Alexander. The result was a secret declaration that in the event of war between France and Russia, Frederick William would not go to war against Alexander.

Meanwhile emissaries of both England and Russia were sounding out Napoleon with a view to adjusting their reciprocal relations in the Mediterranean and the Adriatic. Alexander received a somewhat formal document that merely required the Russian monarch's assent to what had already been done. An agreement with England was a much more delicate matter. It concerned primarily the evacuation of Sicily in favor of the King of Naples. After hanging fire for a considerable length of time it was finally dropped, but not before Napoleon had made an offer of the restoration of Hanover; the disclosure to the Prussian ambassador in Paris that Napoleon was negotiating with England on Hanover behind the back of Prussia raised a storm of indignation at Berlin; explanations were demanded. The unfortunate French envoy was not informed of Napoleon's dealings with England. Mortified by the contradiction between this rumor and his instructions, he asked for his recall. On August 14 the Russian government refused the

ratification of the treaty negotiated by Oubril; the news was the match to the fuse at Berlin. The Prussian armies were put on a war footing, though efforts were still made to appeal to the Emperor but at the same time to draw England and Austria along into an alliance. On September 21, the French ambassador demanded his passports; the same day Frederick William departed for the army. By October 1 Napoleon was at the head of his troops in Germany and the Grand Army was in motion. On October 14, 1806, Napoleon encountered one Prussian army at Jena and annihilated it; on the same day Davoust overwhelmed another at Auerstadt. On October 25 Berlin was occupied by Davoust; two days later, on October 27, Napoleon made his triumphal march into the Prussian capital. From here on November 22 he issued the Berlin Decrees forbidding all commercial relations between Great Britain and the countries on the continent under French control.

From Berlin Napoleon moved to Poland, where he established himself at Warsaw on January 1, 1807. Here he continued his efforts for the settlement of the problems of eastern Europe. The Poles in Prussian territory welcomed him effusively. Napoleon responded by exhorting them to enroll under his banner. While making every effort to exploit Polish enthusiasm and martial ardor, he avoided extravagant promises. Poland was regarded as a pawn in his game; in settling her fate he would be guided by events; he would throw her to Russia or Prussia as best suited his schemes. A program of complete independence would merely complicate his relations with Russia. He would not hesitate to use the threatened withdrawal of the Polish spoils from either of the powers that had shared in the division, if by so doing he could coerce them. To create a new Polish state would but unite them in opposition to himself.

From Berlin, Frederick William fled to East Prussia awaiting events. The news of Jena provoked popular indignation at St. Petersburg against the French. On November 28 Alexander ordered the French ambassador de Lesseps to leave Russia; French subjects were given the alternative of severing their

relations with France or leaving the country. The government constrained the Holy Synod to launch a campaign of hate against the French Emperor to rouse the population. The military forces were put under the command of Count Kamen-skii. However, the latter soon found himself incapacitated by age and ill-health. Within a few weeks he turned the command over to Buxhoevden and retired to Grodno to await imperial permission to return to his estates.

On December 26 Bennigsen's troops were attacked in their position at Pultusk but succeeded in repelling their assailants, who left them in possession of the field. This unexpected victory led Alexander to name Bennigsen to the command. On January 27 (O.S.), 1807, Bennigsen again engaged the French at Preussisch-Eylau in East Prussia, an action which Napoleon characterized as "not a battle but a butchery." This time, though both sides claimed the victory, it was the Russians who withdrew from the field of battle. The winter campaign was a depressing one for both sides. Not only did the weather severely try the endurance of the troops, but for the wounded and the incapacitated it meant lingering torture and slow death in the cold. After Preussisch-Eylau, even Napoleon was ready to grant favorable terms to Frederick William. He contemplated peace and an alliance with Alexander. But meanwhile, at Bartenstein, Hardenburg had arranged a treaty between Alexander and Frederick William. It provided for the establishment of a constitutional regime in Germany organized on federal lines; the fate of Italy was left to the other powers; and the two monarchs pledged themselves to make no war on the continent for the sake of conquest. But the treaty was to be still-born. On June 14 Napoleon crushed the Russian army at Friedland in East Prussia. The remnants of the army of Bennigsen retired in disorder across the Niemen. Alexander and Frederick William retreated to Tauroggen, whence *pour-parlers* were opened for an armistice. This was concluded with Napoleon by Lobanov-Rostovskii on June 22, 1807, and ratified on the following day by Alexander. Arrangements were made for the opening of negotiations for peace at Tilsit.

The conference between the monarchs opened dramatically on a raft on the River Niemen at equal distances from the Russian and French lines. By Napoleon's express wish it was conducted *à deux*; the Emperor felt that, unhampered by subordinates, he could attain the end he desired through his personal influence on Alexander. Frederick William remained a gloomy, silent, and impotent spectator of events. He was deliberately barred from most sessions of the conference, while his presence was grudgingly conceded at formal gatherings. He was quite openly and intentionally excluded from the imperial *tête-à-têtes*. For reasons of convenience, the negotiations were adjourned to the town of Tilsit, for this occasion neutralized and equally divided between the troops of both armies. At Tilsit, even the fair Queen Louisa, brought up for this purpose by ill-advised persons in the *entourage* of the Prussian king, failed to shake Napoleon from his determination to destroy Prussia. Napoleon, during the course of the discussions preliminary to the armistice, had traced on the map the course of the Vistula, which he described as "the frontier between the two empires; your monarch shall reign on one side, I on the other." The agreement between the emperors consisted of two parts: the first, a treaty of peace; the second, a treaty of alliance. By the first Prussia was reduced to the districts of Brandenburg, Pomerania, and East Prussia. From the Polish possessions of Prussia, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was formed and assigned to the King of Saxony. The Emperor of Russia undertook to recognize the political changes made in Europe by Napoleon, the creation of the kingdoms of Holland, of Naples, of Westphalia, and the Confederation of the Rhine. Russia surrendered Cattaro and the Ionian Islands. In the treaty of alliance the Tsar promised to declare war on England and to close Russian ports to English trade, should England not accept Russian mediation in coming to terms with France. If this contingency arose, Denmark, Sweden, and Portugal were to be called on to close their ports to English ships and to declare war on England.

Peace was signed separately with Prussia on September 12,

setting the new boundaries of the kingdom and arranging for the progressive evacuation of Prussian territory by the French. Silesia, with its fortresses, was to be retained till the contributions, which were to be determined later by Napoleon, were met in full by the Prussian government. Napoleon never allowed himself to be generous with a fallen foe; and he was careful to retain the means of applying coercive measures to Prussia should the occasion arise.

The Treaty of Tilsit profoundly altered the position of Alexander in Europe and no less profoundly changed his position at home. From being the head and front of the anti-French *bloc*, Alexander at one step had executed a complete *volte-face*. He who had directed the campaign of vilification launched by the Holy Synod against Napoleon as anti-Christ now claimed that "this union of France and Russia has ever been the object of my desire." It was difficult for Russians to adjust themselves to this realistic change of front. The Empress Mother had always been anti-French and had hated and distrusted Napoleon; in that she was in accord with Russian national feeling in so far as this found means of expression in a country not distinguished for its independent organs of public opinion. Alexander confounded his own people by this all-too-sudden change of front. It dealt a blow to the love and admiration of his people with which he had begun his reign. In the vigorous phrase of a Russian writer, "Russians, like the despised Chuvashes and Cheremessi, flog their gods when they fail to grant their prayers." Their idol was found to have feet of clay. Having lost popular confidence he could not revive the work of reform; the secret committee was dissolved; its members were dispersed. The distinguished triumvirate, Novosiltsov, Kochubei, and Stroganov, gave way to less heroic figures whose gifts, though modest, were equal to the less exacting tasks demanded by the new course plotted for the state. Gone were the high hopes for reform to place Russia's feet firmly on the ladder of progress. The country became the partner of Napoleon in a grandiose plan for world dominion. The adherence of Russia to France all but closed the iron ring drawn

about England. The next step was Spain; and to the task of winning her, Napoleon now addressed himself.

The Peace of Tilsit offered Napoleon dazzling prospects. His head was filled with the most brilliant plans that succeeded one another in bewildering fashion. But above all, he had to bring England to her knees; and for that it was necessary to reduce Spain, occupy Rome, and extend the continental system to include all Italy. A divorce from Josephine and a marriage with Alexander's sister or some other princess of exalted station and royal blood, to enable Napoleon to found a dynasty, was already being bruited about. Then before his gaze flashed a vision of a Mediterranean in French control; of Egypt in French possession; of a joint French and Russian expedition to Persia and India that would overthrow British power in the East. In the mind of the Emperor, day and night, were grandiose schemes, both possible and impossible; in his exalted state of mind the line between the two was blurred. But however his mind might play with remote contingencies, he kept his eye fixed irrevocably on his immediate task. Hence the Milan Decrees, which further closed the circle of the blockade by which England's commerce was to be strangled. Alexander was pressed to implement the terms of Tilsit; to attempt mediation with England or break with her in case of refusal; Napoleon hoped that the corollary would be coercion applied to Sweden and the aggrandizement of Russia at the expense of Sweden by taking at least Finland. With regard to Turkey the situation was not so clear; Napoleon hoped to hold the Ottoman Porte in fee to curtail British power in the eastern Mediterranean. But he had not overlooked the possibility of a partition of the Turkish Empire as a bait to Russia, or, in case of need, to Austria. But Alexander was becoming impatient; he protested against the tardiness with which the provisions of Tilsit with reference to Prussia were being executed; he was retaining the principalities and talking about the seizure of Constantinople and the Straits.

Early in 1808 the crisis in Spain was developing rapidly. And as the Spanish situation became more and more acute,

Napoleon's enemies took heart. It came out in May that Austria was arming. To free his hands, Napoleon was constrained to come to terms with Prussia, much exasperated at the insolent evasion of the terms of the treaty signed at Tilsit. Actually, the Prussian leaders were in a mood that would not stop short of conspiracy or armed revolt, as the French government knew through its agents. Napoleon, knowing that Stein was at the root of this, demanded his dismissal but agreed to sign a convention with Prince William, setting finally the amount of the Prussian indemnity at 140,000,000 francs; France was to retain possession of Glogau, Küstrin, and Stettin till the whole was paid; the Prussian states would be evacuated with this exception forty days after the exchange of ratifications. The King of Prussia undertook to maintain for ten years not more than 42,000 troops and not to supplement these in any way with levies of the militia or of the burghers; Napoleon guaranteed the territory of Prussia so long as the King of Prussia remained his ally; Prussia was to furnish 12,000 for the campaign of 1809 in case of war between Austria and France. In the years following the number would be increased to 16,000; he agreed to recognize the Kings of Spain (Joseph) and Naples (Murat). Having thus removed the Prussian menace, Napoleon turned his attention to Russia, with whose sovereign he had long desired an interview. This was finally arranged to take place at Erfurt for the end of September, 1808.

The Congress of Erfurt, which took place between September 28 and October 12, 1808, had for its purpose the freeing of Napoleon's hands for the work in Spain; nevertheless Napoleon did not overlook the opportunity of rattling the gilded chains of the German princes as well as staging an impressive spectacle for the world to wonder at. There were the same ceremonial occasions, the same round of social activities with little apparent real business. But the chief personages were not idle. The lesser dignitaries gossiped among themselves; the ambassadors exchanged confidences; Napoleon and Alexander entered into the same intimate relations as at Tilsit. Finally, out of all this seemingly planless activity, there emerged on October 12 an

agreement between the two emperors. By this they renewed their alliance directed against England. England would be offered peace on the terms of *uti possidetis* so far as France was concerned; Russia was to be given Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia. Napoleon was to withdraw his offer of mediation between Russia and the Porte; he would recognize the Danube as the frontier between Russia and Turkey; the integrity of the Ottoman Porte was guaranteed afresh and no infringement would be allowed except by general agreement. Russia promised to make common cause with France against Austria, should the latter declare war. The convention was to remain secret for at least ten years.

Events in Austria moved rapidly. The Emperor Francis and the court were now caught up in a great movement that was sweeping the whole of Germany as well as Austrian territory, and it was not easy to resist it. Hence Austrian rearmament proceeded apace; and on this question Napoleon could not afford to temporize. His orders went out for the concentration of the Grand Army. He renewed engagements with Russia, calling on her for fulfilment of her treaties; promising her half of Austria. Events marched so fast that Alexander could only concur. Prussia, anxious to let no favorable opportunity slip to retrieve her position, appealed to Alexander, but the latter warned Frederick William that the time was not yet, and advised Prussia to remain neutral. On April 15, Napoleon reached Strasbourg; on the 17th, Donauwerth; the Austrians had already crossed the Inn on the 12th. The campaign of Essling and Wagram had begun.

The mobilization of the Austrians began in January, 1809. Their forces were divided into two armies: that in Germany under Archduke Charles, the other in Austria under Archduke John. The first was to operate from Bohemia; the second was to invade Italy and the Tyrol. Owing to delays in concentration, operations did not begin until April, when the Archduke Charles moved on the Danube. Delays gave the French control of Ratisbon and the Danube. The Archduke Charles, after the defeat of Abensberg, was compelled to retire down

the Danube, which he crossed at Vienna. Napoleon occupied the city on May 10. On the 18th Napoleon moved across the river to engage the Archduke Charles and was heavily attacked by the latter on the 22nd at Aspern and Essling. After a hard-fought battle, Essling was won, but Aspern was lost to the Austrians. After a seven weeks' armistice the fighting was resumed on July 5, when the Austrians were attacked at Wagram and defeated. On July 12 an armistice was signed and negotiations for peace were begun.

The fighting around Vienna settled the fate of Austria though fighting went on in other theaters of war. Operations took place in the Tyrol and in Galicia, where a Polish rising occurred. The Emperor Alexander had mobilized 30,000 men and despatched them across the Bug into Poland. Though the Russian attack was conducted with great deliberation, the Archduke Ferdinand was compelled to fall back on Cracow, where the armistice found him. The fighting in the Tyrol and in Italy did not affect the main operations.

Negotiations for peace were opened August 15 at Schönbrunn, where peace was finally signed on October 14. According to its terms, Austria ceded to Napoleon, for the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine, Salzburg, Berchtesgaden, and part of Upper Austria; to Napoleon, for his own use, Austrian Friuli, Trieste with parts of Carinthia, Carniola, and Dalmatia to form the Illyrian kingdom; and to Saxony, the whole of western Galicia. The district of Tarnopol went to Russia. Austria recognized the changes made by Napoleon in Spain, Portugal, and Italy; adhered to the continental system; and paid an indemnity. The Austrian army was reduced to 150,000 men.

The Emperor Alexander, despite his friendship for Austria, had been constrained to take part in the operations, but he did nothing more than fulfil the strict letter of his obligations. He had no real interest in the war or the peace that was concluded. Russia was not represented at the peace conference. Her interests were not necessarily neglected. No move was

made to extend her boundaries to the Carpathian mountains, as had been hoped.

More important for Russia than the campaign at Wagram were the dispositions made with regard to Finland, which was annexed following the success of Russian arms in a war with Sweden. Gustav IV was deposed as a result of a revolution and was succeeded by Charles XIII. A proclamation was issued granting a constitution to Finland, and an Assembly (*seim*) of Finnish representatives was opened at Borgä on March 25. By the Treaty of Fredrikshamn, 1809, Sweden surrendered her claims to the Grand Duchy.

The war with Austria did not improve the relations between Alexander and Napoleon. Alexander had extended his help to Napoleon, who rewarded it by withholding western Galicia, which was added to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. In other spheres also their interests did not coincide. In 1809 the Russians, in the Balkans, had had an army which was directed against Turkey, but no move was made to bring it north against the Austrians. Napoleon had also approached Alexander indirectly for the hand of his sister, the Grand Duchess Catherine Pavlovna. She had, however, been betrothed and married to the Duke of Oldenburg. In 1809 he addressed an official request for the hand of her sister Anna. Alexander this time referred the matter to his mother, to whom the will of her husband had assigned the choice of a husband for the daughter. Delay was asked for, but after the lapse of some weeks the request was refused on the ground that the princess was too young. But towards the end of 1809 Napoleon had secured a divorce from the Empress Josephine and negotiations were opened with the Austrian Emperor with a view to arranging a marriage with Princess Marie Louise, which was brought about by Metternich. The slight to Napoleon's *amour propre* at the hands of Alexander mortally offended the French Emperor and was perhaps the most important factor in bringing about a split between them.

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THE DUEL WITH FRANCE

AN INTERLUDE

TOWARD the end of 1808 a new figure appeared in the inner administrative circles in Russia. This was the young state secretary, Mikhail Mikhailovich Speranskii. The former intimate committee consisting of Novosiltsov, Czartoryski, and Stroganov had ceased to exist; its members had drifted apart. Nevertheless Alexander had not quite lost sight of his original purpose of presenting Russia with a constitution. After the Peace of Tilsit he revived it and turned to Speranskii, who, on December 16, 1808, was appointed a deputy minister of justice. Speranskii was a young man of good education, exceptional ability, and unremitting industry. He took up the work of Novosiltsov and Czartoryski with great enthusiasm and worked out a scheme for a constitution. After devoting the greater part of the year 1809 to this project, Speranskii decided on a number of reforms. First, in the field of administration it was proposed to place at the head of the administration a body called the state council, in which all power was to be concentrated. This body was to undertake a reorganization of the government, the most vital parts of which were the drafting of a new body of laws and the reconstruction of the state finances. The other departments of the government were also to be overhauled. The council was to have charge of the codification of the laws, to be undertaken along the lines laid down by Catherine in 1767, but it was intended to expedite the work in every way. Other reforms were contemplated: the introduction of a system of elective

bodies, superimposed on one another in an ascending order—the township дума, the district дума, the provincial дума, and the national дума.

In submitting his report embodying these proposals to the Emperor, Speranskii remarked that these proposals would crown the efforts of Alexander for the past ten years. He hoped that with God's will they would be effective in 1811. Unfortunately, events that thwarted these hopes took place.

Not only were the constitutional changes incompatible with absolute monarchy, but they were regarded with great jealousy by the nobility as a possible menace to their privileges. Speranskii therefore found his position somewhat precarious and felt that it depended solely on his retention of the confidence and support of the Emperor. Public opinion was favorable to the proposed constitution; hence it could hardly be used against Speranskii, but the nobles were quick to resent any measures that diminished their privileges. And on two occasions at least, Alexander found himself compelled to come to the protection of his protégé. Finally the discontent was expressed in the action of Alexei Andreyevich Arakcheyev, who resigned from his position as minister of war in protest against the fact that he had not been consulted on the constitution. On January 1, 1810, the new State Council was opened, which it was hoped would usher in an era of constitutional government. In addition to this propitious step, a complete reorganization of the higher administration took place. Barclay de Tolly became minister of war, Arakcheyev became chairman of the department of military affairs; Dmitryev, the minister of justice; Lopukhin, chairman of the department of civil and ecclesiastical affairs; Count Savadovskii became chairman of the legal department of laws; Razumovskii, minister of public instruction; and Guryev became minister of finance. An integral part of Speranskii's plan was his financial scheme. The issue of assignats was stopped and it was announced that efforts would be made to balance the budget by curtailing expenditures and by raising taxes. It was also decided to reform the currency. A new tariff was introduced affecting neutral com-

merce ports on the Baltic, the White and Black Seas, the Sea of Azov, and along the western frontier.

Meanwhile the situation in the Balkans had not yet been cleared up. In 1810 Kamenskii had taken the place of Bagration. The former succeeded in capturing Silistria but failed to reduce Shumla when he crossed to the south side of the Danube. Later regretting this step, he returned to the north bank. At the end of the year he was replaced by Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov. Kutuzov proved much more aggressive than his predecessor. During 1811 he inflicted a defeat on the Turks and ferried his troops over to the south side of the Danube. In October he retired; the Turks unwisely followed him, were attacked near Rushchuk, and were heavily defeated. Their camp on the north bank was therefore isolated and was forced to surrender. There was now no opposition, so Kutuzov crossed the Danube and marched on Bucharest, where negotiations for peace were undertaken. Meanwhile Napoleon had in 1810 extended the confines of the Empire by the annexation to France of the shore of the North Sea that lay between the mouths of the Ems and the Elbe. One of the princes affected was the Duke of Oldenburg, brother-in-law of Alexander, and the Tsar felt it necessary to lodge a protest against this usurpation. Napoleon was more than discourteous during negotiations, but he agreed to compensations. Nevertheless, this incident disturbed his relations with the Tsar. A cause of further friction was the adoption of the Russian tariff of 1811 permitting the importation of colonial goods under the American flag and forbidding the importation of the products of French industry. This Napoleon considered a direct breach of the continental system, though Alexander in reality had been driven by public opinion in this matter, since the English trade was vital to Russia. The understanding reached between Alexander and the heir to the Swedish throne was also a wanton provocation of Napoleon, owing to his personal animosity towards Bernadotte, as well as the implication it contained of a still further increase in the number of Napoleon's enemies.

Throughout 1811 everything pointed to a coming struggle with France, and Alexander made every preparation possible. One of the first was the retirement of Speranskii. The Chancellor had become extremely unpopular. He was of humble origin, the son of a "pope"—that is, of a village priest. His rise to such an exalted station had been due primarily to the personal favor of Alexander, for he had taken little pains to conciliate either his associates or his superiors. But he was unquestionably the man Russia needed for carrying through the great projects of reform. For that reason his fall, though Alexander claimed it was necessary as a war sacrifice, is hardly creditable to the Tsar. He had allowed the Chancellor to become privy to many state secrets that lay outside of his immediate sphere, even to the exclusion of the minister of foreign affairs. A chance incident disclosed all this, and Alexander, who had tolerated this situation, extricated himself from embarrassment by sacrificing Speranskii. His dismissal was greeted with great joy in the capital, where he was suspected of a lack of patriotic feelings. He was exiled to Nizhnii Novgorod, where he passed the next few years. The work of reform thus was definitely checked by military exigencies.

THE FRENCH INVASION

The year 1812 opened with ominous signs. Napoleon was already making feverish preparations for the mobilization of the Grand Army with which he was to invade Russia. These preparations were countered by Alexander, who put the Russian army on a war footing. Alexander decided to adopt a passive role and to await the attack of the French on Russian soil. The plan of campaign which was adopted was the work of General Pfull, a Prussian officer who had entered the Russian service in 1806. Pfull was not very highly regarded in military circles; he was thought to be a rigid pedant. Nevertheless he was chosen to draft the plan to be followed by the Russian armies.

The main frontier of Russia in the west was the Niemen River. Though a considerable obstacle, it was a difficult line

to defend, since throughout a considerable part of its course its right bank was commanded by the left. The intention therefore was to rely more on the western Dvina. But as the upper course of the Dvina runs at right angles to the frontier, the defensive line would run south along the marshes of Polesie. East of the marshes a second defensive line was formed by the Dnieper, but, as the upper Dnieper runs east and west from Mohilev, the area between the Dnieper and the Dvina rivers forms an undefended corridor. Here the only obstacle is the Beresina. The forces of the Russians were disposed so as to cover this approach to Smolensk and Moscow from the west. The northern army under Barclay de Tolly, which was to concentrate at Sventsiany, was to be much the largest. A second under Bagration was to assemble in the neighborhood of Bolkovisk near Bialystok. The third, and that much the smallest, under Tormasov was to watch the Austrian frontier. The main part of the French army was expected to cross the Niemen at Kovno, and it was proposed to subject it to converging attacks, but this plan had been formed with little appreciation of the actual situation. Napoleon had concentrated over 600,000 men, while the Russians had less than 200,000. Napoleon's main army did cross the Niemen near Kovno, but he had ample forces to contain the Russians at other points. From the first his blows were directed with lightning rapidity. Alexander was compelled to evacuate Vilna with some precipitation. The main body retired on the fortified camp on the Dvina at Drissa, but was not able to hold this position. Bagration soon found himself heavily involved and compelled to retire, while the advance of Davoust southwest from Kovno threatened to cut him off from the main body. He was therefore forced to elude pursuit by a precipitate retreat. This involved a long and roundabout march through Pesvizh, Slutsk, and Bobruisk, crossing the River Dnieper below Mohilev and joining the main body at Smolensk. Meantime the latter destroyed the bridge at Polotsk and moved up the Dvina to Vitebsk. Forces were disposed along the river to deny the right bank to the French. This force of opposition

succeeded in preventing the French from crossing at Polotsk and maintained its position from August until October. The Russian main body then proceeded from Vitebsk to Smolensk. Here it was attacked by the French in a three days' battle. On the 4th, 5th, and 6th the Russians evacuated the city.

The latter continued their retreat eastward along the north bank of the Dnieper, putting up rear guard actions at Lubin, Gorodechnia, and Klyastitsy. After the evacuation of



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NAPOLÉON AND THE GRAND ARMY.

Smolensk, the confidence of Russia in the commander-in-chief Barclay de Tolly waned rapidly, and it was decided to supersede him. A successor was found in Kutuzov, a tried and experienced commander who had served under Suvorov and had commanded on that fatal day at Austerlitz, where his star had been dimmed. But the disaster at Austerlitz had been due to interference with his plans, as Alexander had realized to his sorrow. As commander-in-chief he was now given full authority. Measures were taken to redress the balance of forces which was so heavily weighted against Russia. Orders went

out for a general levy throughout the European provinces, and it was hoped that these troops would enable the country finally to repel the invader.

Kutuzov halted the retreat of the army at the village of Borodino, about seventy-five miles west of Moscow. Here a great two-day battle took place on August 24 and 25 (O.S.), September 5 and 6 (N.S.), 1812. It was a straight stand-up fight on both sides with little maneuvering skill. The losses were frightful. For the moment they bore more heavily on the Russians, and Kutuzov felt compelled to retire. The army reached Moscow, but here no defense was possible and it was decided to retire to the southeast along the road to Ryazan on September 2 (14).

The battle of Borodino settled the fate of Moscow. The Emperor, who had gone to St. Petersburg, had assumed that Moscow would be defended to the last. And though a council of war was called to deliberate the question, Kutuzov overruled the majority and insisted on withdrawal. The army therefore passed through Moscow on September 1 and 2 (13 and 14) and was directed across the city to the southeastern gate, which gave access to the road to Ryazan. But the abandonment of Moscow by the military forces involved also the flight of the civilian population. Already terrified by the approach of the French, their fear was fanned by the Governor-General Rostopchin, a man of undoubted patriotism, but ill-balanced judgment. The population, both rich and poor, young and old, gathered what they could, loaded it in any vehicle to be obtained, and set forth to destinations unknown with the sole purpose of escaping the terrible French. Chaos and anarchy reigned in Moscow; the troops had to make their way amid the tide of refugees surging along the roads in every direction. At every defile congestion and delays occurred so that Kutuzov, despairing of clearing the city, sent word to the French that he would fight on its western outskirts if the French pressed him too hard. The result was an arrangement that gave him until the morning of the 3rd to clear the southern limits. All night long the train of refugees and soldiers poured out of the gates. Kutuzov

took up his position a short distance from the city to cover the withdrawal of transport. His rear guard under Miloradovich successfully protected its retreat. Meanwhile a terrible fire had broken out in the city, set probably by the orders of the Governor-General, partly to destroy provisions, and partly to discourage the French. The bivouacs of the troops were lighted up by the glow reflected from the burning city. The following day the troops moved southward across the Moskva River and then, covered by the rear guard, now turned flank guard, moved westward to Podolsk, and then to Krasnaya Pakhra on the road to Kaluga. From there they retired southeastward to Tarutino, where they took up a position covered by the river Nara. This skilful move put them in a position to threaten Napoleon's retreat westward.

Napoleon entered the city on the afternoon of the 2nd. Just outside the city gates he awaited a deputation from its citizens, but none came. It was difficult for him to realize that the city was deserted, but as night came on, the glow of the burning houses, the confusion, and the deserted streets convinced the French that it was true. Meanwhile in the absence of authority, looting and violence broke out to add to the terror. It was impossible to check the fire or to distribute the troops in such a way as to stop the looting. Napoleon made his way on the morning of the 3rd to the Kremlin, where he took up his quarters. His staff at once gathered around him and proceeded to take stock of the situation, to bring something like order out of chaos. Napoleon occupied Moscow on the assumption that by so doing he would bring Alexander to terms, but the latter had expressed a firm resolve not to make peace. His sudden change of heart after Friedland in 1806 had cast doubts on his firmness of character, but now national feeling against the French was so fierce as to deter him from another change of heart. He instructed Kutuzov that under no conditions were offers of peace to be entertained.

Napoleon sought by every means to extend his successes and negotiate for peace. He brought what order he could in Moscow, but was not successful in his efforts to entice the popula-

tion back into the city. This was a severe blow to the French, as it prevented the satisfactory collection of supplies which they so badly needed. Moreover, the rising of the Russian population and the appearance of numerous bands of partisans about the country prevented foraging except on a large scale. Nor could he move in the direction of St. Petersburg and leave the Russian army intact in his rear. He therefore was compelled by the problems facing him to launch an attack against the Russian position at Tarutino. The French forces were repelled, though Kutuzov was not able to follow up the advantage and deal a decisive blow.

The situation of the French became worse as the autumn advanced. Napoleon found the task of governing his vast empire from so great a distance almost impossible. Moreover, the losses which his forces had incurred were likely to tempt his enemies to make some move against him, and in any event, unless he could compel Alexander to make peace, he was faced with the prospect of having to winter in a hostile country with inadequate supplies and dwindling forces. He therefore decided, somewhat reluctantly, to retire. The movement began on October 8 (20). His purpose was to take the old road to Kaluga and, passing across the flank of the Russian army at Tarutino, proceed through Malyi Yaroslavets to Kaluga. Hence he would proceed to Smolensk, his purpose being to avoid the route followed in the advance, since this territory had been systematically ravaged. This movement, however, was countered by Kutuzov, who put himself astride the Kaluga road at Malyi Yaroslavets. Napoleon's efforts to dislodge him were partially successful. Kutuzov finally withdrew from the field along the road to Kaluga, but when Napoleon thought of renewing the fight his resolution failed and he decided to retire through Vyazma. The retreat continued the night of October 14-15 (26-27) along the road to Smolensk; but Kutuzov, expecting a renewal of the attack, remained inactive during the following day. Immediately, however, Napoleon's purpose was discovered, the pursuit was organized and proceeded for the most part upon roads parallel with the main line of retreat,

only the rear guard following the French. Detachments of Cossacks and of partisans harried the French whenever they moved off the road, while the main bodies threatened, by occupying vital points, to cut off their retreat.

From the first the French army suffered. The troops had left Moscow loaded with plunder. In addition, their discipline had suffered considerably from the two months spent in the city. On the night of October 15 came the first heavy frost, and the cold, together with the scarcity of provisions and proper winter equipment, began to tell heavily on the French troops. The further they went the greater the decline in morale, and even in the discipline in the ranks. Mortality among the horses was extremely high because of the difficulties of foraging. The animals, as they died, provided the soldiers with food, but even with this supplement to their rations, hunger and cold soon took their toll. It was necessary to fight determined rear-guard actions at Vyazma, where the River Vyazma was crossed, at Krasnyi, in order to cover the crossing of the Dnieper at Orsha, and where the rear guard under Ney performed prodigies of valor in the retreat. This action is vividly described by a Russian historian:¹

At dark after the action of November 6 (18) Ney moved with three columns along the country roads and in part across open country without a guide, by means of a very poor map. The Marshal, seeing the evident impossibility of approaching Orsha along the road leading through Krasnyi, resolved to cross over to the right bank of the Dnieper. He led his soldiers along the course of the stream they had encountered in the hope that it emptied into the Dnieper and that, having followed it downstream, the force would reach the bank of the river. Upon the arrival at a village abandoned by its inhabitants, Danilovka, Ney gathered all his divisional commanders and the senior officers of the corps staff at a conference, while the detachment was taking its ease around the fires of the bivouacs. Having explained in full the danger of his position, the intrepid Ney said that the only means of saving the remnants of the corps was to march immediately to the Dnieper and to cross that river. Orders were issued to gather great piles of wood and leave some to keep the fires going, but in the meantime the force moved

¹ M. Bogdanovich, *Istoriya Obshchestvennoi Voiny 1812 Goda*. Vol. III, pp. 138-142. (Author's translation.)

on, taking with it as a guide a lame peasant who had been seized. In answer to the question as to whether the Dnieper was far and whether it could be crossed on the ice, the peasant answered that it was about four *versts* distant, near the village of Syrokorenya, and that the river probably was frozen over. The thick snow and the darkness of the night blinded the men; the moderate frost after the severe cold presaged a thaw and diminished their hopes for a successful crossing. However, the force moved on with no less alacrity because success was problematical. Arriving at the Dnieper they found, at the place where the bed of the stream was compressed between high banks, that it was possible to cross the ice on foot. Meanwhile some of the soldiers set about searching for the best places for getting down to the river. The wounded were moved to the huts of the neighboring village, where the doctors tried to give them aid and dressed their wounds for the first time. The rest set about obtaining food. Meanwhile they found a very suitable place for crossing on the ice between the villages of Syrokorenya and Gusinoe, near the village of Varishek. About midnight the order was given to stand to arms for crossing. The artillery, the transport, the wounded who could not proceed with the troops were left behind. Because of the weakness of the ice, they were successful in getting across the river only a few horses, and even the men, when they became bunched, went through the ice and drowned. Some of them were forced to crawl on all fours over the cracking ice. After completing this terrible crossing the French marched on in the direction of Orsha along scarcely distinguishable paths in the deep snow through the forest, continually wandering from the road owing to the thick snow that was falling. After a three hours' march they arrived at a small village where they found some flour and potatoes. Fires were lighted and the soldiers, cheered with the hope of safety, though threatened with cold and wet, thought of their Emperor, saying, "Surely he will get us out of this terrible country." The storm raged all night but it served Ney's forces well, since it obscured their movements from the pursuing Cossacks. On November 7 (19) at dawn the French had already passed the village of Gusinoe which, though abandoned by the natives, provided some means of feeding the detachment. They went along the road to Lyubavicha. On the way the enemy found good supplies in all the villages, and revived and strengthened, they looked forward to safety, but almost immediately the Cossacks were on them. If, after the action at Losmina on November 14 to 18, Ney had been followed persistently and attacked on the Dnieper, even by a small number of regular troops, while Platov was moving along the other side of the stream, and had met him in front, the French forces would have been completely wiped out. It is said that, the evening after the defeat of Ney, General Opperman, who knew the neighborhood thoroughly,

brought to the attention of Konovnitzyn that near Syrokorenya on one of the bends in the Dnieper, between high banks, the river froze earlier than elsewhere, and that Ney would escape in this way. In the archives are preserved instructions given by the commander-in-chief to Golitsyn and Miloradovich, to keep watch on the enemy, doubling their precautions, and try to head him off at Syrokorenya. But as these orders had been despatched only after the arrival of the headquarters of Prince Kutuzov at Dobroe, it is quite doubtful whether the instructions contained in them could have been carried out in time. It is certain that Ney owed the safety of the remnants of his corps to the failure of our pursuit. Our forces thought they were in an incomparably better condition than the enemy were, quite exhausted by their exertions and the lack of winter equipment. In any circumstances extraordinary driving force was demanded of the leader to urge his troops to yet more strenuous exertions and hardships, to insure the final destruction of the enemy army, whose destruction seemed certain without persistent pursuit. The French writers justly praise the courage of Ney, who not only maintained his spirit in the severest trials, but was able also to inspire his men. For three days he moved with the survivors of his corps without artillery, through unknown country, surrounded by Cossacks who several times cut off his retreat. On the evening of November 7 (19) he was forced to leave the road that led to Lyubavicha and to turn to the left through the timber along the Dnieper. But here too, the Cossacks were waiting for him. He might better have harbored his strength and, after giving the detachment a night's rest, retired at dawn on the 8th (20th) because it was still about thirty *verssts* to Orsha. Hardly had the French come out into the open country when the Cossacks again appeared. Some guns of the Don artillery, which had been set on runners, approached the retreating column and opened fire. Platov, convinced of the complete disorganization of the enemy, ordered the Cossacks to charge with lances. Then Ney formed the remnants of his division into two squares, forced into their ranks all the stragglers who had kept their guns, and sent out skirmishers to keep the Cossacks at a distance from the squares. But the Don Cossacks, herding before them a crowd of marauders, came up with the French force disorganized by grapeshot. Several times the enemy, driven to despair, were on the point of scattering, to seek safety in flight, but the presence of Marshal Ney (*le brave des braves*, as the French call him), his coolness and intrepidity, steadied the men and enabled them to reach the village of Yakubov about noon. Occupying the houses and the neighboring forests with riflemen, the Marshal determined to fight to the last and kept his word, "maintaining himself," as Platov says in his report, "with utmost tenacity." Early in the morning a Polish officer, Pshebendovskii, was sent to headquarters with a report

from Ney of the desperate situation of the French. At the time when news of this reached Orsha, Napoleon had already left for Borisov, but the troops of the Viceroy Davoust were still occupying the town. The Viceroy himself, with part of what was left of his corps, immediately marched to the aid of Ney, who leaving Yakubov about ten o'clock at night, marched across country to Orsha. His reduced force was ordered to maintain perfect silence and to push on rapidly. After advancing about ten *versts* Ney met the viceroy's advance guard and, under the protection of the forces of the 4th corps, which took the position of rear guard, continued the retirement to Orsha, to which he brought back from 800 to 1,000 men.

At the beginning of the campaign the Russian strategy had had to provide for a number of contingencies such as an Austrian invasion, a diversion of French forces to St. Petersburg, an attempt to seize Riga. Of necessity, therefore, there was a dispersion of forces in secondary theaters of war. Wittgenstein had taken up a position on the route to the north of Polotsk covering the approaches to the northern capital from the western Dvina. Steingel was expected to coöperate with Wittgenstein. Tormasov, commander of the third army, was expected to watch the Austrian frontier. Chichagov, assigned to the army of the Danube, found on his arrival that a treaty had been signed with Turkey. Though Alexander played with the idea of creating a diversion against Napoleon in the Balkans, the scheme was abandoned and Chichagov was recalled to coöperate with the army on the Austrian frontier.

Once the retreat of Napoleon from Moscow had become a certainty, the destruction of the Grand Army became the supreme purpose. Alexander therefore proposed that the forces in secondary theaters of war should converge on Napoleon's line of retreat, and endeavor by taking up a strong position to place Napoleon between themselves and the pursuing Russian army under Kutuzov. Chichagov was instructed to detach one corps to watch Schwartzenburg, with his remaining forces to seize Minsk, and to concentrate on the Beresina. Here he was to be joined by Wittgenstein, Steingel, and other forces in sufficient strength to enable him to hold the line of the Beresina, and to prevent Napoleon from crossing. The plan required a

coördination of movement of which the Russian commanders showed themselves quite incapable. Chichagov found it necessary to detach a considerable part of his strength to drive Schwartzenburg westward into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Wittgenstein, who had moved southward from Polotsk and engaged the French army of Victor and Saint Cyr, hesitated to abandon his advantageous position on the flank of the French retreat and, passing across its front, place himself athwart its line of march. Steingel's and other forces were simply out of the picture. Chichagov, however, did his best to carry out his instructions: he occupied the line of the Beresina, strung out his pickets, and disposed his troops at intervals to cover the probable line of approach. But his intelligence service was inefficient, he had inadequate maps, and his instructions from Kutuzov were in some cases misleading. It is to be noted that communication between the commander-in-chief and the other forces was extremely difficult, as couriers had to pass through territory in the occupation of the enemy, and in many cases despatches were only to be transported through partisans. It is only fair to Chichagov to state that while his instructions were based on the assumption that he had at his disposal a force of no less than 80,000, he actually had about one-quarter of that number. His dispositions anticipated attempts at crossing on the lower Beresina, whereas the stream was actually bridged at Veselovo, about fifteen miles to the north of Borisov. A detachment posted near there under Chaplitz proved too weak to prevent Napoleon from effecting a lodgment on the right bank and beginning the construction of a bridge. By the time reinforcements came up it was too late to dislodge the French. An attempt to do this met with disaster, and Chichagov's forces were thrown back.

The developments are largely to be laid to the severe weather, which froze the marshes so that a footing was to be obtained everywhere. Hence the French were not confined to easily defended defiles, as they would otherwise have been. Chichagov was censured for not insuring the destruction of the bridges at Zemin, but the fact that the French found the ground firm

everywhere made these bridges of less importance. Napoleon therefore was able to complete the crossing and to open the road to Vilna. He did not have time to remove or destroy the supplies and ammunition on the left bank of the Vilya, and when the main body had crossed he ordered the bridges destroyed. Many of the wounded and of the camp followers were unable to cross so as to get away with the main body. Some lost their lives in the attempt. From the Beresina on, order and discipline disappeared in the remnants of the Grand Army. The cold weather held; food and provisions were short; the suffering of men and animals was extreme. Units became mingled; indeed, the whole column was little more than a straggling mass of fugitives, frantic to escape the insistent attacks of the Cossacks. The rear guard was helpless to prevent the approach of the Russian advance guard. Indeed, the latter jostled them ceaselessly and it was hard to distinguish the rear guard in the mass of stragglers and fugitives who were so relentlessly pursued. On the approach to Vilna a battery of artillery posted to delay the Russians was dismayed to find that its protecting infantry was not at hand. Inquiry disclosed the fact that the rear guard had disappeared to a man.

Napoleon did not delay at Vilna; indeed, the Lithuanian capital provided little respite for the exhausted and decimated French. Vilna had been a base of supplies and an important link in the lines of communication. But its resources were quite inadequate to cope with the mass of wasted refugees that drifted along with the French columns. The hospitals and private homes were packed with the sick and the dying; the streets were lined with the bodies of men and horses that perished from the cold. The whole city became a charnel-house. The absence of supplies and medical facilities put any long halt out of the question; Napoleon therefore went on at once, leaving the army to straggle along in his wake. The French army re-crossed the Niemen and proceeded to Tilsit, where it was covered by MacDonald's force of Germans which had been withdrawn for this purpose. Napoleon's campaign in Russia was at an end.

Alexander had now made up his mind that there would be no peace in Europe unless it was dictated at Paris. He therefore proposed to follow the French across Germany and to rally the powers of Europe to support him in a campaign to crush Napoleon. The first signs of this were the convention negotiated by Yorck, a Prussian commander, with the Russians, by which the Prussians were withdrawn from active participation in the war. This embarrassed MacDonald in his efforts to cover the retreat of Napoleon, but he could do nothing about it. The year 1813, therefore, opened with the immediate prospect of a combined effort on the part of the allies to secure the defeat and abdication of Napoleon.

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THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1813 AND 1814

ON the morning of January 1 (13), 1813, the Emperor Alexander I, accompanied by Kutuzov, after attending divine service, crossed the Niemen at Merech and set out along the road through Lyck to Plock on the Vistula. The decision of Alexander to carry the war beyond the frontiers of Russia did much to clear up the diplomatic situation and to induce the allies to support him. On December 18 (30), 1812, General Yorck had concluded a convention with Diebitsch by which he agreed to refrain from hostilities for at least two months, and to set up a neutral zone between the Russian and Prussian forces. In spite of the chronic vacillation of Frederick William, this ultimately ripened into a treaty of alliance signed at Kalisch on February 16 (28), 1813; January 18 (30) Miloradovich also signed an agreement with Schwartzenburg whereby the Austrian army was allowed to retire unmolested into Galicia. After passing through Berlin, Alexander met Frederick William at Breslau and prepared for a joint campaign against Napoleon. From Silesia the Russians with their allies entered Saxony. Here, in anticipation of the campaign, the army was reorganized. Kutuzov was made commander-in-chief on April 3 (15); but a week later he was taken ill, and on April 16 (28) he died. The command then passed to Wittgenstein.

Meanwhile Napoleon, having raised a new army, crossed the Rhine at Mainz and passed through Weimar on April 16 (28). On April 20 (May 2) the French forces were suddenly attacked in the valley of the Saale by the allied forces under the command of Wittgenstein, who on this day first took supreme com-

mand. Napoleon had under him 125,000 men, including 8,000 cavalry with 250 guns. The allies concentrated some 72,000 men (39,000 Russians, 33,000 Prussians). Circumstances favored the allies, as the French forces were scattered and taken off their guard. But Wittgenstein showed himself incompetent and vacillating; he was, moreover, embarrassed by the presence of the two monarchs at his headquarters. Alexander, despite his experience at Austerlitz, did not hesitate to express his opinion and to interfere with the plans of the commander-in-chief.

Napoleon's boast that he would fight the campaign as General Bonaparte and not as the Emperor proved correct. The allies found themselves out-maneuvered and out-fought. After consultation between the two monarchs, the painful decision to retreat was arrived at. To Frederick William it called up memories of Auerstadt, and it required the cold intellect of Scharnhorst, wounded as he was, to reconcile the despondent and despairing King to this step. The allies therefore began their retreat from the battlefield of Lützen. Wittgenstein, either from wilful neglect or from oversight, omitted to issue orders for the retreat, and it fell to the Tsar to make good this defect and to send word directly to Miloradovich, who had been standing by, chafing with inaction during the engagement because his force had been designated as the general reserve. It was decided to retire from the line of the Saale, rendered untenable by the action of Lützen, to that of the Elbe. Napoleon, lacking the cavalry to molest them, made no effort to intercept their retreat. They reached the Elbe and took up a powerful position at Bautzen, which they proceeded to fortify. They received other accessions of strength in the person of Barclay de Tolly, whose force, having captured Thorn, was now released for activity in the field. The allies had now at their disposal 100,000 men of whom 70,000 were Russians and 30,000 Prussians. After vain efforts to draw Alexander into negotiations, Napoleon was compelled to renew hostilities and to attack the allied position at Bautzen, May 8 and 9 (20 and 21). Again he was successful. At five o'clock on the afternoon of the 21st, after losses amounting to 12,000 men had been incurred, Alex-

ander gave the order to retire on Reichenbach in Silesia, intending from there to continue the retreat to Schweidnitz with a view to receiving reinforcements from Russia and availing himself of aid from across the Austrian frontier in case Austria should decide to join.

As a result of the battle of Bautzen, Wittgenstein was superseded. He had grievously disappointed Alexander with his lethargy, and there was nothing to do but to retire him. The choice for a successor fell on Barclay de Tolly, the senior officer present with the forces. The latter's first duty was to secure an accurate statement of the actual number of combatant troops available, a task that had proved impossible owing to the extreme confusion. Napoleon took the opportunity to renew efforts for peace; these came to nothing, though an armistice was concluded to last from May 23 (June 4) to July 8 (20). He undoubtedly hoped to draw Austria over to his side, but during the interval of the armistice the allies succeeded in negotiating with Austria at Reichenbach on July 15 (27) a secret convention by which the Viennese court agreed to declare war on Napoleon if at the conclusion of the armistice he did not agree (1) to place at the disposal of the allies the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, (2) to enlarge Prussia by awarding her a part of the Duchy of Bavaria, ceding Danzig and other fortresses in Prussian dominions occupied by French forces, (3) to return Illyria to Austria, (4) to give up the Hanseatic cities and especially to surrender the coast of northern Germany. Shortly before, June 2 and 3 (14 and 15) a treaty had been drawn up and signed whereby England undertook to pay the allies subsidies for the conduct of the war. Armed with this secret agreement, Metternich was able to draw Napoleon into a congress held at Prague among the three emperors. This congress, however, proved fruitless, as neither side desired peace sufficiently to make the necessary concessions.

By the time the armistice had expired, the allies had completely regrouped their forces. They were now to have three armies, the first operating in Bohemia under Schwartzenburg, the second in Silesia under Blücher, and the third or northern

Army on the lower Elbe under the Crown Prince of Sweden, Karl John. In all, the allies had 492,000 men with 1,383 guns. These forces outnumbered Napoleon's 440,000 men with 1,200 guns.

The campaign opened with a move of Napoleon against the Silesian army. This uncovered his camp at Dresden, against which the allies threw the army of Bohemia. The neighborhood of Dresden was reached on August 13 (25), but there was such vacillation and delay in opening the attack that the favorable moment was allowed to pass. Napoleon, informed of the move, was able to hurry back his main body to protect the city. When the attack was begun on the following morning, it was too late and the attack was repulsed. After a stubborn two-day battle, the allies were forced to suspend the fighting and retire to Bohemia, whither they were pursued by Napoleon. But the latter, taken ill, was not able to push the pursuit. Vandame was not able to use the advantageous position he had taken up on the plateau of Pirn; Murat, St. Cyr, and Marmont failed to coöperate with him. The result was that Vandame was defeated and taken prisoner at Kulm, August 17 and 18 (29 and 30). The result of these successful operations was the conclusion on August 28 (September 9) of a new convention at Teplitz by which each of the allies pledged itself to maintain a force of not less than 150,000 men in the field and not to make a separate peace or fix terms which would ensure such a peace. The allies then moved their forces forward to Leipzig, where they offered battle to Napoleon. Here on September 4, 5, 6, and 7 (N.S. 16, 17, 18, and 19) was fought the "Battle of the Nations." On the fourth day the Russian army forced its way into the city. Napoleon made up his mind to retreat. The whole French army was presently set in motion for the Rhine, and the allied armies followed. The King of Bavaria saved his kingdom by coming into the coalition and declaring war on France. The allied armies entered the imperial city of Frankfurt on October 24 (November 5), which became allied headquarters in preparation for the invasion of France.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1814

On December 20, 1813 (January 1, 1814), the Silesian army under Blücher crossed the Rhine between Mannheim and Coblenz, advanced across Lorraine, and occupied Nancy on January 15 (27). On February 4 (16) the main army of the allies, accompanied by Alexander, left Basel on the upper Rhine and proceeded into French territory. It was billeted that night at the town of Delle, not far from Belfort. The main army was under the nominal command of Schwartzenburg; actually the driving force and the real commander was Alexander, who, in fair weather and foul, read all reports and personally superintended all troop movements.

The opening of hostilities synchronized ironically with the opening of peace negotiations. At Châtillon there assembled toward the end of January representatives of all the allied powers—Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain. At Châtillon all of the monarchs save Alexander were in favor of coming to an understanding with Napoleon; Alexander preferred the arbitrament of the sword. But hardly had the negotiations opened when it was announced that Napoleon had quitted Paris, leaving Marie Louise as regent in his absence. Without waiting to hear the results of the negotiations, Napoleon marched up the Seine and Aube valleys and attacked Blücher at Brienne-le-Château, where his army was disposed in an advanced position covering the main body, and drove him back on Bar-sur-Aube. On January 20 (February 1) Napoleon was attacked and defeated at La Rothière and driven through Arcis-sur-Aube on Troyes. He then retired northward; contact was lost with him, and when Blücher ventured down the Marne in pursuit, he was successively attacked and defeated at Champaubert, Montmirail, Château-Thierry, Vauchamps, and Étoges. Meanwhile Schwartzenburg put the upper Seine between himself and the enemy; indeed, he had secret instructions not to cross to the right bank of the Seine. After the defeat of Blücher the main body fell back on Troyes, where a second conference was held to discuss terms of peace. Alexander refused steadily to be drawn into such discussions. When

Napoleon pressed the allies, they retired, taking the conference with them to Lusigny. But negotiations broke down. At Bar-sur-Aube was held another council of war. Blücher, up till now a sort of advance guard, was given freedom of action which allowed him to operate independently of the main body, which thus became a kind of auxiliary. The conference of ambassadors had moved from Lusigny to Chaumont, where on February 17 (March 1) a treaty was signed by Russia, Austria, England, and Prussia, according to which, in the event of their not being able to come to terms with the French, each undertook to maintain in the field 150,000 men; England, in addition, undertook to pay the other allied powers 25,000,000 pounds sterling as a subsidy for the year 1814.

Napoleon, on occupying Troyes, decided to leave a force under Oudinot and MacDonald to contain Schwartzenburg. He himself moved against Blücher, who had marched down the Marne. But the capture of the fortress of Soissons enabled the Prussians to parry the blow. At Craonne Napoleon inflicted a minor defeat on Blücher on February 23 (March 7), but at Laon in a two days' battle on February 25 and 26 (March 9 and 10) he suffered a reverse; again on March 1 (13) he met Blücher at Reims, this time with slight success. After a three days' sojourn at Reims, Napoleon turned back once more against Schwartzenburg. The latter had been lethargic in his conduct of the fighting in the upper Seine country. True, Oudinot and MacDonald had retired under pressure to Troyes and yielded it under the continuance of this pressure. Schwartzenburg was about to extend his successes to the upper Seine when he heard with alarm of Napoleon's successes on the Marne. His forces were scattered in quarters covering the upper Seine and Aube from Nogent to Brienne-le-Château. It was at this moment that Alexander, at Troyes, received an emissary sent out by Talleyrand from Paris, who conveyed the news that Paris would fall into their hands without difficulty if the allies marched with determination and expedition on the city. On the insistence of Alexander, it was decided to concentrate the allied forces around Troyes, Arcis, and Lesmont. Perhaps it is

not without significance that the conference on "peace aims" at Châtillon came at this time to an abrupt end.

On March 8 (20) Napoleon attacked the main allied position at Arcis. With greatly inferior forces, he was unable to make much impression. The vacillation and hesitation of Schwartzburg again paralyzed the allied armies. When the advance was finally ordered for the second day, Napoleon had managed to move his main body across to the right bank of the Aube. The attack therefore was directed into thin air.

At this moment Napoleon boldly decided to throw himself on the communications of the allies with the Rhine. This intelligence was disclosed in a letter from the Emperor to Marie Louise intercepted by Cossacks and forwarded by Blücher on March 11 (23). At a council of war held under the presidency of Alexander at three o'clock that afternoon at Sompuis, it was announced that Blücher's force had joined the main body and cut communications between the Emperor and his reserves under Marmont and Mortier. Schwartzburg was for retiring to cover their communications. But Alexander, going out to consult his own generals, secured their approval of an instant move on Paris. On returning, his advice, backed up by his own deferential staff, was little less than an ultimatum to his allies, and Schwartzburg was forced to acquiesce. Orders went out to begin the march on the following day, March 13 (25). The force proceeded north, attacked the French line of communication troops at Fère Champenoise, and defeated them, capturing a force of 10,000 men together with General Pacteau and others. On March 17 (29) the allies stood at the gates of Paris to the south of Charenton.

On the morning of March 18 (30) the final battle for the possession of Paris opened. After a long bombardment the Russians stormed and captured all the French positions with the exception of Montmartre. With the threat to Paris coming immediately after the occupation of Bordeaux by Wellington, the government was unmanned and the leaders of the defense lost their heads. Marie Louise fled with the young King of Rome to Blois. That evening Joseph, persuaded of the impossi-

bility of further resistance, followed her, giving the generals permission to open negotiations for surrender. Montmartre, the last of the defenses, fell just at evening to General Langeron. *Pourparlers* opened between Marmont and Orlov. It was agreed that the city would be surrendered and that the troops of defense would retire along the road to Brittany.

The following morning a deputation of Paris citizens appeared before the Russian Emperor and received his promise that he would protect the city from all violence. He agreed to send Nesselrode to Paris to discuss the measures to be taken for the security of the city. The same day March 19 (31) Alexander entered the city—a never-to-be-forgotten occasion. The population, delirious with the prospect of the restoration of peace, gave themselves over to transports of joy and the expression of the most extravagant demonstrations of affection for the youthful monarch who had so captured the imagination of Europe. With cries of "*Vive Alexandre! Vivent les Russes! Vivent les alliés!*" it was more like a triumph than a national humiliation. But everything was forgotten in the eagerness with which they listened to the words of hope and of good will that came from the lips of this guardian angel sent down from Heaven. Truly, it was the greatest day of Alexander's life.

That night the bivouac fires of the Cossacks glowed amid the trees of the Champs Elysées. The allied monarchs were quartered with Talleyrand, who had by a sort of destiny become the stage manager for the final act of the play. Napoleon abdicated on March 30 (April 11), 1814, and the restoration of the Bourbons took place on April 20 (May 3).

The first concrete achievement of the allies was the negotiation with the French government through Talleyrand for a convention. This convention was in the nature of an armistice and provided the indispensable conditions for negotiating peace; the terms were:

1. The allies agreed that France should be left with the boundaries as of the year 1792.
2. They would agree to evacuate these territories progres-

sively as France, without compensation, evacuated her troops from the fortresses held by them outside of France (there were fifty of these); surrendered her guns (1,500 in number), her military supplies, munition factories, and ships (the estimated value of which was 200,000,000 francs).

The definitive Treaty of Paris was concluded on May 18 (30), 1814. According to this:

1. France was restored to the boundaries of 1792, losing about 15,000,000 and gaining about 450,000 population.
2. France retained the works of art seized by Napoleon; no mention was made of their restoration in the treaty.
3. England received Malta but had to restore to France her lost colonies.
4. France agreed to whatever disposition the allies made of the conquests surrendered.
5. A congress was to be summoned to meet at Vienna within two months to settle the affairs of Europe.

With his incurably romantic ideas, Alexander insisted that France be given a liberal constitution. Louis opposed this plan as long as he could, but the insistence of Alexander and the lack of diplomatic support forced him into a compromise. He decided to make the constitution appear as an act of royal grace and not an expression of the general will.

After these arrangements Alexander left Paris, visited England, made the rounds of the European courts, and returned to St. Petersburg in July, where he despatched the necessary business before his departure for Vienna. Leaving Kamennostrov on September 1, Alexander proceeded through Poland, where he visited the Czartoryskis, and reached Vienna September 13 (25), 1814.

The Congress of Vienna revealed to a striking degree the inconsistencies and weaknesses of Alexander's nature. He who had played before Europe the role of liberator, and in conquered France of the champion of liberal ideas, now assumed the role of autocrat. He had already made up his mind to

revive the kingdom of Poland with himself as king and to bestow on Frederick William of Prussia the possessions of the King of Saxony, the one German monarch who had remained faithful to Napoleon. But this meant ignoring the interests of Austria and England, enabling Talleyrand to play a masterful game and divide the allies. So alarmed did they become that Talleyrand was able at last to induce England and Austria to sign a secret convention agreeing to give one another armed support against Russia if Alexander pressed his claims. Even Prussia's ministers were hostile to some of Alexander's claims, but a personal appeal to Frederick William brought Hardenburg around. The earlier antagonism waned as the allies began to realize the danger of quarrelling; but this treaty and the escape of Napoleon from the island of Elba in March, 1815, forced them definitely to close their ranks. Napoleon was able to return almost without opposition to Paris; the King went off in such haste that he forgot to take with him the copy of the secret treaty he had just signed with England and Austria.

Napoleon could not, of course, fail to see the weapon thus put into his hands to enable him to drive a wedge between his enemies and to win Russia to his side. He sent the copy of the treaty by special emissary to Alexander. It was ironical that Alexander should have received a copy of the treaty by special courier from Napoleon at the same time that Napoleon through Hortense was endeavoring to sever Alexander from his erstwhile friends. But either from interest or magnanimity, Alexander, after confronting Metternich with the offending treaty, tore it to shreds and consigned the fragments to the kindly oblivion of the fire that burned on the hearth.

The escape of Napoleon and his overthrow of Bourbon power in Paris forced the estranged allies to compose their quarrels and to close their ranks against the common enemy. On March 13 (25) the eight powers signatories to the Treaty of Paris in a joint pronouncement declared Napoleon "outside of ordinary civil and social relations, an enemy and disturber of the world's peace, and consigned to public vengeance." They

announced also their unalterable determination to maintain the Treaty of Paris by all the means at their command. At the same time, there was concluded between the four powers—Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia—a treaty of alliance based on the Treaty of Chaumont, in which they each pledged themselves to put into the field a force of not less than 150,000 men, and not to give over their efforts till they had rendered Napoleon impotent to disturb the tranquillity of Europe. The final settlement of Europe was then hastily concluded. Saxony surrendered Lusatia and part of Saxony to Prussia; the German confederation came into existence; the Grand Duchy of Warsaw with the exception of Posen was assigned to Russia; Bromberg and Thorn went to Prussia; Cracow became a free city; and the district of Tarnopol and the salt mines of Vilichka went to Austria. Alexander thereupon announced the annexation of Poland to the Russian crown as the Kingdom of Poland and the forthcoming grant of free institutions to her. The final act of the Congress of Vienna was signed on May 28 (June 9), nine days before the Battle of Waterloo.

THE HUNDRED DAYS

On affixing their signatures to the treaty, the monarchs and dignitaries present at Vienna immediately departed, summoned thus unceremoniously to their posts of danger in the coming campaign. Alexander passed through Munich and Stuttgart to fix his headquarters at Heilbronn. It was during his sojourn at the Württemberg capital that he met for the first time the Baroness Juliana Krüdener. The latter had already, through Fräulein Sturdza, made the acquaintance of the Empress Elizabeth Alexeyevna and had expressed a strong desire to meet Alexander. The stay at Heilbronn was a heaven-sent opportunity. From the first she found Alexander a ready listener. She had embraced a form of Lutheran pietism which she longed to spread, particularly among the illustrious. Alexander was already half-disposed, by the trying circumstances through which he had just passed, to regard the world as wormwood and gall, and unconsciously longed

for some religious mysticism as an emotional sheet anchor to windward. From the first he was strangely drawn to the German mystic and her curious religion. He conversed with her at frequent intervals, and she followed him when he departed for Paris.

Meanwhile, Napoleon had moved northward and attacked his enemies, who were already in the field: the British, the Netherlands, and the Prussians. Despite the initial victories that he attained on June 16 at Ligny and Quatre Bras, Blücher and Wellington inflicted a crushing defeat on him two days later at Waterloo and began the pursuit towards Paris. On receipt of the news, Alexander moved his headquarters to Mannheim, from where he would push on to Paris. But Napoleon had abdicated, Paris had surrendered, and Louis XVIII had returned. Thenceforth little remained to do but to make the victory a lasting one.

The first task of Alexander on entering Paris was the drafting of a treaty he had long had in mind which was to bring enduring peace and well-being to a distracted Europe. This was the so-called Holy Alliance, a solemn treaty to be signed by all the Christian monarchs, in which they would pledge themselves for the future to be guided by the principles of the Christian religion, both in their relations with their subjects and in their dealings with one another. All except the Sultan and the Pope were requested to sign; only in the instance of England was a refusal forthcoming, in this case, on constitutional grounds. This manifestation of the new light that had come to Alexander had little effect on European diplomacy other than to move the chancelleries to mirth.

The second treaty of Paris was duly drafted. Alexander stood out against the spoliation of France as a measure of retribution. France was reduced to the frontiers of 1790; was to pay a war indemnity of 700,000,000 francs; was to submit to occupation by allied troops for five years, a period that was to be shortened to three years if France in the meantime maintained inner tranquillity.

Alexander then began his homeward journey, passing

through Brussels, Laon, Vitry, Chaumont, Dijon, Basel, Lindau, Ulm, Nürnberg, Prague, and Berlin. At Kalisch he met the first Polish deputation, and on October 31 (November 12) he entered Warsaw. The Tsar labored to disarm Polish suspicion and to win over prominent Poles. He promised them a restoration of the Polish state with a constitution and an administration of their own, though he was noncommittal on the question of extending it to the boundaries of the old Polish-Lithuanian state. As viceroy he named an old crippled general of the Napoleonic wars, General Zaionchek, to the keen disappointment of Adam Czartoryski, who had confidently looked forward to receiving this honor. Alexander returned to St. Petersburg on December 2 (14), 1815.

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THE DAYS OF PEACE

ONE would have supposed that the return to peace in 1815 would have opened to Alexander a new vista of boundless opportunities of reform. Certainly that was what the contemporary world expected of him. The astonishment of society knew no bounds on reading the manifesto of the Emperor on January 1, 1816. France, Paris, and Napoleon were denounced in terms of unmeasured hostility as disturbers of the general peace and as the object of divine retribution. The very Emperor who had shown such sympathy with France and had toyed with the principles of the revolution, now found Paris nothing but a "den of rebels," Napoleon an object of divine wrath. And the Russian people were summoned to a state of humility, recognizing the hand of God, who would not hesitate to visit on them the same woes that had overtaken France if they should ever choose the same path as that blind and perverse nation.

Other events indicated that the Emperor's life had taken a decisive turn in another direction. The reinstatement of Arakcheyev, the appointment of Golitsyn as minister of ecclesiastical affairs and of popular education, the foundation of the Russian Bible Society, presaged little in the way of reform. The coming of peace at least called for efforts to heal the wounds of war, and from these obligations the Emperor could not well hold himself aloof. But it was to plans interrupted by the upheavals of war that Alexander returned as soon as peace gave him the leisure to consider them.

The Emperor had for some time been entertaining a project, interest in which had been aroused by the perusal of an article

written by a Frenchman, General Servin, "*Sur les forces frontières des états.*" This was a scheme for the establishment of "military colonies," permanent settlements of soldiers with their families where they would combine farming with military training. For this purpose an area of crown lands occupied by peasants would be set aside for the perpetual maintenance of special regiments. Peasants already enrolled in that area and doing service in other units would be transferred and enlisted in the local unit. For the future the male population, as obligations to military service fell on it, would be embodied in the local unit and would do its service at home. The children would be given a special uniform and training, to prepare them for their years of service. At the completion of their term, they would be mustered out and would form part of the civilian population of the settlement. The peasants were removed from police control and put entirely under military control. They were likewise freed from all state and local taxes, and from the obligation to military service except in their own area. The idea seems to have been that of the Emperor alone; his chief seconder in the undertaking and the instrument Alexander used in installing them was Arakcheyev. Though the latter had at first been cold to the idea, he apparently was won over and threw himself with characteristic ardor into a task which gave him scope for the exercise of his administrative powers. The scheme never had any legislative sanction but was merely an administrative measure. It was pressed so zealously that in 1825 there were ninety battalions in the Novgorod area and thirty-six battalions and 249 squadrons in the regions of Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, and Kherson.

The Emperor had purposed to combine motives of economy of state revenues with those of improving the lot of the peasants and tempering for them the severities of military service. But in this he was disappointed. As one contemporary wrote: ¹

The idea of the Emperor was a mistaken one, not only in a political but in an economic sense, since the saving achieved in the maintenance of the army did not compensate for the loss the state was bound to incur

¹ N. K. Shilder, *Imperator Aleksandr Pervyi*. Tom IV, p. 29. (Author's translation.)

in the immunity from taxes and other state imposts conferred on these settlements; and only in the false accounts of Arakcheyev was it possible to show profits where in reality there was nothing but loss. Instead of alleviating their military burdens, a population brought, one and all, under the yoke of military service as it was then, was sure to experience at the hands of Arakcheyev the rigorous regulations for training recruits, rendered intolerable by incessant marching in goose-step in winter. The outbreaks with which they protested against these were suppressed with Arakcheyev's characteristic ruthlessness which we contemporaries witnessed and which was revealed to the world in course of time.

A second matter to which Alexander gave the closest attention was the organization of the new Polish state and the drafting of the Polish constitution. One of the things which Alexander had decided before his arrival in Vienna was that Poland should be reconstituted under a Russian sovereign. For that purpose it was necessary to deprive Prussia of the territory of Great Poland (the district around Warsaw), leaving her West Prussia and Posen; for this loss Prussia was to be compensated at the expense of the Kingdom of Saxony. On November 27, on his way back from Vienna, the Emperor proclaimed a new constitution for the state. According to this charter Poland was to have a central legislative body of two houses, a senate and a chamber of deputies—the former representing the upper nobility, the latter, the lesser nobility and the burghers. Initiative rested with a state council; an inner circle of the ministers was to have an imperial representative on its membership, so that the Russian government always kept its hand on the tiller. A measure of autonomy in the local government and justice were assigned to the provinces and the palatinates. Fundamental rights, freedom of speech, guarantee of property rights, and the right to use the Polish language were assured.

The Polish army—part of it the creation of Napoleon himself—had already been called into existence during the wars. But even before the constitution had received the final touch, Alexander had, through his brother Constantine, organized the Polish forces, which he proposed to use in case of a break with England and Austria. After 1815 its organization was put

under the control of the Grand Duke, and the disabled General Zaionchek was appointed viceroy. Alexander used every effort to engage the loyalty and enthusiastic support of the Poles, appearing when in Poland in Polish uniform, the order of the White Eagle on his breast. In March, 1817, the Emperor opened the first meeting of the Diet in the Senate Hall. On this occasion he used the memorable words, "You (by your actions) will show me whether, faithful to my resolutions, I can extend still further what I have done for you."

These words roused the most ardent hopes in Russia that she might look forward herself to a constitutional regime. In general the occasion brought little satisfaction to those Russians who accompanied Alexander to Warsaw; to them it was an abasement of national pride that the Poles were receiving what was denied to them. The Poles, on the other hand, regarded the honeymoon wooing of Alexander as evidence of their superiority to their Russian masters. The seeds of mutual distrust and hostility were thus sown plentifully.

As the wars receded into the background, the hitherto unclouded political sky began to darken. In 1817 the Wartburg celebrations in honor of the three hundredth anniversary of the beginning of Protestantism led to serious disturbances among the German students; and two years later came the murder of Kotzebue at the hands of the students of Jena. Southern Europe was ablaze with revolt; everywhere secret societies seemed to threaten the very foundations of society. To meet this threat, Metternich put through the German Diet the famous Carlsbad Decrees designed to put Germany in an intellectual strait-jacket. The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle called at the instance of France in 1818 was the last of the love-feasts; thenceforth the congresses were to be called only for the repression of revolts.

The revolts in Piedmont, in Naples, in Greece, called into action the system of alliance which had been created by Alexander. At Troppau in Bohemia in 1820 Alexander attended a congress to consider what action should be taken with reference to the outbreak in Naples, as a result of which Ferdinand

had been forced to grant a constitution. The congress opened in October. Immediately Metternich succeeded in establishing confidential and cordial relations with the Russian Emperor. Alexander's faith in the beneficent influence of liberal ideas had been rudely shaken by the events of the past few years. Perhaps his mysticism had also bred in him a distrust in man's ability to raise himself from the mire. But to complete the transformation, early in November, Alexander received word of an outbreak in the Semenevskii regiment of guards. The commander of the corps of guards, Vasil'chikov, reported that the regiment had been disarmed and confined to the prison of Peter and Paul, while the commanding officer Schwartz, who was the occasion of the mutiny, had been brought up for trial before a court martial. There was little to give the mutiny a political character. It was primarily due to discontent with conditions within the regiment itself. Nevertheless Alexander at once suspected political forces behind it, and his agitation over this incident merely propelled him further along the road to reaction which he had taken.

The Congress of Troppau resolved not to treat with the revolutionary government of Naples but to invite Ferdinand to appear before them at Laibach. Here Austrian intervention was decided on; Ferdinand gave his consent. Ferdinand was thereupon restored to his capital as an absolute king but at the point of Austrian bayonets. Meanwhile Alexander Ypsilanti had raised the standard of revolt in Bessarabia and had given the signal for a revolt of the Greeks in the Morea and the Archipelago. This spontaneous national rising of one of the Balkan peoples against their oppressors had little in common with the political upheavals in western Europe. But the monarchs had learned to tremble at the mention of *Carbonari*, *Tugendbünde*, and other secret societies, so that it was a simple matter for Metternich to persuade the Russian Tsar that the Greek rising was of a revolutionary nature and that the *Hetairiai* were but *Carbonari* in a Balkan setting. The first result was that Alexander was induced to turn a deaf ear to the Greek appeal. This meant that he had to sac-

rifice Capodistrias, who had striven to win Alexander to the Greek cause. The Corfiriote was dismissed and left Russia for Geneva, where he devoted himself to the emancipation of his people from Turkish rule.

Meanwhile the revolt in Spain had run its course. King Ferdinand had here been compelled to revive the constitution of 1812. These alarming events led to the calling of a new congress to meet in Verona in the autumn of 1822. The Congress of Verona, summoned ostensibly to consider the Greek case, was occupied almost exclusively with Spain. France, her interests now engaged in the Iberian peninsula, and her chief minister, the duc de Richelieu, supported the case for intervention. Metternich and Alexander ardently seconded France, while Prussia gave an obsequious acquiescence. But England, whose restiveness at being dragged along by her allies had already been apparent at Troppau and Laibach, now broke completely with her former allies and under Canning struck out on a bold new course that was destined to alter the whole diplomatic situation. The other powers persisted in their policy of intervention which succeeded in Spain. But the Quadruple Alliance was split; and though the Holy Alliance continued to live on as polite fiction, the European concert of which it was the expression was shattered.

In Russia itself events were disquieting enough for Alexander. In 1819 he seemed to have had the first premonition that he was not destined to have a long life. Becoming convinced that Constantine wished to renounce his rights to the throne, he first mentioned the succession in an ambiguous way to Nicholas and his consort during the summer of 1819. The matter was advanced another stage when on March 20 (April 1), 1820, the marriage between Constantine Pavlovich and the Princess Anna Fedorovna was dissolved. The Princess had left Russia in 1801 and had never returned. The edict of dissolution further defined the rights and precedence that should be accorded the spouse of a member of the imperial family in case she should not be of rank equal to her husband. Society

had not long to wonder at the occasion that had called forth this edict, for on May 12 (24) Constantine celebrated his marriage with the Princess Joanna Grudzinskaya. An imperial edict conferred on her the title of Princess Lovich and announced that she was entitled to be addressed in Russia as



Brown Brothers.

USPENSKII CATHEDRAL, MOSCOW.

"Her Serene Highness." Two years later in January, 1822, Constantine formally renounced his rights to the throne. A manifesto was drawn up and executed by Alexander, naming Nicholas as heir to the throne. The manifesto was then entrusted to the Metropolitan of Moscow, Philaret, to be deposited in the shrine of the altar of the Uspenskii Cathedral, where other secret imperial documents were preserved. Apparently

only Philaret and Arakcheyev were in the secret, and a mere handful of witnesses attended when the document found its resting place. But what is of more consequence, it seems that nothing was done to apprise Nicholas of what had taken place.

A new shadow seemed to creep into Alexander's life when he became aware of the existence and activity of radical groups in the state. These were the secret societies which had spread from western Europe to Russia. The earliest of these, the Masonic Order, had been introduced in the reign of Catherine and had won adherents in such numbers that the government had become alarmed and had suppressed it. It is questionable whether it actually had a subversive tendency. But the French Revolution with its Jacobin, its Girondin, and Cordelier Clubs had revived the vogue of the secret society, which had been further encouraged by the accession of a new monarch predisposed in favor of liberal ideas and constitutional reforms. But perhaps what gave this trend a new importance was the contact with western Europe, and especially France, that came with the wars in which the Russian army took part in the years from 1805 to 1815.

THE EASTERN QUESTION

Russia's wars with the Ottoman Porte were but the culmination of her long feud with the steppe dwellers. Ivan III had broken the Golden Horde; Ivan the Terrible had seized Kazan and Astrakhan for Russia and opened the way to the Caspian. After a lull of more than a century, Russia under Peter had resumed the march to the south, had annexed Azov, and had sought though without success to extend the Russian frontier to the Danube. The Treaty of Pruth (1711) brought Peter's efforts to an unlucky close. It was left to Anne to seek satisfaction in the Turkish war, 1735-1739, which gave Russia little to compensate her for her immense efforts and losses. Under Catherine Russia had her final reckoning with the Tartars when the Crimea was secured. Catherine had also taken, by the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji (1774), the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Porte under her protection; at the same

time, Russia's western frontier was advanced to the Dniester. She thus acquired an extensive frontage on the Black Sea.

But the Empress Catherine was not content with these substantial achievements. Her imagination was fired by the idea of creating a Hellenic state ruled by a scion of the Russian imperial house, as well as a Dacian appanage formed from the Danubian principalities for her favorite Potemkin. These pretensions by the Empress assumed the dissolution of both the Polish and the Turkish states, a fate that overtook Poland and that was only narrowly averted by Turkey.

The Treaty of Jassy that ended the second Turkish war in 1791 brought no peace to the world. The French Revolution had let loose the dogs of war. In the game between Napoleon and his enemies, Turkey and Poland were but pawns. The seizure of Malta and Egypt in 1798 by Napoleon moved the Emperor Paul to come to terms with Turkey and England, and to enter the second coalition. An alliance was concluded in 1799. In concert with England, the Ionian Islands were occupied to ensure the Muscovite power a foothold on the Adriatic. But this alliance with the Turk was an affront to Russian religious susceptibilities, and England's seizure of Malta gave Paul a pretext for reversing his former policy and reverting to the old scheme of partitioning the Turkish Empire.

The death of Paul and the accession of Alexander seemed to promise a new deal in foreign affairs. The army of Cossacks that had reached the Volga on its way to invade India was recalled. But while Alexander for the moment gave up the francophile policy of Paul, he clung to the advantages that Paul had gained—the exclusive right of Russian war vessels to pass the Straits and have access to Turkish harbors. With the peace of Amiens in 1802 the project of partition was laid away. But the feverish diplomatic activity that revived with the renewal of the war in 1803 of necessity involved the Turkish empire in the struggle. In the project of Czartoryski for the reconstitution of Poland, compensation for various powers was to be found in Germany or Turkey. The alliance with England and the formation of the third coalition in 1805 reasserted

Russia's privileged position in the east, but the Battle of Austerlitz involved the diplomatic situation in uncertainty. Though Czartoryski still held the field, consistency and resolution was hardly to be looked for in the discouraged Alexander. The air was thick with the intrigues of Russia with Prussia and of Prussia with France. Austria had been eliminated from the picture while England was too far away. Eventually Russia, through Oubril, signed a treaty with Napoleon surrendering Russia's possessions on the Adriatic coast to France and joining with Napoleon in guaranteeing the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Porte. But England refused to surrender Sicily to the King of Italy; Prussia was chagrined by the offer of Hanover to England; Russia, refusing to ratify Oubril's treaty, rallied to the support of Prussia. Thus was laid the foundation of the fourth coalition. The campaign that followed led to the humiliation of Prussia, the campaign of the winter of 1806 and 1807, the Battle of Eylau and Friedland, and the peace of Tilsit, 1807. Concessions were wrung from Alexander by the prospect held out before him of dividing the Ottoman Empire. He was thus lured into the Turkish war of 1806-1812 to be concluded only on the eve of the French invasion.

The Treaty of Bucharest negotiated by Kutuzov in 1812 determined Russo-Turkish relations for the next twenty years. Article IV established the new boundary along the Pruth to its confluence with the Danube and along the Kilya branch of that river to the sea. The rest of Moldavia and Wallachia were to be evacuated by the Russian troops. All fortifications, cities, and other settlements were to be restored to the Turks in the same condition as they had been during times of peace. All treaties and conventions guaranteeing the privileges of the principalities were confirmed as they had been in the Treaty of Jassy. Turkey remitted arrears of taxes and undertook to leave the principalities free from taxes for two years. Hospodars of Greek or Rumanian nationality were to be named for four years and could be removed only with the consent of Russia. No troops except garrisons of fortresses were to be maintained in the principalities. Christians were secured by Russia's guar-

antee from arbitrary excesses of Moslem officials. Article VI provided for the maintenance of all frontiers as fixed by the treaty; everything acquired by conquest should be restored, though Russia refused to return Mingrelia, Georgia, and Schugarel on the ground that they had surrendered voluntarily.

Negotiations with Persia which had advanced *pari passu* were concluded at Gulistan on October 12 (24), 1813. The Khanates of Karabeg, Ganshin, Schekin, Schirwan, Derbend, Kuban, Baku, and Talischan were surrendered by Persia. Russian sovereignty was also recognized over Daghestan, Georgia, Schugarel, Imeritia, Mingrelia, and Ab Khasia. The Russian frontier thus followed in the main the River Kur, but was advanced beyond the lower Aras to reach the Caspian Sea at Astara. Russia received the right to maintain a fleet on the Caspian. In the western Balkans the Ottoman Porte undertook to respect the rights of the Serbians to receive some measure of self-government, and agreed to allow them to collect their own taxes and transmit them to the Turkish government.

During the uncertainties of the War of Liberation, and the Hundred Days, the allies had many anxious moments as to the course Turkey would pursue. Napoleon's sudden collapse checked the bellicose tendencies of the Sultan. Turkey, though restive, remained passive, but Russia thought it well to hint at a possible adjustment of frontier difficulties according to the terms of the Treaty of Bucharest. In November, 1815, the Ionian Islands passed from the double sovereignty of Turkey and Russia to complete independence under the guarantee of Great Britain.

But the settlement at Vienna was peculiarly galling to Moslem pride. While the Christian sovereigns were secured in their possessions, the Sultan was deprived of lands that had for centuries been in Turkish possession. Anti-Christian outbreaks occurred in the capital which no efforts could repress. Fulfilment of peace terms could not be enforced. This unfortunate condition lasted to the summer of 1821.

This was an eventful year in post-war Europe. The Neapolitan revolt of 1820 had darkened the diplomatic horizon, and

Metternich had sought to lay the storm by summoning a congress of the powers to meet at Troppau. It was adjourned to Laibach, where it met in January, 1821. In March a rising broke out in Moldavia directed by Alexander Ypsilanti, Michael Suzzo, and other agents of the Russian government. Alexander hastened to disavow responsibility for the revolt, but his disavowal came too late, and Constantinople was swept by a frenzy of religious hatred which ended in the most horrible excesses. The disorders that raged unchecked were probably secretly condoned by the government and inevitably brought a rupture of diplomatic relations. On August 10 Stroganov left Constantinople.

But in spite of the war fever of Russia, Alexander proceeded with caution, for at this crucial moment a formidable revolutionary conspiracy was uncovered at home. Alarmed lest he appear as the champion of a rebellious people in arms against their legitimate sovereign, the Tsar assumed the role of guarantor of public law and order, and on Metternich's insistence he dissociated himself from the cause of Greece. A congress was called in 1822; Verona was finally chosen as the place of meeting. Greece and its relation to Turkey were to be the subject of discussion.

But events in Spain had already outstripped the leisurely official deliberations. The cause of the Greek rebels was lost and the Greek problem was shelved until the fall of 1823. Alexander pressed for another conference on Greece in St. Petersburg, but the Porte took matters in its own hands and concluded with Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, arrangements for the pacification of Greece (February 26, 1825). It was afterwards alleged that part of the bargain was that the Egyptian Pasha was to have the areas he succeeded in conquering, and that he planned to uproot the native Greek population in the conquered areas and to replace them with Egyptians. Moreover, the Hellenic cause had enlisted the support of public opinion in the countries of western Europe, and there rallied to the defense of Greece a small and cosmopolitan band of enthusiasts, who pledged not only their fortunes and services, but

even their lives in her behalf. Among this devoted band was the English poet, Byron, whose arrival in Greece achieved more for Greek liberty than all the notes that had heretofore passed between the chancelleries. The Congress of representatives of the powers met at St. Petersburg in June 1825 to solve the Greek problem. Their deliberations began June 5 (17), 1825. Meantime Canning's victory in the House of Commons for the recognition of the independence of the Spanish colonies had severed the ties that bound England to her allies. The Congress adjourned without having achieved its object, and Alexander apparently had made up his mind to drive forward independently of his allies. But his sudden death at Taganrog brought his plans to naught.

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NICHOLAS I

THE DECEMBRISTS

IN 1817 there met in St. Petersburg a small group of officers and ex-officers who had served in the campaigns against Napoleon. Out of this gathering there grew the so-called Union of Welfare, whose most prominent members were Sergei and Matvei Muravyev-Apostol, Yakushkin and Nikita Muravyev. Later Prince Trubetskoi and Pavel Pestel were included in its membership. A rather elaborate constitution and a tentative political program were drawn up. As officers were transferred from post to post, the organization was spread to the most distant parts of the country. In 1821 the abrupt change in Alexander's foreign and domestic policy occasioned a reorganization of the group, which changed its name to "Union of Happiness." The more moderate members dropped out, and the movement took on a definitely political if not subversive character. From 1821 to 1824 it spread into the south and the southeast, even to the distant Caucasus; the northern branches were grouped roughly to form the northern *okrug*; the southern into the southern *okrug* based on Kiev. But though the work in St. Petersburg and the northern society languished, in the south, thanks to the energy and initiative of Pestel, it thrived. In 1824, in an effort to rekindle interest in St. Petersburg, and to enlist the members there in an attempt at revolution, Pestel visited the capital. But his efforts were of no avail, and this failure led the society to postpone action until the year 1826. This was the state of affairs when the sudden death of Alexander at Tagan-

rog on November 19, 1825, precipitated events and forced the conspirators into action.

The death of Alexander presented the conspirators with an unexpected opportunity. In the first place an *interregnum* of some weeks ensued owing to the fact that, though Constantine had in 1822 renounced his claim to the throne, this fact was not generally known, and the authorities had had the garrison



Brown Brothers.

NICHOLAS I

of the capital take the oath of allegiance to Constantine as heir-apparent, at the time living in Warsaw as commander of the Polish army. The despatch of couriers to Warsaw and the return of Constantine's message declining the throne occupied some weeks, so that it was not until December 14 that the second swearing in of the troops could take place. This delay enabled the conspirators to act. They resolved on the morning of the 14th, if possible, to dissuade the troops from taking the oath, to lead them to some central point, and to seize the government.

The officers scattered to their regiments to raise the garrison. Led off by Ryleyev and his company of the Moscow regiment, various units of the garrison were induced to refuse allegiance to Nicholas and to march on the Senate Square, where they were drawn up to be ready for action.

The absence of a leader paralyzed the rising. While the infantry stood in serried ranks in the Senate Square, Nicholas was not idle, but was moving up the loyal troops from all parts of the capital. The artillery, having remained faithful to the government, was concentrated on the streets opening onto the Senate Square. But though the troops remained inactive and all but leaderless, they were in a sullen mood. Miloradovich, the commander of the St. Petersburg garrison, approached too closely to harangue them and was shot down by the mutineers. Finally, as the afternoon merged into the half-darkness of an early winter evening, Nicholas resolved that a blow must be struck before nightfall. The guns were moved up and unlimbered for action. The first volley thundered harmlessly over the heads of the rebels; but with the second, the muzzles were lowered and the shells tore great gaps in the ranks of the soldiers and threw them into confusion. There was no protection against the shower of steel. The human mass began to surge back and forth in an effort to escape the flying fragments. The ranks broke. The streets leading from the square were blocked by the loyal troops; only one avenue of escape remained, that across the river. The fugitives therefore rushed towards the embankment and flung themselves over its parapet down to the ice that covered the Neva. But the guns, trained on the river, broke up the ice, and the sullen waters closed silently over both the living and the dead. Patrols scoured the city throughout the winter night and rounded up the fugitives. The dead were picked up and thrown into the Neva. So indiscriminately was the work of clearing the streets carried out that, it was said, the severely wounded were in many cases confused with the dead and found a like resting place. By morning the quiet of death reigned in the capital.

In the south the movement suffered from the lack of a center

from which to dominate the country. Suspicion, too, had lighted on Pestel; on the morning of December 13, General Diebitsch issued orders for his apprehension. But two gallant souls, Sergei Muravyev-Apostol and Bestuzhev-Ryumin, made every effort to make good this loss and prevent the collapse of the movement. They managed to secure the barracks at Vasylkov and marched from there with the troops to Masnovyluvka and Kologi, gathering reinforcements as they advanced. But at Kovaluvka the loyal troops met and scattered their columns. Muravyev-Apostol and others were made prisoners and by January 3 the revolt had been stamped out.

Interrogation of the prisoners soon disclosed the wide ramifications of the conspiracy. Nicholas thereupon decided to appoint a commission to conduct a searching investigation. Its report was submitted in June. At once a special court was constituted before which the accused were to be brought to trial. Nicholas personally assisted in the investigation and the trial. On more than one occasion he intervened, visiting the unfortunate accused in prison, listening to their appeals on behalf of themselves or their families, and pressing them for frank and full confessions. Promises of an amnesty may not have been given but hopes undoubtedly were held out; the emotional atmosphere thus created strikes one as out of keeping with the harshness of the sentences and the rigor with which they were carried out. Five of the conspirators were sentenced to death—Pestel, Ryleyev, Kakhovskii, Sergei Muravyev-Apostol, and Michael Bestuzhev-Ryumin. The penalty of being quartered was commuted to death by hanging. Most of the other leaders were imprisoned in European Russia or exiled to Siberia. Not until the accession of the Emperor Alexander II in 1855 were the survivors amnestied and allowed to return to their homes. The reign of Nicholas lay under the shadow of the Decembrist Rising.


The revolt, which shook the empire to its foundation, was no less significant for Poland. Alexander had labored to restore the republic to the boundaries of 1772. In this he had failed, but he had sought to reconcile the Poles to the loss of inde-

pendence by bestowing on them a constitution and encouraging their political activity. But he failed to ensure their loyal coöperation with the Russian officials. Moreover, the development of their economic and cultural life served but to revive their hopes of independence. By 1820 Alexander's ardor for reform had definitely cooled. The gulf between the Emperor and the Polish nationalists steadily widened. In 1822 a widespread conspiracy that embraced Poles of the highest station was unearthed. The leaders were arrested and its organization paralyzed. As a result, Alexander failed to summon the Diet during the years 1823 and 1824. In a last-minute effort made to reconcile the still loyal element in Poland, it was decided to summon the Diet for May, 1825. Alexander attended in person and delivered the opening address. But two months later, discovery of a second conspiracy led to new arrests and a new investigation on the eve of the rising in St. Petersburg. The Decembrist Rising sealed the fate of Poland and the Polish constitution, for the new monarch had little sympathy with national aspirations, and the unfortunate synchronization of the two outbreaks could but involve the Poles in the general repression of all popular movements.

FOREIGN POLICY

It was a grim heritage that Alexander left to his youthful brother when he passed away on November 19 (December 1), 1825. The events on the Senate Square on December 14 abundantly demonstrated the need for internal reform. To this task Nicholas addressed himself in all seriousness at the opening of his reign. The reports of the commission appointed to interrogate the Decembrists were carefully scrutinized by the monarch. The rising itself produced, of dire necessity, one notable change: the creation of a special department of police affairs. The loose system of espionage of Arakcheyev on which Alexander had relied had quite broken down, as was revealed by the government's failure to penetrate the secrecy that veiled the preparations for the Decembrist Rising. A secret police force was also organized in the chan-

cellery of the Emperor. All citizens were required to co-operate in unmasking fraud and misconduct among the officials; even in the government departments, colleague was invited to spy upon colleague.



MAP OF THE BALKANS, SHOWING THE THEATERS OF WAR, 1828-29 AND 1877-78.

A commission was also appointed, consisting of Victor Pavlovich Kochubei, General P. A. Tolstoi, General Adjutant Vasilchikov, Prince G. A. Golitsyn, Baron Diebitsch, A. B. Ludev, D. V. Dashkov and Baron Modeste Korff, to examine the various projects of reform found among the papers in the

desk of the late Emperor. Though many of these were given consideration, one only was carried through successfully to completion. This was the new code of laws drawn up under the direction of Speranskii and published in 1833.

But schemes of reform were inevitably lost in the preoccupation over the tangled diplomatic situation. Alexander unquestionably had entertained the idea of intervention in the Balkans either with or without the approval of the other powers. The obsequies of the late Emperor, to which representatives were sent by the various governments, provided an occasion to sound them out relative to an alliance. On March 23 (April 4) a protocol was signed by Wellington and Nesselrode by which England and Russia agreed on a policy with regard to Greece, which it was hoped would render the lot of the Greeks as subjects of the Ottoman Porte at least tolerable. Russia and Great Britain were to coöperate in reaching a settlement of the Greek question on the basis of the agreement arrived at between Stratford Canning and the Greek delegates. Should the Porte reject their mediation, they would concert measures together or act separately to secure its acceptance. Nicholas refused to give any written undertaking to respect Turkish territorial integrity, though he gave a verbal promise not to occupy or hold a single Turkish village.

While negotiations were going on with Wellington, an ultimatum had been despatched to Constantinople demanding evacuation by Turkey of the Danubian principalities, the release of certain Serbian deputies, and the immediate despatch of plenipotentiaries to the frontier to negotiate peace. The ultimatum arrived at a time when the destruction of the military force of the Janissaries left Turkey prostrate at the feet of her enemies. Despite the favorable turn of events in Greece, the Sultan had no alternative to compliance. On August 6 negotiations opened at Akkerman and culminated in the Convention of Akkerman. Nicholas was not so successful in his relations with Persia. The Treaty of Gulistan, 1813, had left Russia in possession of some of her most valued provinces. The policy of russification pursued in these frontier regions

wounded Oriental susceptibilities—while Russian intrigues at Teheran exasperated the Persian court. Finally in 1826 the Russian embassy under Menshikov was expelled from Teheran and left to find its way back to the frontier as best it could. Russian detachments were cut off. Frontier posts had to be evacuated. Nicholas accepted the Persian challenge. Paskievich was named to lead a formidable field army, though supreme command was vested in Yermolov. Paskievich assumed the offensive and despite terrific odds succeeded in defeating the Persians before Elizavetpol. A reconnaissance in force across the Aras was undertaken, but it could not, because of inadequate forces, be extended as far as Tabriz. Friction developed at headquarters, and Nicholas, after trying to arrange a compromise, decided to supersede Yermolov by Paskievich as commander-in-chief.

Paskievich, now in supreme command, and with a staff of his own selection, made his dispositions for the coming campaign. Crossing the Upper Aras, he laid siege to Abbas Abad. On the approach of an army of relief, he marched out and gave battle at Dshewan-Bulat, where he won an overwhelming victory. Pushing on, he took Sardar Abad and finally met the forces of Abbas Mirza under the walls of Erivan, where he defeated them, occupying the city on October 3, 1827. The Persians, relying on English aid, refused to come to terms. Paskievich had to undertake a winter campaign before he could bring Persia to her knees. Peace was concluded February 10 (22), 1828, at Turkmenschai. Russia received the Persian provinces of Erivan and Nakhichevan, the return of the Khanate of Talischin, and a war indemnity. The request of the province of Azerbaidjan to be taken under Russia's protection was refused as a transgression of the principle of legitimacy.

The convention of April 4, 1826, between England and Russia was regarded by both parties as merely preliminary to a general settlement of the whole Greek problem; Canning looked on it as a means of preventing isolated action on the part of Russia. Nicholas, on the other hand, thought it the first

step towards securing European endorsement of Russian intervention in Greek affairs. Both powers proposed to associate the European states with the protocol, especially since it was provided that England and Russia should impose an armistice between the Turks and the Greeks. The acceptance of Russian terms and the negotiation of the Convention of Akkerman eased the situation. On November 22 Canning felt it was imperative to submit the terms of the protocol to France and secure her adherence. This presented no difficulty, though Villele insisted on a new treaty to be signed by the three powers as equals. Final agreement had not been reached when Lord Liverpool was struck down with paralysis and Canning succeeded him as prime minister at the head of a coalition government. This meant delay. It was not until July 6, 1827, that the Treaty of London was finally concluded. The terms provided for an immediate armistice between the Turks and Greeks, placed Greece under Turkish suzerainty, imposed a fixed annual tribute on her, but gave her autonomy subject to some measure of control by the Turks. A secret article pledged the contracting powers to take the following steps: (1) to accredit consular agents to Greece, if either Greeks or Turks did not accept the armistice; (2) to intervene between the two contending parties in order to prevent all collision between them. Steps were at once taken to concentrate the allied fleets in the Mediterranean (Admiral Codrington already lay off Smyrna). But the inevitable delay involved in securing the concerted action of the allied fleets allowed Ibrahim Pasha to reinforce his troops in the Morea, and the time limit imposed by the allied ultimatum had already expired when the allied commanders had their first interview with the Egyptian commander at Navarino to convey a warning that they would prevent by force any further hostilities at sea. With the arrival of the Russian fleet on October 14, the blockade was complete and the admirals prepared to end the truculent obstinacy of the Egyptian leader. Ibrahim, with fine contempt for the ultimatum, had gone off to resume on land the hostilities interrupted at sea. On October 20 the combined

naval forces of the allies entered the Bay of Navarino and engaged the Turko-Egyptian vessels which lay at anchor in the harbor. Within four hours the fleet of Ibrahim had ceased to exist as a fighting force, a mere handful of ships escaping the universal destruction.

The effect of Navarino was shattering. In England the news was received with dismay by Wellington, whom Canning's death had left to direct England's destiny. In Constantinople the wrath of the government and of the people knew no bounds. The Sultan still counted on dividing his opponents, and would not accept the armistice proposed. He refused to receive the ambassadors of the powers, yet stubbornly refused to give them their passports. At length in December they left the Turkish capital and made their several and perilous ways to Korfu in the Ionian Sea.

It was not difficult to discern that, behind the façade of the European concert, it was Russia against whom the Turks must defend themselves. Russia speeded up her preparations for war. Events in western Europe played into her hands: Wellington was preoccupied with home affairs and could do nothing abroad; in France, La Ferronnays, the new minister of foreign affairs, was prepared to support Nicholas in the east. The latter's first care was to occupy the Danubian principalities, which the Turks evacuated without a shot being fired. The Russian field army was concentrated on the lower Pruth, where the frontier was crossed on May 19, 1828, and the main body directed against the fortresses on the lower Danube, which barred the way to the Dobrudja. Braila was seized and a bridge built across the Danube. By June 13 the chief fortresses on the lower Danube had been secured. The army set out for Trajan's Wall, which marked the southern limit of the Dobrudja. It was reached on the 18th. From this point the course of the Danube made a sharp bend to the west, and therefore, the river having ceased to protect their right flank, the Russians were compelled to detach a force to mask the fortress of Silistria, which lay some fifty miles to the west. Varna was blockaded by sea and land, and the main body pushed on to

Shumla, commanding the main pass across the Balkans. But the forces of the Russians were quite inadequate for these divided operations. The Tsar entertained for a moment the idea of using Polish forces to guard the right flank, but when Constantine demurred, the scheme was dropped. Eventually the dispersion of forces led to inevitable reverses before Shumla and Varna. Disaster threatened the Russians, for cholera had raised its ghastly head in the camps at Varna. But a feud among the senior Turkish officers of the garrison led to the surrender of a considerable number of troops, though the remainder, under a redoubtable leader, Izzet Mehemet, withdrew to the citadel, which he threatened to blow up. Though disarmed, they were allowed to withdraw with the honors of war. The captor made his entry on October 13. Thereupon the Russian troops went into winter quarters.

While results in the European provinces of Turkey were disappointing, in Asia, Paskievich, unhampered by the presence of the Emperor and divided authority, had achieved brilliant results. After taking measures to secure the Russian frontier against surprise, he moved his field army to Goumri preparatory to an advance on Kars. The city was entered on July 1 after a fierce battle on the hills surrounding the town. The citadel thereupon fell into the hands of the Russians. Leaving a force under General Bergman to garrison Kars, Paskievich turned north, stormed Akhalkalaki, and then turned west towards Akhaltsikh, under whose walls he engaged a formidable Turkish force under two Turkish generals, Kies and Mustapha, and won a resounding victory, the survivors taking refuge in the fortress. Menaced by failing supplies, Paskievich stormed the city on August 28 and received the surrender of the citadel—the last stronghold of resistance—on the morning of the 29th.

Nicholas proposed to do during 1829 what he had not succeeded in accomplishing in 1828. The Russian government was put to some pains to forestall intervention by the other European states. France had landed an army in Greece and occupied the Morea. But neither England nor France was

in a position internally to use force to hold Russia in check. The ambassadors of the three powers agreed tentatively, on December 22, that the northern frontier of the new Greece should extend from the Gulf of Volos on the east to the Gulf of Arta in the west, including Euboea and the Cyclades (except Samos and Candia); that the government should be a monarchy; and that Greece should pay a tribute (annual) of 1,500,000 *piasters* and reimburse Turkish owners for their property which was to be expropriated. This program was to be presented on behalf of the three allies by the ambassadors of England and France, who were to return to Constantinople; the Greeks were also to be warned to withdraw their troops south of the tentative boundary thus assigned them. Nicholas, therefore, had succeeded in maintaining his shaky alliance and his own position as executor of the mandates of the allies.

Armed with this authority, Nicholas made his program for the year 1829. There was a general shaking up in the command, Diebitsch superseding Wittgenstein. Alternative plans of campaign were drawn up. It was decided to stake all on a bold advance across the Balkans. As a preliminary to the campaign the fortress of Silistria on the Danube was closely invested. The left wing of the Russian army was thrust forward toward the lower Kamtschlyk River while the main body under Diebitsch was held around Silistria, prepared to meet the menace of the Turkish Grand Vizier, at Shumla. Early in June the Turkish main body left Shumla and moved toward Varna to intercept General Roth and bring him to action. Diebitsch thereupon left Silistria, skilfully concealing his departure from the Turkish garrison and effecting a junction with his left wing, gave battle at Kulewtschi east of Shumla, and won a crushing victory. With the capitulation of Silistria on June 30, the way across the Balkans lay open, though an army of observation continued to watch Shumla. The crossing of the mountains began on July 15.

Meanwhile in Armenia, the Russian armies during the early days of March had had to meet a determined attack on the town of Akhaltsikh. This was repelled and the garrison relieved

by a force sent to its succor. On May 31 Paskievich moved from Tiflis in the direction of Ardahan in the valley of the Upper Kur. He stormed one position after another without giving the Turks an opportunity to rally and finally occupied both Kars and Erzerum.

In the European theater of war Diebitsch had begun to move forward on July 15, had forced the passage of the upper Kamtschlyk, and, crossing the Balkans, had descended into the plain of Rumelia, the objectives being Aidos and Burgas. The fleet under Admiral Greigh lent its coöperation, and the coastal towns rapidly passed into Russian possession. The enemy fled towards Adrianople. Diebitsch, gathering his forces, prepared to follow them. *Pourparlers* for peace opened, but Diebitsch was in desperate need of men and could not afford to wait. Battle casualties and sickness had reduced his units to mere skeleton formations, and on August 19, Diebitsch peremptorily demanded the surrender of Adrianople. The Turks were demoralized; surrender followed on August 20. In Constantinople events were already shaping for peace. The chief of the Prussian general staff, General Muffling, had already gone, on instructions from Frederick William, to arrange for mediation. After August 20 there was nothing left to do. On August 24 Turkish plenipotentiaries accompanied by Prussian officers left for the headquarters of Diebitsch, where they learned the terms on which he would open negotiations: that Turkey would adhere to the protocols of July 6, 1827, and of March 22, 1829. An armistice began on August 28. Negotiations opened on September 2. The Turkish delegates showed themselves complaisant except on the question of the war indemnity, on which they asked to be allowed to consult Constantinople. This Diebitsch agreed to, allowing them ten days on the understanding that if no reply were received or an unfavorable one, he would at once renew hostilities. He also refused to end hostilities in Asia till a definitive peace was concluded. On September 9, after anxious days of waiting, a favorable reply was received and on September 14, peace was concluded. The Treaty of Adrianople provided for minor ad-

justments of the Turko-Russian frontier in Europe; the Asiatic frontier was advanced in the direction of Kars and Erzerum, and along the coast of the Black Sea as far south as Fort St. Nicholas. A war indemnity of 1,500,000 Dutch ducats was to compensate Russian commerce for losses incurred during the war. Greece was to receive her independence, the details of this settlement to be arranged at a conference in London. Additional treaties were signed at the same time regulating the question of Moldavia and Wallachia and settling the war indemnity at 10,000,000 Dutch ducats. On September 27 the Sultan ratified the treaty. Nevertheless, a plenipotentiary who made his way to St. Petersburg succeeded in obtaining some slight mitigation of its terms; final exchange of ratifications took place on May 29, 1830.

The end of the Turkish war brought no peace to war-torn Europe. On July 28 the printers of Paris had summoned the people to armed insurrection. The following day, July 29, the insurgents gained control of the city and proclaimed the downfall of the Bourbons. The Duke of Orleans was called to the throne as "the King of the French" and thus assumed the role of a constitutional monarch.

To Nicholas the July revolution was the undoing of his brother's work, and the assumption of the crown by the Duke of Orleans an act of usurpation which flouted the principle of "legitimacy." He therefore assumed an attitude of uncompromising hostility. Without committing himself, he despatched Diebitsch to Berlin to sound out Frederick William as to measures to be concerted. Meanwhile a revolt in Brussels had spread to the rest of Belgium. The Belgian people, repudiating their Dutch king, declared their independence. Frederick William showed himself noncommittal as to France, but was quite prepared to join with Austria in putting out the fires of revolution. The proffer of troops from Russia, however, was ignored. The news that the dreaded cholera had made its appearance in south Russia and was spreading northward along the Volga toward the heart of the empire impelled the Emperor to caution. Nicholas hastened to the

old capital and assumed personal charge of the efforts to check the spread of the plague. These efforts, ill-conceived and badly executed, did little but aggravate the menace, which abated only when winter came. But on the heels of one calamity came another. Couriers arriving at the old residence announced to the Tsar that on November 29 a dangerous revolt had broken out in Warsaw.

During the reign of Alexander, despite the measure of self-government they enjoyed, the Polish people had chafed under Muscovite rule. The chief grievance was the failure of Alexander to unite to the congress kingdom the provinces that had formerly been a part of the Polish-Lithuanian state. Alexander and Constantine were disappointed in their hopes of reconciling the Poles with their lot. The upper class provided officers in the army and officials of the administration, and was therefore ready to make terms, but the lesser nobility and the middle class held sullenly aloof. The Decembrist Rising of 1825 woke an echo in Poland and was all the more anathema to Nicholas since the Decembrists had entered relations he considered treasonable with Polish patriots. Yet Poles of the congress kingdom were not legally amenable to the rough justice meted out by the Russian courts to the Russian conspirators. It was by Polish justice they must be tried, and the Polish courts that tried the accused either acquitted or imposed the mildest sentences on them. Nicholas in his wrath could hardly bring himself to ratify the sentences, though required by the constitution to do so. Constantine viewed things through the eyes of his Polish wife and stubbornly clung to the belief that only a negligible minority were disloyal.

The July revolution in France had put the Russian administration on guard. Signs of discontent began to multiply. On November 11 the first arrests were made and precautionary measures taken at once, but all to no avail. On the night of November 29, 1830, the students at the various military schools in Warsaw attacked the residence of the Grand Duke Constantine and murdered some of his attendants and officials. The Grand Duke and his wife saved themselves by hastily

fleeing to Belvedere, where they were surrounded by Russians and faithful Polish troops. During the following day (November 30) these did little more than hold their ground. The town was given over to rebellious troops and mobs which had secured arms when the arsenals were seized, so law and order were at an end in the Polish capital. On the morning of December 1 the Grand Duke could do nothing but give orders to evacuate the city. He established his headquarters at Mokotov, three kilometers from Warsaw.

Eventually a group of Poles who stood more or less close to the government made an effort to establish order. A conference was arranged to organize a temporary council to take over the administration. The command of the troops that remained in the city was entrusted to General Chlopicki. (Eventually the command was extended to cover all the troops in the kingdom.) Negotiations opened with Constantine which resulted in the faithful Polish troops being allowed to rejoin their comrades in the city under the direction of the administrative council. Constantine undertook to intercede with the Tsar for a general amnesty and the return of the lost provinces to Poland, and agreed to refrain from hostilities against the city, forty-eight hours' notice to be given of any attack contemplated. On December 4 a provisional government was formed, but the efforts of the patriotic and radical elements to intimidate the government induced Chlopicki to assume dictatorial powers which he insisted would be laid down only after the convening on December 18 of an extraordinary Diet. Meanwhile, Chlopicki decided to send a deputation to St. Petersburg to present Nicholas with a petition for the recognition of Polish independence. An imperial manifesto of Nicholas dated November 26 (December 8) clothed Constantine with dictatorial powers and named Diebitsch commander-in-chief of the troops to be directed against Warsaw to re-establish Russian authority in the Polish capital. A second manifesto of December 5 (17), 1830, warned the Poles they must return to their former allegiance. The Polish delegation which interviewed Nicholas on December 28 did not report till January 13. Meanwhile the

extraordinary Diet summoned for December 18 met on the 20th, confirmed Chlopicki as dictator, addressed a manifesto to the peoples of Europe, and appointed a committee to co-operate with Chlopicki before finally adjourning *sine die*. Chlopicki, anxious at not having heard from St. Petersburg, despatched another intermediary, Wylezinskii, to the capital. The latter's reception was frigid. He was given to understand that nothing but unconditional surrender of the Poles would satisfy Nicholas. Thereafter the issue could be settled only by force.

The disheartening outcome of negotiations led to a breach between Chlopicki and his council. The former laid down his dictatorship, retaining only the command of the army. On January 18 the Assembly, which had been summoned by Chlopicki on the 13th, convened in Warsaw; its opening session was on January 19. The Assembly declared itself in permanent session and on January 25, amid scenes of fanatical frenzy, proceeded formally to depose the Tsar as king of Poland.

On January 28 at a combined assembly of the two chambers a new national government was constituted at whose head was Prince Adam Czartoryski. The National Assembly remained in constant session, and it was thus to prove a thorn in the side of the Russian government. Meanwhile the Russian troops were concentrated in Lithuania on the eastern border of Poland. Supreme command was bestowed on Diebitsch, the hero of the Balkan campaign of 1829, with a force at his command whose paper strength amounted to 170,000 men, of which, however, not more than 80,000 were immediately available. An early success of the Poles on February 2 (14) at Stoczek over General Geismar on the Russian left flank raised the hopes of the rebels and correspondingly depressed the Russians. The Tsar, while urging Diebitsch on, counselled caution. But the Poles themselves were compelled by the advance of the Russians to offer battle before Warsaw. The main body of the Russians was engaged on February 19, 1831, and on the 26th a general action was fought on the plain of Grochow to the east of Warsaw. Both sides had fearful casualties, but Chlopicki was compelled

to retire across the Vistula, surrendering Praga to the foe, but retaining the bridgehead.

After the battle of Grochow a pause in operations ensued. Diebitsch sought to make good his losses and to reorganize his lines of communications; the Poles to regroup their forces and to recover from the fearful losses by bringing up reinforcements. Efforts were made to open negotiations with foreign governments and to secure countenance, if not help, from France and other European states. On May 26 fighting was resumed. The Poles issued from Warsaw, advanced up the Narew, and fell on the Russian right flank. But Diebitsch was able to make the necessary regrouping of his forces. On May 26 he attacked the Poles in the neighborhood of Ostrolenka and inflicted a crushing defeat. Unfortunately the blow was not followed up, and Skrzynecki withdrew his troops through Pultusk on Warsaw. But on June 10 Diebitsch was seized with an attack of cholera and died on the 11th. Nicholas then began in his discouragement to feel out Austria and Prussia, for coöperation in the reduction of Poland, with a view to removing the Polish question for all time from the field of European diplomacy. He was apparently ready to go to great lengths, but his advances met with slight response, and the fighting was renewed. Paskievich was appointed commander-in-chief, and preparations were begun for a resumption of the war. Early in July the offensive was taken; on July 16 the Vistula was crossed at Osziec and, on August 3, Lewicz was occupied without a blow. The Poles retired behind the Bzura; on August 18 Paskievich moved down the Bzura to its junction with the Vistula, to close Warsaw in from the west. Meanwhile in the doomed city preparations were made for a war *à l'outrance*. On June 28 the discovery of an alleged pro-Russian conspiracy further roused the fury of the populace. The arrival in Warsaw on August 2 of General Dembinski, who had cut his way from the Polish position on the Bzura to Warsaw through the ring of his enemies, led to unprecedented enthusiasm. On August 15, under the direction of the patriotic clubs, events took an ugly turn. The populace rose and secured control of

the city; murder and arson raged unchecked; prisons were opened. Members of the government suspected of pro-Russian sympathies were murdered or hunted like animals from the city. On August 17 the government abdicated and Bonaventura Miemiejewski was named dictator with Krykowiecki as commander-in-chief. But the clubs were the real masters of the city. Sorties against the encircling lines of the Russians were made: one under Lubyenski towards Modlin to intercept Russian connections with the Prussian frontier and Thorn; the other under Romarino to attack General Rosen at Minsk and Kaulschin. Both attempts failed, and Romarino was forced across the Austrian frontier, where his command was disarmed. In September a parliamentar appeared before the Polish lines with an offer from Paskievich of fairly generous concessions, provided immediate and unconditional surrender were made. Krykowiecki was under pressure from the assembly. The counter demand of the clubs for independence was answered by the bombardment of the city, and the order was given that it should be stormed. Meanwhile the assembly continued in session. Up to the last, terms of peace were debated in all seriousness while flattering offers were made to those who would come forward in the hopeless defense of the fatherland. But the approach of the Russians and the increasing intensity of the bombardment compelled the unfortunate Poles to recognize realities. The ill-fated government was forced to bow to the terms of Paskievich. These were:

1. Surrender of Warsaw and the Vistula bridgehead by the Poles.
2. Immediate occupation of Warsaw and Praga by Russian troops on the morning of September 8 at seven o'clock.
3. Retirement of the Polish army on Plock; scattered detachments to be granted permission to join them.
4. Submission of the Polish people to the Emperor, a deputation to be sent for this purpose to St. Petersburg.

The city was occupied on the morning of September 8, but the Polish army, which had marched from the field of battle

with its arms, did not observe the terms of the armistice. It retired to Modlin to avoid surrendering to the Russians, but was eventually forced across the Prussian frontier.

Meanwhile Constantine had gone with his wife to Vitebsk, where on June 26 he was taken ill of cholera, and died within ten hours. The death of Constantine coincided with the new advance of the plague from the south, which made its first appearance in St. Petersburg on June 27. The outbreak and the severe yet inefficient measures taken to meet it led to serious disorders in the capital. The terror was universal, but Nicholas dealt with it with characteristic energy, made his way through the streets in an open *calèche* to the center of the disturbance, where he addressed the superstitious, panic-stricken mobs. Gradually order was restored, but not before cholera had taken a heavy toll. On February 14 (26), 1832, after six months of deliberation, an imperial manifesto proclaimed the "Organic Statute" by which Poland ceased to exist; its territory was annexed to Russia and was divided into provinces. Its government in great part was assimilated to that of the Muscovite empire.

The Polish rising, which Nicholas professed to regard as the first wave of the revolutionary tide advancing from western Europe that threatened to engulf both throne and realm, aroused this self-appointed Canute to the most frenzied efforts to sweep it back. The conferences of Teplitz and of Münchengrätz in 1833 resulted in a sort of *cordon sanitaire* in which Austria and Prussia constituted Russia's bulwarks on the west. The secret clauses of this treaty concluded between Nicholas, Frederick William III, and the Emperor Francis provided for:

the right of every independent sovereign to summon to his assistance, whether in the internal or external difficulties of his country, any other independent sovereign whom he shall deem best able to assist him and the right of the latter to grant or refuse such assistance according to his interest or convenience.

Also that:

in a case where such assistance be given, no power not invoked or summoned by the threatened State has the right to interfere, whether for

the purpose of thwarting the assistance thus claimed and granted, or of acting in a contrary sense.

In addition to this disposal of the Polish question, by an agreement according to which each of the three powers guaranteed the others their share of the Polish spoils, the three powers also underwrote the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire against the pretensions of Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt. This agreement all but coincided with a crisis that occurred in 1833 in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire. For his assistance in Greece in 1825-1827, promises of reward had been held out to Mehemet Ali as an inducement. These had ultimately been whittled down until the latter was asked to content himself with Crete. This he declined to accept, demanding in addition the hereditary pashalik of Syria. The refusal of this demand led to hostilities, and the armies of Mehemet Ali under the command of his redoubtable son, Ibrahim Pasha, occupied Gaza, Jaffa, and Jerusalem without a blow and took Acre by storm in May, 1832. Following up his advantage, Ibrahim Pasha quickly overran Syria and by August had secured Adana, the key to the Taurus range. The latter's intention to pass the Taurus and advance on Constantinople quickly brought the European powers into the picture.

While the other powers hesitated, temporized, or attempted to mediate, Russia alone was resolute in her intention to maintain Turkish sovereignty. At this critical moment a special agent of the Muscovite government, General Nikolai Muravyev, reached Constantinople with a definite offer to the Sultan of military aid against his rebellious vassal. Almost simultaneously a Russian squadron anchored off the city. As the crisis became more acute at the beginning of 1833, a Russian force of 10,000 men disembarked at Unkiar Skelessi on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus. Although he was loath to accept Russian help, the advance of the Egyptian army and the impotence of the Ottoman forces to bar the approaches forced Mahmud to avail himself of this timely assistance. The Egyptian troops were withdrawn, and on July 5, 1833, at Unkiar Skelessi was signed a defensive alliance between the two powers. Ac-

cording to a secret article, Russia undertook to go to the assistance of Turkey in case of attack, in return for which the latter agreed to close the Straits to war vessels of all foreign powers with the exception of Russia.

In 1835 a meeting of the Prussian King with the Tsar at Tep-litz and the combined maneuvers of the Russian and Prussian armies that followed at Kalisch during the autumn were also intended as a further demonstration of the solidarity of the three eastern powers. In 1836 the three sovereigns again joined in suppressing the republic of Cracow, whose freedom and independence had hitherto been respected, but which, having now become a sanctuary for Polish refugees, was increasingly becoming a menace to its neighbors.

The difficulties in connection with the Polish revolt and the crisis in the Near East had brought the three allies close together. But the relations of Nicholas with the western powers were far less cordial. In England the triumph of the Whigs and the reform of Parliament in 1832, which secured the dominance of the upper middle class, had aroused in Nicholas a deep distrust. The situation was further aggravated by the consistent anti-Russian policy pursued by Palmerston in the series of issues that arose between the two countries along the wide front from the Balkans to the Afghan border. The short interlude of Tory power in 1835 did not appreciably improve relations. Melbourne came back into power and Palmerston again received the portfolio for foreign affairs, to the disgust of Nicholas. Then began a diplomatic struggle between the two opponents. Palmerston endeavored to break down Russia's control in the Near East; Nicholas made use of the privileged position he had attained to check England, while actively sowing distrust between England and France. Thiers had been extending secret support to Mehemet Ali, whose pretensions were rising higher and higher. Though England was intent on the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, such maintenance could, thought Nicholas, only be secured by himself as the mandatory of Europe. So either way he had the advantage. But Palmerston built up a European coalition against

France and compelled France to back down, and in the end to join the European concert against Mehemet Ali. He then used this concert to bring about a settlement of the eastern question at a conference held in London in 1841. Among other results, the Treaty of London closed the Straits to warships of all nations, Russia included, and thus ended the privileges hitherto enjoyed by the Russian fleets.

Meanwhile the rivalry between England and Russia had extended to a new theater in the Middle East. Afghanistan, the debatable land between Russia's sphere of influence in the east and the sphere of the East India Company, was torn by a bitter dynastic rivalry, in which the former reigning dynasty had been expelled from Kabul. A struggle now ensued between the Amirs of Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and Peshawar. The East India Company supported the dispossessed dynasty and thus sought to prevent the intrusion of Afghan influence into Kashmir and Peshawar. Eventually, however, it decided on the restoration of the former dynasty, and despatched a force to occupy Kabul and to restore the deposed Khan. Here it found arrayed against it Dost Mohammed and the intrigues of Persia and Russia, which sought to turn to their own advantage the disputed succession in Kabul. The rising of the inhabitants of Kabul against the British forced the latter to retreat across the Hindu Kush Mountains, where their force was annihilated. At one blow, British prestige north of the Hindu Kush disappeared.

INTERNAL REFORM

While Nicholas was, throughout his reign, largely preoccupied with foreign affairs, he has to his credit one great achievement in the field of law. In 1826 he ordered the resumption of the work of codifying the laws begun in 1809 under the direction of the State Council, but suspended at the time of Speranskii's fall in 1812. A special section of the Imperial Chancellery was organized for this task. Balug'yanskii was the nominal head of this body, but it was to Speranskii that the Emperor looked for the successful carrying out of this undertaking.

The result of these labors was (1) the *Complete Collection of the Laws of the Russian Empire*, containing all laws enacted from the *Ulozhenie* of 1649 to those of Alexander I, and (2) the *Code of Laws of the Russian Empire*, containing those still in operation. These were issued in 1833, and their appearance was a landmark in the history of Russian law, fully as conspicuous as the *Ulozhenie* of the Tsar Alexei.

[24]

RUSSIA IN ASIA

SIBERIA

DURING the thirteenth century western Europe was overrun by nomads from the deserts of central Asia. The southern steppes were lost to western civilization, and even in the forest regions to the north, the population paid tribute to the Khan of the Golden Horde. By the fifteenth century the tide had turned and ran in the opposite direction. The reasons for this are not simple. A major factor was the weakening of the Horde in the wars with Tamerlane, from which it never recovered. On the other hand the Muscovite princes had succeeded in maintaining themselves against the Lithuanian grand dukes, the Polish kings, and the Livonian Knights, and had slowly but surely emancipated themselves from the Golden Horde. But the Tartar states into which the Horde had broken, and more particularly the Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan, denied the use of the Volga to the Muscovite and blocked the approach to the Caspian in central Asia. The movement toward the Urals had already begun under the republic of Novgorod, and Moscow merely entered into the inheritance of that city. As early as the thirteenth century Novgorod had reached out to these distant regions to secure the articles of commerce, which she bartered to the merchants of the Hanseatic League for western goods, or to the "men of the low country" for the food which the sterile soil of Novgorod did not produce. The merchants of Novgorod reached the shores of the White Sea by divers routes, by traversing the basin of the northern Dvina and its tributaries.

From the Dvina they soon crossed over to the basin of the Pechora or turned south into the valley of the Viatka and the Kama. It is almost certain that merchants from Novgorod likewise crossed the Urals and reached the lower Ob'. But the "great lord" Novgorod failed to secure his political position in the areas exploited and was no match in the struggle with Moscow. When this outpost of the Hanseatic League went under, Moscow easily succeeded to the former Novgorodian

*Sovfoto.*

A SIBERIAN VILLAGE.

Empire. These regions were incorporated with Muscovite territory and used as a base for further expansion.

This extension eastward occurred in the reign of Ivan the Terrible. At the outset Ivan took Kazan and Astrakhan. This gave him control of the middle and lower Volga and, what was of even greater importance, of the Kama. Viatka and Perm were now Muscovite outposts towards the east, and here in the late sixteenth century, a great grant of land was made to Anika Stroganov, a merchant of Novgorod who had acquired wealth in the north and had gone over in his allegiance to Moscow. His grant was made conditional on his maintenance of adequate garrisons to secure the population of settlers in the Kama valley. In return he was guaranteed free-

dom from payment of taxes and from the interference of government agents. But the Stroganovs had interests elsewhere, in the north, and there is good reason to believe that they promoted expeditions by sea from Arkhangel'sk on the White Sea to the Pechora, to the Kara Sea, and to the mouth of the Ob'. This was a period of intense activity of both the English and the Dutch mariners to discover the Northeast Passage, and the presumption is that when the route by sea proved impracticable, Stroganov bethought himself of employing the services of Cossack Yermak Timofeyevich and his band, for an advance by land. Yermak was one of the Don Cossacks who had turned freebooter and had taken up his abode along the lower Volga, where he preyed regularly on commerce travelling down that river to the Caspian. The presence of bandits is frequently mentioned by the English merchants who travelled at the time by this route to Persia. Stroganov saw the possibility of using the Cossacks to supply his garrisons and to form an expedition against the Khanates of western Siberia. An expedition was fitted out to leave Perm for the venture across the Urals in 1580. Yermak had with him some 15,000 men when he ascended the Chusova, and in the spring of 1583 began the descent of the Tura to its confluence with the River Tobol. Here they encountered the first armed resistance. They overcame this without difficulty and descended the Tobol to its junction with the Irtysh, where was situated the town of Iskar Sibir, the capital of the Tartar Khan Kuchun. Toward the end of June 1583, a battle was fought in which the Russians were successful, and the Khan Kuchun was compelled to retire within the walls. After a siege lasting some months the Tartars evacuated the town and retreated up the Irtysh. The infliction of this defeat on the Tartars had striking results. All the natives hastened to recognize the sovereignty of Russia in the person of Yermak. News of this victory at Moscow produced astonishment. The government proceeded to take advantage of the gains won by the Cossacks. Yermak in the meantime had undertaken to follow Kuchun to the wilderness of the steppes, and here he was ambushed by the Tartars and

perished in the autumn of 1585. His death, however, did not shake Russian prestige in these regions. The fortresses which had been occupied were retained in Muscovite possession; the valley of the Tobol became the jumping-off place for the penetration of western Siberia.

During the next two hundred years the Russian frontier was pushed eastward and southward, but in general the open steppes imposed a limit to Muscovite penetration. Here the foe encountered was the nomad, more elusive and yet capable of a more formidable resistance when encountered in the desert, which was his own element. Moreover, beyond the desert were the oases of central Asia, grouped in a somewhat loose congeries of states whose rulers held nominal sway over the nomads, who were regarded by them as a first line of defense in opposing the Muscovite advance.

Hence the forest zone of Siberia passed into Russian control with comparative ease, while no systematic effort was made to penetrate the steppes. In the forest the advance proceeded from one water system to the next, from the Ob' to the Yenisei, from the Yenisei to the Lena, and from the Lena to the Amur. The *voyageurs* travelled along the rivers and dragged their boats across the water partings where these were narrowest. This selection of portages was in some cases a matter of pure accident, but they became the well-travelled highway for each successive advance. Along these routes sprang up the so-called towns, little more than stockades guarding the few cabins and warehouses planted in the wilderness.

As time went on these stockaded settlements blossomed into towns with their own *voyevode*, who exercised authority over the neighboring country and the surrounding forts. His serious duty was the collection of tribute which was levied on the natives, without exception, in the name of the Tsar. A whole group of these sprang up in the sixteenth century—Tyumen, 1586; Tobolsk, 1587; Pelym, Berezov, Surgut, 1592; Verkhoturye, 1598; Turinsk, 1600; Tara, 1594; Narym, 1596; Ketskii Ostrog, 1597; and Mangazei, 1600. During the early seventeenth century the Russian pioneer reached the Yenisei

and founded, on the lower course of the river, the city of Turukhansk in 1603. In 1604 *voyageurs* from Tobolsk pushed up the Ob' and founded the city of Tomsk, and from the upper Ob' passed over to the Yenisei. At the water parting was founded the Makovskii Ostrog in 1618. The same year Yeniseiskii Ostrog was built on the middle Yenisei, and in 1628 the town of Krasnoyarsk. In the 1630's travellers made the passage from the Yenisei to the Lena by a number of different routes: one of them by the Angara (one of the feeders of the Tunguska, a right bank tributary of the Yenisei), across the divide into the River Kuta, a tributary of the Lena. In 1632 the Yakutskii Ostrog was built on the Middle Lena. From Yakutskii the Cossacks and the *Promyshlenniki*, ascending the tributaries of the Lena, passed over the Stanovoy range with comparative ease to the Pacific, or rather to the Sea of Okhotsk.

Meanwhile traders traversed the Yenisei to the Arctic Ocean and, proceeding along the coast, reached the mouth of the Yana, the Indigirka, and the Kolyma. Eventually a hardy traveller, Deshnev, succeeded in rounding the Chukotskii Nos, entered the Bering Strait, and discovered the mouth of the Anadyr River. The whole series of *Ostrog*s and *Zimoviya* (wintering places) were erected along the important routes to secure points of strategic importance.

Finally in the twenty years between 1643 and 1663 the advance was made to the basin of the Amur. The two hardy *voyageurs* whose names are associated with this enterprise are Poyarkov and Khabarov. The former made the first trip in 1644 and returned to Yakutskii in 1646. In 1647 Khabarov made a second expedition eastward and reached the Amur by a shorter route by proceeding up the Olekma and its tributary, the Tugyr; he crossed over the water parting to the Urka, which falls into the Amur; he occupied the site of a Daurian fort, Albazin, recently burned by Cossacks, and returned in 1650 to Yakutskii for aid. In 1651 he again reached Albazin, descended the Amur, and collected tribute of the tribes along its banks. Below the mouth of the Ussuri he occupied Akhariskii Ostrog, and here the following year he had his first clash with

the Manchu-led Chinese army, which he overthrew. Khabarov, however, feared the consequences of this clash and returned upstream to his headquarters at Albazin. The Russians had engaged in a foraging expedition up the Sungari; in retaliation the Chinese attacked the Russians on the Kamarskii, though the latter managed successfully to defend themselves.

In the meantime the Amur had been reached from Lake Baikal, and a whole series of forts were constructed on the upper Angara and its tributary, the Oka. Here the Russians came into contact for the first time with the Buryats and, in 1651, at the junction of the Irkuta and the Angara Rivers, some sixty versts from Lake Baikal, they erected a wintering place, Irkutsk, which became thus an administrative center for controlling the Buryat country.

East of Lake Baikal the Cossacks proceeded up the Vitim. A line of forts was built linking Lake Baikal with the Amur. The center of this new area was Nerchinsk. The Russians made no attempt to cross over to the right bank of the Amur, which was in Chinese territory. It must be borne in mind that at this time the Chinese empire had passed under the control of the Manchus, and that the latter were only too eager to protect their ancestral home against the encroachments of the westerners. After 1680 they assumed the aggressive against the Russian fort of Albazin and demanded the evacuation by the Russians of the whole Amur basin. The defeat of the Russians at Albazin compelled them to negotiate peace with the Manchu empire, which was done at Nerchinsk in 1689. According to the terms, the town of Albazin was razed and the boundary set between the two empires to follow the Gorbitsa River and the Argun, both left bank tributaries of the Amur. The boundary from the sources of these rivers was not delimited.

The Treaty of Bura (Kiakhta) signed with China in 1727 confirmed the provisions of the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), by which the boundary between Russia and China should follow the crest of the Yablovonoy and Stanovoy mountains (which lie to the north of the Amur River), from the Sea of Okhotsk

to the headwaters of the Gorbitsa River, thence it was to follow that river to its junction with the Amur; thence up that river to the junction of the Argun and the Shilka and up the Argun to its source. The new treaty delimited the frontier from that point westwards to the junction of the Ulekem and the Kemchik, where they unite to form the Yenisei. Provision was also made for regular commerce between the Russians and the Chinese empire. The Russian government was entitled to despatch a caravan to Peking every three years for purposes of trade; private individuals, however, were restricted to two points on the frontier of the two countries—at Kiakhtha and Zuruchaitu—where an exchange of goods might take place.

During the course of the seventeenth century, therefore, the Russians had occupied eastern Siberia and the country southward as far as the steppes, which put a limit on expansion in that direction. From the Volga to the Altai mountains, advance by frontal attack was impossible. The obstacle must perforce be outflanked. The Russians had established the Kuznetskii Ostrog in the Altai in 1618 to levy tribute from the local population of Tartars and to protect them from the Kirghiz and Mongols, who were a constant menace. In 1622 Kuznetskii became a town with its own *voyevode*. Toward the beginning of the eighteenth century the Russians secured the line of the Yenisei and the Biya. They likewise pushed up the Ob', founding the Biiskii Ostrog in 1709. They continued their advance toward the Irtysh (a left bank tributary of the Ob'), where a new line was established consisting of Omsk (founded 1716), Zhelyezinsk, Semipalatinsk, and Ust Kamenogorsk. In 1747 this line of fortifications was strengthened and was known as the line of Irtysh, to be superseded in 1754 by a new line on the Ishim.

Meanwhile in the west advance was slow. It will be remembered that Ivan the Terrible had secured the line of the Volga by conquering Kazan and Astrakhan, but the southern steppes remained in the possession of the Crimean, the Terek, and the Nogai Tartars, while between the Volga and the Yaik (or Ural) roamed the Bashkirs. Not till the time of Peter the

Great did Russian colonization reach Samara. Shortly after Peter's death, however, a bold step was decided on, to carry the fortified line across the Volga to the Yaik, which became, therefore, from its source to its mouth at the Caspian, the Russians' defense against the steppes. At one bound the Asiatic and European frontiers were severed from one another. The Bashkirs and Kalmyks were cut off from contact with their neighbors, the Kirghiz. Russian settlement followed slowly, but consolidated itself. With Catherine the Great the Crimea was finally incorporated in the Russian empire and the settlement of the steppe region turned this country into a vast granary.

Russia eventually made good her hold on the khanates and the steppes of central Asia by the extension of her railway system. The Transcaspian line was finally extended to Samarkand in 1888, Krasnovodsk becoming the terminus on the Caspian. Another line, the Orenburg-Tashkent line uniting central Asia directly with the European system, was completed in 1905. The Soviet government has recently linked central Asia directly with Siberia by the so-called Turk-Sib line running from Tashkent to Semipalatinsk.

To the east of the Urals stretched a line of fortifications from the upper Ural to the Uya, a tributary of the Tobol. This was intended to secure western Siberia against the nomads. It was not until the nineteenth century that the next forward movement began, when settlements were planted on the steppes in advance of the line of fortifications. The frontier posts were then moved across the steppes to Kopal (1847) and to Vyernoe. This brought the Russians to the lower Syr Darya. In 1853 began the Russian advance up the latter river in the Khanate of Kokand. In 1864, after the gradual reduction of the khanate, they joined up the two lines by occupying the angle between them. (For a fuller account of the acquisition of central Asia, see the following sub-chapter.)

Russian colonization in Siberia of necessity followed the frontier. In advance of that frontier, and in securing the area protected by it, the state assumed the initiative. But with the occupation of the strong forward position in the steppes, the

settlers behind the line of fortifications remained comparatively unmolested, and the free movement of immigrants into the region became possible. In this matter the role of the government was secondary; that of the pioneer settler was the leading one. It should be noted that the penetration and conquest of Siberia followed the lines that had been laid down during the earlier Muscovite times. The state followed the policy first defined by Ivan the Terrible of imposing on its serving class the task of providing protection for settlements. The serving nobility, the Cossacks, the *stryeltsi*, all played their role, and it was these hardy pioneers who provided the garrisons of lonely outposts and secured the settlements in the plains of western Siberia. This system, backed up by efficient military equipment and methods, enabled the Muscovites to wrest the regions from their ancient enemies, the nomads.

The discovery and opening up of the peninsula of Kamchatka came relatively late in the story of Russian exploration of the coast of eastern Siberia. This is because the initial Russian thrusts in this direction came from the north from the Kolyma and the Anadyr rivers in the extreme northeast of Siberia, regions which had been reached during the course of the seventeenth century from the Lena. When, therefore, the Russians heard of the existence of this new and important peninsula to the south of the Anadyr and attempted to reach it from the north, they found their way barred by warlike tribes of Koriaks. In 1679 Vladimir Atlasov, a *priikaschik*, stationed on the Anadyr, was authorized to make the attempt to enter the peninsula from the north and to levy tribute on its inhabitants. After a protracted campaign, during which he received the submission of the Kamchadels, he finally succeeded in defeating the Koriaks in 1719, and received at least their pretended submission. But the Russian policy in Kamchatka foundered on the untrustworthiness of its servants. Atlasov himself took to a career of plunder, and for many years the peninsula was given over to chaos as a result of the insubordination and lawlessness of Russian officials and the extreme exasperation of its population at being exploited and misgoverned. This anarchy and con-


fusion induced the Yukagirs and Chukchi to combine with the Koriaks in an endeavor to exterminate Russian power in the region of the Anadyr, a plan which almost succeeded and which finally aroused the Russian government to exert itself to put an end to this intolerable situation.

It was decided to make a new approach to the peninsula, and in June of 1719 an expedition reached the coast of the mainland southwest of Kamchatka and founded a new settlement known as Okhotsk. Here the Russians were able to build ships, and from here they could cross the Sea of Okhotsk to lower Kamchatka, where a post was established at the Bolshaya river. This now became the official route from Yakutsk to Kamchatka. The exploration of the Kuril islands came as a consequence of the occupation of Kamchatka, though the completion of this work remained to Bering's lieutenant, Spanberg.

No story of the development of Siberia would be complete without some account of the part played by Peter the Great in promoting its exploration and in endeavoring to solve the problem of the relation of Asia to the continent of North America. After the conclusion of the Northern War, the Tsar turned his attention to domestic reform, and in 1724 he determined to find out the exact extent of Siberia and to ascertain definitely whether it was connected with America. For this task he chose Vitus Bering, a Dane in the Russian service. In the winter of 1725 an expedition left St. Petersburg for this purpose. The overland journey to Okhotsk required two years and encountered almost unbelievable obstacles. The vessels for the voyage were not completed till 1728, and on July 13 of that year the ships put to sea. They doubled Cape St. Thaddeus, the southernmost point of Kamchatka, and proceeded north along the coast. Bering apparently passed the mouth of the Anadyr river and reached Chukotskii Nos at the southern entrance to Bering Strait. He returned without having sighted the North American coast.

Though Peter was dead by this time, the momentum he had given the work carried it forward. In 1733, under the Empress Anne, a new and much more ambitious project was formed to

carry on the work begun in 1728 and to inaugurate, in addition, a thoroughgoing exploration of Siberia. The Academy of Science recruited for this purpose a group of gifted scientists later to become famous—Gerhard Friedrich Müller, the historian and ethnologist; Johann Eberhard Fischer; the naturalist, Johann Georg Gmelin; the astronomer, Louis de l'Isle de la Croyère; the geodesists Krasnil'nikov and Popov; and some students, among them Krashenninnikov, who later wrote a book on Kamchatka. The work of actual exploration was to be undertaken by Bering. He personally was to direct an expedi-



From Golder, "Bering's Voyages." Courtesy of American Geographical Society.

tion to America. He built his ships and assembled his supplies at Okhotsk on the mainland. From here he sailed in the autumn of 1740, rounded the southern end of Kamchatka, and established the post of Petropavlovsk on Avacha Bay. From here the expedition sailed eastward the following spring. Bering reached the coast of North America in the neighborhood of Mount St. Elias, but encountered storms and contrary winds on the return journey. Because of these circumstances he failed to reach Petropavlovsk and was forced to land on an island later called Bering island, where he died on December 8. The expedition returned to Avacha Bay (Petropavlovsk) in August, 1742, which Chirikov, who had lost touch with Bering, had already reached in 1741. De l'Isle de la Croyère and Steller

also died; the former during the expedition and the latter while returning to St. Petersburg.

Among the projects promoted by Admiralty College was one entrusted by Bering to Spanberg, one of his associates on his first voyage. Spanberg was instructed to proceed to Japan. In 1739 he cruised among the Kuril islands, but turned back on August 3 without having sighted Japan. He therefore made a second voyage in 1739-1741. Though Spanberg did not reach his objective, his subordinate, Walton, did. A third voyage was arranged under Spanberg in 1742 which finally passed through the Kuril islands but again turned back without having actually touched the main islands of Japan, though they did establish the route by which they could be reached.

Other achievements of these years were the survey of the Arctic coast, (1) from Arkhangel'sk to the mouth of the Ob'; (2) from the Ob' to the Yenisei; (3) from the Yenisei to Cape Taimyr; (4) from the Lena westward to Cape Taimyr; (5) from the Lena eastward to the Anadyr. The survey was finally brought to a conclusion between the years 1734 and 1742, and the map of the north and east coasts of Siberia sketched at least in outline. There still remained some doubt in the official mind as to whether Asia and America were actually separated. This uncertainty inspired fresh expeditions of the time of Catherine and Alexander I. In 1785 Captain Billings was sent out on an expedition to fill in gaps in the map. The *ukaz* to the Admiralty College specifically called attention to the obscurity in which the coast (with the adjacent islands) from Chukotskii Nos to East Cape was veiled. Wrangell, sent out by Alexander I, is generally credited with having proved beyond all doubt that the two continents were separate by making the journey by dog team to Shalagskii Cape. Though the coast of Bering Strait from Chukotskii Nos and East Cape had been charted by Cook and Billings, no one had actually been able to follow continuously along the Arctic coast to the West, and it had been conjectured that a great isthmus projected north linking Asia and America. Wrangell's voyage finally scotched this hypothesis.

The eastern coast of Siberia was known in a general way in the eighteenth century. The location of the Amur and the existence of the island of Sakhalin are indicated on maps of this period, but it was not until the Crimean War that ships succeeded in traversing the straits of Tartary that separate Sakhalin from the mainland, and finally establishing that it was definitely not a peninsula.

These official expeditions of Bering and his associates under the direction of the Admiralty College were but a small part of a larger movement that included not only the work of Cossacks and other "serving people" but also merchants and private traders attracted by the profits of the trade in sea otter skins in the newly discovered lands of the Pacific. Various expeditions had gone on previously to and contemporaneously with those of Bering, and continued long after. The earliest of these was that of the Cossack Popov, in 1711, who came back to Yakutsk with the first account of the knowledge possessed by the Chukchi of the "large country" lying across the sea where various species of animals and trees unfamiliar to themselves were to be found. In 1727 Shestakov was authorized by the Senate to proceed to northeastern Siberia to reduce the natives there to submission. Shestakov used the boats built by Bering for his first expedition and made his initial attempt to execute his orders in 1729. His plans miscarried and he was killed in a fight with the Chukchi. His subordinates, Pavlutskkii, Hens, Fedorov, and Gvosdev continued his work of exploration, though they did little more than confirm what had already been ascertained by Popov with reference to the existence of a land across the straits. It was for the most part the interest and curiosity aroused by these expeditions that led to the second expedition of Bering in 1741.

Bering's final discovery of the coast of North America gave an enormous stimulus to enterprises directed into the new lands of the north Pacific. A whole series of expeditions undertaken by merchants (mostly of Yakutsk) eventually explored the Aleutian islands during the forties and fifties of the eighteenth century. Serebryannikov, Trapeznikov, Yugov, and Tolstykh

were some of these hardy pioneers. Shalaurov, Lyakhov, Protod'yakonov, and others did similar pioneering along the Arctic coast. In the seventies, merchants and others, after traversing the Aleutian archipelago, finally reached the mainland of North America, known to the islanders as "Alyaska." In the eighties there arose on Kadyak (or Kodiak) and Sitka islands, Russian factories founded by the trading company of Shelokhov and Ivan Golikov. In 1797 this company was merged with another company which had been previously formed by the Irkutsk



Courtesy of the Photo Shop.

VIEW OF SITKA, PRIOR TO THE PURCHASE OF ALASKA, THE HEADQUARTERS
OF THE RUSSIAN AMERICAN COMPANY.

merchant, Myl'nikov, for the prosecution of trade with America. A reorganization of these resulted in the formation of the Russian American Company, in which even the Imperial family held shares.

Rezanov in the early nineteenth century attempted to reach a working agreement with the Spanish government along the North American coast. Fort Ross was founded on the California coast in defiance of Spain's territorial claims in these regions, to provide the northern Russian posts with supplies of fresh food. Rezanov's work was continued and broadened by

Baranov, who, as local representative of the Russian American Company, ruled despotically over these regions for almost a generation. Russian American headquarters were removed by Baranov from Kadyak island to Novo-Arkhangel'sk on Sitka, where the Russian flag flew until it was hauled down in 1867 on the transfer of Alaska to the United States of America.

The last stage in the drama of Russian expansion over northern Asia was played in the Far East in 1847 by an enterprising governor general in the person of Muravyev (later Muravyev-Amurskii), with headquarters at Irkutsk. He was given broad powers, both diplomatic and military, and assumed even wider. Under his direction Admiral Nevel'skoi, operating from the harbor of Konstantinovsk on the Bay of Tugur (on the east coast of Siberia), explored the coast of the mainland and Kamchatka, founded the naval base of Petropavlovsk, rounded the Island of Sakhalin, and founded the settlement of Nikolayevsk at the mouth of the Amur. To appease the alarm in diplomatic circles, the new territory was turned over to a private company, but it was assured of official protection. Sakhalin itself was occupied and the Japanese excluded; Nevel'skoi further explored the coast as far south as Korea. Steamboats were launched and operated on the Amur, and settlers, including Cossacks, were induced to move down the river and settle wherever conditions were favorable. During the Crimean War the naval base of Petropavlovsk was attacked by a joint English and French squadron, but the attack was repelled. This brought China and Russia closer together.

Muravyev took advantage of the situation to expand Russian interests in this region and found the Chinese acquiescent, though they refused to give the Russians the left bank of the Amur denied them by the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689). But the war between Great Britain and China in 1858 gave Muravyev his opportunity. Stressing the danger to the lower Amur from British naval attacks, he induced the Chinese to sign a treaty (Treaty of Aigun, May 1858), by which Russia secured control of the left bank of the Amur down as far as the Ussuri, from which the two powers would exercise joint sov-


ereignty down to the sea on both sides, though this treaty was not ratified by the Chinese imperial government. But Muravyev's explorations disclosed the potential value of the country lying to the south of the Amur and showed him the impracticability of joint control of the Amur in its lower stretches. Moreover, on July 20, 1860, a Russian party occupied a site on Peter the Great Bay near the Korean frontier, where they founded a city known as Vladivostok (Queen of the East).

During 1860 China was torn by the disastrous Taiping rebellion, and Peking was occupied by a joint Anglo-French force. The Russian minister in Peking, acting as intermediary, induced the allies to evacuate Peking. In gratitude for this action the Chinese government was induced to execute with Muravyev the Treaty of Peking, November 2, 1860, confirming the concessions made two years previously by which the Russo-Chinese frontier was modified in favor of Russia. It was to follow the rivers Shilka, Argun, and Amur as far as the Ussuri; from here it was to ascend the river to Lake Henkai, from which it was to follow the Belenho River to the sea. Russia thus got what she had been seeking two centuries to secure, the whole of the left bank of the Amur as far as the Ussuri, and in addition, a stretch of coast down to the Korean boundary with an admirable harbor to boot, that is, the Bay of the Golden Horn at Vladivostok. With this acquisition, Russia's territorial expansion in Asia came to an end.

CENTRAL ASIA

The seizure of Astrakhan by Ivan the Terrible prepared the way for Muscovite expansion into western and central Asia. But the advance across the Kirghiz steppes must inevitably depend on the control of the Caspian, whose possession could alone secure the routes to the East. Though Russia gained access to the Caspian in the sixteenth century, her rulers were too preoccupied with other more pressing needs nearer home to make much progress in these regions. It remained for Peter the Great to resume the forward movement suspended by Russia's Time of Troubles. In 1721, having concluded the Great

Northern War by the Peace of Nystadt, Peter turned his attention to the southeast. Persia at this time was greatly weakened by internal troubles; the opportunity was too favorable to let slip. In 1722 Peter's armies moved south from Astrakhan, part of the expedition proceeding by land through the territory of the Kalmyks, the rest going by sea. Derbend and Baku were occupied, and the following year a landing was made at Ghilan, at the southwest corner of the Caspian. The Turks,



From Skyrine and Ross, "The Heart of Asia." Courtesy of Methuen & Co.

becoming alarmed at Russian progress in this direction and not wishing to lose all of the spoil, occupied Armenia and Georgia and came to an agreement with Peter for the division of Persia. Russia was to take all the west and south coast of the Caspian; the Ottoman Porte was to be content with the back country behind a line running south from the junction of the Kura and the Aras rivers to the neighborhood of Hamadan. The Shah Thaemas, whose capital was in the temporary possession of Afghan rebels, was compelled to acquiesce in this partition.


But the course of events was altered by the death of Peter in

1725 and by the rise to power in Persia of Nadir Shah, who broke the power of the Afghans, restored Shah Thaemas, then deposed him and set up as his successor an infant, Abas. Nadir Shah recovered the provinces acquired by Turkey; in 1735 the Russians were compelled to evacuate Derbend, Baku, Resht, the provinces of Shirvan and Ghilan, and all other districts conquered by Peter the Great; even the Tartars (Lesghees) of Daghestan who had submitted to the Empress were to be restored to Persia. The following year Nadir Shah was formally proclaimed ruler to succeed the young Shah Abas, who had died.

In 1714 Russia had begun to move around the north end of the Caspian. With the accession of a new khan, a message of congratulation was sent to the new ruler in Khiva that led him to place himself under the suzerainty of the Muscovite Tsar. This was followed up in 1715 by the despatch to Khiva of an expedition under a Russianized Circassian, Bekovich Cherkasskii. Bekovich embarked his force at Astrakhan, and landed on the Mangishlak Peninsula, where he established his base. From here, after exploring the reputed former bed of the Amu Darya River, he despatched embassies to Bokhara. In 1717 he set out, according to instructions, for Khiva, to establish diplomatic relations, though in the meantime the former khan had died and his successor was reported to be less friendly to Russia. Bekovich struggled in the face of untold hardships across the Ust Urt plateau, which separates the Caspian from the Aral Sea; but on reaching the Khiva oasis, he allowed his force to become dissipated in scattered detachments. It was surprised by the natives and annihilated to a man.

Progress in the direction of the central Asiatic khanates was suspended throughout the eighteenth century. Under Catherine, however, Russia absorbed the southern steppes lost to her in the early middle ages. In 1783, the year of the annexation of the Crimea, King Heraclius of Georgia declared himself a vassal of Russia; ten years later, after the Persians had made a descent on Georgia and attacked and burned the capital, Tiflis, the Russian government decided to take the country under

its formal protection. In 1799 the King abdicated in favor of Paul I, and Georgia was formally incorporated in the Russian Empire by a proclamation on September 12, 1801. The last years of Paul were distinguished by his alliance with Napoleon, as a result of which he was called on to despatch an expedition against British India. The Russian force had got little farther than the Volga when the death of the Emperor led to its recall. This undoubtedly revived interest in the Middle



Keystone View Company.

SCHOOL IN THE UZBEK REPUBLIC.

East. In 1802 Derbend, Daghestan, and Baku, regions gained by Peter and lost by Anne, once more gave their allegiance to Russia. By skilful diplomacy, and by playing on the instinctive fear of the Turk and the Persian felt by the peoples of the Caucasus, Russia succeeded in securing submission of Mingrelia, of Imeritia, and of Shirvan. Many of the Caucasian princely families were induced to give up their nominal independence and to accept a position of honor and privilege among the noble families of Russia. Persia, the power most interested in these acquisitions, proved powerless to resist the prog-

ress of Russian arms; despite efforts to recover her lost provinces, she was defeated. The most signal defeat of Persian arms was that incurred by Abbas Mirza, when in alliance with Napoleon he attacked the Russian forces in the Caucasus in 1812 at Aslanduz; as a result of this humiliation, the Persians signed the Treaty of Gulistan (1813), in which they finally ceded to Russia the territories acquired in the region of the Transcaucasus. Under Yermolov, the Russian commander in the Transcaucasus, Russia at last made good her hold on these regions by the construction of a line of military posts and especially by the construction of the Georgian military highway over the Dariel Pass across the main range of the Caucasus, establishing strong lines of communication between the North Caucasus and Tiflis, the former Georgian capital.

During the Russo-Turkish war, Persia attempted to avenge the defeat of Aslanduz and the Treaty of Gulistan, but the Persian forces under Abbas Mirza were routed at Gandja. As a result, Persia was compelled to sign the Treaty of Turkmenchai (1828), ceding to Russia the provinces of Erivan and Nakhichevan, agreeing to the payment of a war indemnity and granting Russian subjects commercial privileges and extraterritoriality in Persian territory.

Meanwhile the Turks had become active in the Transcaucasus and had begun the invasion of Georgia. But Paskievich crossed the mountains, attacked the Turks at Akhaltsikh, and laid siege to the place. Though his force was decimated by plague, he stormed the fortress and then pushed on towards Erzerum. Here he defeated and took prisoners the whole Turkish army. At the Treaty of Adrianople (September 14, 1829) Turkey surrendered to Russia the ports of Anapa and Poti on the Black Sea.

During the course of the eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century, Russia had incorporated in her territory the Middle and the Little Hordes of the Kirghiz, carrying the frontier of Siberia down to a line running east from the Caspian. Count Perovskii, the governor of Orenburg, began a chain of posts running east from a fort called Alexandrovsk on

the Mangishlak Peninsula on the east coast of the Caspian. But the difficulty of holding so indeterminate and ill-defined a line, and the constant interference of the nomads with the trade with Khiva, induced the Tsar in 1839 to attempt an expedition across the Ust Urt plateau to Khiva on the Amu Darya. But Perovskii's expedition spent its energies in a vain attempt against the pitiless forces of nature, which unleashed storms of indescribable ferocity on the unprotected pack animals. As their numbers dwindled, the force was compelled to retrace its steps to Orenburg to save its man-power so far as it had survived the fury of the elements. Another attempt was foreshadowed for 1840. Fortunately the Khan, taking alarm at Russian persistence, offered to negotiate, and peace was concluded in 1842.

Meanwhile the growth of Russian prestige in Asia alarmed Great Britain, who was at the time engaged in the effort to secure her interests in the Near East by supporting the Sublime Porte against the rebellious Khedive of Egypt, Mehemet Ali. Fortunately, Palmerston was able to win the support of Nicholas, and ultimately the acquiescence of Louis Philippe, to his policy of maintaining the territorial integrity of Turkey, and the Treaty of London (1841) was the result. This checked the Russian advance in the Near East. Meanwhile complications had occurred in Afghanistan. A Persian attack on Herat brought England into the field to defend Afghanistan against Persian encroachment. This ushered in a series of diplomatic moves by both Russia and Great Britain in Afghanistan against Persian aggression there. The British were determined to hold Afghanistan inviolate. Fearing Russian influence, the British despatched an emissary to Kabul. In a great popular rising he was subjected to violence at the hands of a frenzied mob. When Dost Mohammed went over to the Russian side, the British decided to despatch a force to depose him and set his son, Shuja el Mulk, on the throne. But the British force was attacked and driven out of Kabul in midwinter and almost annihilated during its retreat. Dost Mohammed recovered the throne in 1840.

The reduction of the Caucasus had gone on apace during the early part of the nineteenth century, the Russians gradually absorbing the easily accessible areas surrounding the main range, which was eventually isolated. Here in 1836 opened a long struggle with the Lesghian Tartars led by Ghazi Mulla and Shamyl, who proclaimed a holy war and roused the mountain tribes to a fanatical fury against the Russian advance. Shamyl inflicted more than one severe defeat on the Muscovite troops, but he was finally overcome. On September 6, 1859, Russian forces under Prince Bariatsinskii climbed the almost inaccessible plateau of Guneeb and captured Shamyl's last stronghold. The Lesghian hero was taken prisoner to European Russia. He died in Mecca in 1871.

Perovskii's experiences in crossing the Kirghiz steppes and the Ust Urt plateau convinced the authorities that this was not the right line of approach to central Asia. Farther east the first Russian settlements had been established in the Kirghiz steppes—Kokchetov, Karakaraly (1824), Ayaguz (later Sergiopol) (1831); Bayan Aul and Akmolinsk (1831). The line of Siberian defenses was finally carried forward to Kopal (1847) and to Vernoye (1853), while the Orenburg line was advanced to the mouth of the Syr Darya. Gradually the Aral Sea and the Syr Darya River were explored and opened to the Russians. From Vernoye in the Ili Valley in the east and from Perovskii on the Syr Darya in the west, expeditions pushed west and east, joined hands, and stormed the strong position of Chimkent about three hundred miles southeast of Perovskii. Chernayev, the leader, then pushed on and attacked Tashkent, which he failed to carry. The result was a general rising backed by the Khan of Kokand that threatened to overwhelm the Russian force. Chernayev was but roused to make renewed efforts. He resolved to return to the attack, and with his small force, he stormed and captured this important city in 1864. It became the capital of the new Russian province of Turkestan.

The Khanate of Kokand having lost its most valued possession, it was the turn now of the Khan of Bokhara. That ruler raised a formidable force and marched on Tashkent, where the

Russian leader, Razumovskii, who had superseded Chernayev, offered battle at Irjaion on May 22, 1866, and completely defeated him. Razumovskii followed up his victory by the seizure of Kojent, somewhat to the east of the battlefield on the road to Kokand. The Russians then turned westward and occupied Jizak and Ura Teppe, commanding the valley of the Zarafshan.

Russian conquests were now reorganized in the east. Turkestan was erected into a separate administrative unit under its own governor general with its capital at Tashkent. General Kaufmann was named to this post. The following year the Khan of Bokhara, having received reinforcements from Khiva, decided to assume the offensive. On May 12, 1868, he was attacked by the Russians on the left bank of the Zarafshan in front of Samarkand. The result was the complete triumph of Kaufmann, who was therefore able to occupy Samarkand, the great commercial center of the East, hallowed by Mohammedan tradition and venerated as the capital of the empire of Tamerlane. The Muscovite force then pushed on towards Bokhara. But a rising took place in Samarkand; the rebel Sarts laid siege to the citadel, which was garrisoned by an insignificant number of troops who were further hampered by the wounded men who had been left behind. Kaufmann turned back, and after relieving the city he exacted a terrible vengeance on the treacherous Sarts. The Khan of Bokhara then submitted and was reinstated as Amir under Russian protection and subject to Russian control. Bokhara became a Russian protectorate.

With the fall of Bokhara, the Khan of Khiva, in apprehension of the Russian advance, began to take measures to protect himself, stirring up the Kirghiz tribes of the steppes, interfering with the caravan trade across the desert, and asserting his authority over the tribes of the Ust Urt plateau. This presumptuous challenge drew from Kaufmann a characteristic reply. A powerful military force was organized in several divisions to advance on Khiva simultaneously from various directions: from Orenburg, from the northeastern shore of the Caspian, from Perovskii on the Syr Darya, and from Tashkent. The

movement was perfectly executed; on March 24, 1873, Khiva was stormed by the Russian troops, and the Khan was compelled to make terms. He signed a treaty on March 24, 1873, by which he agreed to pay a war indemnity of 2,500,000 roubles and to become a vassal of the Tsar.

Kokand, the third of the great khanates, was dealt with next. The Khan had intervened in the war between Turkestan and China, and, in addition, his territory was torn with internal factions. The fanatical population of Moslems readily listened to leaders who urged them to flout the authority of Russia. The result was a clash with that power in September 1875. The Kokandis were defeated, and the Khanate was incorporated in the Russian Empire as the province of Ferghana in 1876. This brought the Russian frontier up to the great circle of mountains that formed the northwestern limit of the Chinese Empire.

The most epochal stage in the advance of the Russian forces was the reduction of the Turkoman steppes. Originally the Turkoman tribes roamed the great desert between the Caspian on the west and the Aral Sea and the Khanate of Bokhara on the east. But the reduction of Khiva had brought the eastern shore of the Caspian and the desert that intervened between that sea and the Aral Sea under Russian control and confined the Turkomans to the area between Kizil Arvat on the west and Amu Darya on the east, to the Khanate of Khiva on the north and the mountains of Khorasan (in Persia) and Afghanistan on the south. The heart of this region was the Kara Kum desert, but it comprised also the rich valleys of the Gurgan and Atrek, the valley of the Tejund, and the great oases of Akhal and of Merv (on the Merghab). They were nominally subject to Khiva, to which they paid tribute. With Persia their relations were submissive and defiant by turns, according to the ability of the Governor of Khorasan to hold them in check. Of these tribes the most powerful at this time were the Tekke. Many of the western tribes had submitted to Russia and were used in her struggle with their kinsmen. But toward the end

of the 'eighties, relations had become so difficult that the government of the Tsar had decided to make an end of Tekke independence.

The Tekke Turkomans of the Akhal and Merv oases had worsted the Persians in a pitched battle in an invasion of the Merv oasis undertaken in 1861. This had established their dominance in the southern steppes, of which they had taken full advantage to raid the Persian border without mercy, in addition to plundering the caravans between Orenburg and the central Asiatic khanates. But their unchallenged supremacy was shortly to come to an end. After the Khivan campaign of 1873, General Kaufmann undertook a punitive expedition against the nomad Turkomans, while the Persians extended once more their yoke over the Turkomans along their frontier. In 1874 a Transcaspian military district subordinate to the Caucasus was formed and placed under Major-General Lomakin as governor. The Russians were drawing the noose tighter about the steppe-dwellers. Just on the eve of the war with Turkey, Lomakin was instructed to move forward, partly to forestall Persia in securing the submission of the Tekkes. Kizil Arvat, some two hundred miles east of Krasnovodsk, was stormed, and Lomakin would have received the submission of the dwellers of the Akhal oasis had he persisted. But the war postponed further operations. In 1879 the forward movement was resumed, this time the advance being made from Chikisliar at the south end of the Caspian, up the valley of the Atrek. Crossing the Kopet Dagh mountains, Lomakin attempted to storm the entrenched position of the Tekkes at Denghil Teppe but was repulsed with the loss of four to five hundred men and compelled to retreat on Chikisliar. The blow to Russian prestige in central Asia was disastrous, and the news spread far and wide.


In 1880 Alexander II determined that the defeat of 1879 must be avenged, and selected General Skobelev to command the expedition against the Tekke stronghold. Skobelev made elaborate preparations for the expedition and equipped his force with

the most modern artillery. In addition, to solve the ever-recurring problem of transport in the desert, which imposed severe limitations on the use of pack animals, it was decided to construct a railway, first of narrow gauge, the cars being hauled by horses throughout the campaign. Only at its completion was the gauge widened and steam traction introduced. The advance was made from Chikisliar; Bamy at the western edge of the Akhal oasis was occupied on June 10, and on July 13, 1880, a reconnaissance in force was made in the direction of Geok Tepe, the enemy's main position. Egman Batir was occupied. Here an entrenched camp was built. The enemy's lines were thoroughly reconnoitred; the force retired to Bamy, harassed continuously by clouds of horsemen. During the autumn the railway was pushed forward into the desert; also a formidable military force was assembled, equipped with every device known to modern war. The advance was then resumed, and all the settlements of the Turkomans were occupied as far as Egman Batir.

Here the siege of the Turkoman stronghold was begun. Skobelev attacked and carried the most southerly of the three encampments. January 1, 1881, Yangi Kala was stormed and its occupants were driven in on the main position of Denghil Tepe, in spite of the counter attacks of the Turkomans. Using this as a base of operations, the attackers then began to draw their lines about the Turkoman forces. Fierce counter attacks were directed against the weak points in the Russian lines at sunrise or during the night, but despite fearful losses they were successfully repelled. All the time the unfortunate Turkomans, with their wives and children within the enclosure, were subjected to a fearful bombardment; incendiary shells played havoc among the *kibitkas*. Yet the dogged persistence of the attackers or the desperate fury of the defenders never faltered. The final attack was set for January 24. At seven o'clock in the morning a mine was sprung under the eastern rampart. At the same time four assaulting columns advanced to the attack. The south face was carried with a rush, and this

column, led by Colonel Gaidarov, broke into the position and occupied the mound that commanded the whole camp. The success of the other attacks convinced the Tekkes that the day was lost, and a confused mass of fugitives began to pour out of the doomed camp, streaming away across the plain toward the Persian frontier. The cavalry and Cossacks followed, cutting down the unfortunates without mercy till night checked the pursuit. The Tekkes lost about 9,000 of their total force of 30,000, many of them being women and children, caught in the terrible fires spread by the incendiary shells among the *kibitkas*. The Akhal oasis of the Tekkes was effectively occupied. Shortly afterwards a delegation from the great Merv oasis made its submission to Muscovite power. The new frontier was carried southward to a line joining Saracks on the Tajand and Kwajah Salih on the Amu Darya, across the plains. But the only strategic frontier was the summit of the Paropamisus range, which gave rise to the Merghab and the Kushk Rivers, and which lies some eighty miles to the south. Continuing Turkoman raids compelled the Russians to carry the frontier to this line. The intrusion of Russian troops into this "no man's land" led to a brush with the Afghan troops and alarmed Great Britain, who feared for Herat, the Afghan fortress lying to the south of the Paropamisus range that blocks the road to India. "The Pandjeh Incident" (1885), as it was called, almost led to war between the two countries, but Sir Peter Lumsden used his influence for conciliatory measures, and the difficulty was finally removed. Russia advanced her frontier to include the Pandjeh oasis and most of the debatable territory.

As Russia was now approaching the northwestern frontier of India, it was imperative in the interests of peace that the two countries agree on a definitive boundary line. In 1895, therefore, a joint Russo-British commission was appointed to settle the spheres of Russian and British influence in the Pamirs. Thus did Russia finally achieve her objective of attaining a last frontier, resting on a defensible line and contiguous to a power that was capable of maintaining a condition of peace and security.



From Baddeley, "The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus." Courtesy of Longmans, Green & Co.

THE CONQUEST OF THE CAUCASUS

Contemporaneously with the struggle for central Asia the Russian government found itself engaged in a new direction. The southward advance of Muscovite expansion in the eighteenth century was brought to a halt by the great bastion of the Caucasus, whose towering battlements, stretching from the Sea of Azov to the Caspian, frowned down on the plains of the Kuban and the Terek, where roamed the Kalmyks and the Nogai Tartars. The fabled "land of Colchis," the legendary home of the Golden Fleece, had played its part in the history of the ancient world; into its fastnesses had been swept the scattered remnants of countless races from the north and south, broken in the struggle for existence. The Black Sea and the Caspian, which formed its eastern and western moats, had been frequented for centuries by the merchants of all lands, but the Caucasus had remained a land apart. And as long as the regions to the north of the range were the haunt of the nomad, there was little to tempt their exploration and penetration. The mutual jealousy of Sunnite and Shiite kept the two great Moslem powers—Persia and Turkey—in perpetual enmity. It likewise guaranteed the independence of the Georgian Christians and secured the mountaineers in the wild freedom of their highland homes. But the southward thrust of the Muscovite state in the seventeenth century profoundly altered the situation. With the fall of Astrakhan, the Caspian ceased to be an encircling moat, and became instead a means of taking the mountains in reverse. Peter, taking a leaf from the experience of the marauding Cossacks, launched a fleet on the Caspian and proceeded to wrest from Persia her richest provinces. An expedition begun in 1722 yielded the Shamkalate of Tarkou, the Khanate of Derbend, the province of Ghilan (including the city of Resht), the city of Baku, the last three all subject to Persia. On September 12, 1723, a treaty was signed between Russia and Persia by which the former obtained the cities and districts of Derbend and Baku, the provinces of Ghilan, Mazanderam, and Astrabad. But in 1735, Persia, reunited once

more under Nadir Shah, by the treaty of Gandja, compelled the feeble government of Anne to disgorge the acquisitions of Peter.

Meanwhile the approach to the Caucasus had begun from another direction. In the sixteenth century, in the steppes of the south and the southeast, there had come into existence that great class of freebooters known as the Cossacks, on the Dnieper, the Don, and the Volga. A band of these had struck south and east to the lower Terek, where they were found towards the end of the seventeenth century established on its northern bank. Together with other Cossack groups they recognized the suzerainty of the Muscovite tsars and furnished armed detachments for some of Peter's expeditions, notably the ill-fated one of Bekovich Cherkasskii to Khiva in 1716. As a result of the work of Peter and his successors, there was organized the Cossack Line of the Terek with two important strongholds, Kisliar and Mozdok. The Cossack settlements were recruited from the Don and the Volga, the latter being transplanted bodily under their Ataman Savelyev. The Line was intended primarily as a defense against the wild Kabardans and Chechens, Daghestanis and Koumiks, but during the first war with Turkey, 1768-1774, was used as a jumping-off place for an expedition across the range into Georgia and Imeritia, and against Poti. At the end of the war the Russian forces were withdrawn to the Line.

Successive commanders had bridged the gap between the Terek and the Don by the construction of a series of forts and blockhouses in the intervening space across the open country. The Line was eventually extended down the Kuban to its mouth. Meanwhile the steppes in the rear of the Cossacks were cleared of the Nogai Tartars by Suvorov. The tribe was to take possession of the steppes of the Yaik, but after a fierce resistance it was allowed to settle among the Cherkess and in the Crimea. From the back country that lay behind the Cossack Line of the Terek, the Mongol Kalmyks found their way back to their ancestral homes in western China. South of the Line, the fortress of Vladikavkaz was built to control the Dariel

gorge of the Terek and the road up this gorge over the Krestovyi Pass to Tiflis. Meanwhile, Catherine had proclaimed her suzerainty over Georgia in 1784, though the Russian troops were withdrawn that same year. The unfortunate country was invaded by a Persian army under Agha Muhammed; and Tiflis was taken and sacked in 1796. But in 1799 Vladikavkaz, abandoned and destroyed, was rebuilt, and in 1801, by a proclamation of the Emperor Paul, Georgia was formally and finally annexed to the Russian Empire.

An understanding of the general character of the Caucasus region is essential to grasp the conditions under which the Russian conquest took place. The dominant features are the three ranges, more or less parallel, running from northwest to southeast: the Caucasus proper, a mountain mass extending from the Taman peninsula on the Sea of Azov to the promontory from which Baku looks out over the Caspian; the Lesser Caucasus, of much lower altitude, about a hundred miles to the south, that spreads in an irregular manner from Batum on the Black Sea to the Talysh Mountains south of the mouth of the Aras; a smaller detached mountain mass, the Agri Dag, which marks the first approaches to the Armenian plateau. Between the two main ranges lies a great trough through which the lower Rion finds its way to the Black Sea, while the eastern part is drained to the Caspian by the Kura. The Aras, which drains the southern slope of the Lesser Caucasus, flows through a broad gap in that range to unite its waters with the Kura about one hundred miles above its mouth. Of the great intermontane depression of the Kura, the middle valley was Georgia, while its lower portion was Persian down to the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813; the Upper Kura, rising in the same tangle of mountains that gives birth to the Aras, was tributary to Turkey. With the annexation of Georgia, Russia thus acquired an outpost towards both Persia and Turkey. A road had already been completed from Mozdok up the Dariel gorge and across the summit to Tiflis. During the disturbed era of the Napoleonic wars, the Russian government found itself seriously embarrassed in the east

and had to face disaffection in Georgia as well as the active hostility of both Persia and Turkey. Nevertheless she contrived to maintain herself in Georgia and to keep Turkey and Persia at odds. In 1812 Kutuzov managed to negotiate the Treaty of Bucharest. A decisive victory of Kotliarevskii over the Persians at Aslanduz, on October 14, 1812, enabled Russia to negotiate with Persia the Treaty of Gulistan, by which the Russian frontier was advanced southwards to the Aras and beyond the lower Aras to the fortress of Lenkoran on the Caspian.

From the Congress of Vienna in 1815 the Caucasus was quiescent for many years under the able command of Yermolov. Special attention was directed to the Cossack Line, and advanced posts were thrust forward into the forests of Chechnia. Here a new menace was arising in the native peoples of the northern slope, but imperfectly reconciled to Russian rule. At this point the great central ridge of the Caucasus rears its mass to elevations above 10,000 feet, while a series of flanking ridges through which the tributaries of the Terek and the Kuban have cut their gorges, rise to still greater heights. West of the Dariel Gorge, the inhabitants of Greater and Lesser Kabarda, together with the Cherkessi, had given comparatively little cause for anxiety since Turkey had lost her hold on these regions. But to the east of the Tiflis road, the Chechens along the densely wooded slopes of the north Caucasus, and the Daghestanis in their parched and inaccessible upland valleys, began for the first time to threaten Russian rule. The planting of forts in their midst and the aggressive policy of Yermolov roused the fears of native rulers as well as the wild inhabitants of the mountains. The attempts to forestall Russian absorption were ruthlessly repressed and the seeds of much future bitterness were sown.

In 1826 the confused situation in the Near East developed into war with Persia. On July 19, 1826, Prince Abbas Mirza, at the head of a powerful Persian army, suddenly invaded Karabagh while the border provinces of Bombak and Shouragel were overrun; Baku and Lenkoran were blockaded and Georgia threatened. It was not till the arrival of Paskievich in Sep-

tember, intrusted personally by the Emperor to take command of the field army, that a victory was achieved over Persian arms at Akstafa, near Elizavetpol. Early in the spring of 1827 Yermolov was formally superseded by Paskievich, and returned to Russia. During 1827 Paskievich assumed the offensive: he crossed the Persian frontier, blockaded the city of Erivan, and overran the province of Nakhichevan. On July 7, 1827, the fortress of Abbas Abad was forced to capitulate. The blockade of Erivan had failed to make progress when Abbas Mirza suddenly attacked the blockading force and in turn surrounded it in Etchmiadzin. Only the arrival of reinforcements under Krazovskii saved the Russian army from destruction and Georgia from invasion. The hard-fought battle of Ashtarak resulted in a slight advantage for the Russians, after which the Persians retired. Paskievich then assumed the offensive and forced the retreat of Abbas Mirza. Two of Paskievich's subordinates—Eristov and Muravyev—decided to make a dash on Tabriz, and on October 16 the Persian city surrendered at discretion, and the way lay open to Teheran. Erivan had already fallen on October 2, and negotiations were now opened for peace at Turkmenchai. The Treaty was signed on February 10 (22), 1828.

Hardly was the ink dry on the treaty between Russia and Persia when war with Turkey broke out. Hostilities embraced two theaters of war, and their course has already been traced. Paskievich, in the brilliant campaign of 1828, captured Kars and stormed the towns of Akhalkalaki and Akhaltsikh after crushing the Turkish force sent to the relief of the latter. The following year, after repelling a determined Turkish threat against Akhaltsikh, Paskievich concentrated his forces in the upper Kura valley for a dash on Erzerum. After dividing and defeating the Turkish forces that attempted to oppose his advance across the Saralong Mountains, Paskievich entered Erzerum on June 27, 1829. After allowing his troops only a short period for rest, he made a double advance along the roads to Sivas and Trebizond, movements that threatened with collapse the whole Turkish power in Anatolia. Fortunately for the Ot-

toman Porte, peace was concluded at Adrianople on September 2 (14), 1829. In the eastern theater Russia surrendered most of her conquests, retaining only Anapa and Poti (on the Black Sea), Akhalkalaki, and part of the Pashalik of Akhaltsikh, which left the frontier defenses of Georgia in a precarious condition.

The end of the Polish revolt saw the resumption of Russia's offensive in the Caucasus. Since the time of Peter, the state had extended its territory at the expense of Persia and Turkey, but much of the mountain area inhabited by the unconquered Moslem peoples consisted of mere enclaves around which the tide of conquest had flowed. A heritage of sullen bitterness had given rise to a great resurgence of nationalism which, taking on a religious tinge, swept over the mountains of northern Daghestan. The leaders in this movement were a group of religious fanatics known as Murids, at whose head was the Kazi Mulla of Ghimri and (later) Shamil, a pupil, like Kazi Mulla, of the Kazi Mohammed. These leaders succeeded in working up the mountain population to a religious frenzy and finally proclaimed a holy war which was to sweep the invaders back to the steppes from which they had come. The Russian government had contributed to this movement in two ways: first, by the severe policy of repression and russification that it pursued towards the native population; and second, by the support which it extended to the local princes, who had little influence over the common people, among whom burned a fierce love of equality. Islam is essentially a religion of freedom, and despotism that rested on social inequality was an affront to its first principles. The fire of religious revival, which was so carefully fanned by the Murids, inspired the mountain people to reject the authority of such rulers and to challenge the might of Russia, by whom their assumption of power was sanctioned.

In 1829 the first outbreak occurred, but it was not till 1831 that Nicholas was able to deal with the situation and to call for suggestions on the proper policy to follow. The result was the organization of a campaign for the year 1832 to be under

the nominal command of Rosen, the actual leadership to be entrusted to General Veliaminov. A regular plan was to be followed for the reduction, one after another, of the mountain fastnesses of the rebels. The policy required meticulous preparation, as its execution was attended by the most strenuous exertions, the greatest hardships, and the most fearful losses. Again and again, fortresses were stormed and laid in ashes; the fires of revolt were seemingly stamped out in one place only to reappear in another. The country appeared to be as far from final pacification as ever. Kazi Mulla was killed; Shamyl escaped with frightful wounds from the storming of Ghimri only to raise the standard of revolt elsewhere. At length in 1837, in a prolonged series of operations amid the mountainous terrain, the defenders were driven from one impregnable fortress to another, Shamyl was brought to bay at Tilitl, and for two days fighting was waged with fearful carnage on both sides. Finally, when both sides were exhausted, Kulgenau arranged an armistice, to be a prelude to a final peace, but Shamyl refused to come to Tiflis, and the Russian command had to content itself with the passivity of the tribes, at length cowed into apparent submission. But the pacification of the Caucasus was as far off as ever.

One is forced to ponder the memorable description of the Caucasus by Veliaminov, the greater part of whose life was given to its conquest:¹

The Caucasus may be likened to a mighty fortress, marvellously strong by nature, artificially protected by military works, and defended by a numerous garrison. Only thoughtless men would attempt to escalate such a stronghold. A wise commander would see the necessity of having recourse to military art; would lay his parallels; advance by sap and mine, and so master the place. The Caucasus, in my opinion, must be treated in the same way, and even if the method of procedure is not drawn up beforehand, so that it may be continually referred to, the very nature of things will compel such action. But in this case, success will be far slower, owing to frequent deviations from the right path.

¹ John F. Baddeley, *The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus*. (London and New York, 1908). By permission of Longmans, Green & Company, Ltd., London.

The attack on Tilitl in 1837 kept Shamyl quiet during the whole of the ensuing year, 1838. For the year 1839 a campaign on a vast scale was planned, including a descent on the Black Sea coast, the subjugation of the Upper Samour valley, and the reduction of Chechnia and northern Daghestan. Count Grabbe, at whose disposal were placed all the military forces of the eastern flank (of the Cossack Line) and of northern Daghestan, was to make a drive up the Akhtash River and across Kirk Pass to the fastnesses of the Andee Koisou (a main tributary of the Sulak) and Shamyl's great stronghold of Akhoulgo. One by one the outlying aouls (villages) were stormed. Grabbe's communications, which ran across the plateau towards Vnezapnaya, instead of around through Shoura, the easier though less direct route, were threatened by the impassable gorge of the Andee Koisou. Nevertheless he drew his lines tighter around Akhoulgo. The siege began on June 12 and continued for two months with unabated fury and frightful carnage. Even when both the new and the old Akhoulgo had been secured, the caverns in the cliffs overhanging the Koisou had to be meticulously searched for survivors. During the closing days Shamyl, with one of his wives and a little son, managed to elude the pickets and make his escape, to reappear once more in northern Daghestan.

With Shamyl at large, little progress was made in reducing either Chechnia or Daghestan. Unfortunately chance at this time brought into Shamyl's camp a daring and useful lieutenant in the person of Hadji Mourad, who became the scourge of the Caucasus. Russian prestige was being successfully undermined and Shamyl's power slowly and certainly re-established. Hence, on the initiative of the Emperor, the methodical reduction of the mountains was resumed in 1842 under Vorontsov. Two major operations were organized, one through southern Chechnia towards Dargo on the upper Akhsai, and one, a few weeks later, against Igalee in northern Daghestan. Both failed to achieve any important result. Grabbe was lucky to bring back his command at all.

In 1843 Shamyl himself had completed his preparations for a decisive campaign. From his position at Dileem in southern Chechnia, he was able to watch the Russian post at Vnezapnaya as well as their long lines of communications that ran through Shoura and connected with the upper valleys of the Avar Koisou and the Andee Koisou in northern Daghestan. In a masterly series of operations in which he took advantage of interior lines, he cut off the Russian garrisons one after another, and within twenty-five days he had taken all the fortified places in Avaria (with the exception of the capital, Khouznakh). When a force came up from southern Daghestan, the situation was to some extent saved and Shamyl beaten off. He then made attacks on Andreyevo and Vnezapnaya which were repulsed. Meanwhile, the relief forces having retired, Shamyl again flung himself on the isolated posts in Daghestan and repeated his earlier exploit, following it up with a blockade of Shoura and cutting off the garrisons in the upper Koisou. He was only thwarted by the energetic action of General Freitag, who advanced from the Line with a formidable force to the relief of the beleaguered garrisons. During the following year Shamyl's fame and prestige spread in the Caucasus, and military operations were necessary along the Caspian littoral before it was cleared of the Murids and Russia's front relieved from threats from this direction.

In 1844 the new commander-in-chief, Vorontsov, decided on a drive from the upper Andee Koisou across the mountains on Shamyl's capital, Dargo on the upper Akhsai. This he succeeded in accomplishing without much difficulty but purposed thereupon to proceed downstream to the Gherzel aoul. This meant cutting his way through the forest. His progress was hampered by his heavy transport, overburdened with both the sick and supplies, and the natives harassed him along every foot of his advance to Shaukhal-Berde, about fifteen *versts* from his destination. Here he was finally brought to bay by Shamyl, and his force would have been overwhelmed and exterminated but for the timely arrival of Freitag advancing south from Grozny on the Line. In two days the latter had succeeded in

covering the one hundred and sixty *versts* that separated him from Vorontsov, gathering troops as he went, and on the 19th the beleaguered army was saved.

Eighteen hundred and forty-six was rendered memorable by a bold attempt of Shamyl to raise the country lying to the west of the Dariel Gorge. With the elimination of Turkish influence from the western Caucasus, the natives of Kabarda (Greater and Lesser) as well as the Cherkess had remained disinterested spectators. Shamyl now determined to try to win these people to his cause, and thus completely sever Russia from her Transcaucasus possessions.

The Murid forces held a rendezvous at Shalee fifteen miles southeast of Grozny and on April 13 began to move westward. Orders were issued on this date to the Russians to concentrate at Grozny. On the 14th Freitag began the pursuit of the Murid column. Freitag must needs be somewhat wary in the moves he made, for there was some doubt as to the direction to be taken by Shamyl—against Kisliar, and the left of the Line, or westward into Kabarda. But Freitag dogged Shamyl's footsteps; by communicating with the commander of the central line, he succeeded in concentrating troops in the path of Shamyl. Meanwhile the efforts to seize the Dariel Gorge and block communications with Tiflis had failed. Hearing that a force was on the way from the south, Shamyl decided on precipitate retreat. He succeeded in eluding all the Russian forces that were closing in on him, returned to his base by the end of the month, and dispersed his forces without suffering material losses.

The year 1847 saw an attempt on the part of Vorontsov to storm Gherghebil, a position fortified by Shamyl, commanding the Ainuakee defile of the Kazi Kouzmoukh Koisou. The attempt miscarried, and Vorontsov was compelled to retire up the river, where he reduced the fortress of Saltee. The following year Gherghebil was occupied without resistance by Argutinskii-Dolgorukov.

From 1849 to 1856 the Caucasus remained quiescent. Russian efforts were preoccupied elsewhere, while Shamyl con-

tented himself with lording it over his mountain fastnesses, satisfied with keeping the Russians at bay.

In 1852 Shamyl sustained a severe blow. Hadji Mourad was actively goaded into betraying the Murid cause. He went over to the Russians, and later perished in an attempt to escape from the Russian lines. Meanwhile both Russians and Murids coöperated in the creation of a no man's land between the two lines, that is, through lower Chechnia in front of the Cossack Line. Shamyl moved his headquarters to Veden to command the upper Argoun valley, the wildest and most inaccessible part of Chechnia. Northern Daghestan and eastern Chechnia had gradually been occupied by the Russians, and in 1858 the new commander, Bariatinskii, began to draw the lines tighter, cutting roads through the forests, building bridges, and making sure of every point that was secured. Shamyl attempted a diversion against the Cossack Line, but in this he was foiled and forced to double back. In 1859 Veden was stormed and Shamyl driven from his strongholds in Chechnia to his native Avaria. Here he was brought to bay at Gouneeb. On August 25 the attack began on this, his only remaining stronghold, but at the last moment Shamyl agreed to treat, probably to save the lives of the members of his family who were with him. He was promised his life and the lives of his attendants. He thereupon made his submission to Bariatinskii. With him Muridism collapsed.

The story of the subjugation is without doubt a painful one. Never was blood so freely poured out; contempt of death and the most heroic devotion were commonplace throughout the campaigns on both sides. But one asks oneself to what purpose the frightful carnage, the unending slaughter of noncombatants. If it was written in the book of fate that Muscovite culture was to replace the native culture of the mountaineers, could not the victory have been achieved by the arts of diplomacy as effectively as the arts of war? One is forced to the conclusion that a more humane policy on the part of Russian officials in the early stages might have reconciled the Daghestanis and the natives of Chechnia to their lot. Of course, once

the issue was joined, the chances of success of the natives, however great the fanaticism that inspired them, were but slight. When the fanatical fury of the Murids had been roused and a "holy war" proclaimed, caution and foresight as well as determination were called for. But to soldiers schooled in the methods of Suvorov, efficient conduct of a war was synonymous with a fine contempt for one's opponent and a reckless disregard of tactical considerations. The aphorism of Suvorov, that "the head does not wait for the tail" brought Grabbe and other leaders to the verge of disaster. Slowly and painfully, and at great cost to themselves and their country, did the soldiers learn the lesson that the forests of America had taught the European regulars: that fighting with irregular troops under peculiar conditions of terrain calls for a variation of the textbook rule of tactics.

Out of the bitter experiences of a hundred actions there finally evolved the practice of "carrying the column in a box," the soldier's picturesque description of the terribly laborious order of march rendered necessary in frontier fighting; advance guard and rear guard closed up to the main body, strong flank guards thrown out to the flank, transport in the center. Only during the closing campaigns of Bariatinskii were these lessons taken to heart and applied. The Russians had to learn that they could penetrate the mountain fastnesses of Chechnia and Daghestan at will, could pulverize strongholds with their artillery or take them by storm with reckless bravery, but with inadequate communications and insufficient forces they could not be held. The same positions were taken, abandoned, reoccupied and refortified by Shamyl, and had to be taken all over again. Fortunately the gorge of the Dariel was only once threatened, and it was not necessary to fight the natives of the western Caucasus. But the great, tangled mass of northern Daghestan, with its aouls accessible only through almost impassable river gorges and across parched and towering ridges; the no less perilous forests of Chechnia, where danger lurked behind every tree trunk and swarmed in every clearing, successfully defied the Muscovite power for thirty years because

they could be taken only at great cost in blood and treasure. The stronger the force required to reduce the strongholds, the less likely they were to be held, for, especially in Daghestan, the country could not feed the army. Its supplies had to be brought over immense distances and at great peril. And at the end of the campaigning season, the force must needs retire on its base, when its enemies closed in and reoccupied the conquered country. At the last the Russian soldiers learned to avoid fighting, to take and ravage thoroughly every aoul and valley, and by depriving the population of its homes and the means of livelihood, force it to submit. This cautious policy of attrition and of consolidation at length brought its reward in 1859 when Bariatinskii penetrated to the highest fastnesses at the foot of the central snow-capped ranges, and with the captivity of Shamyl, Muridism was stamped out.

[25]

NICHOLAS THE FIRST

FOREIGN POLICY

THE early years of the reign of the Emperor Nicholas I had been marked by the close coöperation of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, which culminated in the Convention of Münchengrätz in 1833. This convention grew out of the Revolution of 1830 and was intended as a notice served on France that any attempt to take advantage of the collapse of the Quadruple Alliance of July 1814 and to undo the work of the Congress of Vienna would be resisted by the three allies in the east. But the death in 1835 of the Emperor Francis seriously weakened the coalition. His successor, Ferdinand, was quite incapable of playing a decisive role in European affairs. Moreover, Nicholas was shrewd enough to detect the latent rift between Great Britain and France, signs of which had not been wanting in the development of the Belgian crisis and the feud between the Ottoman Porte and Mehemet Ali. The latter had been forced by the threat of coercion at the hands of Russia to accept the Convention of Kiotayeh (May 1833), granting him the hereditary Pashalik of Egypt in addition to possession of Syria and Adana. But the agreement was little more than an armed truce which both parties were determined to break when the occasion was offered. In 1839 the time seemed to have come, and the Sultan renewed hostilities. The results were disastrous; the Ottoman armies were scattered and Turkey left helpless. Russia and England worked hand in hand; Prussia and Austria followed suit and

induced France to agree to act with the other powers as mediators between the Sultan and his rebellious vassal. At the last minute France endeavored to draw from the situation some more advantageous terms for Mehemet Ali, between whom and France relations were more than cordial. But Palmerston stood firm and threatened war with Mehemet Ali and with France, too, if the latter went to the aid of the Albanian. After a short but acute crisis the French king Louis Philippe, and his minister, Thiers, backed down and agreed to act in concert with the other powers.

The death of Frederick William III and the accession of his son Frederick William IV as King of Prussia further weakened the alliance cemented at Münchengrätz. The new King was ill-balanced, of a poetic and highly sentimental temperament. Moreover, he regarded as something more than a paper promise the undertaking of his father to grant a constitution. His sympathy with the cause of constitutional reform made him suspect in the eyes of the "autocrat of all the Russias." There began thus a growing coldness between the two monarchs, though efforts were made to retain undiminished the intimate personal relations that existed between the courts. But Nicholas continued to cultivate the friendship of England, the prospects of which seemed so much more promising after the rise of Sir Robert Peel to power in 1841. Nicholas agreed not to renew the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (1833) and even acquiesced in the calling of a conference that met at London in 1841 to regulate the question of the Straits. This conference declared the Straits open to commercial vessels of all nations on an equal footing in time of peace. They could be closed by the Ottoman Porte when Turkey was at war. Apart from this they were to be closed to the warships of all nations without distinction. Throughout the rest of the nineteenth century these were the regulations that governed the navigation of these waters by other than Turkish vessels.

The visit of the Tsarevich Alexander Nikolayevich in 1839 had prepared the way for the Anglo-Russian understanding of 1839. And Nicholas now proposed to lay the foundations of

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friendship with England by a personal visit. This took place during 1844, and Nicholas used the occasion to broach the question of Turkey and its ultimate decease in an indirect but unmistakable way. Lord Aberdeen, the secretary of state for foreign affairs, did not see fit to follow up the opening presented, with the result that Nicholas seemed to have misunderstood the attitude that England would take. Eventually the question was lost sight of amid the hurly-burly of the international crises that arose out of the Revolution of 1848.

The final rupture with Prussia came with the grant by Frederick William in 1847 to Prussia of a *Landtag* of representatives from the provincial estates called together for consultative purposes. Thereafter Nicholas could see only imminent disaster for Prussia and for Europe.

On the morning of February 22, 1848, revolution broke out in Paris. At once, not only France but the whole of Europe was thrown into the welter of a violent revolution. Nicholas' first feeling on the outbreak in Paris was one of secret satisfaction at the humiliation of the usurper Louis Philippe. He was, however, seized with fear that France would claim her "natural boundaries" and that French armies would shortly be on the march towards the Rhine to overthrow the settlement of Vienna. But the spread of the revolution on March 13 to Vienna, and on March 18 to Berlin, brought the danger nearer home and toned down the belligerency of the Russian government. A manifesto of March 27, compiled under the first vivid impression of the news from Paris, breathed defiance and distrust, and Nesselrode thought it expedient to follow it up by an explanatory note which softened the anti-Gallic fulminations of the author. Nicholas deemed it well to take steps to prevent an outbreak in Poland, inspired by Polish *émigrés* living in France. Almost immediately, however, a new crisis with regard to Schleswig-Holstein had been precipitated by the revolution. These Danish provinces had long been an appanage of the Danish crown though a part of the Germanic federation. An effort to incorporate them in the Danish kingdom had led to a revolt which was put down without delay by

the Danes, but which invited the intervention of the German states, owing to German national sympathies that were aroused. Nicholas, who had a dynastic claim on the Duchy of Holstein, had agreed to waive it in the furtherance of "legitimacy." The despatch of Prussian troops into the duchies was an affront to Nicholas, who was ready to go to war to prevent the duchies from falling to Prussia, but the conclusion of the Truce of Malmö and its final (though reluctant) ratification by the German National Assembly removed the Schleswig-Holstein question for the moment from international affairs.

The situation in the states bordering on Russia had become more and more menacing. A révolution in the Danubian principalities, in Bucharest led to the intervention of Russian forces and the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia at the end of July. During this time there began, at Frankfurt, the efforts to achieve a constitution for the whole of Germany, to determine the relation of Prussia and Austria to the empire, and to select the head of the new German state. The difficulties in this matter ultimately proved insuperable. For the moment Austria was fighting the revolutionaries with her back to the wall.

THE REVOLUTION OF 1848 IN GERMANY

The revolutionary movement of 1848 and 1849 that swept western and central Europe shook the established social and political order and for the moment paralyzed the ruling classes. It also imperilled the settlement achieved at the Congress of Vienna and challenged the whole principle of "legitimacy" on which it was based. It swept Louis Philippe from power in France and set up a republic. It challenged Austrian dominance in Italy; it weakened the authority of various ruling houses in Germany and at the same time drew the German people into the bonds of national unity. In Austria it roused the national spirit of the various races that comprised the empire and, while exalting the principle of self-government, it insisted on the separate and autonomous existence of each of the

ances. It raised the question of Schleswig-Holstein, which threatened to bring Russia and Prussia to blows.

There were many problems in which Russia was interested, but these soon narrowed down to two or three. The proposed reconstitution of Germany assumed the scrapping of the Act of the Congress of Vienna. It likewise brought to a head the long-standing rivalry of Austria and Prussia, both old allies of Russia, and put the question squarely up to Nicholas which he should choose. But even more important to Nicholas was the question of Poland. The upsurge of nationalist feeling in Europe, if not checked in Prussia and Austria, could but spread to Poland. In Austria the national spirit acted as a solvent where diverse nationalities were in immediate contact. And if it should lead to the disruption of the Hapsburg empire, would it not be conveyed to the adjacent Poland with tenfold powers of disintegration? Nicholas therefore during 1848 preferred "to wait on circumstance," and allowed his policy to be determined by Russia's interests. Where these interests were directly imperilled, as in the principalities, he intervened with decisive strength. Schleswig he preferred to regard as a sphere of secondary importance, especially after the Truce of Malmö. In Germany the center of interest was naturally occupied by the National Assembly that met at Frankfurt beginning May 18. But there were other assemblies sitting—in Berlin, in Budapest. In the non-German parts of Austria the revolution was a violent national movement directed against an alien authority. On the securing of constitutions either for Germany or for its constituent parts, Nicholas was a passive though not disinterested spectator. But the purely academic questions of the *Grundrechte* of the German people, or the form of government, were overshadowed by the far more vital question of the rivalry between Hapsburg and Hohenzollern for the headship of Germany and the position of Austria in the newly constituted Germany. Austria, pre-occupied with the various revolts in Hapsburg possessions, remained for the present a detached observer of these political

events while her destiny hung in the balance. Eventually, however, in Italy, Radetzky, by defeating Charles Albert at Novara, March 23, 1849, became complete master of the situation. Windischgrätz had already put down the rising in Bohemia, and occupied Prague, which became a *point d'appui* for the Hapsburgs in their struggle with their rebellious subjects. The Emperor Ferdinand, driven from Vienna in the early days of the revolution to Innsbruck, had, with Radetzky's triumph in Italy in the summer of 1848, been induced to come back to Schönbrunn. But the situation shortly became more alarmingly confused in Vienna owing to the ascendancy of the extremist elements in the city and government; in Hungary, owing to the repudiation of Austrian dominance and the rejection of Hapsburg rule. The court again fled from Schönbrunn to Olmütz, and Vienna was abandoned to disorder till Windischgrätz and Jellacic returned at the head of their victorious legions. Thereafter attention was concentrated on the Hungarian revolt.

THE CAMPAIGN IN HUNGARY

On October 3, 1848, the Austrian government had openly declared war on the government in Hungary, though nominally the popular movement had not yet run its course and the new constitution was being debated by the *Reichstag*. But the arrival in Vienna of Windischgrätz, the restoration of the court, and the installation of the government of Schwartzenburg ushered in a reaction and accentuated the bitter rivalry between the Austrians and the Magyars. On March 1 Schwartzenburg published by imperial authority the constitution of the one and indivisible Austrian monarchy and dissolved the *Reichstag*. In Berlin and Frankfurt matters were moving swiftly to a climax. The National Assembly finally, on March 27 and 28, completed its draft of the constitution and announced that the King of Prussia was its choice for Emperor of Germany. But the King declined the doubtful honor; and Austria, despairing of engineering her admission to the new Germanic state, announced that the *Bund* of the Congress of Vienna would be

revived. The way was rapidly cleared for an epic struggle between the Hapsburgs and their Magyar subjects.

During 1848 the Hungarian government had achieved only meager results, and despondency was almost universal. But by the beginning of 1849, Kossuth had galvanized the Magyar forces into activity and inspired the whole people with something of his own fanatical courage. On December 15 Franz Joseph was deposed, an act that made the rupture all but final. Jellacic and Windischgrätz advanced into Hungary. On January 2, Görgei, the Magyar commander whose forces covered the approaches to Budapest from the north, was compelled to withdraw, and the capital was surrendered. The government was moved to Debreczen beyond the Theiss, but the fortress of Kormorn, which had been garrisoned by the Magyars, prepared for a siege. Windischgrätz mismanaged his campaign and allowed the Hungarian armies to concentrate on the Theiss, and when the commander Görgei assumed the offensive he was able to drive the Austrians out of Budapest and relieve Kormorn. It was at this juncture that the Emperor Franz Joseph swallowed his Hapsburg pride and decided to appeal to Russia for aid. On May 1, 1849, the official decision of Russia to intervene in the war was announced at Vienna. Görgei moved the main Magyar army to the Waag to prevent a junction of the Austrian and Russian armies. To meet this move, it was decided that the Austrian and Russian commanders would conduct separate campaigns—Haynau advancing down the Danube; Paskievich to cross the Carpathians and take Görgei in the rear. On July 18 the Austrians occupied Buda, and on the day following, Pest. Meanwhile the force of the Magyars in eastern Hungary was gradually pushed south and west. Instead of Dembinskii joining forces with Görgei to attack Haynau, he allowed himself to be attacked and defeated by Haynau at Temesvar. At length Kossuth and his ministry, from their retreat in Arad, called on Görgei to obtain the best terms possible for the army and the people, and he himself fled towards the Turkish frontier. On the night of August 11, Görgei submitted at Vilagos to the Russian commander-in-chief. Within

a few weeks resistance had ceased and the revolt was stamped out with more than ordinary severity.

The Revolution of 1848 had given events in central Europe a decisive turn that was destined to have momentous consequences. It seemed that the Holy Alliance had reconstituted its anti-republican *bloc* and that the old friendship of the days of Münchengrätz had burgeoned once more. Nicholas and Frederick William were reconciled at a joyful reunion held in Warsaw in 1851. This *rapprochement* was followed by a less colorful but no less definite understanding between the three sovereigns in eastern Europe against the rising power of Louis Napoleon in the west. But Nicholas gradually came to the conclusion that Napoleon, provided he did not embark on any adventurous enterprises, would be a welcome substitute for Louis Philippe. He was inclined to acquiesce in the results of the *coup d'état* of December 20 and 21 and the plebiscite of January 14, 1852, and took little interest in the controversy that developed over the imperial title and the assumption of the name "Napoleon III."

Early in 1853 fresh issues arose that threatened the peace of Europe. Napoleon had put forward a claim that the Latin clergy should have the right to safeguard and protect the holy places in Jerusalem and brought pressure to bear on the Porte to concede its claim. Immediately Nicholas on behalf of the Orthodox clergy strenuously contested this right of priority. The Porte at first temporized, attempted to placate both parties, and thereby angered both. But other issues had arisen. The Russian government had already advanced its shadowy right to protect the Christian minorities in the Empire; and had backed up its claims by the occupation of the Danubian principalities. At this point, in order to prevent the outbreak of a general war, Austria and Prussia joined with England and France and called a congress at Vienna to negotiate a compromise. A note was drafted by the Vienna conference and presented to both parties; it was accepted in full by Russia, but by the Porte only with modifications. Russia complicated the situation at this moment by publishing a note which indicated that her diplomats entertained the very *arrière pensée* which

Turkey had suspected and the realization of which she was resolved to prevent. Turkey, in the belief that she could count on the protection of the allied fleets riding at anchor in Besika Bay, declared war on Russia (October 1, 1853). On November 1 the first overt act of war was the destruction of a Turkish squadron by Russian warships in the harbor of Sinope. The Vienna conference adopted a note redrafted by the Porte in which it stated its terms. These efforts at mediation, laudable as they were, were seriously compromised by the preparations for war, which had reached an advanced state. The allied fleets had passed the Straits and entered the Black Sea, threatening to prevent Russian troops on the frontiers from being victualled by sea, while withholding their protection from Russian vessels in their own waters. Nicholas was therefore inclined to be truculent. When the powers—England, France, and Austria—demanded the evacuation of the principalities, Russia declined to reply, and war was declared on March 27, 1854.

In an estimate of Russia's share in responsibility for the war, Bernadotte E. Schmitt concludes: ¹

... the tsar intended from the beginning to secure a protectorate recognized by the Porte, over the Greek Christian subjects of the Porte, and never receded from that programme. But understanding the certain opposition to this from the other powers, he sought to detach one or more of them from the Concert. He failed to accomplish this; but his pride, a belief in the justice of his cause, and high confidence in his military strength led him to refuse all concessions. The principal cause of the Crimean war was, then, the continued effort of Russia, after the question of the Holy Places had been regulated, to carry through a policy which would have profoundly disturbed the *status quo* in the Near East. Whether the diplomacy of the powers opposed to this policy was conducted in the manner best calculated to restrain the tsar, is another question.

THE CRIMEAN WAR

Hostilities which had been officially opened in March dragged on through the summer with nothing more formidable than the siege of Silistria and the threat to the Danubian prin-

¹ B. E. Schmitt, "The Diplomatic Preliminaries of the Crimean War," *American Historical Review*, Vol. XXV (October 1919 to July 1920), pp. 49 ff.

cialities, both moves in the diplomatic game that was being played to gain time. But in the late summer the great armaments of the allies assembled at Varna, and in September their flotilla set sail for the Crimea, the Tauric Chersonese of the ancients. On the 14th a landing was made on the beach of Eupatoria some forty miles to the north of Sevastopol, where disembarkation was completed by September 18. On the following day the allied troops began their march southward, proposing to pass to the east of Sevastopol and take up their positions to the south of the fortress, using as bases the bays of Kamiesh and Balaklava. On the 20th their passage of the Alma was disputed by the Russians under Menshikov, but towards evening the latter were dislodged from their positions and retreated on the fortress. The allies continued their march on September 24, occupied the two harbors, and took up their position undisturbed to the south of Sevastopol. On October 2 the Russian civilian population were evacuated from the fortress and the famous siege began.

On October 17 the allies began an intensive bombardment of the city and its defenses, in which the fleet joined. The intention was to prepare the way for a general assault, but the blowing up of a French magazine and the heavy counter-battery fire to which the French were subjected compelled the abandonment of the attack, while the fleets, with an overwhelming superiority of fire, could effect little progress against the land defenses. On October 7 Menshikov, in command of the Russian field army, despatched General Liprandi with 12,000 men to make a dash on the right rear of the British forces at Balaklava. The effort all but succeeded. The positions covering Balaklava were lightly held by Turks in entrenched positions. These were rushed, and it was necessary for the British to draw on their cavalry, which had hitherto covered their right flank, to retrieve their positions. The Heavy Brigade succeeded in driving back one formidable threat, but a few squadrons of the Russian left detached themselves and rode for the harbor. All that stood in their way was a battalion of Highlanders, who stood up, fired a volley, and prepared to

meet the charge in line. This bold action was successful. The Russian right flank on the other side of the Vorontsov road was assailed by the Light Brigade in the desperate charge immortalized by Tennyson. It did not materially affect the outcome. The Russians remained in possession of the heights along which ran the Vorontsov road, which was henceforth denied to the British, while the Russian lines all but looked down on the harbor of Balaklava.

Having been foiled in his attempt to seize the British base by means of his field army, the Russian commander Menshikov decided to use both the field army and the garrison of Sevastopol in a combined attack on the left flank of the British line. This led to a general action fought on the heights overlooking the valley of Chernaya and the outer harbor, which is known as the Battle of Inkermann, a struggle that swayed back and forth across the northwest corner of the upland, where the Russian forces were able to debouch on the plateau from the heads of the various ravines that covered the approach to the British position. At the same time, the Russian field army across the Chernaya, under the command of Gorchakov, continued to feint against the British rear covering Balaklava. But the Russian attacks were ill-coördinated and were beaten back one after another, either by the troops on the spot or by counter-attacks that recovered whatever ground was lost. At nightfall the Russians sullenly withdrew all their men from the heights, some into the town and the rest across the Chernaya to the heights of Inkermann, and allowed the allies to draw their lines closer to the doomed city.

The exhaustion of Russia's offensive efforts almost exactly synchronized with the coming of winter. Hardly had the decision been made to go into winter quarters on the bleak uplands which had been occupied, when a violent hurricane swept the exposed positions of the besieging armies as well as the beleaguered fortress. A great part of the shipping in the harbors of Kamiesh Bay, as well as Balaklava, was destroyed, and with it the stores of army provisions. Driven by heavy wind, torrential rains descended and scores of tents were car-

ried away, the troops being left without shelter of any kind. The rain turned to snow, and the positions, both rear and forward, were converted into seas of mud and slush, imposing terrible hardships on the front line troops, making the task of supplying them with food and reliefs a frightful ordeal, and transforming the rear areas from a longed-for haven of rest into a bog where man and beast, even if in good health, floundered in helpless misery or sought relief by lying down to sleep in the all-present mud. The sick looked forward to finding relief in death. Little wonder that men and animals sickened and died by hundreds. Men who had the good fortune to be evacuated by hospital ship found the hospitals at Scutari jammed with thousands of others in conditions even worse than those of the front line. Cholera had been rampant from the first; other diseases added their quota to the rising tide of misery and death that no efforts seemed able to cope with. By the middle of the winter the number in hospitals swelled to the unbelievable total of 14,000, and it was with the greatest difficulty that the garrisons of the front line could be kept to their duties. The French suffered only slightly less than the British. Fortunately the higher ground and the better communications between the base and their positions gave them decidedly better conditions. In Sevastopol, though the garrison had the advantage of billets, the difficulties of the Russians were not negligible. The precarious communications with Bakhchisarai and Simferopol were difficult to maintain. Reinforcements had to reach the theater of war by road from the interior. The lack of supplies, the severe weather, cholera, all took heavy toll of the Russian troops.

Eventually the British recovered from the hopeless muddle and put things right both in the field and at the bases. The reorganization of the hospitals and medical services by Florence Nightingale did something to wipe out the disgrace that attended their wholesale collapse during the winter. Units were brought up to strength; supplies for men and horses were replenished. By the end of March the allies were ready for a resumption of the siege. But during the last days of Feb-

ruary, Nicholas had been taken ill and on March 2, 1855, he died. His death did not immediately alter the situation, though it undoubtedly did much to prepare the way for peace. Meantime the war went on.

If Great Britain had her Florence Nightingale, the Russians had their celebrated surgeon, Pirogov, who organized an order of nursing sisters for the care of the wounded. One of these, known as Darya Sevastopolskaya, won renown for the courage she displayed in succouring the wounded under fire. A young officer, Lev Tolstoy, who served in the artillery was to win fame, not by his exploits in the field, but by the vividness with which he pictured the incidents of the siege, in his "Tales of Sevastopol," which he sent back from the front and which soon won almost universal acclaim from the literary world.

During the late winter there was some activity displayed by the Russian field army operating from Simferopol. The allies too, having now received fresh strength from a Sardinian contingent, at one time seriously contemplated an attempt to isolate Sevastopol from the north. This would have meant an attack on the Russian field army while the allies were menaced by the Sevastopol garrison. But the new French commander-in-chief, Pelissier, pressed forward with all the resource of his personality and will for an assault on the main positions of the Russians to the south, and was able to carry his colleagues and superiors with him. After some impression had been made by the batteries on the main positions, and after the outer works had been carried by an assault, on the night of June 7, the armies advanced to the reduction of the main positions, which was attempted on June 18. The attack collapsed because of inadequate artillery preparation. The Russian commander endeavored to relieve the pressure on the doomed fortress by a feint across the Mackenzie heights against the allied right. But the feint failed and with it the last hope of relieving the siege. The allies had moved up their guns and proceeded leisurely and methodically to batter down the defenses, the town itself, the harbor works, and the very warships in the harbor. The reply of the Russian batteries was hopelessly in-

adequate. On September 8 the final assault began. The French carried the Malakhov redoubt; the British attack on the Redan lacked the *élan* of their Gallic allies, and the position remained at the end of the day in the hands of the Russians. But Todelben had already decided on the evacuation of the city. During the night many of the fortifications were demolished and magazines destroyed while the troops, holding their opponents at arm's length, retired by bridge and steamer across the outer harbor to the north. On the following day Sevastopol and its defenses were occupied by the allies.

The evacuation of the fortress prepared the way for peace. While the youthful Alexander II and his government made a brave show of further resistance, the military power of Russia was crushed and her spirit broken. After fruitless efforts to divide their opponents, the Russians finally accepted the proposal of Austria of a peace conference which met at Paris February 25, 1856. Peace was finally concluded. The principal terms of the treaty were as follows:

1. All regions and cities won by conquest during the course of hostilities were to be given up.
2. The independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire were secured by a joint guarantee of all the powers.
3. The Black Sea was neutralized, i.e., declared open for commercial vessels of all nations, and free from war vessels and military and naval arsenals.
4. To ensure freedom of navigation on the Danube, the southern part of Bessarabia was to be ceded to Moldavia.
5. Serbia, Moldavia, and Wallachia were to be under Turkish suzerainty and the guarantee of the contracting powers.
6. The protection of Christians in Turkey was to be transferred from Russia to the great powers.

A special convention on the problem of the Straits decreed that the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were closed to the war vessels of all foreign governments.

[26]

ALEXANDER THE SECOND

PEACE and the accession of a new sovereign carried the promise of better things for the harassed land. The young Alexander, born April 17, 1816, was thirty-seven years of age at his accession. Though brought up in the stern school of Nicholas I, liberal influences had not been wanting during his tender years. He had been apprenticed to the great Speranskii in his study of Russian law and institutions. Though he dared not oppose his father, there were signs of a want of sympathy with his policies. And on these grounds, albeit slender, the country took fresh hope.

It was a troubled inheritance to which the new sovereign had succeeded. The war with its attendant miseries and exhaustion presented a thousand unsolved problems of foreign and domestic policy. Stung with defeat and humiliation, Alexander roused the country to renewed efforts to stave off further reverses or to retrieve disaster. The fall of Sevastopol, while not actually sealing the fate of Russia, left the allies free to choose the time and place for continuing the war during 1856. Alexander eagerly grasped at the chance of wringing victory out of defeat. Only the desperate state of the country on the one hand, and the stern attitude of Austria on the other, forced the ministers themselves to make the most serious representations to the Tsar that there was actually no alternative to acceptance of the Austrian ultimatum.

THE EMANCIPATION OF THE SERFS

On the morrow of the Peace of Paris, 1856, Alexander addressed himself to the task of freeing the country from the incubus of serfdom. This inexact term stood for a system as old

as autocracy itself, and was really the basis on which autocracy rested. The success of the Muscovite tsars in extending their domain and consolidating their power had in no small degree been due to the skill with which they either conquered or



Brown Brothers.

ALEXANDER II

attracted into their service the other princes. Such princes who came over with their own following of *boyars* were given high rank and position and entered the ranks of the Muscovite nobility, with whom they ultimately merged. Though all serving nobles at first were entitled to terminate their services when

they saw fit, this right was successfully disputed by the tsars, who learned to assert their position by force. This privileged but restive class of feudal nobles also found its position challenged by the rise of a new class of "serving people" whose "services" were secured by grants of land made on a purely contractual basis. Eventually, during the time of Ivan the Terrible and his successors, hereditary holdings or *vochiny* lost their separate identity by being merged with the *pomyestiya* or conditional land grants, and all the nobility, irrespective of their origin, became a "serving nobility," thus forfeiting the independence secured from hereditary and inalienable land holdings.

Concurrently with this movement there developed another trend, the gradual abasement of the tiller of the soil. Formerly, the agricultural population had consisted in great part of freemen, though at the lower end of the social scale were the *kholopy* or bondsmen. The free population was gradually reduced through debt during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries to a position of increasing economic dependence on the lords. This fate could be averted only by flight, though another lord was bound to return the serf to his rightful owner. After the power of the Horde was broken, the steppe became the serfs' refuge. The system of compulsory service on which the state rested was thus threatened with breakdown, and the state was compelled to intervene to prevent the drawing away of the country's life-blood. The manorial serf was bound to the land.

Peter's administrative measures drew a tighter rein over the nobility. Manorial serfs, also, whatever their status, were alike subjected to the soul tax and military service, thus fusing them into one depressed category. Even another group, the state peasants, were made subject to these obligations. In general, Peter's hand lay equally heavy on the nobility and the peasant. But the era of enlightenment was at hand, promising at first some measure of alleviation of their lot. It was the nobles, however, who first profited by the spirit of the new times. In 1762 by an *ukaz* of Peter III, the nobles were freed from the ob-

ligation of service to the state, and thus were confirmed in their hereditary titles to their lands.

But no relief was in sight for the sufferings of the peasant. The pretentious plans of Catherine might alleviate his lot, but not materially change it. In practice the transfer of thousands of peasants from public to private ownership only increased the sum total of misery. One compensation was that most of the church lands passed from the ecclesiastical authorities into the hands of the state. But in general, Catherine bequeathed to her successor the problem unsolved. Paul's one contribution was the reduction of the *barshchina* to a maximum of three days per week.

While Alexander I's head was full of impossible designs for a new Russia, he achieved few material reforms. In 1803, however, the peasants in the Baltic provinces were freed and a scheme was provided for their purchase of the land. Alexander, like Nicholas after him, was preoccupied with foreign affairs. Nevertheless, the growing enlightenment and passion for freedom ensured that the peasant would not be quite neglected. He found champions among the aristocracy, as attested in the records of the Decembrists. Even the bleak reaction that followed could not quite quench the fires of freedom. Nicholas himself realized that serfdom must go, and made more than one sporadic effort to check its abuses and bring it to an end. But aside from the naming of commissions to inquire into special phases of the peasant question, the only constructive reform was the introduction into the southwestern provinces (that is, Poland) of a scheme of "inventories" by which the obligations of the landlord and peasants to one another were required to be defined for each locality. But this reform was really a punishment meted out to the landlords for their share in the revolt of 1831 and was not motivated by any particular consideration for the peasants. The experience of the government here did not commend it as an example to be followed elsewhere.

Alexander II came to the throne during the hey-day of liberal ideas, and it was his hope that the solution of the peasant

problem could be found by private initiative. But hints to the organizations of the landowners proved ineffective, and he was forced to take the initiative by naming a non-official committee, which began to meet on January 3, 1857. The two men on whom Alexander was able to lean most heavily in the accomplishment of this arduous task were the Minister of the Interior, Lanskoï, and Adjutant General Rostovtsev. The Grand Duke Constantine Nikolayevich and the Grand Duchess Yelena Pavlovna were both sympathetic to the measure, and the former at a later stage rendered invaluable service.

Three questions occupied the deliberation of the committee: (1) should the landlords retain all the land now in their possession; (2) if the landlords retained the land, should the peasant's right to use the land be abridged; (3) should the landlords expect to receive from the state compensation for the surrender of their rights to services. But little came of the deliberations of the committee, which, in general, was hostile to the whole scheme of emancipation. The appointment of the Grand Duke Constantine Nikolayevich as a member of the committee gave it a new lease of life, but the real impulse to the movement came from a petition of the nobility of the provinces of Vilna, Grodno, and Kovno, presented to the Tsar by their Governor General Nazimov. In his reply, Alexander recommended the appointment of a special committee from each of the provinces to make separate recommendations while a general committee should consider and amend these reports.

This movement gave the problem much-needed publicity. Shortly after, in an address presented to the sovereign, the nobility of St. Petersburg manifested interest. Nizhnii Novgorod followed suit, and from March to October, 1858, most of the provinces joined the movement. The result was the organization everywhere of provincial committees to coöperate with the government in the emancipation. The government went half-way and turned the non-official committee into a general committee on the peasant question. A special commission was constituted to receive the provincial programs, examine them, and then refer these to the general

committee. This commission was called the editing commission, but with the great number of schemes presented, sometimes both a minority and a majority report for each province, it was found necessary to divide the work among several commissions.

Early in 1858 the sessions of the main committee were suspended; Rostovtsev went abroad to recuperate and to work out his ideas. Meanwhile the provincial committees began their activities, and some time had to be allowed before these would be complete. Alexander made his contribution by a tour of the central provinces in which he addressed various meetings of the provincial nobility. On the return of Rostovtsev from abroad, the general committee resumed its sessions. The Emperor presided at the meetings of the General Committee and gave it his counsel, largely prompted by the letters of Rostovtsev. Meanwhile, towards the end of 1858, the recommendations of the provincial committees began to reach the ministry of the interior. But dissensions began to appear in the official bodies in the capital; many of the members, nobles with the interests of the nobles at heart, were lukewarm towards the reform. But others, in favor of the reform, wished to safeguard the interests of the nobles; a mere minority supported the project outright. It required all the force of Alexander's character to override this opposition. Among the provincial committees the silent opposition was even greater; and many of them submitted two or more reports. Towards the end of 1859 representatives of these committees were invited to St. Petersburg to be consulted by the state. But the opportunity was used to impress on them that there was to be no discussion of principles; merely a discussion of the proper methods to be adopted in applying principles already decided on. The Minister of the Interior warned them:

The abolition of serfdom is a matter already decided in the generous thought of His Majesty and is not subject to any alteration. The Emperor has given his word and it must be kept. It is the duty of subjects to carry out his solemn promise with the same cheerfulness and

love with which it was given for the benefit of present and future generations.¹

But the latent clash of interest between the nobles and the government was not to be easily appeased. Though not allowed to present their objections to the scheme, they screwed up their courage sufficiently to insist that their objections should at least be considered by the editing commission. A tense situation developed. Temporary respite was gained early in 1860 when Rostovtsev, weakened by the great strain under which he had been laboring, fell ill and died on February 3. His place was taken by the Minister of Justice, Count V. I. Panin.

Alexander held his subordinates to the task in hand. By the middle of July the editing commission, having examined the resolutions of the provincial committees, was ready to begin the codification of the final draft of the manifesto. The General Committee, now under the chairmanship of the Grand Duke Constantine Nikolayevich, warmed to the task and was called on to pass on the proposed laws which came from the labors of the editing committee. The General Committee was joined with the committee of ministers in a series of joint sessions. The last of these was held on January 26, 1861, under the personal chairmanship of the Emperor, and it was this body that gave its final approval to the general manifesto of emancipation.

The Emancipation proclamation of February 19, 1861, however intricate may have been the problems connected with its application, was based on a few leading principles:

1. All servile relations were to be abolished and no compensation was given to the former serf owner for the labor or services of which he was deprived.

2. The peasant in general received his *usadba* (house, kitchen-garden, and so on) plus his strips in the common fields which he had formerly held; all labor obligations or dues were

¹ Report of Lanskoï given in S. S. Tatishchev, *Imperator Aleksandr II*, (St. Petersburg, 1903), I, 358.

commuted for an *obrok* or money payment. The ownership remained with the landlord, and the obligations thus assumed the form of rent.

3. The peasant did not, however, become a free individual, but became, if he were not such already, a member of a commune collectively responsible for the payment of all dues.

4. If landlord and commune could agree, a transfer of the property to the peasant could be arranged, on the basis of a long-term purchase by the peasant.

5. The peasants in the commune were given the rights of self-government.

This legislation did not come into force immediately but only on the expiration of a transitional period varying according to the status of the peasant.

Landlords and peasants might sever completely the economic ties that bound them if the peasants would agree to accept the grant outright of one fourth of their allotment; or if the peasants could provide one fifth of the purchase price immediately, the state would advance the remaining 80 per cent, and the owner's rights could be bought outright. The state thus became the owner of the land, and the state advances were then made a charge against the peasant commune, to be retired at the end of forty-nine years by the payment of annual redemption dues assessed against the land.

The *dvoroye* or household peasants, who held no land but were to all intents and purposes virtually slaves, received their personal freedom, but nothing else. State peasants were brought within the general scheme by being grouped in communes for purposes of self-determination, and subjected to the payment of the same general dues. Their lot after emancipation, as before, was distinctly better than that of the seigniorial peasants. Their allotments, as a rule, were larger. The poll tax was discontinued. While their *obrok* (rent) underwent a slight increase, it was still reasonably low, and it, too, was finally commuted for annual redemption dues which it was calculated would finally extinguish the peasant's indebtedness on the land in the year 1931.

The process of emancipation which spread itself over half a century profoundly changed the old order in Russia. In historical significance, it overshadows that emancipation with which it almost exactly coincided in time, that of the Negroes in the southern states. But whereas the one was achieved only after an exhausting and bloody struggle, the emancipation of the serfs was, by contrast, a peaceful change. In its effects it was more far-reaching. Whereas the Thirteenth Amendment freed some 3,500,000 out of a total population of 31,000,000 in the United States, in Russia out of 74,000,000 people some 23,000,000 passed from serfdom to freedom. But while in the United States industrial and commercial development went on unhindered or even improved, inasmuch as a great part of its population not only were free, but had turned this inherited freedom to account in all branches of human activity, in Russia the economic life of the country was almost entirely bound up with this new class of freedmen who still had to develop those virtues which we associate with progress. Even had conditions been of the most favorable, it is open to doubt whether they would have been able to overtake more favored countries that had passed out of feudalism four hundred years before. In addition to other handicaps were the inadequacy of their holdings (considerably abridged from those they had hitherto worked), the excessive figure of their *obrok* (rent), later (by reason of the excessive valuation placed on the land) the redemption dues, and their inability to divest themselves of their holdings or to improve their lot by emigration owing to their communal tenure of land. Not many decades had passed before thinking men realized that the new system had created perhaps even greater evils than those contained in the old. The lowered standard of living in the central provinces and recurring famines gave striking demonstration of a condition of affairs which the government was loath to recognize.

THE POLISH REVOLT

Reform in Russia has been closely linked with external affairs, for the respect that a state commands abroad seems to

be in some degree dependent on internal calm. But internal stress seems to be the normal condition of free states which feel the ever recurring need of striking a new equilibrium of the forces that are at work. In despotic states the overthrow of authority may easily pass into anarchy. The attempt to provide new channels for social forces presupposes the partial destruction of the old channels, a process which may be the prelude to disaster unless the new authority proves sufficiently strong. Hence the program of reform, which called in question some of the old institutions, could scarcely fail to cast suspicion on the whole of the old order. Ardent spirits among the young identified what was old with that which was vicious, and there arose demands for more sweeping, and far-reaching, changes. The universities were the first to raise the cry. Alexander, who had himself taken the initiative in raising the ban on free discussion, was embarrassed at the boldness of the challenge presented by universities and the press. The only recourse open to the government seemed to be the adoption of a firm tone, and the reorganization of the administration in 1861 foreshadowed a new rigor.

While sporadic outbreaks in the Empire were kept in hand by a combination of firmness and tact, a policy of which Alexander was master, it was Poland that gave the greatest cause for alarm. Here, to the natural restiveness of a proud people under a foreign yoke, were added the sympathy felt abroad for the national aspirations and the religion of the Poles. Hence a Polish revolt was especially to be feared for the diplomatic complications which it would involve. Alexander II had openly courted Napoleon III at the conclusion of the Crimean War, and the friendship of France bade fair to replace the intimate relations formerly existing between Russia and Austria. But the dangerous policy pursued by Napoleon in regard to Italy estranged Russia, though his private feelings did not prevent Alexander from recognizing the new kingdom of Italy. But Poland had always been an embarrassment to Franco-Russian relations, and Napoleon's efforts to conciliate Catholic and Polonophil opinion at home by bringing pressure

to bear on Russia led to a definite cooling of their relations.

The situation in Poland was by now giving cause for alarm. Preparations were already under way for the reorganization of the Polish administration by the extension of a greater measure of autonomy. But the grant of privileges did not halt the disquieting symptoms. Disturbances broke out in Warsaw and elsewhere, which neither firmness nor tact seemed able to check. On the death of Gorchakov, the Minister of War Sukhozanet was despatched to Warsaw to act with supreme authority till the arrival of the new viceroy, Count Lambert. But Lambert proved unequal to the task and finally asked to be relieved. Sukhozanet, who took his place, managed to secure the recall of Wielopol'skii, whose Polonizing policy was reducing the administration to chaos. General Lüders of Caucasian fame became viceroy; the administration policy tacked once more towards repression. Finally in May, 1862, Alexander replaced Lüders with the young Grand Duke Constantine Nikolayevich, and an effort was made once more to conciliate Polish opinion. But all in vain. At the beginning of January 1863, violent outbreaks occurred in Warsaw. The occasion was the levy of recruits for the Russian army which it had been decided should first be made on those who had taken part in earlier disorders. The disturbances spread through Poland and the provinces of western Russia. Of course, now there was no regular army to carry on the fight. Only sporadic and ill-armed risings could be the result, but these brought disastrous consequences on the local population. The revolt was directed by a central committee which managed to elude the vigilance of the authorities, and everywhere the population of both sexes showed self-sacrificing devotion to an extraordinary degree. But Alexander was not to be moved. He resolved that concessions would be preceded by repression. Though Constantine resigned from his post, Alexander pursued his policy without flinching and replaced his brother by General Berg. Finally the central committee was discovered and its members arrested, thus destroying the directing head.

The Polish revolt was dangerous to Russia rather from the

international angle. Poland commanded much sympathy abroad, especially in France and Great Britain. Napoleon III in France and Palmerston in England saw in the revolt the chance for a great diplomatic *coup*. The latter sought to bring about a European concert to force Russia to submit the Polish question to a European congress on the grounds that the relation of Poland to Russia had been defined by the Congress of Vienna. But Alexander would not be persuaded, and Gorchakov composed courteous but adamant notes that left the allies no alternative to war. Russia had made sure of two allies. Bismarck, at the opening of the Polish hostilities, had entered into an agreement proffering Prussian coöperation in suppressing the revolt, and refused to be drawn into the discussion. The United States was preoccupied and herself menaced with a possible combination of European powers against her. Great Britain was thus forced to abandon the project of making the Polish question a matter for a European discussion.

But the Polish revolt was not allowed to check the movement of reform. The emancipation of the peasants had thrust into the foreground the problem of local administration. Hitherto the seigniorial peasants had come under the jurisdiction of the landlords; the proclamation had relaxed that control, but had grouped the peasants in communes which were given a measure of autonomy. This same system was extended to the other great category—the state peasants. But it was felt that some mediating agency was required to intervene between the central administration and the local life of the countryside. These bodies, called at first “land institutions,” ultimately came to be known as *zemstva* (plural for *zemstvo*, from *zemlya*, land). They were arranged in two categories, the local or *uyezd zemstva*, and the provincial *zemstva*. The former were composed of representatives of the village communities of peasants, of the local nobility, and of the burghers in the cities; the latter, of delegates chosen by the former. Both had permanent officials appointed by the assemblies of the *zemstva*.

The activities of the *zemstva* covered a wide range of local interests, education, public charity, the fostering of scientific

agriculture, trade and industry, public health, the collection of *zemstvo* and state taxes, and other duties that might be imposed on them by the central authorities. This grant of a wide measure of local self-government could but raise the question of the grant of constitutional rights to the country as a whole. A marshal of the nobility of Zvenigorod, who had publicly criticized the reforms as emanating from the Emperor's *oprichnina* and not from the will of the people, was summoned before the Emperor, who said: "I give you my word that I am ready to sign any constitution whatsoever, if I were convinced that it would be expedient for Russia. But I know that if I did it today, tomorrow, Russia would fall apart into fragments."

In 1864 the reform of the courts was carried through, the ground for which had been laid in the previous reign. The judicial power was separated from the executive, administrative, and legislative. That is, in civil cases, the judicature was freed from the control of the administration; in criminal cases, the executive's only concern was to conduct the prosecution; court procedure was public; judges were irremovable; for minor cases there was a special court of justices of the peace, separate from the ordinary law courts; a special class of prosecutors was provided by the state; an official body of advocates and an institute of barristers were formed; trial by jury was introduced; in criminal cases, the theory of formal proof was done away with; a court of appeal was established; and a body of notaries was formed.

The restoration of imperial authority in Poland brought up the whole of the vexed question of the status of the former congress kingdom. The drafting of a plan for its organization and the regulation of its economic and social order was entrusted to Nikolai Milyutine, who as deputy to the Minister of the Interior had done brilliant work in emancipation. As a result of his report it was decided to extend the program of economic reform to Poland, but with an eye single to Russian interests. The lands formerly tilled by the peasants were deeded to them outright. Redemption was provided by the

state, but its cost was charged against the Polish revenues. Numerous privileges were extended to the peasants in the way of use of the commons and forest lands. The village communes (*gmina*) were given extensive rights of self-government and thus emancipated from aristocratic control. In this way the government proposed to win the favor of the peasants and to punish the aristocrats for their undying hostility to Muscovite rule. In western Russia in those provinces formerly a part of the Polish dominions but denied union with them at the reconstitution of the Kingdom in 1815, a policy of thorough russification was inaugurated, aimed at uprooting the Polish *pans* and winning back the native White Russian and Ukrainian populations to the orthodox faith and assimilating them with the Great Russian element of the Empire. This policy of russification necessarily gave affront to the Catholic Church, accompanied as it was with the secularization of church lands in the western provinces. Sharp exchanges took place with the papal court, and on November 27, 1866, the concordat was denounced.

The most pressing duty assumed on his accession by Alexander was that of healing the wounds of war. In addition to the direct losses of life, the drain on the productive forces of the country, and the check imposed on progress, the war had disorganized the country's finances. The enormous deficits occasioned by war expenditure could be met only by the absorption of the deposits of credit institutions turned into long-term loans at low rates of interest, by the issue of paper money, which on January 1, 1857, reached the stupendous figure of 689,279,000 roubles. Even the end of the war did not put a stop to the constantly recurring deficits. The painful impression made by this discovery led to a keen search for its cause and a decision to appoint a committee charged with the special task of bringing revenue and expenditure into a more satisfactory relation to one another. But little was accomplished, and in 1858 the Emperor turned to V. A. Tatarinov. His report on finances was considered by another commission under Gur'ev to draw up regulations for the budget. An elaborate system of rules was drafted and their enforcement entrusted

to a permanent commission. This commission made earnest efforts to introduce unity, regularity, and proper responsibility into the work of the Ministry of Finance and the State Control, and tried to remove the abuses due to the caprice of various departments. The revenue and expenditures of the Empire in all provinces were closely scrutinized by the controller through his provincial branches. But despite these loyal exertions, deficits began to mount again in 1859. This led to the budget being once more passed in review, and in 1860 it was frankly recognized that it was the services of defense that were imposing so heavy a burden on the state, and that these must be curtailed. Once more the committee on finance turned to the task of bringing expenditure and revenue closer together, for despite the economies, the paper money in circulation amounted in 1862 to 713,500,000 roubles. After making some minor reforms, such as the substitution of excise for the farming of the monopoly of spirits and the creation of an excise on salt, a great step forward was made, however, with the appointment of M. Kh. Reutern as minister of finance in place of Brock, who had been appointed in 1857.

Reutern was a man of great perspicacity and strength of character. His first act was the decision to publish in full the budget, and from 1866 it appeared in the press. His second was an attempt to go on the gold standard, but the attempt was abandoned in 1863 after incurring considerable loss. From this time on, the ministry of finance managed by careful accounting to build up the revenues and succeeded in finally eliminating the deficit and turning it into a surplus. But the year 1876 with its world crisis put a definite check on economic development, and the incidence of war subjected the finances to a strain such as they had not undergone since the campaign in the Crimea. Despite the foreign and domestic loans, the deficits returned, amounting in 1877 to 429,000,000 roubles, and in 1878 to 408,000,000 roubles; even in 1880 the deficit was 55,000,000 roubles. In 1878 Reutern was replaced by S. A. Greig as minister of finance. Reutern's gloomy pronouncement—that the country which was just getting on its feet after

the radical reforms of the 'sixties, was in no position to weather another storm, whatever the issue of the war, and would require another twenty years to recover from the effects—ran counter to government policy.

In one field the government had substantial success to its credit. The emancipation settlement of 1861 had provided for the purchase of their allotments by the former proprietary peasants, in cases where both peasants and landlords were agreed. After the Polish revolt the compulsory sale of their land by the Polish landlords was resorted to as a political measure (1864), and in 1881 it became universal throughout the Empire. By this date 8,500,000 peasants—84 per cent of the former proprietary serfs—had purchased their allotments. The total amount involved was in the neighborhood of 750,000,000 roubles. But against this there was a set-off of about 300,000,000 uncollectible debts of the landowners which had been carried on the books of the state bank. Thus the state was required to advance only about 434,000,000 roubles issued in bonds, to retire which there was at the disposal of the state the so-called redemption dues amounting annually to about 90,000,000 roubles collected from the peasants. This excessive levy was reduced somewhat under Alexander III but was not finally discontinued till after the revolution of 1905.

The emancipation ushered in an era of liberal ideas in all branches of economic life. There was a general slackening of government restriction, in travel, in importation and exportation of goods, and every encouragement was given to enterprise in trade, industry, and finance. The government itself took the lead in the founding of the State Bank, later creating special banks for the nobles and peasants. But a wide field was left open to private initiative, and foreign capital flowed in to engage in various enterprises. Comparing the year 1855 with 1879, we find that exchange operations for the former totaled 93,340,000 roubles, and for the latter, 417,149,000; short-term loans amounted in the former year to 9,726,000 roubles and in the latter to 271,213,000 roubles; long-term loans in 1855 amounted to 649,993,000 roubles and in 1879 to 1,647,569,000

roubles. Exports for 1855 were 39,517,000 roubles and imports 72,699,000, while in 1880 these amounted respectively to 498,672,000 and 622,811,000 roubles.

It was in the construction of railroads that the country made the most gigantic strides. At the beginning of the reign, the only railroads in existence within Russia were the Nicholas line from St. Petersburg to Moscow and the short line from St. Petersburg to Peterhof. The Crimean War had demonstrated the inadequacy of the existing lines of communication, and in 1857 a contract was signed with a group of bankers, including Baron Shtinglitz, Gotze of Amsterdam, the Perier Brothers of Paris, and the Baring Brothers of London, for the construction of a vast network of railroads totaling 4,000 *versts*. The cost was to be provided partly by the issue of shares and partly by the issue of bonds, the interest of 5 per cent on which was guaranteed by the state. But the results were insignificant. Neither bonds nor shares were paid up; the state had to advance the money to the company; the result was that the government decided to break down the monopoly of the company and to allow competing interests to take a hand.

Meanwhile a special committee to pass on the grant of concessions to railway companies was founded in 1858. But in 1863 the department of ways of communication and public works was expanded into a Ministry of Ways of Communications under Mel'nikov, and a vast plan of railway construction was drawn up to provide for the economic needs of the country, that is, access to the great centers—Moscow and St. Petersburg—access to the sea, and strategic requirements. But Mel'nikov's scheme, watered down somewhat by the cautious Reutern, did not materialize despite the favorable terms on which concessions were granted. The threat of diplomatic complications made it impossible to float bonds on the foreign markets at favorable rates.

This unsatisfactory condition was made the subject of study of a special commission appointed in 1865 and presided over by Adjutant General Chekvin. This commission found that Russia's greatest need was railroads, that while the immediate

returns were less likely to be realized than in western Europe, the probabilities of the cost ultimately being recovered were promising, and in addition, it held out prospects of the state being able to balance its budgets through savings in expenditure and the increase in revenue. The necessary railways were divided into two categories: one included those whose need was most pressing and which were to be constructed for the most part by the state; for the other category, not so essential in the immediate future, the contracts for construction were to be awarded to private individuals or to companies. Some success was achieved with the first; the second category led to such feverish activity in the organization of companies and competition in bids, that the government abolished the guarantee of interest on the loans. Competition did not secure low prices, which in many cases exceeded by 40 per cent the estimate made by government engineers. But here the government was drawn into the operations. In some cases it absorbed the shares or bonds of the companies to facilitate their operations, with the intention of disposing of them later, on the money market; in some cases vital loans or advances were made.

But the Minister of Finance had determined to extricate the state so far as lay within his power and in 1868 formed a special railway fund, into which he proposed to pay amounts realized from the sale of state railways. The first of these to be sold was the Nicholas Railway, which was sold to the Capital Railway Company for 106,000,000 roubles. The amounts accruing were to be used for the construction of new lines. In 1868 experience in the construction of railways led to the redrafting of the rules, so that civil servants were debarred from being a party to any group concerned with a railway contract; complete control in the matter of building railways and letting contracts was left with the committee of ministers. In 1869 Mel'nikov resigned and was succeeded by Count V. A. Bobrinskii. The latter embarked on a scheme whereby a company, undertaking construction, issued bonds which were deposited with the state in return for a loan from the railway fund, on which the railway was required to pay interest of 5 per cent. These bonds

were then sold by the government. The element of competition was eliminated in 1870 on the grounds that the contracts let on this basis often found their way into the hands of unreliable persons. September, 1871, Count V. A. Bobrinskii went into retirement and was replaced by Major-General Count A. P. Bobrinskii. The latter made a determined effort to reduce the organization of railway companies and the floating of loans to some sort of order and to eliminate the undesirable type of promoter by direct contact between the government and the contractor. The companies created for the control and operation of the lines were thus reduced to a position of complete dependence on the government. Bobrinskii could not agree with Reutern in his views of the relative roles of private and state enterprise. In 1874 the opposition came to a head and Bobrinskii resigned. But the elaborate machinery invented by Bobrinskii to promote private enterprise in railway building led to small results, and the war of 1877-1878 put a stop to construction except for purely military purposes.

The net result of this policy was that by the end of the reign the private railway companies had become indebted to the government to the extent of 1,091,000,000 roubles. Most of the bondholders and the management were content to draw the 5 per cent guaranteed by the state without doing anything to increase the revenue. Roads not guaranteed were in a desperate condition. It is small wonder that harassed ministers saw the only hope in the resumption by the state of all railways as security for the loans, in which case the interests of the public could at least be secured by the drafting of reasonable tariffs. During the reign of Alexander II the length of railways operated in the empire increased from 671 *versts* in 1857 to 17,568 in 1876. The amount invested in railways increased to 971,500,000 roubles. During this period other services vital to communication—post, telegraphs, steamer services—were likewise expanded to meet the new needs of commerce and industry in all parts of the Empire.

Since the Crimean War, Russia had been preoccupied at home and had held aloof from European affairs. The Ameri-

can Civil War, however, threatened to draw her into the diplomatic game. The intention of the European states led by her old enemies, Great Britain and France, to intervene in the struggle at once evoked in Russia strong sympathy for the people who had been more than friendly during the Crimean War. The Polish complications that arose in 1863 prompted the Russian government to turn to good account these cordial relations by the despatch of a naval squadron to the United States. The spontaneous demonstrations of joy that greeted this gesture of friendliness obscured the fact that it was solicitude for his vessels that had led the Tsar to despatch them to the security of a neutral port and thus save them, in case of hostilities with Great Britain and France, from the inactive role to which they had been doomed in the Crimean War by the blockade. The ground was thus prepared by this happy event for the sale of Alaska in 1867 to the United States government.

The year 1863 saw foreign affairs once more pushed to the front. This time the question concerned Schleswig and Holstein, the two Danish duchies which, with Lauenburg, had been given to the Danish crown by the Congress of Vienna. In 1848 Russia had blocked an effort of the German National Assembly to detach them from the Danish crown and add them to Germany. The result was the summoning of a conference in London, in 1852, which finally awarded them to Prince Christian of Glücksburg, who later became King Christian IX on the death of the former monarch, Frederick VII. The incorporation of the duchies in the kingdom, one of the first acts of Christian, was resented in Germany. The duchies were occupied by Saxon and Hanoverian troops on orders from the Diet. The Prussian and Austrian armies supported the other German armies, and eventually occupied Jutland. Immediately a European conference was called to attempt to arrange a settlement, but this proved impossible and hostilities were resumed which led to the complete defeat of the Danish forces. Preliminaries of peace were signed in Berlin on July 20 and confirmed by the Treaty of Vienna, October 18, 1864, by which Denmark surrendered to Austria and Prussia the duchies of

Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg. Bismarck then quietly set aside the claims of Frederick of Augustenburg and declared the duchies the property of Austria and Prussia. He later refused to submit the question of the duchies to a European conference. A quarrel with Austria over the spoils led to the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, which ended in the complete victory of Prussia, and the Peace of Prague in August 1866, dictated by a victorious Prussia to Austria. Austria was excluded from Germany, and the German confederation was transformed into the North German Confederation under Prussia, which had already absorbed a number of the smaller German states.

But events in Europe continued to move toward a new crisis. Napoleon III had remained neutral during the Austro-Prussian war with the intention of claiming compensation, but in this he was foiled by the wily diplomacy of Bismarck and exasperated by his failure. In 1869 arose the crisis over the Spanish succession, which, despite the moderating influence of Alexander, developed into war between France and Prussia. Alexander at once declared his neutrality in the struggle, and his action had a decisively sedative effect on both Austria and Italy. With the crushing defeat of France, Russia was one of the first courts visited by Thiers in his search for help for prostrate France. Active help was denied, and he was urged to make peace. Negotiations resulted in the Treaty of Frankfurt, April 28, 1871. These events crowned the reconstruction of Germany and the proclamation of the German Empire at Versailles on January 18, 1871.

The question that more vitally concerned Russia was that of her position in the Black Sea. At the height of the war, Gorchakov, inspired by Bismarck, who sought to prevent the formation of an anti-Prussian front by embroiling the other powers with one another, announced to the European signatories of the Peace of Paris, 1856, that in view of the infractions of the terms of this treaty that had already taken place, Russia considered herself no longer bound by it. The powers were forced to acquiesce, but to save face it was decided to call a

conference in London. This conference reaffirmed the principle of the closing of the Straits to warships of all nations, except on the invitation of the Sultan.

Following the Franco-Prussian war, Bismarck determined to buttress his new Germany with alliances, and he turned naturally to his old allies, Russia and Austria. In 1872, at a meeting of the three emperors in Berlin, the foundation was laid for an intimate alliance of the three courts, commonly known as the Three Emperors' Alliance. It was confirmed the following year, 1873, by military conventions between the three powers.

Two years later, Gorchakov, perhaps irritated by Bismarck's highhandedness, lent a ready ear to the French ambassador Deflaut, who maintained that Germany was preparing to wage a preventive war against France. Both Alexander II and Queen Victoria were induced to enter a protest at the German court; the former's was given personally on a visit to the Prussian court in April 1875, while Queen Victoria's was in a letter addressed to the German Emperor. The latter gave instant assurance of his peaceful intentions, but Bismarck never forgave Gorchakov for what he considered his treachery. Bismarck always contended that the menace was purely imaginary.

In 1875 events in eastern Europe took a new turn with the outbreak of serious disorders in the Balkans in the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These called forth instant sympathy, not only in the neighboring states of Serbia and Montenegro, but also in distant Russia, where the Slavophiles and the Panslavs at once rose to the aid of their distressed kinsmen. The revolt was put down with severity, and when it was later followed by an outbreak in Bulgaria, Turkish patience was exhausted and the repression of the revolt was marked by savage brutality. Immediately Russian opinion took fire, and there was a call for intervention to save the Christian population from extinction. A proposal of Andrassy for reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina found favor with the powers, but was rejected by the insurgents on the pretext that the promise of reform was not accompanied by guarantees. Alexander submitted the

problem to the Alliance of the Three Emperors, and a joint note was drafted to be submitted to the Porte, to which both France and Italy afterwards subscribed. Britain had already despatched her fleet to the Mediterranean but refused to join the concert of powers. At this juncture, feeling in Constantinople ran high. When the crisis was most acute, the Sultan was deposed by a palace revolution, and a nephew, Murad V, was installed in his place. But the change of monarchs failed sensibly to ease the tension. A series of brutal atrocities at the expense of the population in Bulgaria served but further to inflame public opinion in Europe.

Finally the sword of the two little Slavic states of the Balkans, Serbia and Montenegro, was thrown into the scales, with results disastrous for themselves. Confronted with overwhelming superiority, they were overborne by their opponent and in their extremity compelled to appeal to the allies. The crisis in the Balkans brought to the fore the latent rivalry of Austria and Russia. The former stood squarely opposed to the grant of autonomy to Bosnia and Herzegovina. This led to the meeting between the two sovereigns, Francis Joseph and Alexander, at Reichstadt in Bohemia in July 1876, at which it was agreed that they would consult together to regulate the situation in the Balkans. No actual treaty was signed, the results of the conference being embodied in a protocol drafted afterwards from the notes of the two ministers, the consequence being that there were two conflicting versions.

A second palace revolution in Constantinople ended in the deposition of Murad V and the accession of his half-brother, Abdul Hamid II. Efforts were now made to secure an armistice between the belligerents, but diplomatic negotiations were long drawn out. In the meantime, Serbian resistance collapsed. In the excited condition of public opinion at home, the Russian government was compelled to send an ultimatum to Constantinople calling for an immediate armistice of one month or six weeks. The ultimatum was accepted on October 20. Yet military precautions were not neglected, for on November 1, when the imperial couple returned to Tsarskoe

Selo, orders went out to mobilize twelve infantry divisions, with their artillery brigades, four rifle brigades, seven cavalry divisions with their horse artillery, four artillery parks, two brigades of sappers, the Don Cossack division, and ten Don regiments, a force whose total peace establishment was 272,000 but which was ultimately, when put on a war footing, 546,000 men. The alarming nature of the situation led to an agreement to call an international conference at Constantinople to regulate the eastern question. Lord Salisbury, minister of colonies in the cabinet of Disraeli, was named a delegate. He visited most of the European capitals on his way to the conference at Constantinople. Notes were exchanged between St. Petersburg and Berlin, while negotiations were set on foot to arrange a settlement with Vienna in case of a breach with Turkey. This issued in the Convention of Budapest; it was based on the agreement of Reichstadt, one of whose secret clauses provided that Austria was at liberty to choose the time for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The conference assembled at Constantinople just before Christmas, 1876, but without achieving results. Turkey took the wind out of the sails of the conference by proclaiming a constitution, but rejected all efforts to coerce her into making peace with Montenegro and Serbia, or pledging herself to introduce reforms. The conference on January 22, 1877, dispersed without reaching any conclusive results.

The ambassadors met once more at London, and on March 31 (N. S.) drew up a declaration to present to Turkey, calling for an improvement in the lot of her subjects, an effort at reform, and a reduction of her army to peace footing. To demonstrate her good faith, the Ottoman Porte was called upon to despatch an ambassador to St. Petersburg to agree on final terms of peace. Failing this, the powers would reserve to themselves the right to take steps necessary to the protection of their own interests. This led to a rupture of diplomatic relations between Russia and the Porte on April 21, and the Russian armies were moved across the frontiers in accordance with the terms of an agreement signed on April 16 at Bucharest by

which the Rumanian government accorded to Russia the right to pass its armies through the principalities.

The Russian plan of campaign was largely determined by a few major factors. In the first place, though Russia had, by the Treaty of London, resumed the right to maintain a fleet on the Black Sea, her naval strength was not yet sufficient to protect the left flank of a march through the Dobrudja as in 1828. She must therefore pass her military forces through the Principalities, across the Danube at Sistova or Nikopolis, throw out forces to the right to guard against troops coming from the west down the Danube and to the left to mask the quadrilateral of fortresses in the Dobrudja, and, thus secured, push the main body across the main range of the Balkans and advance down the Maritza valley on Philippopolis, Adrianople, and finally on Constantinople itself. The Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolayevich, brother of the Tsar, was named commander-in-chief.

The main Russian army was concentrated in Wallachia to the north of the Danube and about equidistant from Nikopolis, Sistova, and Rustchuk. During the night of June 26-27 a pontoon bridge was run across the Danube at Sistova. On the morning of the 27th the advance guard crossed under General Dragomirov. On July 16 Nikopolis fell. In the meantime, Osman Pasha with a force of 40,000 troops fresh from their victory over the Serbians were on the march from Widdin towards the east. On July 17, this force came into collision with the pickets of the Caucasian brigade under General Schilder-Schuldner along the line of the Vid, who on the following morning was directed to occupy the town of Plevna. With quite inadequate forces at his command and in almost complete ignorance of the strength of his adversaries, Schilder was thrown back, and thus the first attempt to carry Plevna ended in complete failure. To remove this serious threat to the Russian right flank, the attack was renewed on July 30, but despite the most persistent efforts of the left wing under Shakovskii and the personal leadership of Skobelev, the most meager results were attained. The positions captured after most frightful losses had to be given up.

Meanwhile Gurko had been selected to lead a picked force with pack transport across the Balkans by a blind trail halfway between the Elena and Travna passes and to take in reverse the main route across the mountains—the Shipka pass—on whose defense the Turks had concentrated their efforts. The stroke was brilliantly successful, and the pass fell into the hands of the Russians. But Gurko found himself confronted with the greatly superior forces of Suleiman Pasha in the Tunja valley, and since no reinforcements could be sent him from the north, on August 5 (N. S.) he was forced back across the mountains on Tirnova, though still managing to keep control of Shipka pass. The commander-in-chief had decided to remain on the defensive along the line of the Balkans to his front and on the Lom and the Yantra on his left flank, while bringing every effort to bear on his right flank against Plevna. But even for this effort, reinforcements on a generous scale were required. On August 3 the Tsar signed an order for the mobilization of a further force of 120,000 men and 460 guns. But before these troops could be brought to bear, the Russian lines were heavily attacked at Shipka, August 21-23 (N. S.), where Suleiman was brought to a standstill, and along the Lom and the Yantra, where Mehemet Ali after initial successes was finally checked by a defeat inflicted on him at Cherkovna on September 21 (N. S.). Operations were now begun to secure greater freedom for their right flank by pushing the Turks back from Lovcha on the road from Plevna to Shipka and thus isolating Plevna on the south. This was accomplished in the battle of Lovcha, September 3, and the Russians were thereby enabled to close in on Plevna.

On September 7 the attacks were renewed, culminating in a grand assault on September 11, launched with the greatest determination and self-sacrifice, but finally brought to a standstill. The Russians were compelled to retire to their own lines and abandon their attempts. The result of this was that Todleben, the hero of Sevastopol, was summoned as “adjunct” to the commander of the west army, Prince Charles of Rumania, on September 14 (N. S.), and the decision was taken

to reduce the town by investment. After the inevitable lull following the engagement, to allow for regrouping and reinforcing units, the two wings of the Russian lines were advanced to effect encirclement and to isolate the town. This was completed on November 2, and the commander-in-chief now having ample forces at his disposal, Gurko was sent along the road to Sofia to occupy Orkhanie. On the night of December 9-10, 1877, the garrison of Plevna made a desperate sortie in an attempt to break through the Russian lines on the Vid. The effort failed, and the Turkish commander surrendered at discretion.

The fall of Plevna immediately released the Russian main armies, and the advance across the Balkans was at once resumed. The considerations that dictated a winter campaign were political. The English government under Disraeli had taken up an attitude of uncompromising hostility toward the Russian campaign. In the late summer, Disraeli had sent a confidential communication to Alexander that England could hardly maintain her policy of neutrality in the event of a second campaign. The Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolayevich thus realized that it was a race with time and determined, despite the arguments against it, on a winter campaign. Reinforcements were then hurried forward to the troops in position along the Balkans. Gurko forced the passage of the range at Araba-Konak, placing himself astride the Sofia-Philippopolis road. Sofia fell and with it immense reserves of food, ammunition, and other supplies. Meanwhile Radetzky, on January 9 (N. S.), 1878, forced the Shipka pass and captured the Turkish army defending their positions at the outlet to the pass in the neighborhood of the town of Shipka. Gurko pressed over the Isker-Maritza watershed through Trojan's Gate. He overtook the forces of Suleiman Pasha at Philippopolis, where he intercepted their retreat towards Adrianople and compelled him to retire across the Rhodope mountains to the south. Fuad Pasha on Suleiman's left was, however, compelled to give battle with his back to the mountains and isolated from the main body of the Turks. On January 17 he vainly endeavored to

avoid encirclement, but at nightfall his whole force dispersed and ascended the slopes of the Rhodope mountains through the snow in the effort to reach the coast. The whole Russian line, from Gurko's right wing at Philippopolis in the west to the army of the Dobrudja in the far northeast, began to converge on Constantinople in a series of forced marches. On January 22 Skobelev occupied Adrianople, which was entered by the Grand Duke and his staff on January 26 (N. S.). Enos on the Aegean at the mouth of the Maritza was occupied on January 29. Radetzky reached Kirk-Kilisse while Skobelev occupied Chorlu. Late on January 31 (N. S.) an armistice signed at Adrianople ended hostilities. It embodied the essential conditions of peace reached at San Stefano, March 1: (1) the erection of Bulgaria into an autonomous tributary principality with a national Christian government and a native militia; (2) the independence of Montenegro with an increase of territory; (3) the independence of Rumania and Serbia with a territorial indemnity; (4) the introduction of administrative reforms into Bosnia and Herzegovina; (5) an indemnity in money to Russia for the expenses of the war. Guarantees of a military character were demanded to prevent the renewal of hostilities.

THE CAMPAIGN IN ARMENIA

The campaign against Turkey in the Transcaucasus was under the direction of the Grand Duke Michael Nikolayevich, Viceroy of the Caucasus, who had at his disposal about 55,000 men and 210 field guns of all calibers, a force considerably less than that of the Turks opposed to him. The plan of campaign was to secure Ardahan and Bayazid (across the southern part of the frontier), to invest Kars, and after securing the fortress, to march on Erzerum. Loris-Melikov began the investment of Kars on April 28, 1877. Bayazid was occupied on April 30, and a force despatched from Kars succeeded in capturing Ardahan on May 17. Despite the initial successes, the offensive came to a standstill early in the summer, and at Bayazid the tables were turned on the Russians when the little garrison was actually in turn besieged by an army composed largely of


Kurdish freebooters and was rescued only with great difficulty. Loris-Melikov was worsted in a battle at Zevin on June 25, compelled to raise the siege of Kars, and forced to retire to wait for reinforcements. These began to arrive in August. On the 18th Loris-Melikov attacked the Turkish position at Aladja Dagħ with indecisive results. It was not until October 15 that a serious attack was made, the result of which was the destruction of nearly half the army of Moukhtar Pasha, the remainder fleeing to the protection of Kars. Heimann was despatched along the road to Erzerum. On October 24 he succeeded in driving Moukhtar Pasha behind the protection of the fortifications of Erzerum. Heimann's attacks failed, and he decided to await reinforcements.

Meanwhile the main body of Loris-Melikov drew its lines tighter around Kars, and on the night of November 17-18 a general assault without artillery preparation was delivered. After a night of fighting, the whole series of fortifications on the right bank of the Kars River were in Russian hands. The garrison made a desperate effort to cut its way through to the Erzerum road but found itself caught between the infantry in front and a force of Cossacks despatched to their rear. All but a handful surrendered, and the fortress thus passed completely into the hands of the Russians. During December reinforcements were despatched to General Heimann before Erzerum, and the latter made his investment of the city complete, but it was still in the possession of the Turks at the time of the armistice on January 31, 1878.

Great Britain had pursued a policy of watchful waiting. But the prime minister, the Earl of Beaconsfield, was firmly resolved to prevent Russia from securing direct access to the Mediterranean, which might endanger England's position in those waters. He could not, however, openly espouse the cause of Turkey. The atrocities committed by the Turks in Bulgaria in 1875, forcefully brought home to the English people by Gladstone and others, had made the English little disposed to entertain such a project. Disraeli had, therefore, to content himself with a policy of "conditional neutrality," trusting to

warnings uttered by England and Turkish resistance to make Russia reasonable. But the fall of Plevna on December 10 and the complete collapse of Turkey in January turned what had merely been a remote contingency into an immediate probability. Supported by Queen Victoria, Disraeli pushed forward in his determination to prevent the destruction of Turkey in Europe by the Russian occupation of Constantinople and the creation of an overgrown Bulgarian state. He forced the resignation of recalcitrant cabinet members and pressed through Parliament a war vote and other war measures. Instructions were also sent January 24 (N. S.) to the admiral in command of the British fleet at Besika Bay to pass the Dardanelles and to take station in the Sea of Marmora close to the Turkish capital, though the order was almost immediately countermanded. Nevertheless, two weeks later, on the conclusion of the armistice and receipt of the information that the Russian armies were advancing on Constantinople, the British cabinet, on the initiative of Disraeli, renewed instructions to the admiral in command of the fleet to pass the Dardanelles and to anchor in the Sea of Marmora near the capital. This was accomplished though the permission of the Porte was withheld. The other powers were invited to participate in joint action to restrain Russia. The demand made on Russia was that the terms of the treaty signed (whose contents were still unknown) should be passed in review by the European powers that had signed the treaties of 1856 and 1871. Austria proposed a conference. Arrangements were first made to hold the conference at Vienna, but later the place of meeting was changed to Berlin. The conference was replaced by a congress. But to England's categorical demand that the congress have plenary powers actually to modify the terms of the treaty, Russia returned a categorical "no." On March 27 (N. S.) Disraeli decided to call out the reserves. On April 1, the new secretary of state for foreign affairs, the Marquis of Salisbury, addressed a circular to all the powers defining England's position and asking for support. A tense situation lasted throughout April. Early in May Shuvalov went home to St. Petersburg and secured the

consent of the Russian government to the consideration of the Treaty of San Stefano (1878) by the congress. On his return a memorandum was composed and signed by Salisbury and Shuvalov at London on May 30 (N. S.) by which not only did Russia agree to submit the treaty to the congress, but she pledged herself beforehand to accept the modifications demanded by England. Russia agreed to the reduction of the "Greater Bulgaria" called into existence by the Treaty of San



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THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN (1878) HELD AT THE CLOSE OF THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR TO SETTLE THE BALKAN PROBLEM.

Stefano. The autonomous Bulgaria, ruled by a prince of its own, was to have as its southern frontier the summit of the Balkan range. The Aegean coast (western Thrace), together with Macedonia, was definitely retroceded to the Porte, while the area south of the Balkans was to be erected into a Turkish province, to be known as Eastern Rumelia, and receive some measure of administrative self-government. The question of the right of the Sultan to occupy the line of the Balkans with his own troops was to be submitted to the congress. Disraeli also insisted that Russia should not retain Batum and other acquisitions made during the war; but in case Russia were

obdurate, he proposed to protect England's interest by securing the cession of Cyprus to enable Great Britain to ward off any menace to the integrity of Asiatic Turkey from that quarter.

The congress opened at Berlin on June 13, 1878, under the chairmanship of Bismarck. The Earl of Beaconsfield (Disraeli) and the Marquis of Salisbury represented England; Gorchakov and Shuvalov, Russia; while Austria was represented by Andrassy. On the question of the right of the Sultan to occupy Eastern Rumelia with armed forces, Disraeli would admit of no accommodation and threatened to go to war rather than concede it. Russia gave in. On the retention of Batum, the utmost concession that Disraeli could win was that Batum should be made a free port. The other provisions of the congress of a less controversial nature were those ceding to Russia the districts of Kars and Ardahan in Armenia and those modifying the boundaries of the other Balkan states, in most of which the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano were whittled down.

In summing up the results of the Congress of Berlin, Disraeli in 1880 said:² "Next to making a tolerable settlement for the Porte, our great object was to break up, and permanently prevent, the alliance of the Three Empires, and I maintain that never was a general diplomatic result more completely effected. . . ."

Austria, despite the agreement of Reichstadt and the convention of Budapest, had actually joined Great Britain in compelling Russia to submit the Treaty of San Stefano to a European congress. And Bismarck, to whom the *Dreikaiserbund* represented the cornerstone of his whole political system, found himself compelled to side with England and Austria against Russia and rob the latter of the fruits of her victory.

ALEXANDER'S LAST DAYS

The last days of the Emperor Alexander II were decisive in Russia's external relations no less than in her domestic affairs.

² Monypenny and Buckle, *The Life of Benjamin Disraeli* (1929), New and Revised Edition, Vol. II, p. 1239. By permission of John Murray, London, England.

He could not reconcile the role of the "honest broker" assumed by Bismarck during the Near Eastern Crisis of 1877-1878 with that of a genuine ally. It fanned his barely concealed distrust for the policy of Bismarck, which had been gathering force since 1876, and foreshadowed the cooling of those intimate relations that had subsisted between the courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg since the beginning of the century if, indeed, they do not go back to the time of Peter III. Worse than that, *rapprochement* between Russia and the new French republic, which the chancellor had for years striven to avert, began now to cloud the international horizon.

Internally the country entered on a state of social stress and intellectual confusion. The current of radical thought, long dammed up by Nicholas I, had been released with the accession of Alexander. It is true that the immediate effects were salutary. The near prospects of reform reconciled the exiled Herzen to the new regime. His capitulation was signalized in the generous words of the Emperor Julian, "Galilean, thou hast conquered"; the title "Emancipator" was his personal tribute to the reforming monarch. During the all-too-brief period of reform, the government enjoyed a respite from the scourge of the revolutionaries. But with the Polish rising of 1863 and the escape of Michael Bakunin from the fortress of Schlüsselburg to Switzerland, a new opposition began to develop. Groups of students gathered round the veteran agitator in his retreat in Switzerland and came under the spell of his teaching. By cancelling the permission to reside abroad, the Russian government sought to avert the menace by withdrawing his disciples from his influence. In this they were successful, for all but the leader, Bakunin, obeyed the government's instructions and returned—but they returned solemnly pledged to the task of carrying the seeds of the new socialism, "To the People." To achieve this end they sought occupation in the villages, and among the people, as school teachers, *feldschers*,³ industrial workers—no calling was too lowly that brought them into intimate contact with the masses, among whom they sought to

³ A medical officer with practical, but not university, training.

undermine confidence in the existing social order and to prepare the way for a new one.

But the movement proved abortive. The "white-handed gentry" with their abstractions were received with indifference. When they began to question the authority of the all-powerful Tsar, it was too much for the peasants, to whom the veneration of the monarch was a habit deeply ingrained through the centuries, and forthwith the agitators were handed over to the police. Those who avoided this fate had no recourse but to seek refuge in the cities, where, out of their disillusionment and searching of heart, was born a new and more promising movement. They had had enough of talk and discussion. What was needed, they felt, was the adoption of more active methods to focus attention on the country's desperate plight and the crying need of reform. This was to be achieved by individual acts of terror against the ruling class in the hope of inducing the government to renew the interrupted program of reform.

The first act was an attempt by a young student, Vera Zasulich, on the life of General Trepov, commander of St. Petersburg, in retaliation for a flogging administered on somewhat trivial grounds to an inmate of one of the prisons. The jury sworn in to try the case refused to convict; she was acquitted. The consequence was a whole series of outrages against the persons of officials. The government replied to violence by violence. Behind prison walls and in the secrecy of the chamber of examination, the anger of the police vented itself on the unfortunate accused and further embittered the struggle between the state and its adversaries. Finally a student, Solovyev, dismissed from the university, lurked in the grounds of the Winter Palace on April 15, 1879, in the hope of bagging bigger game. His poor marksmanship was all that saved the Tsar. As usual, the sensational act in which the campaign culminated, as well as the blind fury with which the government struck back, checked all but the boldest spirits. The more moderate fell away and left to a few fanatics the continuation of the struggle. On December 1, 1879, a mine was sprung under the

imperial train; again the Emperor's life was saved by accident. The explosion occurred under the second section of the train after the first section carrying the Emperor had already passed. Evidently it was to be a fight to the finish waged against the bureaucracy by a handful of terrorists determined to wring concessions from the government by a campaign of ruthless terror.

This time the government temporized. A special committee was instructed to examine the problem of calling a constituent assembly of the Empire, though its work was impeded by the outspoken opposition of the heir-apparent, Alexander. On February 5 (17), 1880, came the reply of the revolutionary committee—the blowing up of the banquet hall of the imperial palace. Again the Emperor was saved; this time a guest's late arrival had delayed the entrance of the imperial family. But the ruins were littered with the bodies of attendants, casualties in a struggle in which they had no interest. Alexander capitulated.

The first step was the appointment of a special commission which, through the six governors-general, would initiate measures looking to the re-establishment of public order and confidence. At its head was Loris-Melikov, an Armenian by birth, the general whose sensational capture of Kars in the Turkish war had won him an enviable popularity. His strong hand brought the violence of the "six satraps" within bounds. In an effort to calm the storm of popular discontent, Count Dmitrii Tolstoi, the hated Procurator of the Holy Synod and minister of public instruction, was sacrificed. His place was taken by a comparatively obscure man in the person of Constantine Pobyedonostsev, a member of the state council. By a purge of its worst offenders the police received a warning that their true role was the enforcement of law, and not the wreaking of private vengeance on offenders. The dictator then recommended that public opinion be appeased by a plan for a constitution. A proclamation of March 13, 1881, called for the convening of a representative assembly within the near future. This body, unlike the democratic legislative assemblies of western Europe,

was to have merely a consultative function; it was to be patterned after the preparatory commission appointed in 1859 to consider the problem of emancipation.

Meanwhile a secret terroristic organization known as the "Will of the People" had managed to elude the administrative eye and to continue its conspiracies against the government. Toward the end of December 1880, the leader of the group, Aleksandr Mikhailov, fell into the hands of the police; the leadership now devolved on Andrei Sheliabov, under whose direction preparations were begun for mining the street *Malaya Sadova*, frequently used by the imperial escort in passing from the Winter Palace to the Mikhailovskii Palace, and which it was anticipated the Emperor would follow on Easter morning on his way to the religious services. The conspirators rented for this purpose a basement apartment where they opened a cheese shop. From this vantage point they drove a tunnel under the street and laid a mine. In addition, they made bombs which, entrusted to the various members of the conspiracy, were to be used in the event of a failure of the mine to achieve their purpose.

On Easter Sunday the imperial *cortège* did not pass along the *Neuskii Prospekt* and *Malaya Sadova*, but proceeded along the Catherine Canal, to the Mikhailovskii palace to enable the Tsar to pay a visit to the Grand Duchess Ekaterina Mikhailovna. Alexander returned by the same route between two and three in the afternoon. On passing *Inzhenernaya* Street the leader, Sophia Perovskaya, posted across the canal to elude observation, dropped her handkerchief, the signal agreed upon. Thereupon Rysakov, stationed near the corner of *Inzhenernaya*, threw his bomb at the imperial equipage. There was an ear-splitting detonation; as the smoke cleared away bystanders could see a Cossack and a workman lying on the ground while others near by were seriously wounded. Alexander stopped the carriage, alighted, walked over to the group surrounding the trembling Rysakov. After questioning him, he started to return to the carriage, when a second bomb was hurled by Grinevetskii, one of the terrorists who had stood apart from

the crowd leaning on the iron fence that ran along the canal, apparently an idle spectator of the scene. The bomb went off at the feet of Alexander; and for the second time as the smoke cleared, a scene of horror was presented to those near by; the monarch lay huddled against the iron paling, terribly mangled. Hardly able to cry for help, he swooned as he was lifted to the sledge to be carried back to the Winter Palace. A trail of blood marked the route traversed by the forlorn cavalcade. Alexander was carried up to his own work room and laid on the bed. Efforts were made to check the loss of blood and bring the sufferer back to consciousness. In vain. At 3:35 in the afternoon March 13, 1881, the Tsar died.

"The Will of the People" had achieved its aim. Some of its members were stricken with remorse at their all-too-complete success, with its attendant horror. Such withdrew from active participation in the struggle. But to the bolder spirits the elimination of the Tsar was but a step preparatory to the emancipation of the people. One of their number, Lev Tikhomirov, penned an "Open Letter to the Tsar" addressed to the dead Emperor's successor. On behalf of the organization, and of the people, the young Alexander was exhorted to finish the work which his father had left unfinished; that is, the conferring of a constitution on the Russian nation.

[27]

ALEXANDER THE THIRD

THE ACCESSION of a new sovereign was to be fatal to the constitution. The young prince who now came to the throne was physically cast in the mold of Peter the Great, but his mental capacity was limited, and in addition he had a somewhat restricted outlook. Moreover, during the lifetime of his elder brother Nicholas, the secondary role for which he was cast called for hardly more than a perfunctory education. It was only after his brother's death had advanced him to the rank of heir-apparent that this was seriously taken in hand and entrusted, by a fateful chance, to the reactionary Constantine Pobyedonostsev, professor of civil law at the University of Moscow. The imperial pupil possessed some qualities to be desired in a monarch, a high sense of duty, and a scrupulous honor. But lack of confidence in himself exposed him to the influence of others of more pronounced views—particularly of his instructor, known for his Slavophil views and his frankly conservative tendencies.

In the confusion that attended the death of the Emperor Alexander II, the question of constitutional reform called for an immediate decision. But at the first session of the State Council, the two grand dukes, Constantine and Vladimir, pronounced against the grant of constitutional rights. Pobyedonostsev, as Procurator of the Holy Synod, opposed it with all the fanatical hatred of which he was capable, supporting his anti-constitutional views with a wealth of learning and eloquence. In the agony of uncertainty, Alexander temporized by turning the matter over to a special committee under the chairmanship of Loris-Melikov. The discordant clamor of

the would-be leaders of public opinion, the Slavophiles, under Aksakov, and the liberal congresses of *zemstva* and of the nobles, each advancing their own strongly partisan opinions, made confusion worse confounded. Eventually, perhaps at



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ALEXANDER III

the instigation of Pobyedonostsev, the matter was secretly decided by the Emperor in person. The Tsar was induced to sign a manifesto declaring that he had taken over the government "with belief in the might and truth of autocracy, which he was resolved to maintain and defend against all assaults." The publication of this document, perhaps without the Em-

peror's realizing it, finally decided the issue of constitutional government and was so interpreted both by the bureaucracy and by public opinion.

The drastic measures of repression now adopted by the government against the terrorists merely drove the remnants of the revolutionary movement deeper underground. The sapping began in the navy; then in the army, where a conspiracy of two hundred officers, with a certain Baron Stromberg at their head, was unearthed in 1883, and its members taken into custody. The place of the leader, now in prison, was taken by Lopatin and the center of the movement was transferred to Paris. The subsequent attempt to revive it in Russia resulted merely in delivering its five hundred members into the hands of the government. This blow effectively paralyzed the activity of the nihilists for some years. The police, under the direction of Vyacheslav Plehve, Minister of the Interior from 1881 to 1884, and his successor Peter Durnovo, Minister from 1884 to 1893, had little difficulty in keeping the movement within bounds. The public was cold toward revolution, while for a brief spell the state actually received the coöperation of certain radical elements in rooting out the hateful tree of nihilism. The last echo of this terrorism was a conspiracy formed in 1887 to murder the Emperor on the occasion of his annual visit to the tomb of his father in the fortress of Peter and Paul. The leader, Alexander Ulyanov, and his companions were arrested. Together with Ulyanov, four of them paid with their lives for their folly. A younger brother of Alexander, Vladimir Ulyanov, was roused to fierce hatred by what seemed to him the savage reprisals of the authorities, and he swore to avenge his brother's death. He is known to us by the name of Lenin, which he adopted. At the death of Alexander III in 1894 the old revolutionary spirit of the nihilists was dead. Both Switzerland and France had withdrawn the hospitality they had so long extended to refugees: Switzerland out of her need for the gold of the Russian tourist; France out of deference to the wishes of a government whose friendship she was so assiduously courting. But apart from these extraneous factors, a

new type of revolutionary had come on the stage and the old one, of necessity, bowed himself off.

INTERNAL CHANGES

To establish the causes of the transformation that came over Russia in the 'eighties and the 'nineties, we must go back to the time of Nicholas I, when Slavophilism first appeared in Russia. The movement was in part a perfectly natural revulsion against the foreign influences that had predominated at court since the early part of the eighteenth century; in part it was also a product of the French Revolution and of the nationalist movement that grew out of the revolutionary epoch. But it was also in part an expression of injured pride at the failure of western Europe to form a just appreciation of Russian culture. If it could be established that in the Slavic world there was another and a better scheme of values according to which Russia stood higher than western Europe, the Slavophiles' wounded self-complacency might be solaced. But even this balm in Gilead, while it brought some consolation, did not carry a full measure of comfort to the Russian heart. The solidarity of the Slavic family of nations must be vindicated before the world, and this could be done only by freeing it everywhere from bondage. Hence on its political side Slavophilism tended to pass into pan-Slavism, though the Slavophiles were seldom at first ardent nationalists, or even pan-Slavs. But nationalism was in the air during the nineteenth century, and nationalism above all else meant emancipation from all bondage either political or economic.

In Russia three movements, Slavophilism, pan-Slavism, and nationalism, eventually merged in one great and irresistible tide that moved toward national self-sufficiency. Russians, however, saw that it was idle to talk of cultural emancipation till the country had achieved economic independence of western Europe. This conviction accorded with the trend of the times where, from the 'sixties, the doctrine of economic nationalism advanced by Friedrich List was making rapid progress and its converts were making the first experiments with protective

tariffs. Germany under Bismarck broke with *laissez-faire* in 1879, and already the baneful effects of its new fiscal policy were being felt in Russia. It was an added drop in the cup of Alexander's bitterness that Germany was growing great and rich at the expense of her poorer neighbors, and it became his firm policy to achieve emancipation from German thralldom by stimulating the growth of native industries in Russia.

Under the liberal regime of Alexander II, these had been slow to strike root. In common with many others, Alexander III came to the conclusion that the time had come for a revamping of the country's fiscal policy. The first protective tariff was finally drawn up by Vyshnegradskii and put into effect in 1891. Its provisions had not had time to make their effects visible before Vyshnegradskii had resigned from the post of Minister of Finance and his place had been taken by Sergei Witte in 1892. It was Witte, therefore, who incurred the displeasure of the German government at this reversal of policy that threatened seriously to hamper commercial relations with that country. But in spite of threats, Witte refused to abate in favor of Germany one jot or one tittle of the new tariff. His courage and self-confidence, however much it alarmed the official world of St. Petersburg, was amply justified in the results. Caprivi had to retreat from the impossible position he had taken up, to the great glee of the fallen Bismarck, which found expression in a message of congratulation he despatched secretly to the new Russian minister. The net result was that the double tariff was allowed to stand and the privileges that Germany secured in Russian commerce had to be dearly bought with concessions. In 1893 a similar treaty was signed with France, although, since French trade was slight as compared with German, less significance was attached to it.

A second factor in the forward surge of Russia's economic life was the nationalization of the railways and the construction, at state expense, of the railway across Siberia. Inspired by the example of the great railway builders in America, Alexander thought to equal or even surpass their achievements by throwing a great band of steel across the trackless wastes of Asia.

Coupled with the construction of the railway were other related enterprises: the building of rolling stock and the construction of dockyards, of harbors and harbor works, and of fortified naval bases. With the extension of the railway into Manchuria as the Chinese Eastern, these projects assumed formidable proportions not only economically, but also diplomatically. At home the insatiable demand for iron and steel, for timber, for all kinds of building material—most of them, thanks to the new protective tariff, now produced within the Empire—set the wheels of industry turning and kept them running for many years. The result was an unprecedented boom in Russia that lasted almost till the close of the century.


But the state did not restrict its energies to railway building and its associated industries. Beginning with 1893, the government called into being a gigantic monopoly in the sale of intoxicating liquor. Without undertaking the actual manufacture, which was left to private enterprise, the state assumed the task of refining liquors and conducted their sale through retail shops. Enormous profits flowed from this source into the coffers of the state, and the personnel required to administer the monopoly brought a huge increase in the already swollen army of the bureaucrats.

Simultaneously with these changes came others in the monetary system which culminated in the adoption in 1897 of the gold standard and the revaluation of the rouble at two thirds of its former nominal value. By these enactments the old confusion and uncertainty in domestic business and foreign exchange came to an end. Ordinary commercial transactions were greatly facilitated, and the worst obstacles to the ready flow of capital and of interest across the frontiers were removed.

It is difficult to determine what each of the different factors contributed to this industrial boom of the 'nineties, but the general results are not open to question. The number of workers in industry and the industrial output, which hitherto had increased but slowly, began in 1887 to show substantial gains; and by 1893 the workers engaged in industry had risen from 1,318,048 in 1887 to 1,582,904 in 1893. Production of industrial

goods, which in 1887 had stood at 1,334,499,000 roubles, had by 1893 risen to 1,734,997,000, and by 1897 to 2,839,144,000.

But there was another side to the picture. Ever since the edict of emancipation, controversy had raged around the question as to whether the provisions of this legislation had furnished a satisfactory settlement of the peasant's economic grievances. There were many who maintained that the peasant's allotments were inadequate and that some provision must



Sovfoto.

NIZHNYI NOVGOROD (GORKII) AND ITS KREMLIN.

be made for the constantly increasing population of the Russian countryside. The answer seemed to come with startling suddenness in 1891, when a famine of catastrophic proportions swept the middle Volga and adjacent regions. The local resources for relief were rapidly exhausted. Appeals were made to the provincial and central administrations, but the bureaucratic wheels turned with great deliberation and very awkwardly, with the result that the widespread distress deepened into a horror, the full extent of which became known but slowly to the general public owing to the censorship. Eventu-

ally Count Leo Tolstoi and others, who realized the magnitude of the disaster before the rest of the country, appealed to the world. The *zemstva*, more responsive to the human appeal and less hampered by official red tape, threw themselves into the breach, and their members did yeoman service in combating the calamity. Eventually funds flowed from abroad and from more favored sections of the country, and the rate of mortality slowed up. But in the wake of the famine came a visitation of the cholera which by its severity, and the area affected, again taxed to the limit the resources of the state and of private agencies that were enlisted to combat it. These twin disasters left deep scars on the body politic of Russia. It was their appalling effect that nerved Alexander to undertake the reforms of the 'nineties, and it was under their shadow that the realignment of Russia's foreign policy with that of France was pushed through between 1891 and 1894. The Emperor was not to live to see the effects of these drastic changes, for he passed away suddenly in November 1894, to be succeeded by his eldest son, Nicholas.

While the earlier years of Alexander III had brought merely cessation in the movement of reform, towards the end of the 'eighties there was definite retrogression. Trial by jury, one of the innovations from the West, had seemed to be a guarantee of the fundamental rights of the citizen. In 1887, however, class representatives nominated by the state replaced the juries in many cases. But the crowning blow came in the same year when the elected justices of the peace in the country districts were replaced by the *zemskie nachal'niki*.¹ Thus not only were the rights of self-government of the peasants greatly abridged by bringing them under police control; in addition, the justice administered to them now, instead of springing from their own customs and needs, was turned into a means by which they could be brought under the domination of the landlord class.

¹ Land-captains.

NICHOLAS THE SECOND

THE ACCESSION of the young Nicholas II brought a series of critical developments in public opinion in Russia. On the occasion of his marriage to Princess Alice of Hesse on November 14 (O.S.), 1894, deputations from the nobility, from the *zemstva*, from the chief cities, from the universities and other corporations, waited on the Tsar to convey their loyal felicitations. The delegates were forbidden to offer formal addresses expressive of their devotion to the person of the monarch, but were ordered to confine themselves to the traditional presentation of bread and salt. The blundering and tactless manner in which they were herded together while their gifts of bread and salt and the keys they had brought were gathered by perfunctory attendants was aggravated by the Tsar's delay in putting in an appearance. When he finally came out from his conference with Pobyedonostsev, pale and confused, he repeated parrot-like the lesson he had learned from his instructor and harangued the deputies on their duties as subjects:

I realize that recently in some *zemstvo* gatherings voices were raised by persons who have allowed themselves to be carried away by senseless dreams of the participation of representatives of the *zemstva* in the inner government of the state. Let all know that I shall devote all my energies to the welfare of the people, but also that I shall maintain, firmly and unshaken, the fundamental principles of autocracy as did my father, whose memory will ever live in my heart.

The studied discourtesy with which the sovereign received the expressions of the genuine loyalty of his subjects alienated public opinion and went far to revive popular movements

against the dynasty. This wanton flouting of the aspirations of reformers coincided with the rise of a new revolutionary movement based on the teachings of Marx and patterning itself after the Social Democratic party in Germany. Its leader was George Plekhanov, the son of a nobleman who had become a professional revolutionary and had fled to Germany to take up there the study of Marx's doctrines. Turning his back on his former associates and their principles, he advanced the view that the hope of Russia and of the Russian Revolution was not, as the *narodniki* held, the Russian peasant with his mystic reverence for the Tsar, his superstitious belief in God, and his *petit-bourgeois* ideology, but in the now rapidly increasing class of urban artisans who provided a more receptive field for revolutionary propaganda. A group known as the "Freedom of Labor" formed abroad in 1883 launched its activities in Russia in this year. It shortly began to coöperate with a group of workers that had evolved in the bosom of the old revolutionary party of the *narodniki* but who were now turning for inspiration toward Marx. What both groups had in common, and what was henceforth to distinguish them from rival revolutionary groups, was the belief that socialism could be inaugurated in Russia only after the destruction of the peasant commune and the formation of an urban proletariat out of its individual members. Through their agency, strikes were launched in St. Petersburg to protest against the long hours of the industrial worker. The strikes collapsed but their purpose, which was to rouse the worker, was achieved. In 1895 the nucleus of a party was formed at St. Petersburg by a group of social democrats, as they called themselves, consisting of Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (Lenin), Krzhizhanovskii, I. K. Krupskaya, Starkov, Yu. O. Cederbaum (Martov), Vaneyev, and others. Active propaganda and agitation among the workmen was carried on by means of an organization known by the sonorous title of "Society for the Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class," groups of which operated both in St. Petersburg and Moscow. The leaders of this movement, young in years and experience, were slowly and with great

effort slipping the cables that bound them to the old *narodniki* movement, to cast anchor finally in the Marxian harbor.

Eventually on March 1, 1898, there gathered at Minsk a small group of men (nine in all), delegates of workers' so-called social democratic organizations. It is interesting that but one of these protagonists of the working class was himself actually a worker, the rest being professional revolutionaries. It was decided to form a party to be known as the *Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party*. A central staff was organized and provision was made to publish a newspaper, *The Workers' Gazette*, to serve as a party organ. Almost immediately at the close of the congress, its staff, its printing press, all its members, and its documents fell into the hands of the authorities; the official dragnet was thrown out over all the large cities, and about five hundred members of the Social Democratic party were taken into custody.

The emergence of these new frankly subversive groups coincided almost exactly in point of time with the beginning of a severe economic crisis. The years 1897-1898 saw the recurrence, with similar severity and similar horrors, of the famines which had periodically ravaged the grain-growing areas and which had been so acute in 1891-1892. Again the economic life of the countryside was paralyzed and the state machinery showed itself impotent to meet the crisis. But to add to the calamity, there ensued a great industrial depression which gripped the manufacturing cities of the Polish provinces and of the Ukraine and spread to the whole Empire. Minister of War Kuropatkin reported in 1900 that a large percentage of the recruits who answered the call were showing visible signs of the effects of prolonged malnutrition. But the government showed itself indifferent to the welfare of the people, and even oblivious of its own interests. It had become to an increasing extent absorbed with its own problems in Asia and the Far East. In addition, the able group of ministers whom Alexander III had collected around him and had transmitted as a heritage to his son were being discarded in favor of others of meaner abilities and lower personal integrity, who managed to have the

ear of the sovereign or of those who stood nearest to him. It is therefore not to be wondered at that the misery and hopelessness of the people goaded them to a series of outbreaks, at first among the peasants but eventually extending to the cities. The natural exasperation of the people was, of course, stimulated by the revolutionary parties; the Social Democrats were active among the workers, the Social Revolutionaries among the peasants. Society therefore entered on a highly dangerous phase marked by agrarian disturbances, leading to horrible excesses and an increasing number of attempts on the lives of officials and dignitaries, the list of victims mounting as the years went on into an alarming total. It was obvious that the country was drifting into anarchy.

Meanwhile in an effort to cope with these evils, the government had begun to adopt repressive measures towards the students of the universities and of the higher schools in the two capitals. This struggle culminated in the murder in 1901 of the hated Minister of Public Instruction, Nikolai Bogolyepov, a creature of Pobyedonostsev. Moreover, the Social Revolutionaries began to make trouble for the government in the provinces, where famine and hard times had prepared the ground for them. The risings called forth the most energetic measures of repression of Plehve, the new Minister of the Interior. The police force in forty-six provinces was doubled and a special tax levied on the seditious villagers to compensate the landlords for the destruction of their property wrought by the peasants.

The government had entered on a prolonged struggle with the *zemstvo* opposition. Plehve first summoned the *zemstvo* leaders and asked for their coöperation with the government; when their representatives demurred, Plehve threatened. The *zemstva* thereupon braced themselves for the struggle. It was decided to maintain permanent offices and a permanent staff in Moscow; a special subsidized press came into being. The new organ, known as *Osvobozhdenie* or "Emancipation" was published at Stuttgart under the editorship of Peter Struve. In 1904 the *zemstvo* opposition took formal shape in the organization of the League of Deliverance, the most important

members of which were Princes Peter and Paul Dolgorukov, N. Lvov, D. Shakhovskoi, Professors S. Muromzev, Paul Mil-yukov, M. Kovalevskii, the journalist Korolenko, and the *zemstvo* statistician Annenskii.

During this time the Social Democratic party went its own way. Lenin had been exiled to Siberia, but he escaped in 1901 and went abroad to Geneva to coöperate with Plekhanov in the foundation and carrying on of the Social Democratic organ *Iskra* (Spark). But a rift had come between the two associates. Plekhanov was committed to the summoning of a national assembly in which the Social Democrats would coöperate with other liberal groups and trust to securing their aims by establishing an ascendancy over their allies. Lenin would have none of such deliberate constitutional methods, believing that the struggle for political freedom could be won only if the party refused to coöperate with the *bourgeois* classes, relying on its own methods of strikes, popular risings, mutinies, and mass terror. At the second party congress the rift became final. On questions of the party program, of party membership, and of tactics, the delegates divided. Lenin and his group stoutly maintained their ground, though they were not able to carry all their points against their opponents. But secessions from the congress materially altered the distribution of forces. When it came time to elect the Central Committee and the editorial board of the *Iskra* (Spark), Lenin was able to command a majority of the votes. His followers came to be known as the "majority group"—*Bolsheviķi* (*Bol'shinstvo*—majority) while their opponents were dubbed the *Men'sheviķi* or Minority group (*Men'shinstvo*—minority). But Lenin's uncompromising attitude after the Congress in insisting on implementing these resolutions and excluding minority members from the editorial board and the Central Committee alienated Plekhanov and Martov and others who sought to heal the breach by admitting them. In protest against this temporizing attitude Lenin withdrew from the staff of the *Iskra* and the council of the party, but, unable to carry the other leading members of the party, he finally formed his own party, the *Bolsheviķi*,

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which held its first party congress in London, April 25 (N. S.), 1905.

Plehve meanwhile redoubled his efforts against the opposition, both liberals and radicals, that found refuge in the camp of the *zemstva*. Pressure was brought to bear on Germany to close the *Osvobozhdenie* in Stuttgart, whence it moved to Paris. Here, too, the resources of the Russian state were used to buy up the French press and quiet French journalists in regard to the campaign of frightfulness and repression in Russia. Plehve also conceived the idea of forming his own illegal press in Russia to incite the people against the Jews and capitalists. His fertile brain also gave birth to the astonishing idea of creating his own trade unions to enable him to control the working class movement and to direct it against the Jews or "other state enemies." Out of his plans grew the so-called Jewish pogroms of 1903, the most notorious of which was that at Kishineff, in Bessarabia. The Jewish quarter of that city was set on fire while hecatombs of victims were sacrificed to the fury of the Black Hundreds.

EVENTS IN THE FAR EAST

By a strange irony of fate, the very industrial expansion to which Alexander III had looked to ease the strain on the country's productive forces was to occasion the first great crisis of the reign. The building of the Transsiberian Railway inevitably involved Russia in the Far East. After the accession in 1894 she found her commitments in this direction even more grave. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894 ended in the defeat of China and her loss of Korea. The foothold secured at Port Arthur, on the Liao Tung peninsula, Japan was compelled under pressure from Russia, Germany, and France almost immediately to relinquish. The Tsar's government also advanced China the money to pay the Japanese war indemnity. This prepared the ground for her demands that a concession be granted her to extend the Transsiberian across Manchuria. China acceded to this, but the concession was made to a private corporation known as the Russo-Chinese Bank and not to the Russian

government. Thus the Chinese Eastern Railway came into existence. In 1898 Port Arthur was occupied by the naval forces of the Tsar, and the Chinese government was forced to sign a long-term lease of Port Arthur and the Liao Tung peninsula, and to grant a concession for the construction of a branch line from Harbin on the main line of the Chinese Eastern Railway to tidewater, thus giving Russia access to a port free from ice the year round. In 1900 the Boxer Revolt in China was the inevitable outcome of the aggressive policies of Russia and the other European powers in the Far East. It was necessary to despatch an international force to the relief of the legation quarter in Peking, which were besieged by the national Chinese troops. Eventually this same policy of aggrandizement was also to involve Russia in war with the Japanese.

During the summer of 1900 the international force for the relief of the beleaguered garrisons of the legation quarter was placed under the command of General Count von Waldersee. The expedition landed at the mouth of the Pei Li River, took the Taku forts, occupied Tien Tsin, and pushed on to Peking, into which it forced its way without difficulty. The Emperor and the Empress Dowager fled to the Summer Palace, from which they directed negotiations with the victorious allies for a treaty. This was granted on condition that the Chinese government accept responsibility for injuries to Europeans and their property caused by the revolt.

In the meantime, Russia had made the Boxer Revolt a pretext for further aggrandizement in Manchuria, though it was agreed that the strategic points occupied would be evacuated when order was restored. Nevertheless, the suspicion was widespread, especially in China, that Russian troops had come to Manchuria to stay and that the nationals of other states would gradually be forced out. Hence the demands put forward by John Hay, Secretary of State of the United States of America, that the policy of "open door" be maintained in Manchuria, which Russia, tongue in cheek, readily conceded. But England and Japan had decided on more effective steps to protect their interests in China and had signed a treaty of

alliance in 1902. With her back thus protected, Japan now took a firmer line towards Russia. The control of Russian foreign policy, however, had passed out of the hands of Russia's responsible ministers, into those of a gang of adventurers who had gained the favor of the Tsar by back-stairs intrigue—Rear Admiral Abaza, Admiral Alexeyev, Bezobrazov, Vonliarliarskii, and others. Admiral Alexeyev, a creature of Bezobrazov, had been named viceroy of the Far East, and henceforth all affairs—diplomatic, naval, and military—were concentrated in his hands to be settled in direct consultation with the Emperor alone. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was reduced to the humiliating role of an apologist for decisions in the framing of which it had had no voice.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

The Russian government, outwardly courteous to Japan, stubbornly refused concessions, retained troops in Manchuria or evacuated them with annoying dilatoriness, and as steadily refused a compromise with Japan in regard to Korea. It is little to be wondered at that Japan grew tired of the shadow-boxing and on the night of February 4, without a previous declaration of war, loosed her fleet of destroyers on the Russian fleet which was lying at anchor in the harbor of Port Arthur, quite unprepared for an attack. After crippling the Russian fleet, the Japanese began deliberately moving their army by sea and landing it on the coasts of Korea and Manchuria for the blockade of Port Arthur. General Stoessel was thus shut up in Port Arthur, his communication by land and sea severed. All sorties failed to break the hold of Nogi; eventually, early in 1905, the fortress was compelled to surrender.

Meanwhile the main Russian armies were assembled along the Chinese Eastern Railway south of Mukden. Owing to the slowness of concentration, the initiative passed to the Japanese, who had landed their first army at Chinampo on the ice-free coast of Korea. It marched through Ping Yang and Anju to Wuji, on the Yalu. Here Kuroki attacked the advanced Russian position on April 30, forced the passage of the Yalu,

and on the following day completed the discomfiture of the Russians, who had no alternative but to retire through Feng-Huang-Cheng to the Fen-Shui-Ling range, which covered the approaches to the railway and army headquarters at Liao Yang from the southeast. With the disappearance of ice from the Manchurian coast, two other Japanese armies had landed on the Liao Tung peninsula, the second at Pi-tzu-wo and the fourth at Ta-ku-shan, late in May. The second army was to sever the railway connection with Port Arthur and to move north on Kai-Ping; the fourth was to coöperate with the first in forcing the passes over the Fen-Shui-Ling mountains to open the advance on Liao Yang from the southeast.

The third army under Nogi, having landed at Pi-tzu-wo on April 28 (O. S.) on the Liao Tung peninsula, stormed the Russian position at the isthmus of Nanshan, thus uncovering Dalny and the approaches to Port Arthur. The Viceroy Alexeyev decamped from the fortress, allowing some 45,000 men to be cooped up there while the Japanese leisurely occupied Dalny. After clearing Talienwan Bay of mines, they proceeded deliberately to land their siege guns for the reduction of the fortress. It was not, however, until July that the advance southward began; early in August the third army closed in on the doomed city from the north; on August 17 Nogi summoned the Commander, Stoessel, to surrender. On his refusal, the systematic reduction of the unfinished ring of outer forts began. Meanwhile, Togo watched at the mouth of the harbor for a sortie. His first chance had come on March 31 when the battleship *Petropaulovsk* was sunk and Admiral Makarov was drowned. His successor had attempted a sortie on August 10 (O. S.) just before the besiegers closed in and had made a great effort to break through to Vladivostok. But he was unsuccessful, and was compelled to put back into Port Arthur; though not a single ship was lost, Admiral Vitgeft was killed. Henceforth the fleet remained inactive and the armament was gradually removed to strengthen the defenses. The assault on the outer forts began on August 20 after a few days' preliminary bombardment. The attacking troops met

with murderous fire and suffered unbelievable casualties on August 21 and 23, but eventually secured one of the outer forts. From this time, the command proceeded to a slower, more methodical, but less costly reduction of the fortifications. As the year drew to a close, the position of the beleaguered garrison and the civilian population in the town had become desperate, without hope of succor. On January 2, 1905, the city and fortress surrendered.

The Russian commander-in-chief had not entirely left the city to its fate. A force under General Stakelburg comprising 32 battalions, 22 squadrons and *sotnias* (of Cossacks), and 100 guns had been concentrated at Telissu; here it had been attacked on June 13 by the second Japanese army under General Oki and driven back along the railway. Kuropatkin reinforced these southern troops; nevertheless, they were driven in on Kaiping. By these maneuvers the Russians were disposed in a great semicircle whose arc ran along the Fen-Shui-Ling mountains from northeast to southwest to the neighborhood of Kaiping and covered Liao Yang. But as the Japanese thrust against the eastern end of this arc was intensified, it became vital to draw in the troops from the southwest to cover Liao Yang, and to surrender some 75 miles of the railway. Here in front of Liao Yang between August 29 and September 5 (O. S.) was fought a general action known as the Battle of Liao Yang. The Russians, after a stubborn resistance, were defeated and compelled to retreat on Mukden. In front of this city they assumed the offensive and attacked the advancing Japanese on the Sha Ho on October 5, with indecisive results; both sides thereupon began to dig themselves in for the winter. Here, towards the end of January, after the fall of Port Arthur but before the reinforcements from the south could become available, the Russians opened an attack on the Japanese lines, which was repulsed. On February 23, the Japanese began an attack of their own on the Russian positions. This battle lasted till March 16 (O. S.) and ended in the defeat of the Russians and the abandonment of Mukden. On March 16 the Japanese entered Tieh Ling, and on March 21 Chang-

tu-Fu was occupied. This marked the farthest point of Japanese advance.

But it was events at sea that finally decided the fortunes of war. On May 14 the Baltic fleet, under Rozhdestvenskii, after a spectacular voyage 'round the world, entered the Sea of Japan to attempt to recover for Russia the command of the sea she had lost. Here in the Straits of Tsushima it encountered the Japanese fleet under Togo, and in an action lasting barely 24 hours, May 14 and 15 (O. S.), 30 out of 47 of its vessels were sunk—a loss in tonnage of 137,000 out of a total of 156,000. Three vessels only, the light cruiser *Almaz* and the two destroyers *Groznyi* and *Bravyyi*, reached Vladivostok; the greater part of the crews on the lost vessels went down with their ships. After this the struggle seemed hopeless; there was no chance of restoring the balance on sea; on land the Russians had been pushed back to within measurable distance of Harbin. It was time for negotiations for peace to be opened.

Towards the end of June, 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt of the United States of America offered his services to bring about peace between Russia and Japan. Sergei Witte, chairman of the committee of ministers, was named to head the Russian delegation to the peace conference with Baron Rosen as his assistant. The delegation crossed the Atlantic on the Hamburg-American liner *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*. The conference opened at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in August 1905. Witte played his cards with consummate skill; he prepared the ground by carefully cultivating the American press and the American public, not overlooking the Jews in New York. At the conference he out-maneuvered the Japanese plenipotentiary, Komura. On one point he stood adamant: there would be no war indemnity. Not for nothing had he been minister of finance for eleven years. But the only alternative was the surrender of the southern half of Sakhalin Island, which the Japanese demanded, and against this the Tsar had taken a definite stand. At length, when the only alternative was seen to be a renewal of hostilities, the Tsar yielded and

was prevailed on to accept this humiliating condition. Peace was concluded on the following basis:

1. Russia to surrender to Japan her interests in Korea, in southern Manchuria, the Liao Tung and Kwantung peninsulas, together with Port Arthur, Dalny, the railways in this area, dockyards, and so forth, without compensation.
2. The Island of Sakhalin, south of the 50th parallel of latitude, was to go to Japan.

What led to Japanese victories? Much has been said of the superiority of Japanese training, superior discipline, and efficiency in all ranks of the army and navy, of the unity and the morale of the people. The people were animated by a common purpose; this spirit inevitably communicated itself to the combatants, where it was heightened by the discipline and camaraderie of service. But the national forces were directed by a highly trained personnel; the army and navy were guided by men selected for their intelligence and devotion, and, like the people, animated by one purpose. By contrast, Russia's case was compromised by conflict and intrigue among its ruling class; even under war conditions divided counsel prevailed. Three departments of the government had been concerned with the work undertaken to hold the Kwantung peninsula—the Ministry of War, the Ministry of Marine, and the Ministry of Finance; the port at Dalny had been amply equipped by the Ministry of Finance with docks and quays, but left undefended by permanent fortifications; Port Arthur, the naval base, was in process of being strongly fortified by the Ministry of War, but was without dock facilities; Dalny had therefore to be abandoned after the battle of Nanshan, and the Japanese were thus presented with a harbor completely provided with facilities for landing their heavy siege howitzers and other armament for the reduction of Port Arthur. On the other hand, at Port Arthur the Russian fleet was unable to make good the damage sustained in sorties against Admiral

Togo and was therefore doomed to inglorious inactivity. Furthermore, at the outbreak of the war, three ministries were competing for the privilege of operating the Chinese Eastern Railway at a time when united efforts were required to surmount the obstacles to be faced.

But the greatest misfortune was in the supreme direction of the war. Chief military command in the east devolved on the incompetent Admiral Alexeyev, by virtue of his position as viceroy of the Tsar. Yet the actual command was entrusted to Adjutant-General Kuropatkin. Hence during the crucial early months of the hostilities, conflict of opinion prevailed on vital issues. The strategy of the war was seriously compromised by Alexeyev, who at first belittled the menace to Port Arthur but later suddenly changed his mind. He himself fled from the fortress, then called on Kuropatkin for the diversion of a material force to its relief. This unfortunate army concentrated at Telissu under Stakelburg suffered a disastrous defeat and in consequence was compelled to fall back on the main body without accomplishing anything for the doomed fortress. So long as there were military laurels to be reaped, Alexeyev remained in the east in nominal command. After Mukden, perhaps in deference to public opinion, he was made a scapegoat and retired to the comparative obscurity of St. Petersburg society. Such colossal blunders might have been retrieved in the field if Russia had had to face a less enterprising and determined enemy than the Japanese or had her troops been able to make up for their own insufficient equipment, training, and discipline, by the stolid courage with which they had been wont to face disaster. But the highest bravery and determination avails little against troops protected by adequate field fortifications and equipped with modern, quick-firing arms, intelligently served.

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THE REVOLUTION OF 1905, AND THE REACTION

INTERNAL DISORDERS

THE disasters of the Russo-Japanese War precipitated a crisis in Russia's internal affairs that was long overdue. The industrial depression that began in the late 'nineties had prepared the seedbed among the industrial workers, of which the newly organized Social Democratic party was not slow to avail itself. Similarly the perpetual misery of the peasants, which reached catastrophic proportions in the famine years, aggravated the discontent at the lot imposed on them by the emancipation of 1861. Here, too, coincident with the deterioration of their material condition, came the rise to renewed life of the Social Revolutionary party. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that these factors, accentuated by the neglect and stupidity of the administration, coöperated to produce the disorders that swept over Russia after the turn of the century. In 1901 an epidemic of strikes broke out in the industrial centers; the intellectual classes, represented by the university students, supported these movements by numerous demonstrations. A new campaign of terror directed against the officials broke out in 1902, when the Minister of the Interior, Sipyagin, met his death by assassination on April 15. The more moderate *zemstvo* opposition took courage in its central congress of the *zemstva* of the Empire to call into existence a substitute for the constituent assembly denied them by the state. An oppositional press was created abroad in the

Osvobozhdenie, an organ published at Stuttgart under the editorship of Peter Struve, a convert from the party of the Marxists. A formidable movement of opposition representing all shades of opinion, from moderate *zemstvo* members to the representatives of the extreme left, the Social Democrats, gave the government no little concern and turned the thoughts of the most reckless members of the administration to war as a possible means of counteracting these dangers to their continued rule. But the reverses of the war, the signs of incompetence and blundering, could only aggravate the condition they were designed to cure. On July 28, 1904, Sipyagin's successor as Minister of the Interior, Plehve, known for his ruthlessness and arbitrary cruelty, met the fate of his precursor. The *zemstvo* opposition plucked up courage to summon a congress of its representatives from all over the Empire at which they formulated eleven demands. These they presented to the new Minister of the Interior, Prince Svyatopolk-Mirskii. The government, unable to suppress the congress, reluctantly looked the other way.

BLOODY SUNDAY

The greatest vacillation prevailed in administrative and court circles as to the proper course to adopt. Eventually to calm the storm an *ukaz* was issued on December 12 (O. S.) announcing an extension of self-government, independence of the judiciary, religious tolerance, freedom of the press, and legal rights. No mention was made of representative government. The reply to these grudging concessions was a frenzied renewal of workmen's strikes and student demonstrations in the streets of St. Petersburg. Among the organizations most active in the midst of the disturbances were the so-called *Zubatov* trade unions promoted by the police among the workers for the purpose of controlling the movement. On the morning of January 9 (O. S.), 1905, workers from the Viborg district marched along the Schlüsselburg highway in the direction of the Winter Palace for the purpose of presenting to the Tsar the demands of the workers, formulated by the official trade

union leaders. The demonstration was led by Father Gapon, a priest who had, with official approval, been active in organizing and promoting the movement. The authorities, though warned in advance, acted with characteristic stupidity, allowing the procession to form and start moving towards the Winter Palace without expressing approval or disapproval. A half-hearted effort was made to halt it by stationing a cordon of troops along the *Neuskii Prospekt*, but the demonstrators broke through and pushed on to the square in front of the Winter Palace, where a great crowd of sympathizers or the merely curious gathered. Then and only then did the military authorities decide to disperse the demonstrators. Without warning, soldiers from the Pechevskii Bridge were ordered to fire into the mass of humanity; the volleys continued until the square was littered with bodies. Dead and wounded lay about in confused disorder on the snow.

The appalling loss of life stunned even government circles and convinced them that they had blundered; the effect on public opinion both at home and abroad was disastrous to the prestige of the old regime. But the only appeasement to the general indignation of which the administration could think was a carefully staged visit of hand-picked workers' representatives. They were allowed to visit the palace, where they were addressed in pious platitudes by the Tsar. After being served with tea and sandwiches, they were sent to their homes. The hollow mockery of the occasion failed to make any impression on the stark realities of the situation.

The events of January 9, henceforth known as "Bloody Sunday," brought the administration into a calamitous position. For the first time the moderate opposition—the *zemstvo* workers, the *intelligentsia*, all wings of the labor movement, and even the peasants—closed their ranks and emphatically declared war, not only on the bureaucracy, but on tsarism. Demonstrations in the streets of the cities were followed by strikes involving the means of communication. In the country, peasant risings broke out in the provinces of Orel and Kursk, and spread to all parts of European Russia. On February 17 the Grand

Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich, the head and front of reaction, was assassinated in the Kremlin. The government replied to these popular outbreaks by an *ukaz* on March 3, granting the rights of petition and a reform of the government; a rescript was also addressed to the Minister of the Interior A. G. Bulygin promising a national assembly—a *zemskii sobor*—with deliberative powers. But the time had gone for such half-measures; disorders spread to all the chief cities of the Empire—St. Petersburg, Odessa, Nizhnii Novgorod, Riga, Lodz; through the Caucasus and Finland; and even Father Gapon urged the workers to revolutionary activity. On May 27-28 came the battle of Tsushima, the fatal news reaching St. Petersburg late that night by way of Berlin. There was redoubled excitement everywhere, and renewed demands not only for an advisory assembly, but also for the grant of full constitutional government. In the meantime a congress of peasants met in Moscow and organized a peasants' federation; a second *zemstvo* congress met to press the needs of thorough-going constitutional reform. But with the initiation of peace negotiations the atmosphere cleared somewhat, and on August 19 the first project for a constitution was issued.

The scheme had been drawn up by Alexander Grigoryevich Bulygin, Minister of the Interior. According to the manifesto:

1. The Duma (as the new organization was to be called) was to be an institution functioning on the model of a parliament.
2. All laws, provisional and perpetual, civil lists, the budget, must be submitted for its consideration.
3. It was to be an advisory body, but with the right to free expression of its views, in the matters under consideration.
4. The electoral law was to be particularly favorable to the peasants as the predominant element of the population which, in the opinion of the framers of the law, was the most reliable, monarchical, and conservative element; the electoral law was subject to change on the basis prescribed for the Duma, that is, after consultation with the Duma.
5. The franchise was to be independent of nationality or religion.

The two outstanding features of the Duma—that it was to have a purely consultative function and that it was to give a

precedence to the peasantry—could hardly recommend it to the most vocal elements of the population, the *intelligentsia* and the liberal nobility. The answer came in the third congress of the *zemstva* which assembled September 23-28, when demands for an imperial assembly with legislative powers were made. Peasant and student congresses swelled the chorus of discontent. Demonstrations followed one another in quick succession in the various towns of the central provinces; then came a renewal of peasant disorders. Finally in October followed a great transport strike that paralyzed the country and that all but grew into a general strike embracing all industries and all walks of life. Then the revolutionary spirit gripped the fighting forces; mutiny broke out at Odessa, where the *Knyaz Potemkin* was seized by the mutinous sailors and marines and put to sea in defiance of orders; Reval and Sevastopol also experienced disorders; discipline in army and navy were all but at an end. The danger that threatened the military and naval forces compelled the government to yield, and on October 17 a new manifesto offering new concessions was issued.

THE MANIFESTO OF OCTOBER 17, 1905

The manifesto of October 17, 1905, guaranteed the fundamental political rights—inviolability of person, freedom of conscience, of speech, of meeting, and of association. It extended the franchise to those classes previously deprived of it, insofar as this was practicable in view of the approaching elections. It proclaimed that no law would be made without the consent of the Duma and that the people's chosen representatives would be allowed a check on the legality of the acts of all the officials. These conciliatory acts were followed up by the creation on November 1 of a cabinet of ministers, by the raising of the censorship, and by the granting of an amnesty on the same day. Pobyedonostsev, Bulygin, and Trepov retired and made way for more liberal servants, Durnovo becoming Minister of the Interior. The more striking appointment, however, was that of Sergei Yulevich Witte to be chairman of the coun-

cil of ministers or, as he was also called, Prime Minister. With this innovation the principle of ministerial responsibility was, for the first time in Russia's history, tacitly accepted.

On November 16, 1905, a proclamation abolished redemption payments for the peasants. Nevertheless disorder still held the field. A second general strike broke out in November; in December came a second transport strike. There were mutinous outbreaks in the army and the navy, pogroms against Jews, and violent agrarian revolts. Most serious of all, however, was open rebellion in Moscow; but Poland and the Baltic provinces also were swept into chaos with risings against the central government to enforce their demand for autonomy. Only the German element in the Baltic provinces stood firm.

In this atmosphere the elections of February 1906 were held. The extension of the franchise by a decree of December 25, 1905, to renters in the cities allowed the *intelligentsia* and the workers to express themselves, and prevented the peasants having a majority of members in the Duma. Meanwhile, the government discovered that the disorder was perhaps less menacing than it appeared on the surface. It could rely on the army. If the peasants were not to be counted on, they had, nevertheless, few common interests with the *intelligentsia* and the workers. On March 4 an imperial manifesto reorganized the old state council which had hitherto been appointed, and transformed it into a second chamber—at least part of its members were henceforth to be elected by certain special groups. A law was proclaimed that regulated meetings and associations and appointed provincial and county commissions (consisting mostly of officials) to consider measures for the relief of the peasants and the extensions of their holdings. At the same time (March 21) the government regulated the manner in which the budget could be considered by the Duma. This preparatory work having thus been got out of the way, the opening of the Duma was proclaimed for May 6, 1906.

Meanwhile, on May 5, Witte had retired from the scene; as the administration began to feel that it had the upper hand, it was loath to trust itself to Witte, and against the former Min-

ister of Finance powerful groups in the administration had arrayed themselves. His successor was the elderly Goremykin, who had no sympathy with constitutional government. Stolypin took over the duties of Minister of the Interior, while Kokovtsev became Minister of Finance. Four days before the Duma convened, the government issued a decree excluding the fundamental laws of the Empire from the consideration of the Duma. At the same time it was negotiating a loan from Paris which would free it from financial dependence on the legislature. Thus it proclaimed that the Duma was not to be a constituent assembly, and that the fundamental laws flowed as an act of grace from the will of the sovereign and not from an act of the people's representatives.

REACTION

The first Duma met in the Taurid Palace on May 10, 1906. With its convening, the more violent phases of the revolution came definitely to an end. A popular assembly (however restricted its powers) having now been achieved, all that remained was to consolidate the apparent gains that had been made.

The short and intensive campaign in the spring of 1906 had apparently called into life a ready-made political structure which at first sight was comparable to that of any country of an old-established democratic tradition. In the election the most active groups had been the so-called *intelligentsia*, consisting of the professional classes; the *zemstvo* men, who were largely nobles and landowners; the workers, represented by the Social Democrats (except the Bolsheviks, who boycotted the elections); the peasants, whose Peasants' Union had acquired great authority during the revolution and who now became the nucleus of the Labor group. The hope of the administration was placed in the Octobrists, who in general supported the government's reforms.

When the Duma had convened, the five hundred odd members shook down into the following organized parties: (1) the Constitutional Democrats (shortened thereafter into Ka-

dets) represented by 177 members, led by Milyukov (from the lobbies, since a pretext had been found by the administration for excluding him); (2) the radicals, comprising Social Democrats, Social Revolutionaries, Anarchists, and a peasant group of 29 members; (3) towards the right, the so-called Octobrists, who stood on the constitution granted by the decree of October 17, 1905; (4) the monarchists, the party of "law and order"; (5) the trade and industry group; (6) a group of unattached men of various shades of opinion—federalists, autonomists, representatives of national minorities. It is to be noted that while they did not form a distinct group, there were 204 peasants, almost 40 per cent of the assembled gathering, exceeding the representatives of any other class.

The government had no plan for the session, and the speech from the throne gave the Duma no lead. It did, however, provide the opposition with an occasion for presenting to the Tsar a series of revolutionary proposals—universal franchise, responsibility of ministers, the abolition of the State Council, and the abrogation of the death penalty. Such radical demands alienated the monarch and antagonized the bureaucracy, which saw itself and its privileged position threatened. The truth was that the Duma regarded itself as a constituent assembly, and as such it put in the forefront such things as would come under fundamental laws.

~~The chief question to come before the assembly was the peasant problem.~~ There the Kadets joined forces with the radical group in putting forward projects for the expropriation of church and private lands and their transfer to the landless peasants. But the Tsar came out emphatically for the inviolability of private property. The extreme demands of radicals and liberals, and the evident purpose of turning the Duma into a sovereign legislative assembly to discuss the most basic problems convinced the government that in the interests of law and order the time had come to dissolve it. ~~The dissolution took place July 21, 1906; the new Duma was to assemble on March 5, 1907; Stolypin, the Minister of the In-~~

terior, was raised to the post of Prime Minister to succeed Goremykin.

The members of the Duma refused to be thus unceremoniously dismissed without a chance to protest. The majority, therefore, slipped out of the capital and assembled at Viborg in Finland, where, beyond the long arm of tsarist justice, they issued a resounding challenge to the government, calling on the population to refuse to pay taxes or to provide recruits for military service. There was some renewal of the disorders of the preceding year, but on the whole the results were disappointing. Against all attempts to force the government's hand, Stolypin alone stood forth as a pillar of strength; his house on Aptekarsky Island was blown up on August 12; he and some members of his family were injured, but he showed signal self-restraint and courage. He persisted with his work of pacifying the people and conciliating his opponents. He fought against the growing disorder with the weapons that lay nearest to his hand—Section 87 of the Code, which permitted the administration exceptional powers in case of an emergency. But he was far from being satisfied with repression; he wanted to satisfy the people. Hence he decided on a bold step—a sweeping reform of the condition of the peasants.

This involved nothing less than the breaking up of the rural communes and the transformation of its members into farmers operating on individual holdings (*khutors*). Preparatory stages in this reform had been: (1) the exhaustive investigations of the two commissions (presided over by Witte and Sipyagin, respectively) appointed in 1902 to study the peasant problem; (2) the naming of a land commission on March 17, 1906, to prepare plans for the proposed reform. Lacking legislative authority (the Duma having been dissolved), Stolypin secured a *ukaz* which defined the principles on which rural society was to be reconstructed. These were: (1) the right of each peasant family to sever its connections with the commune; (2) the right of the head of such family to claim in lieu of his former dispersed holdings a single compact area; and (3) his

right to conduct his own operations apart from the other members of the commune. The principles so defined were embodied in a series of legislative acts that culminated in that of June 27, 1910. To give effect to this legislation there were established: (1) a central commission for the whole Empire; (2) commissions for each province; and (3) commissions for each *okrug*. The first of these was made up of persons chosen by the government; the latter two were composite, some of their members being elected while others were named by the government. The project, once launched, made good progress in the four years before the outbreak of the Great War. Already by 1912 some 2,650,000 families had announced their intentions of leaving the communes, and of these, 900,000 had entirely severed their ties. It is estimated that by 1914 the heads of some 2,000,000 households by various means had assumed the status of individual landowners. If the reform had ultimately been extended to the frontier regions and Siberia, which were especially excluded from the original scheme, fifty years would have completed the transformation of Russian rural life.

In addition Stolypin granted toleration to the Old Believers, guaranteeing to members of the national minorities some of their newly-won privileges—Polish schools in Poland, German schools in Livonia; the censorship was drawn tighter but did not completely abolish freedom of the press. Nevertheless, these concessions did not altogether achieve their purpose of checking lawlessness. On December 23 Count Ignatiev, one of the country's strongest reactionaries, died at the hands of an assassin. For this reason the meeting of the second Duma on February 20 (March 5) was looked forward to with eager anticipation.

The constitution of the second Duma consisted of the following parties: (1) to the right, the Union of the Russian People under the leadership of Gringmuth; (2) the Union of 30 October (the Octobrists, who stood for the constitution granted in the autumn of 1905, the party of peaceful renovation, the party of "democratic reform"); (3) the Kadets, the Workers' Party (*Trudoviki*), the Social Democrats, the Social Rev-

olutionaries, and the Anarchists. A few other groups such as the Peasants' Union, the Poles, and the Ukrainians held themselves aloof from the regular parties and pursued an independent course. Stolypin had an ambitious program of legislation to bring before the Duma and made passionate appeals for their support.

But it was not possible for them to work together. At the very beginning, Stolypin, stung by the criticism of the left and their refusal to meet the government halfway, broke out in bitter denunciation of their course and declared in the most vehement language that the government would not be intimidated. Despite everything, the sniping continued. In a stormy session on April 7 the administration of the army was attacked, to the great annoyance of the Tsar, who was for immediate dissolution. But the climax came on May 7 when the question came up of suspending the immunities of certain Social Democratic deputies implicated in subversive activities. The Duma refused to withdraw the immunity, and on the morning of June 3 an *ukaz* of the Tsar dissolved the second Duma.

THE GOVERNMENT ALTERS THE ELECTORAL LAW

The new electoral law was then changed to favor property owners at the expense of the propertyless, and Great Russians at the expense of other nationalities, which, in some cases, could not hold elections. The result was that Polish representation was cut down from 36 to 12, the Caucasus from 29 to 9, Siberia from 21 to 14, Central Asia from 23 to 1; the total reduction was from 109 to 36, a loss borne by the frontier regions. The franchise was exercised indirectly; there was no change in property classification. But the primary elections took place in colleges, the population being grouped under heads—landlords, peasants, burgesses, and workers. The apportionment of electors, and hence of deputies, was so distributed that the representation of the peasantry was reduced by 50, and landlord representation was increased by a like amount. Out of a total of 6,036 electors for the first and second Dumas, the peasants

chose 2,529, the burgesses 1,336, landlords 1,963, workmen 208; for the third Duma the peasants chose 1,168, burgesses 258, landlords 2,644, workmen 114. In some cases peasants had to go through four steps before they finally elected their deputies. The property qualifications were designed to exclude the unpropertied *intelligentsia* in the towns and hence to exclude the professional revolutionary. Though a clamor was raised against the illegality of the act, there was little disturbance; the reforms of the government, especially the land reform of Stolypin, were beginning to take effect among the peasants, who rapidly lost interest in revolutionary agitation.

At the first meeting of the Duma there were 11 factions. The rightist groups comprised 127 members; the Octobrists and their allies, moderate reformers and Balts, 154; Kadets and Progressists, 82; the extreme left, the Workers' Group and the Social Democrats, 33. The rest—Poles, Lithuanians, and so forth, were almost negligible. The radical groups had decreased and the conservatives had increased at the expense of the left. As time went on, the nationalist influence among the moderates continued to grow. As they voted with the extreme right, and not with the Octobrists, they further increased the conservative element. The landlord class grew at the expense of the landless. The new creed of nationalism finally completely altered the complexion of the parties and led to a redistribution in the fourth Duma.

The third Duma quickly accustomed itself to parliamentary procedure on the western model and showed itself competent in the work of legislation. The Octobrists easily secured control of the praesidium and the position of second vice-president (in 1913, that of first vice-president also). The first president was N. A. Khomyakov (till 1910); the second, A. Guchkov (till March 1911); the third, M. V. Rodzyanko (also president of the fourth Duma). The Kadets were without influence, in view of the distrust they aroused for their part in the revolution. But they had the abler men, for example, Milyukov, and they grew in importance as distrust of the government in-

creased, and as the position of the Octobrists became more and more difficult.

The principal question that occupied the time of the third Duma was the budget. The fundamental law had permitted the Duma the right to approve the budget without determining the exact limits of its power. A widespread opinion was held that the budget and the public accounts concealed the true position of the country's finances. Even the publication of the government's financial statement had done little to clear up the actual situation. Deficits continued to be obscured under such euphemisms as "extraordinary resources," and the practice of keeping accounts open long after the end of the fiscal year further added to the mystification. The truth is that the demands of the fighting services had swelled to gargantuan proportions and now swallowed up the lion's share of the state's income. Even assuming that there were no irregularities in the use of the state funds, the position would have been serious; and considering the age-long tradition of "takings" in the Russian bureaucracy, it needed no prophet to sound the alarm. But unfortunately the opposition became bogged in the question of budget rights (ill-defined in the Code) and allowed a red herring to be drawn across their trail in the so-called "iron-clad credits"—fixed charges, such as service on foreign debts. The result was, therefore, that the more astute and experienced Minister of Finance did not find it hard to put upon the Duma and to secure approval of his budget.

In other respects the third Duma had relatively little to show as the fruits of its labor. The truth is that as the administration became stronger and recovered confidence in itself, it endeavored to render the concessions made in 1905 innocuous and to reduce their exercise to a minimum. Nationalism was in the air, and even Stolypin, at first a firm believer in constitutionalism and the need for reform, turned more and more to the problem of national minorities—in Finland, where a new regime was inaugurated; in Poland, where the *zemstva* were now introduced; and in the Baltic states, where the priv-

ileges of the German landowners were curtailed. Moreover, the state council, though a part of its members (half) were elected, continued to be dominated by a national and conservative spirit, and hence did much to reduce the constructive work of the Duma to a nullity.

The elections to the Duma in 1912 resulted in the following party groupings: rights, 64; nationalists, 88; moderate rights, 33 (the right wing representing, therefore, 185); Octobrists, 90; Kadets, 58; Progressists, 47; Workers' Group, 10; Social Democrats, 14. If we include the Octobrists in the center, the left wing totaled 129. Other smaller groups were: the Poles, 15; Lithuanians and White Russians, 6; Mohammedans, 6; unattached, 5; peasants, Cossacks, urban and *zemstvo* members represented small factions.

In this fourth Duma, the Great Russian elements and the Orthodox faith predominated. But otherwise the picture was very confused. The peasant representation, as well as the *intelligentsia*, was strong. But the predominating tendency was in the direction of nationalism, which after 1908 had become marked. This movement especially affected the Octobrists, who represented the liberal opposition and at the same time was pan-Slav. The Octobrists thereupon broke up into Left Octobrists, Country Octobrists, and Right Octobrists. Their indomitable leader, Guchkov, lost political power which he never regained. At the outbreak of the World War the grouping was: right, 59; nationalists, 96; center, 33; Right Octobrists, 23 (total Right, 211); Country Octobrists, 64; Left Octobrists, 20; Kadets, 55; Left Progressists, 44; extreme left Workers' Group, 10; Social Democrats, 14 (total, 207); unattached and non-Russian, 20.

Stolypin, the president of the council of ministers, had been assassinated at Kiev on September 14, 1911, and was succeeded by Kokovtsev, who retained the portfolio of Minister of Finance. He had been a pupil of Witte and followed in the footsteps of the latter. He strove to maintain the autocracy but sought to combine it with a constitutional government; he promoted the unity of Russia under Great Russian leadership.

Reforms were solely in matters of detail. He found himself confronted with a strongly reactionary group in the council; Makarov and Malakov (successively Ministers of the Interior), Shcheglovitov, Minister of Justice, and Sabler, procurator of the Holy Synod, opposed him; he himself resisted the nationalist trends in policy and was strongly opposed to war. His position was gradually undermined, and on February 13 (N. S.), 1913, he was dismissed. His successor in the Ministry of Finance was Peter Bark, who was raised from a subordinate position in the Ministry of Finance. Goremykin became president of the council of ministers.

The chief occasion of the dismissal of Kokovtsev had been strong criticism directed against him in the state council by Witte for debauching the peasants through the state monopoly in spirits. The abolition of this monopoly was probably contemplated, as well as other fiscal reforms, but the outbreak of war in July 1914 made these impracticable. Though Goremykin was recommended to seek to secure a working compromise between the government and the legislative body, his (Goremykin's) known reactionary trend made this impossible. More than this, the entry on the scene of the notorious Rasputin, who had haunted the court since 1912, tended to bring the imperial family and government under criticism. It was also rumored that the government proposed to suspend or considerably abridge the constitutional privileges granted by the manifesto of October 17, 1905. The result was that scenes occurred in the Duma that were reminiscent of those enacted in 1906. A faint sign of a change was to be discerned in the program of reform put forward by Krivoshein, Minister of Agriculture, but the outbreak of the World War postponed all this. With mobilization all parties closed their ranks and, with the government, presented one united front against the foreign foe.

PRELIMINARIES OF THE GREAT WAR

THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN, 1878

A TRUE perspective of Russia's development cannot be achieved without including a view of her foreign policy. The program of Russia in the Balkans and the Near East met with a disastrous setback in the Crimean War, and the energies of Nicholas' successor were absorbed, as we have seen, in the program of internal reforms that occupied the early 'sixties. But in the next decade of the reign of Alexander II, the tide of nationalism began once more to rise, and Russian foreign policy in the Balkans began to respond to this impulse. Russia had hoped to be able to count on the support or at least the benevolent neutrality of her allies in any Balkan venture in which she engaged. But she reckoned without Austria. Alexander was soon undeceived. Turned out of Germany by Prussia, Austria sought compensation in the Balkans. Her ambitions in that quarter were encouraged by Bismarck, who let it be known that he would not second Russia in a Balkan war, and that in a clash between Austria and Russia, Germany would support Austria. Russia, impelled by the pan-Slav movement, sought single-handed to force the door, but, faced with England's hostility, was obliged to submit her designs to the European council table at Berlin in 1878. Here Gorchakov, the Russian plenipotentiary, suffered a humiliating defeat, chiefly owing to Bismarck's neutrality. This Alexander never forgave, and the ensuing estrangement terminated for the time being the threefold alliance in which the German, the Austrian, and the Russian monarchs had been joined since

1872. Austria and Germany thereupon formed their own alliance, to which Italy was admitted in 1882.

Meanwhile Alexander II had passed off the stage. His son, Alexander III, anxious for the fate of Russia and harassed by internal disorder, in 1884 reopened the question and revived the Three Emperors' Alliance for three years.

THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE

In the meantime Russia pushed her plans in the Balkans, setting up Bulgaria as a client state. But in 1885 Bulgaria, under Alexander of Battenburg, got out of hand, for which Alexander put the blame on Bismarck. Prince Alexander allowed himself to be elected Hospodar of Eastern Rumelia, an act which virtually united that Turkish province with Bulgaria under his sway. But Russia's desperate situation did not allow Alexander to go his own way: in 1887 he was forced to enter anew into an alliance with Germany. This time Austria was excluded. The so-called "Reinsurance Treaty" was little more than a *modus vivendi*, and in 1890 Alexander found the courage to let it lapse and began a *rapprochement* with France. Then followed the military convention of 1892 with France, and in 1894 the political alliance.

RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST

But Russia was now becoming involved in the Far East owing to her railroad construction. In 1897 she came to terms with Austria over the Balkans by which the Balkan question was to be "put on ice" for the next ten years. She then embarked on her forward policy in the east, built the eastern portion of her railway across Manchuria to Vladivostok, and availed herself of China's weakness and of a trifling pretext to seize a warm-water harbor at Port Arthur in southern Manchuria. To this point she extended her railway, constructing also a commercial port at Dalny, and proposed a fortress and naval base at Port Arthur.¹ The aggression of Russia (and of other European

¹ For convenience, developments in the Far East and the Russo-Japanese War are treated *in extenso* in connection with the building of the Transsiberian.

powers in China) provoked the Boxer Revolt, which required an international force before it was repressed. But in Manchuria, Russia acted alone with the obvious intention of excluding other powers. This led the chief interested power, Japan, to secure herself by an alliance with England and to begin the Russo-Japanese War, whose results have already been recorded.

RETURN TO THE WEST: ANGLO-RUSSIAN ENTENTE

France, in search of a make-weight for the ally now hopelessly involved in the Far East, turned to England, and there came into existence in April, 1904, the Anglo-French *Entente Cordiale*. After the disasters of the Russo-Japanese War, Russia gave up her designs in the East and, under the lead of Izvol'skii, resumed her place in Europe, taking up the threads of her Balkan policy dropped ten years previously. To strengthen her weakened position, she made advances to England. Both powers came to an agreement in 1907 to patch up their quarrels in the Middle East (Persia and Afghanistan). Under the terms of this treaty England and Russia staked out their respective spheres of influence in Persia and undertook to maintain the *status quo* in Afghanistan. In the various crises that arose in Europe in the decade before the Great War, England, France, and Russia, therefore, acted together, beginning with the first Moroccan crisis of 1905.

The Emperor William had, previously, taken advantage of the embarrassment of Russia in the East to force on the Tsar a treaty of alliance, signed by both sovereigns at Bjorkoë in Finnish waters in July 1905. But Russia's need of France and French money was so great that none of Russia's ministers dared rebuff her, and the treaty was never ratified. In 1908 the restless Izvol'skii endeavored to score a diplomatic triumph by a deal with Aehrenthal by which, in exchange for an acknowledgment of Austria's title to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia would receive the support of Austria in her efforts to secure title to the Straits. But Austria, without awaiting European confirmation of her rights, annexed the two provinces and left Izvol'skii to secure his own prize. No one in Europe was interested in

going back of a *fait accompli*, and Izvol'skii found that he had wounded pan-Slav aspirations at home. His efforts to stir up the Balkans brought Germany into the field, and Russia received a significant warning against setting her neighbor's house on fire; the Balkan states too, were overawed by the Dual Monarchy. But Izvol'skii bided his time. Though he ceased in 1910 to be Minister of Foreign Affairs, from Paris whither he was sent to represent the Russian government, he seconded the efforts of his successor Sazonov to secure Russian hegemony in the Balkans.

THE BALKAN WARS

Italy's support was secured by the Treaty of Racconigi in 1909. In the ensuing Italo-Turkish war, Russia sought to extort from Turkey special privileges in navigating the Straits, but failed owing to England's implicit support of the Ottoman Porte. Then came the Balkan alliance, a grouping of the three Slav powers—Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro—with Greece, in a union pledged to mutual support in case of aggression by a third power. This league was intended as a diplomatic weapon to be used by Russia to back her demands in the Balkans. But instead of being innocuous, it was, as Poincaré promptly characterized it, "an instrument of war," and he demanded that Sazonov at once exert himself to minimize its dangers. But it was already too late. The League got out of the control of its Russian mentor; early in October Montenegro declared war on Turkey, to be followed by the three other Balkan states; their armies were launched across the frontier and within a month the Turkish forces were overwhelmed and driven in confusion on their nearest fortresses: the most easterly on the Tchatalja lines before Constantinople; the Macedonian armies on Adrianople or Janina; the most westerly on Scutari and Durazzo. Here the Serbians and Montenegrins threatened Austrian hegemony in the Adriatic; to the east the Bulgarians threatened the privileged Russian claims to Constantinople and the Straits. The scramble for territory was thwarted by the great powers, and this action turned the minds of the Slav states on Mace-

donia, the prize they already had in their power, and set Bulgaria at the throat of Serbia. In the second Balkan war that ensued, Serbia and Greece, supported now by Rumania, turned on Bulgaria and fought her to a standstill, while Rumania joined in from the north and brought her to her knees. The treaty of peace dictated at Bucharest robbed Bulgaria of most of her gains; while the western Balkans were carved up to form the kingdom of Albania; the crumbs left over from this repast fell into the mouths of Serbia and Montenegro.

Russia was still as far from her goal as ever. During the winter of 1913-1914 there was revived an old scheme, taken up and abandoned more than once, for the outright seizure of Constantinople by force without waiting for more peaceful methods. This was seriously discussed in a series of ministerial conferences but eventually voted down, not on moral grounds, but because its execution was beyond the resources at the command of the Russian government. It is probable that this consideration explains Russia's emphatic protest against the appointment of Liman von Sanders as military adviser to the Ottoman Porte and commander of the Constantinople corps area.

THE JULY 1914 CRISIS


It was on this troubled atmosphere that the assassination of Franz Ferdinand at Serajevo on June 28, 1914, broke. The known Greater Serbian ambitions of the southern Slavs and especially the Serbs, which could be gratified only at Austria's expense, indicated Serbia as the probable source of the crime, and a further effort was made to lay it at the door of the Serbian government. Acting on the information secured at the trial of the assassins, the Austro-Hungarian officials drew up a formidable indictment of the whole Greater Serbian movement with which they sought to link the Serbian government. Armed with this document, they issued an ultimatum to the Belgrade government, calling on it to stifle this revolutionary movement, to punish those implicated in it, and to associate Austrian officials with Serbian in tracking down its ramifica-

tions. The document was not so insolent as the manner of presenting it; still more so was the manner in which the very moderate and conciliatory reply of the Serbian government was categorically rejected. Russia had followed the controversy with interested attention from the first, resolved within reason to support Serbia and the pan-Slav cause. The rejection of the Serbian reply on July 26, and still more, the Austrian declaration of war on July 28, brought things to a head. The state council had already on July 25 authorized the taking of preparatory measures, which, if known, might have been provocative; but in concert with England, Russia's exertions were directed toward putting a brake on Austria's precipitate course and forcing her to conciliate. Such pacific measures foundered on the question of mobilization. The frenzied Ministers of War and Marine, backed up by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sazonov, terrified lest Austria was merely playing for time and lest Russia, in case of war, be outstripped by Germany with her smooth and efficient plans of mobilization, sought to gain every moment while it was still possible. On July 29 they persuaded the Tsar to sign the order of mobilization, though at the earnest behest of the German Emperor it was withdrawn the same night. But the next day, mediation was found to be a mirage. The bureaucrats, now in a panic, overbore the peaceful Tsar, and on that evening the fateful telegrams of mobilization went forth over the vast expanses of the Empire. The answer of Germany and of Austria was a foregone conclusion, as well as that of France. The nations were on the march towards Armageddon.

THE GREAT WAR

THE EASTERN THEATER OF WAR

THE plan of the Central Powers was based on the assumption that Germany and Austria would find their land forces arrayed against those of France and Russia and that they would not have the support of Italy, the third member of the Triple Alliance. In consequence, it had been decided, partly because Germany alone had a contiguous frontier with France, and partly because she was the most dangerous opponent, that the bulk of Germany's forces would be directed against France, while along her eastern frontier she would remain on the defensive. Austria, compelled to divide her forces between Serbia and Russia, would have the overwhelming bulk of her forces aligned along the Galician border of Poland. The Russian armies, hampered by poor transportation facilities and the immense distances of the Russian Empire, could not hope to match their rivals in the speed of their mobilization, and could only by the fifteenth day (of mobilization) have nineteen infantry divisions along the East Prussian frontier against the Germans, though at that, most of the latter's troops having been diverted to the west, Germany could confront the nineteen Russian divisions with only thirteen; on the southwestern front 23 Russian divisions would face 38 Austro-Hungarian divisions. The Russian preponderance against Germany was thus offset by their numerical inferiority against Austria-Hungary. But of decided advantage to Russia was her marked superiority in cavalry and greater potential man-power, which would continue to provide fresh



Adapted from "Der Weltkrieg," Vol. X. Courtesy of E. S. Mittler & Sohn, Berlin.

units from the Caucasus, Turkestan, and Siberia, till the end of two months from the day of mobilization.

The eastern theater of war by nature is that part of the vast plain of Eurasia that lies between the Carpathian mountains on the south and the Baltic on the north. History had contrived to thrust Russian territory as a great salient directed against the heart of Germany, flanked on the one hand by East Prussia and on the other by the Austrian province of Galicia, which lies north of the Carpathians. It may be considered as a broad triangle with its base reaching from the Gulf of Riga in the north to the Austro-Rumanian frontier near Cernowitz, its apex a rounded salient whose western extremities rest on Thorn and Cracow. The general triangular idea is carried still further by the railway system which, starting from St. Petersburg in the north, from Moscow to the east, and Odessa and Kiev in the south, converges in a nearly symmetrical pattern on Warsaw, its apex and nodal point in the west. Transverse lines cross the triangle from north to south, thus forming a network to facilitate lateral communication. The river system had an important bearing on military problems. The Vistula, rising in the Beskide mountains, joins the San near Sandomierz and turns northward, severing western Poland from the main theater of war; in its course across East Prussia to the sea it cut off that province from the rest of Germany. Other important river lines were the San and the Tanew, southern tributaries of the Vistula that would oppose the Austrians entering Poland from the south; and the Bug (with its tributaries, the Narew and Bohr), which flows into the Vistula near Warsaw from the east. These were fortified and, with the fortresses of Novogorgievsk and Ossowiec, served as a bastion for northern Poland. In case the line of the Vistula were forced, the upper Bug rising near Lemberg in Galicia, in its northerly course to Brest Litovsk, provided an admirable second line of defense which was carried north along the Lesna, the forest of Bialowiecz, and the Middle Niemen as far as Kovno. At the base of the triangle lie the formidable Rokitno marshes on the upper Pripet, called Polesie by the Russians, the ancient home of the

Slav. Regarded as impenetrable for large bodies of troops, they were generally avoided. The communications of the northwestern armies passed to the north; those of the southwest to its south. They might assist or embarrass either side according to circumstances. The distances of the eastern theater of war were vast as compared with those of the western front: the country was more open, and the density of the military forces was much less.

The Grand Duke Nicholas (Nikolai Nikolayevich), a cousin of the Tsar, was named commander-in-chief of all the fighting forces, both military and naval, with Yanuskevich as his chief of staff. The Russian plan was to concentrate two armies in the north—the so-called northwestern group—under the direction of General Zhilinskii, and four in the south—the so-called southwestern group, under General Ivanov.

THE EAST PRUSSIAN CAMPAIGN

On August 14, even before mobilization was complete and while even mobilized units were, in some cases, without transports, it was decided in response to an appeal from France, simultaneously with the advance of the southern Russian armies into Galicia, to launch an offensive against East Prussia. The Russian first (or Niemen) army under Rennenkampf crossed the frontier on August 17. This army, advancing from the direction of Kovno, was directed towards Königsberg, keeping to the north of the Masurian lakes; the second or Narew army under Samsonov entered East Prussia some three days later and advanced towards Allenstein, keeping to the west of the lakes. The German eighth army, under General Prittwitz, comprising all the German troops in East Prussia available for operations in the field, attempted to block Rennenkampf in the north. It was pushed back at Stallupönen and, after retiring on Gumbinnen, was severely handled on the 20th when it made a stand at the latter place. News of the advance of the Narew army from the south compelled a precipitate retreat. Prittwitz apparently intended to retreat to the Vistula but had apparently no hope of even making a successful stand here. When he disclosed his

panic in a telephone conversation with the High Command, it was decided to relieve him of his command. He was replaced by a general on the reserve list, General-Colonel Paul von Beneckendorff und von Hindenburg, who was called from his retirement at Hanover. His chief of staff was to be General Eric Ludendorff, who at that time was on special duty with the second army in Belgium and had just effected the capture of Liège by a *coup de main*. On August 23 the two reached Marienburg and assumed charge of German operations in East Prussia.

Count Schlieffen, chief of the German general staff till his death in 1905, believed that the strategy of Hannibal at Cannae was the most perfect in the history of the art of war. Following his example, every German commander dreamed of winning imperishable renown by emulating the matchless skill of the great Carthaginian. Hence, the new commander and his chief of staff sought to take advantage of the terrain and the military situation to surround and annihilate the southern Russian army, dangerously exposed as it was by Samsonov's oblique thrust westwards towards the Vistula. The perilous gap between the two Russian armies that resulted from this move, and the painful deliberation with which Rennenkampf advanced, enabled the German command boldly and skilfully, while allowing its front, the twentieth corps, to be driven in by Samsonov, to draw the first corps around his weak southwestern flank and his rear, and to drive in his eastern flank, so that by August 28 the noose had been drawn tight around an army of 200,000 men. This six-day engagement is known to the Germans as the Battle of Tannenberg, so-called because the modern battlefield encompassed in one small corner of its great expanse the field where the chivalry of the Teutonic Knights went down before the army of the Polish King Jagiello in 1410. It brought the Germans 92,000 prisoners of war (among them 13 general officers) and a booty of 350 guns. It eliminated two and a half corps and destroyed for months the fighting value of the second Russian army.

The Russian defeat is to be ascribed to many factors, among

them the difficulty of the terrain, the deficiency of Russian communications, and the admirable efficiency of the German railway lines. Aside from the lack of transport there were some far more obvious defects that made defeat inevitable. For one thing the Russians allowed themselves to be effectively "blinded" by the German staff, though they had an overwhelming superiority in cavalry (99 squadrons to 58). Not only did they fail to secure intelligence of the enemy but they revealed their own secrets by failing to take the very elementary precaution of coding wireless messages from army group headquarters to the army and back from the army to army group headquarters. Crucial messages thus picked up enabled the German staff to keep posted on all contemplated Russian movements. But perhaps most glaring of all was the criminal slowness with which movements were executed; neither the high command nor the lower ranks seemed to have an appreciation of the value of time in a strategic situation, nor possessed of the enterprise to turn it to account. Favorable opportunities let slip seldom recur in war. Above all, the inability of the army group headquarters to coördinate the movements of its two armies and the failure of Samsonov and Rennenkampf to keep in touch with each other were fatal to success. Perhaps the most noticeable lack in all ranks was that of that thorough mastery of their craft possessed by the Germans. Enterprise and dash were conspicuously absent; and stubborn courage availed the private soldier little when his officers allowed themselves to be trapped or he himself was outmarched by his untiring foe.

But more was yet to come. On August 31, the last day of the battle of Tannenberg, the commander of the German eighth army issued a directive that "the next task of the army will be to clear East Prussia of the army of Rennenkampf." The latter had during the closing phases of the battle of Tannenberg thrust forward some feeble detachments in the direction of Bischofsburg and Allenstein towards Samsonov, but immediately on learning of the disaster that had overtaken the Narew army, he had retired northwest of the Masurian lakes,

his right flank resting on the Kurische Haff, his left flank refused from Gardhausen to Lake Mauer, on which it rested.

Hindenburg redistributed his troops along the railway from Lötzen to Königsberg facing northeast. In a great battle lasting from September 7 to 11, he attacked the Russian lines through the gaps between the lakes and south of them, taking steps meanwhile to secure himself from any menace to his right flank and rear by the remnants of the Narew army. His principal thrust was directed against the left (southern) flank of the Russians in an effort to repeat the achievement of Tannenberg and break through to the railway running east and west from Kovno to Königsberg. He almost succeeded, but the determined resistance of two corps thrown in south of Darkehmen allowed the main body of Russians to escape by marching continuously for fifty hours in three parallel columns along the highway through Gumbinnen and Wirballen. Nevertheless, though no large fighting unit of Russians was bagged, 45,000 prisoners were taken and 150 guns. The total number of prisoners taken in East Prussia to date was 145,000, over one-third of the Russian effectives, with 500 guns, about one-quarter of the guns in possession of the Russian army.

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST AUSTRIA

Meanwhile the Russians had launched their four armies of the southwest against the Austrian army: the fourth under Ewert from Lublin, the fifth under Plehve from Cholm-Kowel, the third from Rowno along the Dubno-Lutsk line, the eighth from Proskurov facing westwards toward Tarnopol. In the concentration, Conrad, Austrian chief of staff, had assembled his troops farther westwards than had been anticipated; this enabled him to beat back the fourth Russian army in the battle of Krasnik; the next, the fifth Russian army, was engaged by the Austrian fourth and part of the third near Komarov; in a desperate and complicated series of engagements, this Russian force was threatened with envelopment, but at the critical moment false information led the Austrian commander to withdraw. Thereupon he in turn was subjected to the same

danger. Meantime, the armies under Ruzskii and Brusilov, advancing on Lemberg from the east, were able, in view of the Russian numerical superiority, to defeat the Austrian armies in a battle on the Gnila Lipa and to throw them back on Lemberg. The latter place was evacuated. Though Plehve, to the northwest of Lemberg, had been defeated, he rallied his men, marched south, and threw them onto the Austrian flank from the north while their front was driven in at Rawa Russka on September 9. This operation, in combination with the attack on Dankl of fresh forces in the west, threatened the destruction of the whole Austrian line and compelled its retirement to the San and the Dniester.

These stupendous encounter battles sounded the note for the whole war on the eastern front. The Germans had struck the Russian armies staggering blows; the latter in their turn had all but put the Austrian armies out of the fight, taking over 100,000 prisoners from them and 400 guns. Almost without exception, these were the terms on which the forces of the three powers engaged.

THE AUTUMN CAMPAIGNS

Hindenburg had been put in charge of all German operations in the eastern theater of war and had surrendered the eighth army to Schubert, who, on instructions from Hindenburg, had prepared a plan for an offensive against the lines of the Niemen and the Bobr. This was carried out in the period September 30 to October 8 through difficult terrain; Ossowiec was approached from the west by the Germans in an effort to reduce its forts by indirect fire from heavy howitzers, but the difficulty of advancing the heavy batteries to effective range over marshy ground, and the danger of infantry attack to which they were exposed, led to their being withdrawn.

The northern corps was heavily engaged at Suwalki and Augustovo. Despite the victories won on this flank, withdrawal was decided on. The decision led to the removal of the commanding officer, and the appointment of the fiery François as army commander. But the latter had as little luck

and was compelled on October 30 to acquiesce in the withdrawal to the Lötzen-Angerapp line across the East Prussian frontier.

In the south the high command had decided to relieve pressure on the Austrians by concentrating an army in Silesia and launching an attack northeastward across west Poland towards Warsaw. For this purpose they assembled the ninth army under the direct command of Hindenburg at Breslau. September 30 it began its march across the glaxis of western Poland, joining hands with the first Austrian army under Dankl, which marched astride of the upper Vistula. The country had been purposely left by the Russians without adequate means of communication, either roads or railroads. A special transport had to be improvised from native carts and draft animals. Brushing aside Russian resistance, the Germans pushed on to the middle Vistula, where they became heavily engaged before Warsaw and Ivangorod; after fruitless attacks to force the crossings of the Vistula, the allied armies, now greatly outnumbered, withdrew on October 20. The Russians following them cautiously till they reached the Silesian border on November 2.

But Hindenburg had recoiled only to make another spring. The ninth army was reassembled on the northwest frontier of Poland west of the Vistula. At this juncture, Hindenburg received formal appointment as supreme commander of the forces of Germany in the east; Mackensen became commander of the ninth army in Hindenburg's place. An effort to achieve unity of command between Germany and Austria came to nothing. It was decided, despite protests of Conrad, chief of the Austrian staff, to tear the main German army loose from the left wing of the Austrians and leave the latter, with the help of one German division, to shift for itself.

The ninth army assembled in place and began its forward move against the northern flank of the Russians on November 11. Then followed a series of gigantic battles as the German forces, thrusting southwards, came into contact with the right wing of the Russians and tore it asunder. Pouring through

the gap, they pushed the northern end of the Russian line back on the Vistula; the southern part of the line they rolled up around the city of Lodz, which they threatened with investment. By the capture of Bzheziny, the Germans finally drove a wedge between the second and fifth armies and thus succeeded in passing around the eastern outskirts of Lodz to the encirclement of the town and the troops defending it. But the first Russian army closed up from the south, and this maneuver, in turn, led to the encirclement of the German group under General Scheffer, who had thus intrepidly thrust himself into the jaws of the lion. He realized his peril immediately and at once took steps to withdraw his men. Marching all night they returned through the gaps in the Russian lines with their transport and prisoners, stormed Bzheziny, held by two Russian battalions, destroyed six other battalions isolated to the west of the town, and joined hands once more with their comrades of the twentieth corps.

After the failure of the Russian plans, General Ruzskii determined to straighten out his line. He evacuated Lodz and took up a line from the Bzura Rawka River in the north to the Nida in the south (left bank tributaries of the Vistula). But though the Russians surrendered their plans for the direct invasion of Germany from the east, they concentrated along the upper Vistula for the seizure of Cracow and the invasion of Austria from the north. But their defeat before Cracow forced their retirement on the Dunajec. Meanwhile farther east their advance guards had forced the approaches to the passes over the Carpathians and the Beskide, and in some cases acquired the passes themselves. From here they planned after regrouping their forces to launch an attack on the weak Austrian forces in the mountains and to debouch on the Hungarian plain to the south.

The year 1914 had brought disastrous losses in man-power and material to all the belligerents. Especially was this true of Russia, where the shortage of artillery, munitions, and rifles was becoming acute by the close of the year. Hardly less so was this the case of Austria. But in those intangible factors

which we call *morale*, the Austrian army was perhaps at its lowest ebb; its offensive power, unless reinforced by German troops, could be put at nearly zero. For the Central Powers, the eastern theater of war at the end of the year presented almost insoluble problems.

THE 1915 CAMPAIGN

At German headquarters the burning question was, "Should Germany's weight be thrown to the east or to the west?" During 1914 Falkenhayn had, since the Marne, insisted on a decision in the west; for that reason he had held out for the attack at Ypres. Here, in October, the Fabeck group of four reserve corps of volunteers, whose presence might have brought victory in the east, were thrown away in desperate but unavailing attacks on the British lines. Falkenhayn, without success or hope of success in the west, could not resist the pressure on him to turn Germany's reserve eastwards to force the issue in that theater of war. The winter battle of the Masurian Lakes and the abortive offensive in the Carpathians was a concession to this, but both fell short of a complete victory. A vast new operation was envisaged to achieve this complete triumph, and to its framing, Falkenhayn made his contribution.

The opening of the 1915 campaign was heralded by the creation of a German southern army to coöperate with Austrian armies on the Carpathian front, in an offensive which was to coincide with a great offensive in the north. These opening battles began in February. In the Carpathians the Austrian and German armies were within a few days brought to a standstill, but in the north, the operation broadened out into the winter battle of the Masurian Lakes. In a great action lasting from February 7 to the 22nd, the tenth German army broke in overwhelming strength through the feeble Russian defenses along the Niemen east of Tilsit, and swung south and east in a series of forced marches in severe winter weather, through Vladislavov and Suvalki, destroying the Russian railway from Kovno to Stallupönen as it went. Meanwhile the eighth German army, forcing its way through the region of the lakes,

passed south of Augustovo (reached by the troops of the tenth army) and compelled its evacuation. The Russians retreated eastward into the forest of Augustovo. But detachments of the twenty-first division had, in an audacious move carried out under the very guns of Kovno, closed the exits from the forest from the east. The result was the destruction of the greater part of the tenth Russian army. Ninety-two thousand prisoners were captured (including nine general officers), 295 guns, 170 machine guns. The help sent from the fortress of Kovno arrived too late. But though the operation in the north was a tactical success, the failure of the Carpathian battle in the south, the strength of the Narew and Bobr line, and the appearance of large reinforcements forbade any attempt to exploit the success further, in the direction of Bialystok. At the end of the battle the German line was withdrawn to the fortress of Lötzen and the lines of Drewenz and Angerapp.

It was two months before the offensive was renewed. This time the area selected for attack was the south at the point where the Russian line, after following the crest of the Carpathians and the Beskide, turned to the north to come down to the Dunajec, the Biala, and the Vistula rivers. A second German army (in addition to the original southern army), the eleventh, had been created to act as spearhead of the thrust. The Austrian forces that flanked were stiffened with German units. On the morning of May 2, after a prolonged bombardment to which the Russians could not reply, the Germans and Austrians carried the Russian lines in the region of the upper Dunajec, Biala, and Wisloka rivers, and by threatening to take in reverse the Russian positions in the Beskide and Carpathians, forced their speedy evacuation. The attack spread north and east till the whole Russian line in Galicia had retired behind the line of the San and the Dniester, where it had a temporary breathing spell and could make up its losses.

Simultaneously with the opening of these operations in the south, known as the battle of Gorlice, the German command launched an offensive in Courland which, while it led to only minor territorial gains, distracted attention from the main

operation and drew to this far-distant front reserves whose intervention might have turned the scale in Galicia.

Again on June 3 the army group of Mackensen, moving forward, forced the passage of the San, captured Yaroslav and forced the evacuation of Przemyśl. This was accompanied by an offensive north of the Carpathians from the Dniester to the Złota Lipa, passing around the city of Lemberg, which fell on June 20.

These operations were followed by a minor offensive of the southern (German) army in which it secured control of the Dniester. Then on July 13 the army of Gallwitz on the frontier of West Prussia moved forward against the Narew line protecting Warsaw from the northwest, stormed it, carried Przasnysz, and finally compelled the evacuation on July 24 of Płock and Łódź, thus partially uncovering Warsaw. Though it pressed on towards the junction of the Bug with the Vistula, it was not able to force a decision. This came from the ninth army which moved up from the south in conjunction with Gallwitz early in July. On August 5 the German troops occupied the Polish capital, on the western bank of the Vistula.

It was at this stage of operations that General von Hindenburg put before the high command his views that frontal attack and pursuit would but crush in the enemy's lines without bringing a decisive result. To achieve the latter he proposed to assemble a powerful group on the right flank of the Russians, to pierce their line on the Niemen, and by a drive eastwards through Kovno and Vilna to cut Russia's vital lines of communication. But the request was turned down by Falkenhayn; the troops made available by the fall of Warsaw and Ivangorod were thrust into the pursuit east of Warsaw or diverted to Novogeorgievsk, which fell with a great booty on August 20. The Germans thus achieved success in the west; but these operations failed to prevent the withdrawal to safety of materials from more easterly areas.

The combined operations above described had carried the German armies east and north till they described a great arc to the east of Warsaw, its northern flank on the Narew near

Ossowiec and its southern resting on the Bug near Cholm. Mackensen's group, on reaching the Bug in its northeastward drive, had been redistributed; the southern wing, crossing the Bug but keeping south of the Rokitno, advanced till it came in touch with the Russian southwestern group. The rest turned north, following the left bank of the Bug to press the advance on Brest Litovsk. No effort was made to penetrate through the swamp region to the Russian communications through Pinsk. The high command was not informed that the prolonged drought had rendered that route practicable.

Though battle-worn and far from its railheads, Mackensen's force pushed on in the early part of August, and on the 17th launched a series of attacks in the direction of the fortress of Brest Litovsk. These led to its surrender on August 26. Then came the offensive of the Niemen army in Courland and Lithuania, which led to the fall of Mitau. Though Riga was saved, the German line passed close to its southern edge and followed the line of the western Dvina beyond Dünaburg. Hindenburg followed suit by an attack on Kovno with the tenth army. This fortress fell on the 18th. Then the Germans pushed forward with great speed in an endeavor to entrap the whole body of the Russian army moving eastward on Minsk through the narrow neck between the Beresina and the Vilya. The railway was cut north and south of Vilna by the tenth army, and the German cavalry, ranging far to the east, succeeded in reaching the railway at Molodczerno behind the retreating Russians. They were insufficiently strong to hold it back. The Russian tide overbore the Germans' feeble attempts to intercept their flight. Vilna was successfully evacuated September 18 and the retreat to safety made good. On September 25, the beginning of the battle of Loos and its twin action in the Champagne in the west led the high command to order the troops in the east to take up permanent positions north of the Pinsk marshes—Mackensen from Telechany to the mouth of the Beresina; Hindenburg from the Beresina to the Gulf of Riga.

South of the great marsh area, the right wing of the allied

army had merely conformed to the general progress of the movement on the left flank; but on August 27, led off by the Austrian second army, it assumed the offensive across the Bug in eastern Galicia. Farther south the southern German army crossed the Zlota Lipa but was held up by the failure of its northern neighbor. Meanwhile the first and fourth Austrian armies under Linsingen, squeezed out of the pursuit of the main Russian body, were moved eastward across the middle Bug for an advance on Rowno. At enormous sacrifice they forced the Russians out of their position on the Syerna, captured Lutzk, and reached positions on the Kormin and the Ikwa rivers, thus opening the way for the southern and the second Austrian army to the Sereth. But Tarnopol held, and a counter attack drove them back to the Styr river. The whole position south of the marshes was then stabilized in an almost straight line running generally north and south along the Styr and its tributaries to the Strypa and the Dniester, where it touched the frontier of Rumania.

The disasters that had overtaken the Russian army, and particularly the menace to Petrograd through Courland, led to a reorganization of the Russian forces. The northwestern front was divided between two groups—the northern under General Ruzskii and the western under General Alexeyev. To the former fell the task of covering the approaches to the capital by both land and sea; and therefore, he was given control of the naval forces in the Baltic and the Gulf of Finland. An invasion of this area contained the greatest menace to the whole army, as it opened the possibilities of severing its communications. General Alexeyev was to guard the roads leading to Moscow. The new dispositions were to be effective from August 31. A further change took place on September 5 when the Tsar visited headquarters at Mohilev and personally took over command of the military forces, with Alexeyev as chief of staff. The Grand Duke Nicholas was assigned to the command of the armies in the Caucasus. Ewert succeeded to the place vacated by Alexeyev.

Thus ended the campaign in the eastern theater of war for

1915. The Russians had suffered cruel losses in men and material—92,000 men and 295 guns in the winter Masurian battle, 90,000 men and 1,600 guns at Novogeorgievsk, 20,000 men and 1,300 guns at Kovno; in the attack on the Narew, 37,000 prisoners. In the great retreat from Warsaw, however, the enemy had to content themselves with frontal attacks and nowhere was an encircling movement successfully carried out. From most of the fortresses—Warsaw, Brest Litovsk, Przemysl, and Vilna—armament and munitions were removed or destroyed. Nevertheless, the Russian losses were prodigious. For the year 1915, they totalled 2,300,000 (including 1,000,000 missing). The shortage of rifles that had developed during the summer was still acute, about 12 per cent of the infantry having none. The lack of guns and munitions which had paralyzed Russian resistance was still felt, but strenuous efforts were being made to overcome this handicap.

On October 14, 1914, when Turkey had joined the Central Powers, her first acts of war were to harry Russian commerce in the Black Sea and to close the Straits to Russian commerce. This was a shrewd blow directed at Russia's vitals, for it severed her most important sea route to the outside world. The Baltic now being closed by German submarines and the White Sea by ice for half the year, Russia was restricted for foreign supplies to the long single-track railway across Siberia to her far eastern port on the Pacific, Vladivostok. To remedy this, a corps was made ready at Odessa for landing operations directed against Constantinople, but the inability of Russia to secure control of the Black Sea prevented this move. An appeal was, however, directed to the western powers to open the Straits by other means; hence the British naval attack on the outer forts of the Dardanelles in 1914, an operation which finally broadened out into the ill-fated Gallipoli expedition of 1915.

But the year 1915 had brought other calamities to Russia. One that concerned Russia not so much in a military as in a political sense was the elimination of Serbia. The little state, which had been the occasion of the European conflagration,

had in 1914 broken and driven back Potiorek's Austrian army to the Danube. But in 1915 Austria and Germany had induced Turkey to join them, and they approached Bulgaria in an effort to persuade the Bulgars to cast their lot with the Central Powers. On September 6 a military convention was negotiated with her, and on September 14 a combined offensive was launched against Serbia under the lead of Mackensen. The Serbian army was driven back across the Danube and lost its arsenal at Kragujevac on October 1. Its way southward was barred by the advance westward of the first Bulgarian army to Veles. There was no alternative to surrender left save to traverse the pathless and barren Illyrian Alps to the Adriatic—a *via dolorosa* for the mass of desperate soldiers and refugees who, suffering the last extremities of hunger and exhaustion, toiled through snow and ice across the desolate mountains of Albania. Most of the women and children had been left behind before the ascent of the mountains was begun. The survivors, a mere fraction of the Serbian armies, were collected at San Giovanni de Medua and shipped to Corfu, where an effort was made to re-establish them as a fighting unit.

Meanwhile Turkey moved two of her armies to the Caucasus to assume the offensive against Russian arms in that region. Starting from Erzerum, Turkish Armenia, three Turkish columns under the command of Enver Pasha, early in 1915, struggled across the mountains in a great encircling movement on Sarikamysh, a frontier outpost and rail head covering the route to Kars and Tiflis. But the elements were too much for the Turks. Snow lay deep in the mountain valleys; sub-zero temperatures made the journey an unending agony for man and beast; the transport was paralyzed by weather conditions; men and horses died by thousands of cold, exposure, hunger, and neglect. The expedition was abandoned and the survivors straggled back to Erzerum, less than a third of their original strength.

The Grand Duke Nicholas was not slow in striking back. On February 1 the Russian army of the Caucasus, 160,000 strong, pushing across the frontier from Sarikamysh on a front

of 300 kilometers, stormed the Turkish position in front of Erzerum, and, after occupying the city, pushed the defenders half way along the road to Erzingjan. The Russians had also entered Persia, overawed the government at Teheran, and overrun western Persia, occupying Kermanshah and Hamadan, thrusting forward feelers towards the British in the Tigris valley. The fall of Kut early in 1916 discomfited the Russians; half of the sixth Turkish army at Kut was withdrawn and sent into the mountains against the Russians. It succeeded in reoccupying Hamadan and Kermanshah. But this advantage was merely temporary. In the north the fifth Caucasian corps, which had been held at Odessa for a *coup de main* against Constantinople, was thrown into the Armenian theater of war, and early in July landed east of Trebizond. The city fell and the whole Turkish force was thrown back to the Line Kemach (on the Karasu) and Tireboli (on the Black Sea), with a loss of over fifty per cent of its fighting strength. Another force occupied a position running northwest from Lake Van across the Murad Sea and barred the route from Diabekr, on the upper Tigris.

For the moment the situation was stabilized in the east while Falkenhayn turned to the west to batter through the French lines before Verdun. Italy, who had joined the *Entente* during the desperate days of May 1915, when the Russians were retreating on the San, hardly found her role a burdensome one while Austrians and Germans were preoccupied in other theaters. But in 1916 both the Italian and western theaters woke to new life. In February began the German attack on Verdun. It led to a frantic appeal, conveyed through diplomatic channels, for Russian help in France's extremity. An offensive was hastily prepared and launched in the area of Lake Naroch north of Pinsk on March 16. But the low morale of the Russian troops gave little grounds for confidence. Deficiency in heavy artillery did not allow adequate preparation for the attack, and the spring break-up made the roads impassable. After insignificant gains had been bought at prodigious cost, the attempt was given up as a failure.

THE BRUSILOV OFFENSIVE

Meanwhile, a conference of the staffs of the various groups of the Russian armies had been summoned to meet at General Headquarters at Mohilev in April 1916. Here, despite the gloomy reports of Kuropatkin and Ewert, commanders of the northern and western groups, Brusilov reported in favor of a renewed effort in the south. Where the Russians faced only the troops of Austria-Hungary, there seemed better chances of success. It is but fair to add that the troops stationed here had not been involved in the disastrous defeats of 1915. The plan was approved by General Alexeyev, chief of the general staff. The offensive was to be begun only after the most meticulous and elaborate preparations, but the Austrian attack on Italy in the middle of May and an immediate call for help led the high command to advance the date.

The attack as carried out by the eighth, eleventh, seventh, and ninth armies embraced the area from Lutsk to the Pruth river. It was, despite heavy losses, a brilliant success from a tactical point of view, and substantial progress was made at most points. Unfortunately the positions covering the roads to Lemberg from the east held and forces on the flanks, where the progress was most marked, were diverted to places of secondary strategical importance. Too late was it realized that Lemberg was the decisive point and that the forces must concentrate on a supreme effort to capture that city, thus to disorganize the whole Austro-Hungarian front. But reinforcements of both Germans and Austrians had by now arrived on the scene. The Russian effectives had withered away in the early attacks and they were now heavily outnumbered. Up to August 12, the losses of all the armies of the southwestern group amounted to 550,000 of all ranks, to which must be added 200,000 casualties suffered by the Russians in the Lake Naroch offensive in March. The Austrian prisoners captured by Brusilov—375,000—were only a partial set-off to the losses sustained.

This unexpected victory had raised Russian prestige, and its

immediate result was the military and political convention signed with Rumania on August 17. But with a view to covering the Rumanian invasion of Transylvania, the Russian ninth army had to be moved southward to the Carpathians, thus slackening military activity on this front and finally putting an effective end to the operation.

The Brusilov offensive was really the last expiring effort of the Russian army. The year 1917 saw the revolution which gripped the army as well as the back areas; talk and argument took the place of commands and directives. The morale of the men at the front, as well as in the areas behind the lines, was further undermined by "Order No. 1" which destroyed the discipline of the fighting forces. The abortive offensive ordered by Kerensky on the Stokhod river in the summer of 1917, when the flower of what was left of the Russian army, its best officers and non-commissioned officers, were sacrificed in a patriotic but fruitless effort to revive the flagging war spirit and to fulfil Russia's duties to her allies, failed to check the disintegration. Henceforth the descent to Avernus was swift and unbroken.

EFFECTS OF THE WAR

A bald narrative like the above fails to convey any adequate impression, if such were possible, of what the war meant to Russians, either collectively or individually. It came as a thunderclap on the people as a whole, hurrying millions, without being consulted, to death or mutilation. Other millions were thrown on the world as orphans and widows, though the issues for which husbands and fathers died remained obscure or unintelligible. But, at least for those elements of society that were most vocal, it came at first with a cleansing power, lifting them out of themselves and giving them a cause for which they might die. Tsar and the government and people were one, each vying with the others in pledging its all in the cause of Russia. In that first flush of enthusiasm, alas never to be recaptured, Nicholas sacrificed at a stroke of the pen one-third of the state's revenue that the nation, now awakening to a new

life, might not sink back into sloth and drunkenness. The liquor monopoly was abolished for the duration of the war, and men went to war as it were to an uplifting experience. Even with the appalling shock that the sight of the wounded and the long casualty lists brought, the national temper arose to new heights; people took on new duties and welcomed new sacrifices.

But the Russian state was curiously inept in canalizing such forces and directing them into beneficent channels. Whatever there was of spontaneous political life centered in the *zemstva*, and immediately the *zemstvo* leaders put themselves at the head of the people. A *zemstvo* congress was called; the administration, though it disapproved, for the moment, looked the other way. A *zemstvo* committee was organized for war purposes and immediately took up the most pressing question—the care of the wounded. But the government took alarm, as it considered this its special problem, and refused to allow the *zemstva* to intrude. A compromise was arranged whereby the care of the wounded in the interior of the country fell to the *zemstva*, while in the forward areas this duty would fall to the medical services of the army. No one had realized the magnitude of the task. The casualties from the first were on a scale never anticipated, and the medical personnel of the army found its slender equipment and facilities hopelessly overtaxed. There was nothing to do but to call on the *zemstva*, the only institutions capable of marshalling popular effort. Gradually, as the army proved itself unable to deal with the problem unassisted, the *zemstva* were drawn in more and more until they bore the heaviest part of this vast burden. Yet this did not exhaust their energies. The supply of clothes and of other necessities for the troops—even of munitions, a service badly handicapped by the shutting off of imports and the paralysis of Russia's manufactures—was also organized by the *zemstva*. They found supporters in the officials of the cities; a joint committee of the two organizations, the *zemgor*, finally enabled them to present a united front to the government and to bring under their control existing popular agencies. . Other agencies

came into existence to further the prosecution of the war, such as the War Industries Board and the five Special Councils for national defense, transport, fuel, food supply, and refugees. Their beneficent influence went forth throughout the land—beneficent to those to whom assistance was extended, but



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THE TSAR NICHOLAS II AND HIS FAMILY.

beneficent also to those who thus acquired the capacity for public service. Would that this were all there was to record.

As time went on, the keen edge of enthusiasm and the spirit of self-sacrifice were dulled. The sufferings of the war, the prolonged and unrelieved strain, the rumors of treason (most of them ill-founded) of those in high places, the stories of incompetence (some of them justified), the callous indifference

and inefficiency of the bureaucracy, the resentment shown by authorities at spontaneous activity of private individuals—all these combined to bring disillusionment. The defeats, the mounting losses, chilled the heart. The confidence of the people in their destiny waned, and in their great need their leaders failed them. The Tsar and the imperial family more and more retired in on themselves. Preoccupied with her own grief, the Empress turned for relief to the notorious Rasputin. His conduct was a scandal to the capital; but worse than that, his low intrigues insinuated incompetent and worthless persons into high places and turned out of office the men on whose integrity and patriotism the country could have and should have relied. The despair became general and a creeping paralysis spread over the country. Maladministration and the failure of the incompetent authorities to take any steps to correct abuses or to summon the people to a supreme effort gradually slowed down the nation's effort. By the end of 1915, thinking people in Russia had lost hope and had now resigned themselves to await in despair the inevitable catastrophe.

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THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1917

THE WINTER OF 1916

THE WINTER OF 1916-1917 was a gloomy one for Russia. The Tsar was absent at Mohilev, in nominal charge of military operations. The government was at this critical juncture left with only such pitiful direction as could be given by the Empress and the incompetent and dishonest Stürmer, president of the council of ministers, who had taken the place of the senile Goremykin on February 2, 1916. The appointment of Stürmer was really the culmination of the intrigues of the camarilla that had grown up around the person of Rasputin; appointments to other crucial positions indicated the growing influence of Rasputin, Vyrubova, and her friends, working through the Empress. Incapacity, corruption, intrigue, self-seeking, open and unashamed, were the order of the day; old and conscientious servants of the tsarist regime, such as Sazonov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, were thrust into the background. Not only was the whole spirit of the ruling clique reactionary in the worst sense of that word, but it even undermined respect for that most reactionary institution—the autocracy, whose interests it was prepared to sacrifice to its own selfish intrigue. Its perspective in domestic affairs was one of narrow horizons and its capacity nil; in foreign affairs, defeatism and treason robbed it of all credit with those who, while reactionary, were honestly so, and were devoted to their country's cause. To aggravate this condition, the short-lived triumphs of Brusilov had been succeeded by stalemate on the front in Galicia and Volhynia. Then had come the inter-

vention of Rumania in August. The Rumanian government, disregarding its undertaking with France to direct its military forces against Bulgaria, launched its armies in a mad venture north and west across the Transylvanian Alps in defiance of all sound strategy. A debacle was the inevitable outcome. The effort of Russia to send help was tardy and unavailing. The collapse of Rumania dragged the already shaken Russian prestige down with it and increased the despair that was beginning to clutch the hearts of the upper classes of Russia. And in domestic affairs, as in foreign, the Emperor showed himself less and less able to intervene with effectiveness. His bearing was that of a man already doomed and who but awaits the final blow.

The chief difficulties from which the country was suffering were psychological rather than physical. But as the war went on into the third winter, disquieting physical symptoms began to manifest themselves. The transportation system, especially the state railways, which had never functioned perfectly, began to slow up and suffer frequent interruptions. Rolling stock, engines, had deteriorated markedly as a result of neglect and lack of replacement; the war had overstrained its resources. The cities, with their heavy requirements for food and fuel, were peculiarly sensitive to any tie-up in communication; the capital, Moscow, and some of the larger industrial cities, began to suffer from shortage of food, with its inevitable accompaniment of high prices. Food queues were familiar sights on the streets of Petrograd; and unavoidably this bred discontent among the workers, of which the revolutionary agitators were not slow to avail themselves. Strikes and major disturbances were everyday occurrences. Another factor in which the government showed itself shortsighted was the concentration around Petrograd of large numbers of troops, only partly trained and indifferently officered. Presumably held for replacements, they were allowed to stagnate in idleness; morale deteriorated, and discipline was relaxed. Yet no one seemed to be aware of the danger they constituted for the capital.

The winter of 1916 saw also the drama of Rasputin reach its

dénouement. The Emperor had shown himself inaccessible to influences from any quarter directed against the camarilla that centered in the dissolute monk. The very ambassadors of his allies had been listened to in frigid silence when they attempted to warn him against the dangers that threatened the state. The Emperor seemed impervious to advice, and intrigues and cabals seethed in court circles with greater intensity than ever. The members of the imperial family took fright and made some effort to avert the approaching catastrophe. It seemed that the days of Paul had come again. There were ugly rumors that a palace conspiracy was afoot. But the Tsar could still overawe even the most imposing and truculent of the grand dukes. The intrigue therefore turned against the sinister source whence the upper class derived all these evils. Early on the morning of December 30 Rasputin was murdered at the residence of Prince Felix Yusupov. His body was removed and pushed through the ice into the Nevka. But Rasputin was more a symptom of a disordered society than a contributing cause of that disorder; his death could not remove the deepseated evils that had brought him to the surface.

THE FEBRUARY (MARCH) REVOLUTION

In early March (N.S.) the situation became acute; demonstrations against the war and high prices were fused with the constant strikes that disturbed the city's peace. Then on March 8 came the celebration of Women's Day, observed in industrial centers in Russia as a socialist holiday. The profound dissatisfaction, long held in check, welled up on this and succeeding days, and threatened to sweep away the feeble efforts of the authorities to keep it within bounds. The Tsar was absent at military headquarters but he gave authority for the most extreme measures to be taken, and the council of ministers was in almost constant session. The measures adopted were of the severest kind, though they in no wise availed to check the disturbances. The Duma, which had gathered in the capital for its sessions, was prorogued by imperial decree till April and General Ivanov was despatched

from military headquarters at Mohilev with almost dictatorial powers to restore order in the capital. In answer to alarming reports received at headquarters, the Emperor left Mohilev on March 13 for Tsarskoye Selo but was stopped at the little station of Malaya Vichera with the news that the line to Tsarskoye was closed. The Tsar gave orders that they should proceed to Moscow, but at the station of Dno he was told that Moscow had gone over to the revolutionaries. He then directed that the train should go to Pskov, the headquarters of General Ruzskii, the commander of the northwestern group. By this time the situation in the capital was so bad that the leader of the Duma, Rodzyanko, had already, after a series of warnings, screwed up his courage to wire the Tsar, suggesting his abdication in favor of the heir-apparent, Alexei. Ruzskii had, in the meantime, consulted the commanders of the other armies by telegraph and presented to the Tsar their unanimous recommendation that he should vacate the throne. On the 15th the formal decree of abdication was signed in favor of the Tsar's brother, Michael.

Meanwhile the Duma in session in the Taurid Palace at Petrograd had received the decree of dissolution. Rather than defy it openly, it adjourned to another wing of the palace, where a committee of its members were named to form a provisional government and take over the administration. Prince George Lvov, a well-known *zemstvo* worker, was to be president. On March 14, after a long-drawn-out conference, the Duma leaders decided to urge the sovereign to abdicate in favor of his son, and a deputation was despatched to present their resolution to him. They reached Pskov at nine o'clock in the evening, when Guchkov presented the decision of the Executive Committee. The abdication had, however, already been decided on, but the Tsar's heart had failed him at the prospect of separation from his invalid son; he had, therefore, decided to name his brother Michael Aleksandrovich his successor. Two days later the last act was played when the Grand Duke, in fear for his life at the hands of the revolutionists, declined the perilous honor thus thrust upon him. The Rus-

sian state so long governed by absolute autocracy was now without a head. The storms that were to buffet it overtook it with sails set but with no pilot at the helm.

The refusal of the Duma to accept dissolution on March 12 and the seizure of power by the Executive Committee on March 14 became a bold and revolutionary step only in retrospect. As a matter of fact, the members of the Duma, on hearing the decree of dissolution read, moved from one wing to another of the Taurid Palace and there assembled merely as private citizens. Moreover, their assumption of power was only an acceptance with reluctance of what was actually thrust into their hands. Nor was their authority unchallenged. On March 14 there was organized the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which held its first meetings at the Finland Station but subsequently moved to the Taurid Palace. This institution was modelled on the "Soviets" that had come into existence in 1905 and which had been such a thorn in the side of the authorities and of the liberal regime which Witte had endeavored to set up. The government had finally found the courage to dissolve them. In addition to these there were other organizations such as the "Headquarters of the Troops" which sat at the Fortress of Peter and Paul, representing the mutinous garrison of Petrograd, which, though now in process of dissolution, comprised the only organized troops in the neighborhood and which, through the possession of arms, was in the future to be in a position to overawe any government.

But the assumption of power by the new authorities and securing recognition of this power were not the work of a day. Other centers of population had to be heard from. Moscow saw heavy fighting, but the triumph of the new order was complete. As we have seen, the first definite step in the revolution had been taken by the high command of the army; all hastened with one accord, despite their oath of fealty to the sovereign, to make their peace with the Provisional government. Foreign states also were not backward in extending recognition. The United States, at the time on the verge of hostilities with the Central Powers, was the first in the field.

England and France, while maintaining a show of reluctance, fell into line; and most of the other *Entente* powers followed suit, not, of course, without an anxious thought for the future of the war.

The Provisional government was actually initiated by the Council of Elders (an organization consisting of the leaders of all parties in the Duma). Its nucleus was a Provisional Committee of the Duma (or the members of the Duma, as they called themselves). But it was obvious at this date that any government worthy of the name must have the support of the Soviet, if it was to maintain order. The Executive Committee of the Soviets were, therefore, approached on the question of participation in the government. After some discussion, they agreed to take part, but at the same time they exacted their own terms:

1. Complete amnesty for all political and religious offenses.
2. Freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of strikes, and all trade union activity.
3. Abolition of all caste, of religious and national restrictions of privilege.
4. Immediate preparations for the holding of a constituent assembly to be chosen by universal, direct, equal, secret ballot, which should establish the form of government and the constitution which the country was to have.
5. Replacement of the police by a people's militia, with an elected administration subordinated to the organs of local self-government.
6. Election of local administrative bodies by direct, equal, universal, and secret ballot.
7. No disarming and no removal from Petrograd of the military units which took part in the revolutionary movement.
8. Abolition of all restriction on the enjoyment of general civil rights by soldiers, on condition of the maintenance of strictest discipline while on duty.

The conditions were quite in accord with the spirit of those revolutionary days. They did not, however, contain anything of special significance, except the clauses regarding the Petrograd garrison, destined in the future to have a sinister influence on events.

A second concrete step in the revolutionary movement scarcely less ominous was the publication of the famous "Order No. 1." This was a document drawn up in the Soviet on the night of March 14, and dictated to Sokolov by a group of soldiers. It expressed the natural impatience of the rank and file with the rigors of discipline and particularly the privileges of the officer caste. But it went further and enjoined the election of soldiers' committees to supervise the giving of orders by officers and the issuing of arms and ammunition. It further required the election of delegates to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in Petrograd to assemble there on March 22. But perhaps its most important clauses were the claims put forward to full control over the fighting forces of the government:

3. In all its political activities every military unit is subject to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and to its committees.
4. Orders of the military commission of the State Duma are to be carried out only when they do not contradict the orders and resolutions of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

These orders, which acquired an official character not so much from the body which drew them up as from the fact that they passed unchallenged, were followed up and supplemented by a Declaration of the Rights of Soldiers composed by the Soldiers' section of the Soviet and published in *Izvestia*, the official organ of the Soviet, on March 28. This practically destroyed the authority of all officers over the rank and file, even on duty. Thus were the new organs of government launched on their unhappy career. It must be constantly remembered that the Provisional government, born to this troubled existence, was from the first saddled with all the unsolved problems of the tsarist government, immensely aggravated by three years of a war that had demanded unprecedented efforts and sacrifices;


that, being selected from a body chosen on a restricted franchise, it enjoyed only a limited authority beyond the spheres of the interests it represented; and that while it accepted the responsibility of government thrust on it by groups represented in the Soviet, the support it was accorded was purely conditional. At critical moments that demanded action, it was threatened by the minority groups, or its authority in the country was undermined by the partners in the coalition. As each crisis was passed, it found itself progressively weaker. The ground was slipping from under its feet. Political inexperience thus exacted its vengeance.

Any government, whatever its character, called into existence at such a time would have been confronted by two or three acute problems. One was the economic distress occasioned by the war: the scarcity of food and high prices in many districts, especially the larger cities. Closely linked with that was the scarcity of consumers' goods, in the absence of which it was difficult to induce the peasant to part with his grain or to produce more than he and his family could consume. This phenomenon, coupled with the breakdown of transport, was the occasion of the food shortage. But at this very time, the industrial worker was busy complaining about his own grievances. Foremost among his demands was that for shorter hours and higher wages, so that the government was caught in a vicious circle.

Almost equally pressing was the question of the war, which everyone blamed for these calamities and which, though it did not create them, had undoubtedly done much to aggravate them. But any social or political disturbance was bound to bring up a long-standing grievance of the peasant; namely, the inadequacy of his land holdings, a heritage of the emancipation of 1861, which had been heightened by the increase of population and its inability to find relief by moving to Siberia. These became the burning questions of the next few months. A solution was impossible under the disturbed conditions of the time.

The government busied itself during the first weeks with

organization of power, and the new ministers gradually acquainted themselves with their duties. But in April, the honeymoon of the revolution was rudely broken when Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (Lenin) returned to Petrograd. Finding

*Sovfoto.*

VLADIMIR ILYICH ULYANOV (LENIN).

himself in Switzerland at the beginning of hostilities, he had adopted an attitude of uncompromising antipathy towards the war. On the outbreak of the revolution he was denied passage through France; he thereupon turned to the German government authorities and was given passage across Germany to the Baltic in a sealed train. Proceeding to Sweden, he

crossed into Finland and reached Petrograd on the night of April 16. Four days later he issued a challenge, calling on the workers to join in a struggle against the Provisional government and the war. From the first he resumed his role as leader of the Bolsheviks, and with his immense prestige dominated their decisions.

THE MAY CRISIS

The United States had, on April 6, entered the war against Germany as one of the "Allied and Associated Powers." These powers had recognized the new Russian government, which was anxious to bring the war to a successful termination and to secure the funds necessary for its military as well as its domestic expenditures. On the occasion of the May Day celebration, Milyukov, as Minister, reasserted the determination of Russia to pursue with her allies to a successful end their common struggle. The realization that the Provisional government was to continue the war brought a storm of protest from the Bolshevik press. The Executive Committee of the Soviets considered it and referred it to a plenary session. On May 3 occurred a great demonstration of soldiers and workers, together with the sailors of the Baltic fleet, which was continued on the following days. A counter-demonstration of patriotic elements threatened to bring a clash, which the government sought to avert by the use of troops. But here the Soviet intervened with its authority and forbade the movement of armed forces. The Soviet voted adversely on the note but refused to make it a vote of want of confidence. On May 10 Milyukov cut the gordian knot and relieved the government of embarrassment by resigning his post, and was followed into retirement by Guchkov. On May 18 the government was reorganized as a coalition government; after some hesitation the socialists agreed to accept six of the fifteen posts. The most important change was that involving the assumption by Kerensky of the portfolio of War and Marine; Tereshenko succeeded Milyukov as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

But the Provisional government, though it had sought to turn aside the wrath of the workers, had not broken with the *Entente*. Kerensky had by heroic efforts reorganized the army in preparation for an offensive. The ground was prepared by submitting the matter to the first Congress of Soviets that met in Petrograd beginning on June 3, and a Cossack conference that met in the capital at the same time. They gave it their blessing, but the Congress was more concerned with the struggle that developed between the Bolsheviks and the Social Revolutionary-Menshevik *bloc*. The latter had clung to the idea that without military victory, the triumphs of the revolution were worthless. But in the working quarters and among the garrison troops there was a growing aversion for the war. The latter particularly dreaded the coming offensive and turned to Bolshevism for support. A demonstration of June 18 gave ample evidence of the lukewarmness of the population of the capital for the war. A counter-demonstration of patriotic elements on June 19 only partly offset its effects.

EVENTS OF JULY 1917

The great offensive was then launched against Lemberg (Lvov) on July 1. At first it made some progress at Breczany and before Stanislaw, but it was at the cost of excessive casualties. Within a few days reserves were exhausted and the drive came to an end. Then the Germans launched counter-strokes at Kalisz on July 11 and Zborov on July 19, where they struck the Russian line and rolled it up with devastating effects. The southern end of the Russian line retired from Stanislaw beyond the Lomnica into Bukovina while the main body, consisting mostly of the seventh army, evacuated Tarnopol and retired beyond the Zbrucz into Russian territory. Cernovitz finally fell and the Germans entered Rumania and inflicted defeat on the Rumanian-Russian forces at Maresheshti on August 6. Events in Italy compelled them to suspend the campaign in the south. In the north, however, they succeeded in entering Riga on September 4. These defeats further deep-

ened the war-weariness in the Russian army, which, with mass-desertions, rapidly melted away and ceased to count as a military force.

Meanwhile disintegrating forces were at work among the subject nationalities. This was especially the case in the Ukraine, where a representative Rada had been elected that claimed to speak for the Ukrainian people and demanded autonomy. It was a difficult situation; to deny the right to self-determination in 1917 was a denial of freedom, yet in this case self-determination provided Germany with a pistol that could be directed at the heart of Russia. Four Kadet ministers resigned in protest and at once the over-strained nerves of the capital snapped. Demonstrations swept Petrograd for days, in which the Bolsheviki were especially conspicuous. The government—even the Soviet and the public—were shocked at the disorder. Leaders of the demonstration attempted to hold the movement in check. Then in the midst of the storm came ugly rumors about the secret relations of Lenin and Trotsky and other Bolshevik leaders with the German general staff and the German government. Copies of incriminating documents began to circulate and the pro-Bolshevik feelings of the populace began to ebb. The government, sensing the situation, struck and struck hard. Orders went out for the arrest of Lenin and Trotsky, who at once went into hiding. The palace of Kshesinskaya, hitherto occupied by the Bolshevik party, was seized; the sailors on guard fled to the Fortress of Peter and Paul; to prevent bloodshed, Stalin arranged for their surrender to the authorities, who returned them to Kronstadt. The Bolshevik party was all but suppressed.

This new crisis led to a second reorganization of the Provisional government. Prince Lvov resigned as Prime Minister, and his place was taken by Kerensky, who henceforth exercised a virtual dictatorship. It seemed imperative that the government should not satisfy itself with repressive measures, but that it should endeavor to secure an adequate basis for its power to marshal behind itself the forces of law and order, to keep in check the unruly population of the capital. The

logical course would have been to summon the Constituent Assembly to which the Committee of the Duma had committed itself in those far-off February days. But almost nothing definite had been done about summoning the Assembly. The committee charged with arrangements did not begin its sessions till three months after the February revolution and then lost much time in wrangling about preliminaries. Meanwhile the Provisional government, feeling the need of some institution to rally popular support, made three separate attempts to create a basis for its own support: the Council of Churches in July, the State Conference in Moscow on August 12, and the Democratic Conference held in Petrograd on September 14, to fill up the gap left by the failure to summon the Constituent Assembly. But a new crisis had overtaken the government.

THE KORNILOV EPISODE

Kerensky had long toyed with the idea of playing the role of the iron man of the revolution. The Provisional government had not got over the original difficulty in that its authority was strictly limited by the Soviet; the Soviet, on the other hand, commanded the military forces of the capital. The real fighting forces on whom the government might have relied were in the trenches, and any efforts to effect an exchange had, up till then, encountered the opposition of the Petrograd garrison and also the Soviet. During the July outbreaks, it was also evident that the Bolshevik party had been making progress among the soldiers. A proposal apparently emanating from Kerensky was relayed to the commander-in-chief, Kornilov, that reliable troops should be despatched into Petrograd to occupy the headquarters of the disturbing elements, arrest their leaders, and allow the government to assume the authority it had so long been denied. In other words, dictatorial powers were to be conferred on Kerensky, backed up by troops brought from the front. There may have been collusion between the Prime Minister and the loyal groups, and perhaps even the reactionaries in the capital. Kornilov showed

himself receptive to the idea, and arrangements were set on foot to carry out the plan. When, however, Kerensky's intermediary, N. N. Lvov (not Prince Lvov), visited Kornilov at the *Stavka* (military headquarters) to receive his final word, and was told of the conditions which he attached to his coöperation—that supreme power was to be transferred by the Provisional government to the commander-in-chief—Kerensky was in doubt whether this was a suggestion or an ultimatum. After some hesitation he decided that it was an ultimatum and that, instead of finding in the general a ready tool for the repression of disorder, he himself was to be thrust aside by the soldier. This hardly agreed with the role of the savior of his country that Kerensky had assumed. The Prime Minister then dismissed Kornilov and appointed Alexeyev in his place, and ordered the latter to the capital. But Kornilov was not the man so tamely to submit. He had his military dispositions ready. The troops were set in motion, but now he had against him not only the authority of the Provisional government but also the opposition of a new force, the Committee for Struggle with Counter-Revolution, as well as the Committee of Defense, called into existence for the crisis, and of whose assistance the government availed itself.¹ It can be readily imagined that against such a combination, little could be achieved; the Bolsheviks had the ear of the railway workers; trains were despatched in wrong directions or held up at country sidings; echelons were lost or sidetracked; none could reach the city. Krimov, the officer in charge of the troop movements, went into the capital to interview Kerensky and, after learning the true state of affairs, shot himself. As a matter of fact, having summoned to its aid the most revolutionary elements in the capital, in Kronstadt, and in the surrounding country, the government found after the crisis was over that it had played into their hands and all but abdicated its power. The Kornilov insurrection was the last blow to the Provisional government.

¹ Also called Military Revolutionary Committee, according to Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution*, Vol. II, p. 228. Simon and Schuster, New York, 1932.

THE OCTOBER (NOVEMBER) REVOLUTION

Lenin recognized that from this moment victory had been secured for the Bolsheviks. Though they still were a minority in the Soviet, though their leaders were in prison or in hiding, though their paper, *Pravda*, had been suppressed, their control of the revolutionary troops and the workers was almost complete. Their strength in the country was still to be revealed. The agrarian disturbances which had begun in February were on the increase and on all sides was heard the demand (originating with the Bolsheviks) for the immediate division of the land. The Provisional government, in evading this issue, had signed its own death warrant. With the collapse of the Kornilov movement, the government had no longer anything to hope for. The Democratic Conference after long and endless discussion had finally agreed to a new coalition on September 24, with a few new names but with Kerensky still at its head. It was with this new alignment that the Provisional government faced its last and greatest crisis.

The situation throughout the country had been going through a strange transformation. During August the wave of revolutionary ardor had ebbed. Bolshevism, overwhelmed under its accusations of treason to the Germans, was discredited. Moreover, the vitality of the Soviets themselves and their executive committee had been impaired. On the other hand, the subsidiary organizations which the Soviets had called into existence took on renewed vigor, and that of a most extreme character. Though outlawed, the activity of the Bolsheviks was unremitting. Eventually the Soviets were dragged along in the movement by the eager, restless minority. The Kornilov affair provided just the right setting for the demagogic tactics of the Bolsheviks, and was exploited to the full for discrediting Kerensky and the Provisional government. Then came the organization of the Directory of Kerensky on September 13, the Democratic Conference in Moscow, September 14 (27) to September 22 (October 3), the new coalition government including the Kadets on October 8, then the Pre-parliament, all efforts

of the conservatives to bolster themselves up by orthodox parliamentary maneuvers. But the days of the Provisional government were already numbered. On September 22 (October 3), at the close of the Democratic Conference, the Petrograd Soviet demanded the prompt calling of a congress of Soviets. The Central Executive Committee decided to summon it for October 20. On October 20 the Pre-parliament was ostentatiously boycotted by the Bolsheviks, who created a scene as they withdrew under the leadership of Trotsky. There can be no doubt that this occasion was to be seized for the raising of an insurrection.


But other developments had already thrown any action of the Executive Committee, even the summoning of the Congress of Soviets, in the shade. Lenin had said during the July Days:

The power can be seized henceforth by an armed insurrection; we must obviously rely in this operation, not upon the soviet, demoralized by the compromisers, but on the factory committees; the soviets as organs of power will have to be created anew after the victory.

His underground literary productions, written while in hiding, are illustrative of his convictions—*On Compromises, The Crisis is Ripe, Will the Bolsheviks be Able to Hold the State Power? The State and the Revolution, Marxism and the State*. Perhaps it was the signs of the peasant upheaval that drove him along the road to insurrection. But Lenin was not able directly to influence the decisions of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik party, which hung back and with which he found himself continually at variance. But the summoning of the Congress (originally set for October 20 but postponed to October 25) practically set the date for the revolt.

Trotsky had been elected president of the Petrograd Soviet; in addition he was able to control the military situation through the activities of the Military Revolutionary Committee, a body that had come into existence during the Kornilov episode. Meantime, the activities of the revolutionaries met a challenging movement in the government. Warnings were sent to faithful detachments; the cadres of military schools were told

to hold themselves in readiness; arrangements were made for bringing into the capital troops from Tsarskoye Selo, artillery from Pavlovsk, and Cossacks from the front. Eventually on the night of October 23-24 it was decided to act against the Bolsheviks. Orders went out to raise the bridges over the Neva connecting the city with the Vyborg quarter; to cut off the tele-



From Stoddard: "Glimpses of the World."

THE WINTER PALACE, LENINGRAD. Formerly an imperial residence, later the seat of the Provisional Government; taken by the Bolsheviks October 25, 1917.

phone connection of Smolny, the new Bolshevik headquarters; to increase the guard over the Winter Palace. On the morning of October 24 (O.S.) a government commissar with a detachment of junkers effected an entrance to the building occupied by the *Pravda*, destroyed the type, ejected the staff, and sealed the building. This challenge to the Bolsheviks was promptly taken up. Troops to guard them were secured through the Military Revolutionary Committee and the workmen went

back, set up the type once more, and got the paper out. Events now moved with quickening pace. The revolutionists called in the workers' cohorts from the Vyborg quarter and the sailors from the fleet at Kronstadt. Smolny was put in a state of defense. Plans were laid for an offensive all along the line. By means of the cruiser *Aurora*, anchored in the Neva, the Military Revolutionary Committee broadcast instructions and warnings. The workers first directed their efforts to raising the bridges; they alternately threatened and cajoled the guards; finally applied force with the crew of the *Aurora* which was warped to the quays, and landing its crew, lowered most of the bridges.

Then during the night, the revolutionary soldiers, sailors, and workers set systematically to work to occupy the strategic points in the city, particularly railroad stations and telephone buildings. At ten o'clock on the morning of October 25, Smolny announced, "The Provisional government is overthrown. The state power has passed into the hands of the Military Revolutionary Committee." Actually the work was not yet complete. At noon the Mariinskii Palace was surrounded and the members of the Pre-parliament were sent home. Preparations were made for throwing a cordon around the Winter Palace and isolating it. Telephones were to be cut and arrangements made for moving vessels of the Baltic fleet close in to bombard the palace in case of need. Kerensky, finding during the night that the ground was slipping from under him, secured a fast motor car and sped away to the front. During the early morning of October 25 the armed detachments closed in on the Winter Palace and drew around the building a cordon of troops, who were met with rifle and machine gun fire from the junkers and the Women's Battalion of Death on duty. But reinforcements were few and unreliable. Almost none of the regular troops would rise in defense of the government; even the Cossacks held aloof. Military headquarters was occupied by the enemy during the afternoon; towards evening, the lights of the palace were cut off. Finally the gun at the Fortress of Peter and Paul boomed a signal for the opening of fire from the cruiser *Aurora*, anchored in the

Neva. Its first echoing salvos against the doomed building were blank shots; immediately after, its firing was in deadly earnest. The besiegers pushed their lines closer; defenders in groups or singly slipped out of the building through the lines in increasing numbers; and agitators filtered into the building or sprang from nowhere to ply the defenders with doubts or suggestions to consult their own safety. Not till two o'clock in the morning was the final rush made. The firing ceased, and the assault was carried out by a resolute mob of victors who merely pushed and jostled the defending junkers and women aside and disarmed them. Antonov-Avseenko, one of the leaders, and certainly the guiding spirit of the attack, burst through the crowds, with a detachment, into the ministers' room. "I announce to you, Members of the Provisional government," he said, "in the name of the Military Revolutionary Committee, that you are under arrest." The second stage of the revolution was accomplished.

Meanwhile the delegates for the Second Congress of Soviets had assembled in Petrograd from the morning of October 25. During the day caucuses of delegates were held and the work of organization went on while fighting in the city was in progress. But the opening of the Congress was delayed. The Bolsheviks wanted to finish with the Winter Palace first so as to present the opposition with a *fait accompli*, but the other parties also had reason for delay. At 10:40 in the evening the session was declared open, and the members proceeded to elect the praesidium, which was chosen on a proportional basis, the Bolsheviks having over half of its members. Then a series of futile and complicated political maneuvers ensued between the Bolsheviks and their enemies of the right. The Menshevik and the Right Social Revolutionaries decided to withdraw in protest against the revolt started by the Bolsheviks. During the session, news of the collapse of the movement of government troops towards the capital was received. The capture of the Winter Palace was reported. The only business was the drafting of a manifesto to the people. At six o'clock the Soviet was adjourned.

At nine o'clock on the morning of October 26 the Congress reopened. Lenin, now issuing from his hiding place, was present on the platform for the first time, and the ovation that greeted him pulsed through the building in long, rolling cheers. He stood patiently enduring till it ceased, and then said simply: "We shall now proceed to construct the socialist order."

[33]

THE YEARS OF CIVIL WAR

THE BOLSHEVIK PROGRAM

THE Second Congress of the Soviets, whose summoning on October 25 coincided so dramatically with the overthrow of the Provisional government and the seizure of power by the Bolsheviki, had on its agenda three important matters of policy to decide. The first was the question of peace, and on Lenin's initiative an invitation in not too truculent terms was addressed to the governments of all the warring peoples "to open negotiations for a just and democratic peace." On the second question, that of the land, it was decreed that:

The landlord's property in the land is annulled immediately and without any indemnity whatever. The landlord, appanage, monastery, and church estates with all their goods and chattels are given in charge of the town land committees and country soviets of peasant deputies until the Constituent Assembly.

Nothing was said in the decree about the nationalization of the land. But to the decree was attached, for amplification, a summary of instructions prepared by the Social Revolutionaries for the first Congress of Peasant Deputies; they provided that:

The right to private property in the land is annulled forever. . . . The right to use the land is accorded to all citizens . . . desiring to cultivate it with their own labor. . . . Hired labor is not permitted. . . . The use of the land must be equalized, that is, the land is to be divided among the toilers according to local conditions on the basis of standards of either labor or consumption.

The third question concerned the formation of a government. On the recommendation of the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks, it was decided to entrust the management of various branches of the administration to commissions who were to carry out the policy decided on by the Congress. The heads of these commissions, called commissars, together were to form a council—the Soviet of People's Commissars. Eleven Bolsheviks, all members of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik party, were nominated to the first Soviet—Lenin as head of the government; Rykov as People's Commissar of the Interior; Milyutin as Commissar of Agriculture; Mogan in charge of Commerce and Industry; Trotsky as head of the commissariat of Foreign Affairs; Lomov as Commissar of Justice; Stalin in charge of Nationalities. Labor was to go to Shliapnikov, Education to Lunacharskii. Theodorovich was to be Commissar of Food; Glebov was to be Commissar of Post and Telegraphs; three, Antonov-Avseenko, Krylenko, and Dybenko, were to co-ordinate the forces of defense. No appointment was made to the post of Commissar of Communications, pending an agreement with the railroad organizations. All the members of the Soviet were Bolsheviks, and on Trotsky's motion the congress excluded the other parties from a share of responsibility in the administration. On the other hand, the Left Social Revolutionaries were admitted to the Central Executive Committee, which, with the Soviet of People's Commissars, was to direct the policies of the state.

The first matter on the agenda of the Bolshevik party, the question of peace, was an international one in which Russia's former allies, as well as her present enemies, were involved. As the *Entente* showed little interest in peace, the Bolsheviks decided to open direct negotiations with Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Russian commander-in-chief, Dukhonin, refused to send emissaries into the German lines. He was accordingly deposed and replaced by the Bolshevik Krylenko. After dismissal he met death at the hands of mutinous troops. Negotiations for the armistice, begun at Brest Litovsk, December 2, were adjourned on December 7 to be resumed on Decem-

ber 14. The adjournment was to allow the delegates to return to report the terms. The armistice in its final form was signed on December 16. It was to last for twenty-eight days and was to be automatically renewed unless denounced by either signatory. It provided for cessation of hostilities pending definite peace negotiations. Unfortunately, on the question of the transfer of troops to the western front, though this had been forbidden both in the provisional agreement of December 7 and in the second agreement of December 16, the ban on such movements did not apply to transfers ordered before December 5; there was a loophole, and through it the Germans were able to move most of their effective troops from the east to the west.

BREST LITOVSK

Preparations were at once set on foot for a peace conference. An appeal was broadcast to the peoples of all the belligerent countries to join the negotiations. As none of Russia's allies replied, it was finally decided to open the conference with Germany at Brest Litovsk on December 22. The Soviet delegation was headed by Ioffe and Kamenev. The Austrian representative was Czernin; the German, von Kühlman; and the German military adviser was General Hoffmann. The basis of the negotiations had been defined by Trotsky as "no annexations, no indemnities," and the Central Powers had tacitly accepted these conditions. But when it came down to particulars, it was apparent that there was a wide gulf between the two sides. It was easy enough for Russia to renounce annexations since, with the exception of certain districts in the Transcaucasus, she stood on Russian territory. In the case of Germany and Austria it was different. Their armies were in occupation of the greater part of Poland, Lithuania, and the Baltic provinces. The regions that were renounced by Russia, the Central Powers intended to separate from Russia; but to the Russian demand that the inhabitants be allowed the right to determine their destiny, the reply was that the population had already expressed their preference, and any further action was unnecessary beyond the adjustment of details, a matter to

be decided solely between Germany and these groups. It was expressly provided in the preliminaries that there should be no indemnities, but certain clauses were inserted by Germany intended to cloak payments to be made to the victors. On December 25 the conference adjourned for two weeks to allow further discussion by both parties at home. In Petrograd the attitude of Germany on the self-determination of Poland and of the Baltic peoples was discussed in the Central Committee of the party. Trotsky, who was charged with the further negotiations, was instructed to insist on the original terms.

The conference was resumed at Brest Litovsk on January 8, 1918, and it was evident from the first that the Central Powers proposed to have done with Russia. The Germans stood by their conditions of December, but new issues had risen in which they showed their hand. One of these was the question of the Ukraine. After the Bolshevik *coup d'état*, a Ukrainian National Rada had been installed at Kiev. The Ukrainians had sent a delegation to the peace conference though the Russians had opposed separate peace terms. The session of the conference which opened on January 8 continued without interruption until February 10, when Trotsky was allowed to return to Petrograd to attend the Third All-Russian Congress of the Soviets. In the meantime the Bolsheviks had endeavored to reassert their authority in the Ukraine and had resumed possession of Kiev. Nevertheless the Germans insisted on separate peace with the Rada. Finland also provided points of friction. The German delegation now showed itself extremely truculent and on February 10 insisted that the Russian delegations accept its conditions. Trotsky refused point blank to accede to the German demands, announcing at the same time that the Russian army would be demobilized and that hostilities were at an end. He then withdrew with his delegation and returned to Petrograd.

The answer of the Germans came on February 18 when they denounced the armistice and resumed hostilities. Offers of the Bolsheviks frantically despatched to Germany by wireless were disregarded. The armies continued on the road to Petrograd;

Minsk and Polotsk were occupied, Reval was isolated. There was nothing that could prevent the seizure of Petrograd. On February 19 the Bolsheviks agreed by wireless to accept any peace, and a courier started for Dvinsk to receive the final German terms. These came on February 21, and embodied considerably harsher conditions than the original. The frontier lines were extended further to the east at Russia's expense. The most onerous terms were those providing for evacuation of the Ukraine and of Finland and a clause that required heavy contributions from Russia under the guise of expenses for prisoners of war. Hard as they were, there was no alternative to their acceptance. Lenin induced the Central Committee of the party to accept them. A delegation was despatched to Brest Litovsk, and the peace terms were signed without further question. The German advance, however, was continued up to the very last and the city of Pskov fell on February 25.

With the war now out of the way the Bolsheviks were ready to proceed with their reconstruction of society along the lines of socialism. A series of sweeping decrees were published nationalizing all banks and terminating payments of dividends and dealings in shares. On February 10 all debts of the Russian government and all foreign debts of a private nature were repudiated "unconditionally and without any exceptions." The Russian alphabet was shorn of superfluous letters, the Julian calendar hitherto observed was dropped, and Russian dates were brought into conformity with those of western Europe by the adoption of the Gregorian calendar. February 9 the church was separated from the state, and ecclesiastical control over the schools was done away with.

Meanwhile the much-advertised constituent assembly, which had been postponed again and again, met on January 18; but as the Bolsheviks found that they were in the minority, on the following day it was dissolved and the delegates sent home. Russia had definitely turned its back on the parliamentary form of government.

The reconstruction of society so cheerfully undertaken in the winter and spring of 1918 had to wait on other more pressing

events. For almost three years Russia was to be distracted by desperate civil war. The triumph of the Bolsheviks in October 1917 and their uncompromising hostility to the old order were not accepted without a struggle by the dispossessed classes. These elements, however, were unable to make headway against the Bolsheviks at the seat of government and withdrew to regions where they were likely to receive more support from the population. By the spring of 1918 large areas of the country were in more or less open revolt against the new order and only a rallying point was required to start armed revolt. By a curious turn of fate, it was an alien group that gave this turn to events.

THE CZECH LEGION INTERVENES

During the last months of tsarist rule, Austro-Hungarian prisoners captured by the Russians were allowed to organize themselves into units for service in the Russian army. Of these the most important were the Czecho-Slovak, though there were also Polish and Serbian units. With the collapse of the Russian army the Czecho-Slovak corps, finding itself isolated, sought permission to withdraw from Russia. Permission was given reluctantly. The Bolsheviks hoped to bring about the disintegration of discipline among the Czechs and to win them for communism. Obstacles were put in their way and the movement of these troops across Russia and Siberia was much hampered by the local authorities. Finally a clash occurred in Siberia between the Czechs and Hungarian war prisoners, and when the local authorities attempted to disarm the Czechs, the latter retaliated by seizing the railroad. As their *échelons* were disposed along the Transsiberian, a concerted movement was difficult. Nevertheless, all obstacles were overcome. The whole railway, and with it the control of the country, passed into the hands of the Czechs. They had no thought except to secure their return to their homeland, but the Allied Powers, faced with the German occupation of the Ukraine, and with the threat of their penetration of Siberia, urged the Czechs to retain their possession of the railroad to prevent this con-

tingency, and decided to land troops in the Far East to protect their rear. The Japanese and British landed in August 1918 at Vladivostok. They were followed shortly afterwards by contingents of other powers until the whole area east of the Urals was under Allied control.

THE TSAR MEETS HIS DEATH

Meanwhile a certain anti-Bolshevik group had taken refuge in the Trans-Volga region and in Siberia, where it hoped to



Brown Brothers.

THE TSAR NICHOLAS II IN THE CUSTODY OF TROOPS OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT.

revive the dissolved constituent assembly. Though the loss of Kazan definitely deprived them of a hold on the Volga, they retired to Ufa, where they held a conference, hoping to establish a new government. The success of the Czechs gave this movement a new lease of life and provided a rallying point for all

the anti-Bolshevik forces in the east. This reactionary wave brought in its train one unfortunate incident. The Tsar Nicholas II, who had been sent by the Provisional government from Tsarskoye Selo to Tobolsk in 1917, had been transferred by the Bolsheviks to Ekaterinburg. When these Bolshevik jailers heard of the Czechs' progress from the east, they herded the imperial family into the basement of the house, where they were shot down. Their bodies were then loaded in carts and taken out into the forest, where they were drenched with gasoline and burned. The pitiful remains were thrown into an abandoned mineshaft. This horrible event passed almost unnoticed, and its gruesome details were not known for months afterwards.

KOLCHAK

Under the protection of Czecho-Slovak bayonets, a new government came into existence in Siberia, to which the Ufa government had retired. This government, which was known as the Directory, attempted to assert authority in Siberia and sought to provide a nucleus for an anti-Bolshevik movement. In the meantime, with the end of the war a new figure appeared on the scene: Admiral Kolchak, a Russian *émigré* who had offered his services to England but had been requested by the British government to help organize an anti-Bolshevik movement in Siberia. Kolchak, therefore, with his prestige as a naval officer and with the support of Great Britain and France, began to dominate the situation from the first. He found the political groups in Siberia torn by strife and intrigue, and on September 17 there took place a *coup d'état*, as a result of which the more radical members of the government were arrested and hustled out of the country and Kolchak was proclaimed dictator. The pretense at parliamentary government was terminated. A group around Kolchak controlled not only military affairs but exercised also political power. Kolchak then began to recruit and train forces for a campaign against the Bolsheviks.

DENIKIN AND THE KUBAN

In the meantime in the south the Cossack area in the Don and Kuban regions became a gathering place for the loyal officers of the old tsarist army and other groups such as the dispossessed landlords. While the Great War continued, the Don Cossacks were commanded by a General Krasnov, a former officer in the Russian service. Krasnov established a working agreement with the Germans in the Ukraine and managed to keep the Bolshevik officials out of the Don area. But it was farther to the south in the Kuban region that a real movement of revolt was organized. There gathered around Alexeyev and Denikin large numbers of former officers and men of the tsarist army under the name of the Volunteer Army. The Kuban Cossacks were disposed to make common cause with them against the Soviet regime, and finally they joined forces. The Volunteer Army had early attempted to clear the Kuban but had been defeated. The new accession of strength in the summer of 1918 enabled the united forces of the volunteers and the Kuban Cossacks to sweep forward and capture Ekaterinodar and Novorossiisk. Though the Red forces in the North Caucasus were reinforced by the Taman army, they were again attacked and defeated in the late autumn and, after the winter campaign, were driven in headlong rout across the desert to Astrakhan. At one blow the Caucasus passed under Denikin's control.

SIBERIA, 1918-1919

During the winter of 1918-1919 Kolchak raised an army in Siberia, which he managed to arm and equip with British uniforms and which was trained by British officers. He proposed to launch an offensive against the Bolshevik forces on the Volga in the early spring. But Siberia was in the utmost turmoil. The country was apportioned among Allied troops, which exercised independent control in the respective areas assigned. There was considerable friction with the local population and

absolutely no coöperation between the powers. This was fatal to the operation of the railroad, which fell more and more into disorder; but worst of all, there was discontent among the peasants, who were required to pay excessive taxes and to serve in the army in a cause for which they had no stomach. To make it worse, Kolchak was surrounded by a group of reactionary officers who were guilty of barbarous acts as well as indiscipline. All over Siberia there was discontent, but in certain areas it was more intense, owing to local conditions and tacit sympathy with the Bolsheviks. Even in regions where Kolchak was supposed to be unchallenged, he found himself menaced by bands of partisans who waylaid his troops and shot at trains from ambush, or by the insubordination of his own nominal followers, such as Semenov, Ataman of the Amur Cossacks, and Kalmykov, Ataman of the Ussuri Cossacks.

Kolchak received tacit support from the British representative in Siberia, Sir Alfred Knox, and the commander of the Middlesex Regiment, Colonel Ward. Later on, General Janin, who was in nominal command of all the Allied forces in the east, acted as the representative of the Allies, and ultimately a loose form of recognition was extended Kolchak and his government and some measure of material support was granted him. He also was recognized by the other anti-Bolshevik commanders in Russia as the legitimate head of the Russian government.

THE END OF KOLCHAK

At the beginning of 1919 Kolchak believed himself in a position to assume the offensive in the direction of the Volga, crossing the Urals and extending southward into the Orenburg steppes. Unfortunately his strategy was dominated by the idea of joining hands with the British forces south from Arkhangel. This led to Kolchak's forces being called on to operate in a difficult country with a sparse population and remote from centers whence supplies could be secured. In April the Red forces under Mikhail Frunze concentrated in the south and struck northward from the Samara-Orenburg

railway against the left flank of the western army. No help came from the northern flank. As a result, the front was rolled up and pushed back to the Urals. On June 9, 1920, the city of Ufa fell. Red forces also moved up through the Kirghiz steppes. These converging troops threatened disaster. The Red forces, after some maneuvering, felt their way across the Urals and found surprisingly little resistance. They met the White forces near Chelyabinsk in late July and early August 1920, and captured fifteen thousand prisoners. Kolchak thus lost the Ural industrial areas and fell back along the railroad with what was left of his troops. But in his retreat he found it impossible to rally his men or even maintain a semblance of order. The effects of months of misgovernment, of indiscipline, of harsh and arbitrary treatment of the population of which the Kolchak forces had been guilty, now began to exact their inevitable consequences. The back areas were showered with propaganda. Bolshevik pamphlets were scattered everywhere among the troops and the civilian population. But even farther to the rear, disorganization and revolt began to manifest themselves everywhere.

In November 1920, the capital, Omsk, was evacuated, and the White forces under General Diederichs, in their retreat, became more and more disorganized and demoralized. They had to share the railroad with the retreating Czechs and with the countless thousands of refugees flying before the Red menace. Around them everywhere signs of hostility increased. Eventually the force reached Irkutsk, where, in the absence of any organized government, an administration sprang up called the Political Center. At Irkutsk the crisis in the White force came to a head. The Czechs insisted on having the right of way to continue their retreat. At the same time some Japanese troops, caught in the general retirement, were also moving eastward. The immense number of refugees further added to the congestion. It was obvious that someone had to be sacrificed in the general *sauve qui peut*. Kolchak allowed his men to shift for themselves, and most of them abandoned him. In order to secure the safety of the Czechs, General

Janin authorized the handing over of Kolchak and his former prime minister, Pepelyaev, to the representatives of the Political Center, by whom they were placed in prison. The Political Center dissolved on January 1 and handed Kolchak over to a committee of Communists. Kolchak was subjected to an examination by this committee, which was not, however, a court; but the approach of some White forces from the west created alarm among the revolutionaries in Irkutsk, and the committee decided to execute Kolchak. He and Pepelyaev were led out, on a February morning, to a hill outside of the town and shot; their bodies were thrust into a hole in the ice on the river Angara.

Not all of the troops caught in the retreat retired eastward. Many were unable to reach the railroad, and in any event it was already congested. Some, especially the Cossacks, moved south and east, crossing Mongolia and finding their way across the Chinese frontier.

THE BALTIC STATES AND THE UKRAINE

The termination of the Great War in November 1918 created an entirely new situation in the frontier areas of Russia adjacent to the Central Powers. Realizing the German power was broken, the Bolsheviks denounced the Treaty of Brest Litovsk on November 17. The Central Powers were required by the terms of the armistice also to withdraw their troops from the Ukraine and from Russian territory, while in the Baltic states and in Poland, their movements were to be directed by Allied commissioners. In effect, however, a period of chaos ensued. The revolutionaries in Germany itself disorganized the civil administration and the army. The units in Russia hastened homeward, though some detachments remained in Finland and in the Baltic states to protect German interests there. In the wake of the retreating Germans, the shadow government of the Hetman Skoropadskii, called into existence by the Germans, collapsed, and a number of rival groups attempted to seize power. In the west, nationalist forces were led by Petlyura, who set up a Directory at Kiev in December.

In the east was the force of the Don Cossacks of Krasnov. Krasnov endeavored to exploit the opportunity by extending his hold northward to Voronezh on the upper Don and eastward to the Volga at Saratov and Tsaritsyn, but this proved beyond his powers. It was Denikin's Kuban Cossacks far off to the southeast who alone had sufficient political and military power to achieve this end.

In the west the Bolshevik forces surged forward in the wake of the retreating Germans, and the Austro-Hungarian dominions offered tempting possibilities for the spread of revolutionary agitation. This move westward allowed the White forces in the south to develop unhampered. The Red forces, however, were not welcome in Poland, and even in the Baltic states they found the nationalist feeling too strong to allow the spread of revolutionary propaganda. Military forces that sprang up resisted penetration. Here also were considerable German forces, especially in Esthonia and Latvia. Finland meanwhile had driven out its Bolsheviks and was ready to lend aid to the Baltic states. The forward surge of the revolutionary troops was thus abruptly checked. It is to be noted, however, that a socialist government was set up in Germany in November, and early in 1919 a Soviet Republic was established in Hungary. But the Ukraine provided the most perplexing problem. Scholars yet had not made up their minds whether the Ukrainians were a race distinct from the Great Russians or not. But undoubtedly the Ukraine had developed along fundamentally different lines from the Muscovite state. The peasants, as a rule, were well-to-do as judged by a Russian standard and would be more difficult to sway by revolutionary propaganda. It was also less easy to arouse them against the landlords, whose holdings had not assumed the proportions they had in the central provinces. Any animosity on the part of the peasants was reserved for the townsman, who was usually either a Great Russian or a Jew. Moreover, the repression which Ukrainian nationalism had undergone in tsarist days had made everything emanating from Moscow suspect. To crown all, the Ukrainian was an individualist

almost to the point of anarchy, and he refused to be regimented into any one organized movement. This situation provided, therefore, a fertile field for scattered agrarian risings, which, under suitable leaders, assumed formidable proportions, but which were directed in turn against the Bolsheviks, against the Germans, and against the Whites. The rapidity with which one government had succeeded another during the war years had kept the whole administration disorganized. Through 1919 the Ukraine, therefore, was swept from end to end by these anarchistic movements, with no clearly conceived political aims and expending themselves in the most frightful forms of atrocity. The most celebrated of these movements was that headed by Makhno, centered in the steppes near Ekaterinoslav and the Sea of Azov. Scarcely less famous was Grigoryev, who was little more than a bandit. Each of these served his time in the Red Army and sometimes was on friendly terms with the Whites, but both were unstable and unsatisfactory allies.

DENIKIN'S OFFENSIVE

Meanwhile in May 1919 the armies of Denikin had been reorganized in the region of the lower Don and began an offensive in the Donets basin; a rising of the Don Cossacks and the mutiny of Grigoryev greatly facilitated this drive. The whole of the Donets and the city of Kharkov passed into their hands, and the White forces swept westward to Ekaterinoslav on the Dnieper. The right wing, moving from the Don basin, had already reached the Volga at Tsaritsyn and passed northward. Beginning July 3 Denikin thrust his forces still farther north in a great effort to reach Moscow. Kherson and Nikolayev on the Black Sea fell on August 18, and on August 23 the city of Odessa. Towards the end of July, Trotsky, commander-in-chief of the Red forces, concentrated a formidable army and launched a counter-offensive which, heavily compromised by counter-movements, ultimately was brought to a standstill. A cavalry raid by the White General Mamontov disorganized the back areas, and Red forces

had to be diverted against him. With the collapse of the Red offensive, Denikin resumed the advance, occupied Kursk and Voronezh, Chernigov, and finally Orel, which was reached on October 13. This represents the farthest point of advance of the White forces.

Denikin had run into difficulties elsewhere. His troops were made up of two distinct parts, the Volunteer Army and the Cossacks, more particularly the Kuban Cossacks. His force was based on the Cossack regions south of the Kuban and the lower Don, which provided him with supplies and food from the steppe region, and munitions and medical equipment by sea through Rostov. The Kuban region was dominated by its own government, the Rada, and with these Denikin and his officers had acrimonious disputes. The strained relations were naturally reflected in the attitude of the Kuban forces, whose morale was seriously affected.

In the west, Denikin hoped to come to some arrangement with the Poles, whose military forces were stretched along the old front line held by the Germans and the Russians, ready, if need be, for a thrust eastward. An offensive in the direction of Kiev was launched to invite the Polish help which did not, however, materialize. Marshal Pilsudsky was distrustful of Denikin's Great Russian nationalism. His favorite slogan, "Russia shall be great, united, and undivided," seemed to imply that Poland was to be held in subjection. The Bolsheviks were quick to take advantage of this and despatched a Polish Communist, Julian Markhivsky, to confer with Pilsudsky and to make him a generous offer. This, therefore, kept the Poles quiet until Denikin had been disposed of.

YUDENICH

A threat to the Bolsheviks appeared from another quarter. The northwestern anti-Bolshevik army under Yudenich unexpectedly launched a drive on Petrograd from the direction of Narva; pushing rapidly forward, Yudenich reached the outskirts of Petrograd on October 20, and despatched a force to sever the railroad at Tosno, but the commander neglected to

effect this until it was too late. Meanwhile, Trotsky had brought up reinforcements and on the 21st launched a counter attack directed against this threat to the Bolshevik lines of communication. Having inadequate forces at his disposal, Yudenich was compelled to retire to Esthonia.

COLLAPSE OF DENIKIN

On October 20 a Bolshevik offensive began against Denikin's forces in the neighborhood of Orel. The Reds had an overwhelming superiority of men, guns, and machine guns, and some divisions that had been newly organized. Makhno had stirred up trouble for the forces of Denikin in the south. The pressure on the Whites, therefore, was effective, and as they had no reserves, retreat was inevitable. East of Kursk the unconquerable cavalry corps of Budenny broke through the Cossacks of Mamontov and occupied Voronezh. Further victories and further retirements followed. At Kastornaya, on November 15, Budenny drove a wedge between the two parts of the White army, and desperate efforts had to be made to retrieve disaster. Disorganization set in which even changes of command did not check. After great exertions, the two parts of the army were reunited and brought back to Rostov, where they found refuge behind the river Don. Denikin now found that the Kuban Cossacks had lost all heart for the cause. The Volunteer Army was disorganized. Eventually, when the Red forces attacked, Rostov was evacuated and the government retired on Ekaterinodar. But the great sweep by Budenny to the east threatened Denikin's hold on the Kuban, despite the fact that Rostov was recaptured on February 20, 1920. But already the Red cavalry was moving down the Kuban. Unless the Kuban army was to be cut off, it must retire on Novorossiisk. The retreat, therefore, began and was carried through. Novorossiisk could not be held, and within ten days of their arrival the unfortunate survivors crowded on the available ships in an effort to elude their pursuers. Twenty-two thousand prisoners and vast military stores fell into the hands of the Red army. The army of the Kuban Cossacks,

which had turned southward across the mountains, was hemmed in along the shore of the Black Sea and compelled to surrender. Denikin, on his arrival in the Crimea with the troops that he had saved from the debacle, decided that his usefulness as a commander was over. He therefore resigned and appointed as his successor Baron Wrangel, who had been one of his subordinates during the campaign. He himself departed for Constantinople.

Denikin's failure was as much political as military. His army was composed of volunteers drawn largely from the old tsarist officers and landlords and the Cossacks, none of whom had any sympathy with liberal policies. The first requisite of an army was to have its rear secure. This required effective administration and contentment among the population, but Denikin could give neither of these. His subordinates were inexperienced and tactless, and his whole regime suffered from a demoralization consequent upon civil war. A contented population presupposed the adoption of policies that would do justice to the needs of the people. On the land question, Denikin tried to be liberal but failed to satisfy the peasants, even in his proclamations. And more than that, even his mild reforms could not be put into practice in the turmoil of war. When reverses came, his rear collapsed much as Kolchak's had done, but the most fatal result was the defection of the Kuban Cossacks, who absolutely refused to support him at the last.

WAR WITH POLAND

At the opening of 1920 the Bolsheviks had disposed of two threats, that of Kolchak and that of Denikin; but now in the west a new danger appeared. In December the Soviet government had invited the Polish government to discuss terms of peace. The offer was repeated in January, but Pilsudsky held aloof until spring. Then on April 25 the Polish army was hurled against the Soviet lines in the western Ukraine. The Soviet forces were outnumbered, and were also handicapped by the disorganization in the Ukraine. The Poles

advanced rapidly and occupied Kiev without difficulty. They were not, however, able to penetrate to the east of the Dnieper. They found also that the peasants of the Ukraine did not receive them as deliverers. In the meantime the Bolsheviks were about to bring up the reinforcements from the southeast, where hostilities were at an end, and on June 5 the cavalry corps of Budenny broke through the Polish lines and compelled retreat. The Poles were hustled out of Ukraine and across the frontier.

To the north another drive had been launched on the upper Dnieper. On June 4 the Poles were attacked on the Beresina. They were defeated and driven westward on Minsk and Grodno. Here the Niemen River was crossed and the Soviet troops found the way open to Warsaw. In southern Poland, Pilsudsky attempted to check the Red army on the Bug. But Brest Litovsk fell on August 1, and the line of the Bug was lost. Thenceforth the two wings of the Bolshevik army united for a drive on Warsaw. The Poles, in their desperation, made frantic efforts to secure an armistice and favorable peace terms. Even the British advised them to adopt this course, but the Soviet government, now riding on the tide of success, made almost impossible demands, the general purpose of which was to transform Poland into a Soviet state which would be controlled from Moscow. The Poles therefore decided to make one more bid for success. Munitions were rushed from abroad and General Weygand, Foch's right-hand man, arrived at Warsaw to direct the offensive. At the last the Soviet commander had weakened his force by extending its right flank westward to the north of Warsaw in order to cut Warsaw's communications with the sea. The failure of Budenny to reach the main army left the Red front east of Warsaw weak. Here Pilsudsky launched his offensive, driving northward against the right wing of the Red army. At last the Bolshevik line was broken. The Bolsheviks' right flank was cut off and driven back across the German frontier, where it was interned. The defeat of the Russians soon turned into a rout, and within a week Brest Litovsk was once more in Polish hands. Polish

territory was thus cleared of Soviet troops. The Poles this time halted their offensive at Pinsk, and in the space of a few weeks peace negotiations were opened. Peace was signed at Riga on October 12, and the western boundary of the new Soviet state was made to conform with the old front line held since 1915. During the advance the Poles had re-occupied Vilna, which they refused to surrender to the Lithuanians. Thus the Poles drove a wedge between the Lithuanians and the Russian border.

WRANGEL IN THE CRIMEA

In April, 1920, Wrangel had set about reorganizing the forces in the Crimea. By instituting disciplinary measures, he succeeded in reviving morale. The opening of the Polish war gave him an opportunity to resume the attack, which he did on June 6. His purpose in this was to obtain if possible a better base of supplies in the Crimea. This base he hoped to secure on the mainland in the north Taurid province, or farther to the east among the Don Cossacks. On June 6 Wrangel's forces began their forward movement into the Ukraine. He then decided to extend his operations across the Sea of Azov to Taganrog. From here he advanced east in the direction of Ekaterinodar. Apparently he was not decisive in his movements. He was attacked in September and driven back out of the Kuban. Meanwhile, with the liquidation of the Polish offensive, the Soviet government was enabled to move its troops into the north Taurid province against Wrangel in the Crimea. On October 28, 1920, the Red forces attacked Wrangel's positions. His troops were forced back on the isthmus of Perekop, which they prepared to defend. The attack on the isthmus was made on November 7, but a secondary attack was launched across the Gulf of Sivash. This attack took Wrangel's forces in their rear. Desperate fighting ensued, but the Whites were heavily outnumbered and pushed back into the Crimea. From here there was no retreat for them except by sea. Frantic efforts were made to secure all prospective vessels for evacuation. Civilians and troops num-

bering 145,000 were loaded on boats and sailed away for Constantinople, where they found for the moment a refuge from their Red enemies. Thus the last effort of the Whites to overpower the Bolsheviks collapsed in the fall of 1920.

THE END OF INTERVENTION

With the end of the Civil War the Bolshevik party was accorded a breathing spell and enabled to take stock of conditions. The Civil War had imposed on the Russian people heavy demands and the severest privations. Since the beginning of intervention Russia had been subjected to a blockade. Moreover, shortly after the treaty of Brest Litovsk the Allies had broken with the Bolshevik government and, whether overtly or not, had furnished aid and comfort to their enemies. Believing that the rule of the Bolshevik party would be transient, they had passed from a policy of benevolent neutrality to one of active, poorly disguised hostility toward them. Thereupon had followed intervention, on one pretext or another, on three fronts: in the north at Arkhangel and Murmansk, in the south at Odessa, the Crimea, and the Kuban, and in the Far East at Vladivostok. But war-weariness and the sympathy felt for the Bolsheviks by the labor groups which at this time wielded considerable influence in England and France prevented really effective intervention. Eventually the Allied governments were compelled to withdraw their detachments. In 1919 the British and Americans were evacuated from north Russia after some desultory fighting. The French naval forces were compelled by mutiny to withdraw from Odessa. The British, French, and most of the Allied detachments were sent home from Siberia in the spring and summer of 1919. The Czecho-Slovaks secured transports and sailed for home in the same year. The last American railway troops left in 1920. But the Japanese managed on one pretext or another to maintain troops in the maritime province till 1922, when they were withdrawn on the eve of the Washington conference. From the collapse of the Kolchak movement till the withdrawal of the Japanese there had been main-

tained the fiction of an autonomous state in the Far East to act as a buffer between the Bolsheviks and the Japanese. On the withdrawal of the Japanese, this area was finally incorporated in the Soviet Union.

During this period the whole economic life of the country, disorganized by war and revolution, had sadly deteriorated. The workers' control of industry had had unhappy results. Production had progressively declined and costs of industrial products had mounted. On the other hand, there had, at first, been ample reserves of food in the country districts, however difficult of access they had been in the existing paralysis of the transportation system. But the inflation of the currency, at first resorted to as a means of balancing the budget, and later adopted as a settled policy with a view to impoverishing the possessing classes, further enlarged the gulf between the pittance the peasant received for his produce and the exorbitant prices he paid for what he had to buy. This vast disparity, known to the Russians as the "scissors," seemed to have become a permanent feature of the economic life of the countryside and demoralized production. Eventually recourse was had to barter. Taxes were collected in kind; workers, soldiers, and other state employees were paid in rations. Foreign trade was at a standstill and domestic trade languished. So long as the state seemed to be fighting for its existence, the population accepted the situation with the wonted Muscovite stoicism. But once peace was restored, even the passive Russians refused to be reconciled to the rigors of war communism.

The peasant discontent, which had lain dormant during the years of the civil war, flared up at its conclusion. There were outbreaks everywhere. Even in the fighting forces, there were ominous signs of sullen discontent. Finally a dangerous revolt broke out among the Kronstadt sailors, the very men who had so stalwartly supported Lenin during the critical days of 1917. Detachments of Red troops who were considered reliable were assembled at Petrograd. They marched across the ice of the Gulf of Finland in white uniforms to blend with the snow. But the government was taking no chances. Be-

hind the troops followed picked detachments of Poles with machine guns, with orders to open fire if the first line for a moment wavered, and so prevent retreat. After a severe battle personally directed by Trotsky, Kronstadt was taken by storm. Rigorous measures of repression were taken against the revolting sailors and their supporters, but Lenin knew that the discontent must be appeased by substantial concessions. On March 21, 1921, he came forward in the *Politburo* with his new economic policy which terminated the radical program of war communism and announced a retreat to a modified form of capitalism.

THE SOVIET STATE

THE termination of the civil war gave the Bolsheviki their first breathing space in four years, and enabled them to take stock of the situation in which the country and the party found themselves. Three years of war against the Central Powers, two revolutions, and three years of civil strife had thoroughly demoralized the country's economic life and inflicted cruel hardships and privations on all classes of the community. Intervention, which occasioned the severance of diplomatic relations with Russia's former allies, brought as its inevitable consequence a blockade. Even without the blockade foreign trade would have come to a standstill, for the productive forces of the country were at a low ebb and there was nothing to export or the wherewithal to import.

The seizure of factories by the workers and their attempt to run them had brought disastrous consequences. It was naïvely assumed that the enormous profits which the capitalists had been making and appropriating to their own use would, if diverted to the workers, enable the latter to live handsomely, reduce working hours, and receive greatly increased wages. The need of discipline and of efficiency was completely lost sight of. Workers went to and came from work with little regard to punctuality. Their rate of production continued to slow up. Profits vanished; mounting deficits ate up current capital and prevented purchase of raw materials and payment of wages. Without skilled supervision, the machinery was neglected. When worn out it could be neither replaced nor repaired. Workmen took payment in goods for the wages

which could not be paid, or stole raw material or finished products, to sell in secret that they and their families might live. By 1920 industrial production had fallen to twenty per cent of the pre-war level. In desperation many of the workers had left the factories and the cities and had gone back to their villages, with which, in accordance with Russian custom, they had retained their connection. Thus the number of workers had shrunk to 60 per cent of their numbers in 1913. Real wages had dwindled to 35 per cent of pre-war wages. Little wonder that Lenin had decided a halt must be called in the pace at which socialization was being accomplished, to enable a complete change to be made in the methods.

THE NEW ORDER

The revolutions of 1917 had effected a complete outward transformation in the government and in society. Tsarism had been swept away, and with it the whole system of bureaucracy. The nobility, on which autocracy had relied for support for centuries, had suffered the loss of their landed property. Most of them had met death during the civil war or had gone into exile. The middle class, of little importance numerically, and without the enterprise and cohesion of its counterpart in western Europe, was easily deprived of factories and businesses, and had encountered the full fury of the revolutionary mobs during the civil war. The new proletariat of the cities, never strong numerically but reinforced by the soldiers of the tsarist armies and by the peasants, had swept into power the Bolsheviki with their program of thoroughgoing social revolution and their refusal to compromise with the bourgeois or with "the compromisers." The "October" revolution of 1917 had been brought about by the armed mobs of the capital ably led by the Bolsheviks. Their power rested on the Soviets (especially the Petrograd Soviet) of workers, soldiers, and peasants throughout the country, in which at first the Bolsheviks were only one of the parties. Their real predominance, however, was secured by the iron discipline which Lenin was able to impose on his followers, and by their un-

swerving loyalty. By organizing the Bolshevik cells in every elected public body as a unit, and in lesser bodies as fractions, the communists were able, by their centrally controlled organization, to sway their counsels.

After experimenting for a few months with a policy of toleration of opposition groups within such bodies, the Bolsheviks finally decided to suppress them. The recalcitrants were either silenced or thrown into prison. Maria Spiridonova, of the Social Revolutionaries, was one of the last of these to be reduced to impotence. The pretext for this was the espousal of the cause of the counter-revolution by some of the Social Revolutionaries or the Mensheviks, but it is easy to see that, with their fanaticism and devotion to doctrinaire principles, the Bolsheviks could not brook opposition. But mere suppression of outward activity was not enough. The Bolsheviks had had enough experience during their outlaw years to know that movements driven underground may become even more dangerous to the group in power. Hence there came into existence during 1918 the *Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution*, usually called the *Cheka* (from the initial letters of the first two words—*Cherezvychainaya Kommissiya*), at the head of which was Felix Dzerzhinsky, a Pole, whose name became a synonym for remorseless efficiency in unearthing and stamping out all kinds of plots and conspiracies. It was modeled on the so-called secret police, controlled by the third division of the Tsar's chancellery. Rumor had it that its personnel was recruited in part at first from former members of the *Okhrana*.

The system of soviets was in reality based in the first instance on the local soviets; in the country, the village soviets. These soviets were elected by open balloting at assemblies. In the case of the cities, these assemblies were held at factories or other places of work. The village assemblies usually met in the villages. Outlying farmers came into the villages if the settlements were not too distant or too large; otherwise such settlements held their own assembly for the election of deputies to the central village soviet. The whole division into precincts

was very informal, intended to consult the convenience of the voter and his economic affiliation.

THE CONSTITUTION OF JULY 1918

During the first weeks of the revolution in 1917 the government had been concerned with the assumption and consolidation of its power. But once its tenure of office was found to be fairly stable, it turned to the question of drafting the fundamental laws and the constitution of the people, a task designed for the original Constituent Assembly. Various committees and sub-committees were put to work on the drafting of a body of principles and rules on which the new government was to be based. These various committees had completed their work by the summer of 1918. Their results, embodied in a formal draft of a constitution, were submitted to the Fifth Congress of Soviets, July 10, 1918. This document (based largely on the *Communist Manifesto* of Karl Marx, published in 1848) provided for a dictatorship of the proletariat, for the socialization of land and all other means of production, and the control of almost the whole economic life of society by the government. The new state, named the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, was nominally to be governed by an All-Russian Congress of workers', peasants', Cossacks', and Red Army deputies. But to further administrative efficiency, a body called the Central Executive Committee was to be chosen to be the supreme authority during the intervals when the Congress was not in session. By this committee a council, or Soviet of People's Commissars, was to be chosen to be in charge of departments or bureaus through whom the central government should function.

For local administration a hierarchy of territorial authorities was set up, including four classes of congresses of soviets—*oblast*, provincial, county, and township. At the bottom of the scale were the local village (or other) soviets, to which elections took place by a show of hands. The elections of delegates to the congresses were to take place in the soviets. In the county, provincial, and *oblast* congresses, the urban vot-

ers received proportionately a larger number of delegates than the rural. Finally, for the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, city soviets were to elect representatives in the proportion of one for each 25,000 of the population, the rural soviets receiving one representative for each 125,000. Elections were subject to cancellation by the higher authorities, and the rights of the local administrative authorities were severely circumscribed.

During the hurly-burly of civil war, the question of racial minorities had become a part of that memorable struggle. Many of the non-Russian or non-Slavic minorities of the empire were indifferent to the issues involved and were ready to seize the first opportunity to secede. The Bolsheviks must needs appeal to them on the grounds of self-determination, a principle that was on the lips of most people about the year 1920. A Commissariat of Nationalities had been set up in the first flush of victory in 1917, and during the civil war the government strove to regularize its relations with minorities in such a way as to secure their support. This was done by facilitating the formation of a number of autonomous republics within the state. But the Bolshevik party was determined not to allow such decentralization of control to weaken its power. Eventually the problem was solved and a whole group of autonomous republics was created within the Russian state and endowed with a form of government (modeled on that of the central government), but means were found to keep them within bounds by securing control of their central organs, usually through the local branches of the Communist party. In addition to these republics there were created an equal number (18) of autonomous regions (*oblasti*) with more restricted rights. This system was called into existence by a series of decrees of the central government, modified by it from time to time without consulting the wishes of the peoples involved.

THE FRONTIERS OF THE NEW STATE FIXED

But the question of the constitution had also an external aspect. With the disintegration of the Russian Empire under

the impact of revolution, the western parts occupied by the German army had already been lost. During the exigencies of the civil war, and the war with Poland, the Bolsheviks found themselves impotent against their foes in the west. Nor could their propaganda make progress among the Poles or the Baltic provinces. Hence Lenin, realist as he was, accepted the inevitable: during the course of 1920 he made peace with Poland and the Baltic states—Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia—recognizing their independence and establishing regular diplomatic relations with them. But the areas which the Bolsheviks had surrendered had, after all, perhaps not been integral parts of the Empire. The Bolsheviks were not disposed to surrender regions whose strategic advantages or wealth made them vital to the security and development of the whole country, even should their populations wish to secede—such were the Ukraine, the Transcaucasus, and central Asia. During the civil war much of this territory was in the occupation of hostile forces or had to be given up. But with the defeat of the last of the White forces, the way was open to take up the task of bringing back these areas of the former Tsarist empire within the new Soviet state. In December 1922, the tenth All-Russian Congress of the Soviets took the initiative in the creation of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, consisting of the Ukraine, White Russia, the R. S. F. S. R., and the Transcaucasian Republic, on the basis of a Federal State. A treaty of union was concluded between the four republics and ratified by the first Congress of the Soviets of the U. S. S. R. on December 30, 1922. A special committee was charged with the task of drawing up a constitution, which was finally completed and ratified by the Second Congress of Soviets of the U. S. S. R. on January 31, 1924.

In 1925 two republics were added—the Turcoman and the Uzbek, and in 1929 there was created the Tadzhik republic, all in central Asia. Later the Transcaucasian republic was broken up to form the Azerbaidzhan, the Georgian, and the Armenian republics, while in central Asia there have appeared on the roster two new ones—the Kazak and the Kirghiz. All

were officially known as "Soviet Socialist Republic." Taken altogether (there were eleven of them), they formed the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1924

The constitution provided for a federal system. The sovereign body of the Union was the All-Union Congress of Soviets, which was supposed at first to be in session once a year. (This provision was later changed to allow meetings once every two years.) For the remainder of the time authority was to be vested in the Central Executive Committee of the Union. The Congress alone confirmed and altered the fundamental principles of the constitution. The Central Executive Committee was divided into two chambers: (1) The Union Soviet was to be elected directly by the Congress of Soviets, the number of delegates to be in proportion to the population of each republic or region. (2) The Soviet of Nationalities consisted of delegates chosen by the soviets of constituent and autonomous republics—five for each republic—and of autonomous regions—one for each. Their election was subject to review by the Congress. In both of these bodies, the R. S. F. S. R. occupied a commanding position; in the Union Soviet it had 300 members out of a total of 438, while in the Soviet of Nationalities it had 72 out of a total of 135. The Central Executive Committee was to meet three times a year for sessions of not over one week each. During the interval when the Committee was not in session, the praesidium, consisting of 27 members, was to be the supreme source of authority. A Soviet of People's Commissars for the Union was to be responsible to the Central Executive Committee.

The Soviet Union so created was intended to be a supra-national state in contrast with the national states of Europe. The revolution in Bavaria had been abortive; the Soviet state in Hungary had been short-lived. But the eyes of the Communist¹ party were still on Germany, which, it was hoped,

¹ On March 8, 1918, the Party abandoned the name "Bolshevik" in favor of "Communist."

would come into the fold. Thus, by the creation of a state which left vacant places for states that should undergo a revolution in the future, an invitation was hung out to the proletariat of the world to set up governments of the workers.

WAR COMMUNISM AND FAMINE

The worst heritage of the years of War Communism in Russia was the famine which raged in the middle and lower Volga region during the years 1921-1922. The causes of this calamity were similar to those of previous famines, mainly a low productivity of Russian agriculture, heavy state demands, and finally a drought which completely exhausted reserves of food. In the famine of 1920, 1921, and 1922, certain peculiar factors operated. In the first place the seizure of the landlords' estates by the peasants had involved their transfer from an efficient, up-to-date system of production to the primitive methods of agriculture that prevailed among the peasants. This in itself would have occasioned a serious decline of agriculture, as it involved no less than 25 per cent of the land. But this condition had been aggravated by the fall in the purchasing power of money and the almost complete cessation of manufacture of industrial products. The peasant was reluctant to accept payment in the currency that was rapidly becoming worthless, a natural prejudice in view of the fact that he could not buy manufactured goods with it. The government, therefore, had to resort to coercion to force him to disclose and surrender his surplus. The measures which were adopted to discover and take possession of these surpluses were at first effective, but they were countered by the passive resistance of the peasants, who, more and more, curtailed production. Eventually it resolved itself into a running fight between the authorities and the peasants. The peasants used every means in their power to thwart the government's requisitions. The latter replied by the most drastic methods of search and of mass terror. From 1918 on, the reserves were gradually used up, and in 1921 the drought in the southeast completed the disaster. Though the communists partly minimized the calamity,

news of it leaked out and eventually an appeal was addressed to the outer world by Metropolitan Tikhon and Maxim Gorky.

At the time, the American Relief Commission, which had been engaged in the relief of the population of Belgium, France, and central Europe from the inevitable distress which resulted from the war, was winding up its affairs, and Herbert Hoover, on being approached, agreed to lend aid on condition that his organization be given a free hand. After prolonged negotiations, the services of the A. R. A. (in conjunction with other organizations, the International Red Cross, and the League of Red Cross Assistance in the East) were enlisted in the efforts to bring relief to the starving population. The organizations spread their representatives over the afflicted areas in the south and east and alleviated the worst effects of the famine throughout the years of 1921, 1922, and 1923. In spite of this there was widespread distress and heavy mortality, especially in the areas which could not be reached in time, and these results thoroughly demoralized much of the peasant population.

THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

It was most essential, however, that steps be taken to allow Russian agriculture and industry to revive. For this purpose the government resolved on a drastic revision of its whole program. The changes involved a retreat from the extreme forms of war communism, and therefore constituted a disillusionment for the fanatical wing of the party. Lenin justified it by his claim that, despite the retreat, the state would retain its "commanding heights"—the monopoly of foreign trade, the monopoly of banking, and the control of transportation. The first change was to substitute a system of taxation in kind for the demoralizing system of requisition. This allowed the peasant to keep his surplus after he had paid what the state required. In addition to this, the government allowed the resumption of private trading, the purpose being to induce the peasants to bring out their hidden surpluses. Efforts were also made by the government to hold out inducements to the peasants with a view to producing the maximum amount of

grain. In the field of industry a whole series of measures were put through to revive the almost stagnant manufactures. In November 1921, industries were combined into groups, each of the groups being intrusted to a state organization called a "trust," modeled on the German *cartel* or the American trust. Foreigners were brought in to effect this reorganization. It was also hoped to attract a flow of foreign capital by offering concessions. But few of these were actually granted; one of these that promised rich profits—the Lena Gold Fields—was withdrawn in a short time. The whole of the economic production was put under a Supreme Economic Council. These measures are usually referred to as the New Economic Policy.

In order to revive trade it was necessary to undertake a reform of the currency. This the government launched in 1923. It involved practically the repudiation of the vast amounts of paper currency floating around the country whose value had sunk to almost nothing. It was decided to restore the pre-revolution value of the rouble in the world's markets at least. At home a rouble was to have the same nominal value. This reorganization involved heroic measures, but it was carried through successfully and the country went back to a money basis. The peasants gradually increased farm production, relieved as they were from the exasperating measures of requisition by the government which had roused them to such stubborn opposition.

DEATH OF LENIN AND RISE OF STALIN

Lenin had hardly piloted the country through the throes of this crisis and the reorganization when, towards the end of 1922, he was stricken. He was ill throughout the greater part of 1923 and then recovered sufficiently to return to duty. But he was again seized and died in January 1924, leaving the question of his successor undecided. In reality the history of Russia since the Revolution has been a history of the Communist party, which, through its congresses and conferences, has, in appearance at least, determined the policies of the government. Lenin perhaps could have imposed his authority on his follow-

ers, but during his last sickness his control was withdrawn.

After his death the party lapsed into partial chaos. The dominant figures were Trotsky, who had been Commissar of War, and Stalin, who had been chosen Secretary of the Party in 1921. Trotsky had been ill in 1923 and had gone into the



Sovfoto.

STALIN

Crimea to recuperate during the winter. Thus he was absent from Moscow at the critical time of Lenin's death. His absence was made use of by his opponents to lower his prestige with the party. On the other hand, Stalin found himself in a strategic position as secretary of the party, which placed him in touch with all persons in the party and all departments of the government. A struggle thereupon began between these two outstanding personalities for the position of successor to

Lenin. In addition to the personal rivalry, there was a fundamental question of policy. Trotsky had always maintained, as had Lenin, that the Russian revolt was merely to be the curtain-raiser to a world revolution, and that no efforts should be spared by the Communist party to bring this about. This was all very well during the disturbed period of the postwar period. But the hopes of the Communists had been belied. The Bolshevik government of Bela Kun in Hungary and the abortive Communist rising in Bavaria had been suppressed. The invasion of the Ruhr by France in 1923 had thrown Germany into political and economic turmoil which revived the hopes of the revolutionists, but again the Communists were disappointed.

THE FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN

In the meantime, Stalin, having secured the backing of the party, proceeded to bring into effect a scheme which had been maturing for some time. Back in 1921 Lenin had conceived the idea of a vast hydro-electric system to supply power to the whole of the Soviet Union for both industrial and domestic consumption. This scheme had broadened, and while the country had settled back to something like pre-war conditions, the idea had taken root in the members of the Communist party that, without actually prohibiting private enterprise, the state might take the initiative and become a great capitalistic *entrepreneur* on its own account. Private enterprise was to be gradually suppressed and the state to embark on a vast scheme to expand its industrial production. Any scheme, however, for increasing industrial production involved an increase in agricultural production. So far the backward peasant in agriculture had shown himself stubbornly opposed to communism in any form and quite incapable of expanding his production by individual efforts to meet the country's increased needs. Stalin, therefore, conceived the idea of combining the small and dispersed peasant holdings into large farms which would be worked coöperatively by the peasants. The state had already a number of state farms, for the most part of enormous

extent, for which labor and machinery were provided by the government. These were to be retained in the system, but more in the nature of experimental or demonstration farms. The collective farms were to be the chief means of production. The plan was finally put into effect at the end of 1928; it was to run for five years, and hence was called the Five Year Plan.

The party first approached the peasant problem. It despatched great numbers of agitators into the country districts to stir up the peasants and to endeavor to bring about the consolidation of their holdings. The ground had already been prepared, as there had always been a certain division of interest among the peasants. According to Lenin there had been three classes: the poor peasant, the middle peasant, and the rich peasant. It was therefore easy to arouse the envy and greed of the poorer class against its more thrifty neighbors, who were all lumped together under the opprobrious term *kulak*. Throughout 1929 there was almost universal civil war in the villages, but by the end of that year a great part of the peasants had been forced into the collective or coöperative farms. The intention was that the government would provide them with mechanical equipment and tractors to enable the farming to be done efficiently and with a minimum of labor. Unfortunately these demands were far beyond the powers of the state to meet. The tractor plant established at Stalingrad (Tsaritsyn) began production, but its output was disappointing. The same was true at the other industrial plants. The lack of tractors was almost fatal, for the peasants, in entering the collective farms, had slaughtered their livestock, and the inability to secure mechanical equipment left them without any sort of power. There was likewise a great dearth of farm machinery. In addition to that, many of the peasants had entered the coöperatives under coercion and were sullenly resentful. There was in some parts of the country a widespread neglect or indifference to their work. In the Ukraine in 1931, when there was a partial crop failure, the government carried through its tax collections with great severity, and the peasants, having insufficient grain, were allowed to starve. The num-

ber of those who perished is not known, but it probably amounted to millions.


On the whole the main problem of Russia was still the securing of an adequate food supply; the first Five Year Plan did not bring abundance. But during the second Five Year Plan (ending in 1938) there was considerable improvement, to be ascribed in part to better crop conditions.

To plot the achievements of the Soviet Union under the first and second Five Year Plans would tax the power of a Gibbon. The system evolved somewhat slowly out of Lenin's scheme of hydro-electric power plants. After the stabilization of the *chervonets* (the Russian currency), there emerged the idea of setting tasks for each of the national industries so that the state would know what credits were needed and what could be produced. These control figures applied for the years 1925-1929, the period immediately preceding the first Five Year Plan. But until the equilibrium with regard to the foreign policy of the country was achieved, nothing could be done. After 1927, however, the party was ready to move rapidly ahead.

The main purpose of the scheme as announced by the party organs was to provide a basis for socialism, but there was also present in the minds of the leaders the vital needs of defense against foreign dangers. The production of munitions, therefore, was an integral part of the program. But the basis for future industrial production was to be laid by the development of the mining and metallurgical industries, which would allow all kinds of construction to be undertaken—railways, bridges, factories, blast furnaces. The emphasis was placed on the heavy industries, those that turned out producers' goods. Light industries, producing consumers' goods, were to be left for the second five years. The first proposals emanated from the local authorities, whose figures were assembled by the central organs. Finally all the figures from all branches of industry from all parts of the Union were placed before the State Planning Commission (commonly known as *Gosplan*). On

being authorized, they then became the program for that particular industry in a particular locality. Maximal and minimal figures were provided to anticipate all sorts of exigencies.

One essential feature of the plan was with reference to education. For the immediate success of the plan it was necessary to bring in large numbers of foreign specialists to supervise construction and production, but it was hoped in time to dispense with their services. To replace them, the educational system of the Union was called on to train thousands of se-



Brown Brothers.

A MODERN INDUSTRIAL PLANT.

lected young men and women in the various branches of higher education. This meant expanding the educational services and the generous provision of stipends to enable students to pursue their studies. By 1937 the number of students in institutions of higher education had grown to over 500,000, five times the pre-war figures. Special training was also provided for the workmen in the factories.

Two weapons that were found effective were the introduction of piece work for industry and the formation of shock brigades of the best workmen to speed up production. Competition was also resorted to to stimulate the interest of the workers, and various "brigades" of workers strove to achieve records of speed of production hitherto undreamed of. Finally a young miner, Stakhanov, in the Donets basin, worked out a system for increasing the output of the miners. The system found favor and its rapid spread resulted in a marked improvement in volume. Similar schemes were adopted in other industries. The name of Stakhanovism was given to the system, though it has much in common with practices in more highly organized industries in the United States. Records of individual and coöperative achievements were kept and published in the local and party press. They certainly raised the rate of production, but it is believed that this was often done at the expense of quality.

Outstanding accomplishments of the two Five Year Plans were the two canals built by the G. P. U. (the secret police, successors to the *Cheka*). Both the Baltic-White Sea Canal and the Moskva-Volga Canal, built with convict labor, were phenomenal accomplishments, testifying to the ability of the Soviet Union to build without foreign help. The Moskva-Volga Canal was built entirely by native engineers.

The Five Year Plans were tremendous undertakings, so intricate and many-sided that any accurate evaluation is impossible. Housing conditions in the capitals (Moscow and Leningrad) presented a great problem. The outsider noticed the lack of ordinary consumers' goods evidenced on every hand. The great need was for tractors, combines, diamond drills, on a scale commensurate with the greatness of the task of developing a country that occupies one-sixth of the earth's surface, and for purposes of defense. The state dared not turn aside from this self-appointed task to make clothing, boots, household goods, automobiles, for the people. These needs must wait.

THE STALIN-TROTSKY FEUD AND ITS AFTERMATH

The expulsion of Trotsky from the Soviet Union did not end the controversy within the Party as to the proper policy to pursue. In addition, the tension induced by the radical changes involved in the first and second Five Year Plans led in many cases to exasperation at slowness of production or at failure to succeed. The government decided to compel efficiency by meting out severe penalties to officials and workers charged with incompetence or negligence, the most serious being met with capital punishment. These trials for "sabotage" more and more assumed a political character, and merged with the controversy between Stalin and Trotsky. The assassination of Kirov in December 1934 led to an investigation which appeared to implicate many members of the Bolshevik Old Guard—Zinovyev, Kamenev, Sokolnikov, Piatakov, Radek, and others. These trials resulted in the execution of Zinovyev and Kamenev in December 1936, and the execution of Piatakov and the sentence of Radek to ten years at hard labor in January 1937. Even the army seemed to have been implicated, and there were ugly tales of treasonable contacts established by foreign powers with some of the higher chiefs of the Red army. In 1937 Marshal Tukachevskii and seven other high-ranking officers of the Red army were brought to trial and, after confessing that they had entered into treasonable relations with *Gestapo*, the German secret police, with a view to betraying the Soviet Union, they were condemned to death and shot as traitors in the spring of 1937. The significance of all this was obscured from people in the Soviet Union, as well as from the outside world. Evidently a bitter though silent struggle was going on within the Soviet Union between various groups competing for power, while outside the Union the country was menaced on almost every side by hostile combinations of dictatorships. The whole atmosphere in Russia, as in other countries of Europe, was poisoned by this fear, by hatred between the citizens of those states which professed different philosophies and systems of government. And amid such a welter of

conflicting views, of charges and countercharges, it was impossible to discover the truth.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1936

An outstanding event of recent years was the adoption in 1936 of a new constitution for the Soviet Union and its constituent parts. The constitution was drafted and presented by the Central Executive Committee to the All-Union Congress of Soviets in the winter of 1936. Elections were to be held in December 1937 for the two chief legislative bodies of the new assembly—the Soviet of Nationalities and the Soviet of the Union. The two chambers, as in the Constitution of 1923, besides forming the highest legislative body in the land, together constituted the supreme executive power—the Central Executive Committee. The elections took place on December 12, 1937, after an election campaign that had lasted from early summer. As a result of the election, there were chosen to the new Supreme Soviet some 1,143 candidates, practically all communists, with a small sprinkling of “partyless” men whose distinction in some walk of life had recommended them to the voters alongside the communist stalwarts of purest water. The boast was made that the elections were the freest and most democratic ever conducted in any country, with all the appurtenances of popular elections such as the secret ballot. But nominations were made in public, and since all initiative emanated from the central committee of the Party, it is a fairly safe assumption that its result was foreordained.

Similar elections were held during 1938 for the unicameral Soviets of the eleven union republics and the twenty-two autonomous republics of the Soviet Union. These were provided for by the constitutions adopted in 1937 by the various republics and were conducted on much the same lines as those of the Soviet Union. The deputies were likewise elected for a period of four years and subject to recall. But, as in the federal elections, the initiative in the campaigns came largely from the Communist party. The nominating commissions were almost entirely communists and in all elections there was but one

candidate, all rivals having been eliminated in the earlier stages. The elections were regarded as a demonstration of the unity of the electorate rather than as a spontaneous expression of the will of the people.

REGIONALIZATION

A unique outgrowth of the concentration of all political and economic power in the hands of the central government was the gradual reorganization of the local administrative system. The need of a more satisfactory and efficient unit than the old *guberniya* with its divisions into *uyezds* and *volosts* had been felt in tsarist times and various proposals had been put forward by P. P. Semenov Tian-Shanskii, the geographer, and by Mendeleyev, the chemist, but nothing had been done till after the revolution of 1917. Lenin's scheme of electrification required a new form of local unit with some coördinating agency, and there came into existence the *Gosplan*, which was authorized to draw up plans for future economic development. These plans required the division of the country into economic units which would serve as a basis for administrative reorganization.

Such an ideal scheme, however, could not be adhered to too rigidly, for in many cases boundaries of such units cut across the territory of national minorities, whose rights the Communists had promised to respect. This difficulty led to a compromise with the ideal. As a result, there came into existence a division of Soviet territory into units that were neither wholly economic nor racial. The larger and more compact of the minorities were grouped into autonomous republics, while in many cases they were severed administratively from their neighbors without being given any special rights. The system was still in a state of flux, but in general one may say that the basic unit for purposes of economic development was the *rayon* of the *Gosplan*. Between this and the Soviet Union as a whole was a series of intermediate steps through which the administrative machinery of the central government acted on the population as a whole.

The significance of the events of the past generation in Russia has yet to be revealed. None but a Sibyl could read the fates aright; and the historian, while he may unravel the mysteries of the past, is denied that supreme gift of prescience in forecasting what is to be. In most cases he does not understand the present. The future is in the lap of the gods.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

From the beginning, the relations of the Allied and Associated Powers with the new Soviet state had not been happy. The defection of Russia from the alliance in 1917, the continuous and bitter campaign of propaganda poured out in Bolshevik despatches, notes, and proclamations, the circumstances of intervention, the civil war, the blockade—everything conspired to poison the whole diplomatic atmosphere. Efforts were made from time to time to break through the vicious circle. The Russians were not invited to the Peace Conference at Versailles or to become members of the League of Nations. It was hoped that some form of accommodation might be arranged between the warring factions after the return of the Bullitt mission, and an invitation was sent out to all factions in Russia, inviting them to a conference to be held on the Island of Prinkipo in the Sea of Marmora. But nothing came of it, and the Soviet state turned its attention to crushing its enemies, contenting itself with a vitriolic proclamation from time to time against "the imperialist robbers."

After the conclusion of the civil war and the inauguration of the New Economic Policy, there seemed to be a good prospect of establishing smooth relations between the Soviet State and the European and world powers. On March 16, 1920, a commercial treaty was signed between Great Britain and Russia, which, as David Lloyd George told the House of Commons, amounted to recognition *de facto*. Austria, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and Czecho-Slovakia followed suit. The necessity Europe felt for a restoration of normal relations with Russia and the need of the latter for credits and machinery, for the revival of her economic life, led to the development of informal

diplomatic relations. The Soviet government let it be understood that it was not averse to the grant of profitable concessions to western capitalists. A conference of experts was held in London, March 1922, to prepare the way for the holding of a European congress to consider means of re-establishing the ruined economic life of the continent. Here the idea of a European *consortium* of bankers to put the Soviets on their feet was evolved. The United States declined to participate. The Communists refused to accept the collaboration of the bourgeois countries on the terms indicated, that is, practically a grant of extraterritoriality. David Lloyd George, however, pressed forward with the idea of a general congress to be held at Cannes. But the atmosphere was unpropitious, for the Briand government had fallen, to be succeeded by the uncompromising Poincaré, who was resolved on the seizure of the Ruhr.

The congress to meet at Cannes was therefore turned into a conference to meet at Genoa to concern itself solely with Russia. Here both sides endeavored to drive a hard bargain. The Allies demanded a recognition of public and private debts, together with restitution of the private property of their nationals confiscated by the Soviet state—or in lieu of such restitution, compensation. The Russians turned the tables on their opponents by advancing counterclaims for the sum total of all material damages that had resulted directly or indirectly from intervention. Eventually they agreed to waive these claims if recognition were granted the Soviet state. But they insisted on a reduction of British and French debts to manageable proportions and, in addition, demanded that if they admitted them, substantial credits should be advanced them for purposes of reconstruction. During the course of the negotiations, the Russians came to an understanding with the Germans at Rapallo—an understanding which amounted to recognition. But the Congress finally rejected the proposals of the Soviet government. Great Britain and Italy decided to angle separately for an agreement, and a committee of experts of these countries met at The Hague, June 23, to endeavor to

effect this. But Litvinov, who took Chicherin's place, adopted an attitude of intransigence. He went back on even the previous modest concessions of the Soviets. There was thus no possible basis for an agreement and the conference broke up.

Events in the Near East were occupying the attention of Russia. The creation of a Turkish nationalist movement by Kemal Pasha, the setting up of a new state with its capital at Ankara, and the refusal to recognize the Treaty of Sèvres dictated by the victorious Allies gave the Soviets a chance to intervene effectively in the east by supporting the pretensions of the Turks. Hence, when the Greeks refused to abate their demands in the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey turned to the Soviets, from whom she received money and supplies. France also concluded an alliance with the Turks and lent them assistance. As a result the latter were able decisively to beat the Greeks, drive them from Asia Minor, and seize their base at Smyrna. France, Great Britain, and Italy arranged mediation, and in 1922-1923 a peace conference was summoned at Lausanne. At this conference the Turks were supported by the Soviet state in requiring full control of the Straits, with the right to fortify them and to close them in time of war, but eventually the former agreed to compromise their extreme demands, to the great chagrin of Chicherin. The Straits, over the protests of the Soviet ambassador, were opened to the passage of the warships of the nations who maintained naval forces in the Mediterranean.

Meanwhile friction had developed between Great Britain and the Soviets over the rights of British fishermen off the Murman coast and over the question of propaganda against Britain in central Asia. The situation became so tense that Lord Curzon despatched an ultimatum to which the Soviets were compelled to accede (June 13, 1923). In this atmosphere the Conference at Lausanne drew to a close and the Soviet government, despite its disagreement with the decision, decided to sign, reserving to itself the right to endeavor to secure later modifications in the status of the Straits.

From 1922 to 1924 there were continual maneuvers between

the Soviet government and the European powers over the question of recognition and over the activity of the *Komintern*. This body, usually referred to abroad as the Third International, had come into existence in 1919 at the behest of Lenin, its main purpose being to embarrass the Allied governments as well as to hasten the world revolution, which the Bolsheviks believed near. Its headquarters were in Moscow. It was believed to receive generous subventions from the Soviet government. As recognition by various governments was secured, overt activity against these governments became impossible, and its activity was driven underground. At the same time, the Moscow authorities tried to enforce abroad the general "party line" from which the slightest deviation was forbidden. Around a group of simon-pure communists was to be arrayed the general mass of the revolutionary workers without regard to their own party leaders. With such resources and methods did the communists undertake to create the world revolution. There was some hope in 1923-1924, with the French occupation of the Ruhr, that Germany would go communist; and hence the tone of the ruling clique in Moscow rose accordingly. But these hopes were doomed to disappointment. The social-democratic government in Germany stood unmoved. Despite the high hopes entertained in 1924, the revolution was turned back all along the line.

Thus the Soviet government continued to play for recognition with the supposed advantages which recognition would bring it. This, to the various powers, was a matter of pure expediency. The first to grant recognition *de jure* was England under its first Labour government, led by Ramsay MacDonald. In addition to recognition, an agreement was reached on August 8, 1924 with the Soviet government on the question of debts and a loan; the question of the loan was to be dependent on a satisfactory solution being reached on the question of debts. But during September and October, two untoward incidents occurred: (1) the "Campbell affair"—the government was accused in the House of Commons on October 8 and 9 of dropping the case against a communist

charged with inciting the armed forces to mutiny; (2) on October 24 was published the so-called Zinovyev letter, purporting to be instructions issued by Zinovyev in the name of the *Komintern* to the communists in England with a view to an armed rising. These two events sealed the fate of the Labour government in the elections on October 29, and the new government refused to ratify the trade agreement of MacDonald. The recognition of Soviet Russia by England was followed by that of France in November 1924, and diplomatic relations were once more resumed, though France was not able to secure a promise for the repayment of Russian debts.

During the course of 1925 Germany began to take an interest in Russia and Russian trade, and negotiations were opened looking towards a commercial treaty. This was finally concluded towards the end of the year and ratified at the beginning of 1926. As a result of this treaty, Germany advanced the Soviets 300,000,000 marks credit and received certain valuable privileges, among them the right to develop military aviation in Russia, which was forbidden in Germany by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. The Dawes commission had secured the evacuation of the Ruhr, and in 1926 Germany and the major European powers signed the Treaty of Locarno. Germany was likewise admitted to the League of Nations. The impelling motive was apparently to prevent Germany being drawn into the Russian camp. But Germany entered this year into closer commercial relations with the Soviets, hoping to get a larger share of their trade. By further treaties, December 21, 1928, and January 25, 1929, these relations were made even more cordial and intimate. They culminated finally in a treaty in 1931 by which the Germans hoped to oust the United States from their leading place in the program of reconstruction.

In 1925 a revolution broke out in China which brought the *Komintern* once more into prominence. The Communists despatched to the Far East emissaries and money to help organize a Communist group in alliance with Sun Yat Sen's party, the *Kuomintang*. The movement was successful in the south, and it spread from there into the Yangtse valley, where it was

directed against the foreign treaty ports. In addition to organizing the propaganda the Communists established a military academy at Whampoa to train the revolutionary leaders, but after the sack of the British concession, at Hangkow, the *Kuomintang* repudiated the alliance and sent Borodin, the Russian leader, home. The truth was that the Communist party in Russia was becoming lukewarm and was beginning to grudge the money spent in this Chinese adventure. Trotsky severely criticized Stalin for his indifference, but Stalin had the ear of the party and carried the matter finally into the conference of the party in 1926. In the Central Committee of the party, a bitter attack was made on Zinovyev. Eventually Trotsky and Zinovyev were excluded from the Central Committee. Trotsky endeavored to use ordinary party machinery to support his measures, and actually carried the issue before the International, but here he was blocked. He then attempted to bring about a demonstration in the streets on November 7, 1927, the tenth anniversary of the Revolution. The result was that he, in addition to being disciplined by the party, was brought to trial for a political offense and was exiled to central Asia. It was later decided to expel him from the Soviet Union. For some time he lived on the Island of Prinkipo in the Sea of Marmora, later in Norway, and finally in 1937, he was deported from Norway, but allowed to settle in Mexico.

THE RISE OF LITVINOV

In 1926 Soviet foreign relations entered on a new phase. France had endeavored to secure the isolation of Russia by forming a *cordon sanitaire*, a series of alliances among the states contiguous to Russia, by which Russia would be excluded from contact with the outer world. In Asia, Great Britain sought to promote a similar scheme. All these efforts, however, came to naught. Chicherin had early countered by the pact with Turkey, with Persia, and Afghanistan; and the Soviet Union now entered into a series of pacts with her various Baltic neighbors, as well as Poland, thus securing the latter against Russian

aggression, as well as detaching them from the French constellation. In 1927, after the failure of the Communist International's efforts at promoting revolution, there was a noticeable moderation in Soviet foreign policy, signaled by the disappearance of Chicherin and the emergence of Litvinov as Commissar of Foreign Affairs.

The rise of Litvinov to the position of Commissar of Foreign Affairs had synchronized with a revival of the project of disarmament. Though the Soviet Union was not a member of the League of Nations, like other countries that were not signatory to the pact, it was invited to participate. This provided Litvinov with an admirable stage for the display of his gifts as orator and as diplomat, though there was an air of unreality about some of the proposals for disarmament he made in that body. But the rise of Hitler's party in Germany, and the increasing volume of Germany's demands on the League, and other international bodies, brought the Soviet statesman down to earth and impelled him to drop his make-believe behavior for serious work. It was imperative that before the menace of German rearmament, Russia should not be isolated but should forestall such a contingency by a proposal for a general disarmament. But almost immediately, with the Japanese intervention in Manchuria, a difficult situation arose in the Far East for all of the European powers. The latter hedged on this question and left it to the League; the League, not sure of support, temporized. Eventually the extension of Japan's military activity into the region of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and the increasing control assumed by the Japanese over the country, and finally the creation of the independent Manchukuo, confronted the Russians with a *fait accompli*. The Soviet Union, therefore, pursued two courses concurrently: tactful accommodation with the Japanese and Manchukuo authorities, and a vast increase in Soviet armaments, especially in the east—military, naval, and air—and preparations to make the far eastern forces self-contained with their own supplies of food and their own armament industries. Thus Japan was allowed, without a protest from the Soviet Union, to absorb

the whole of Manchuria, and to take practical possession of the Chinese Eastern Railway, for which the war of 1905 had been fought. As a way out of an impossible situation, it was finally decided to sell the railway to Manchukuo, the purchase price to be guaranteed by the Japanese government.

Against the threat of Germany and Poland in the west, the Soviet authorities decided to negotiate a series of non-aggression pacts with their neighbors—Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Rumania. These were largely brought about through the instrumentality of France. Even Italy, Hungary, and Spain were embraced in the system.

Relations of the Soviet Union with Great Britain and France at this time took a turn for the worse. The open propaganda of the communists directed against British power in India and China, and particularly their activity in England in the Trades Union Congress and intellectual circles, for which they made lavish use of funds drawn from Moscow, drew forth sharp protests from the conservative press and the group of "die hards" in the House of Commons. The part played by communist activity in promoting the general strike of 1926, and the subsidies they sent to the miners, eventually induced the government to break off diplomatic relations, though *Arcos*, the Soviet purchasing agency in London, was allowed to remain and continue its work. Thus the situation remained till the return of MacDonald and the Labour Party to power in 1929, when diplomatic relations were re-established on the basis of mutual promises of cessation of subversive propaganda. In 1930 a new commercial treaty was signed, followed by a treaty over the rights of British fishermen in Soviet waters. During the execution of the Five Year Plan, the vast scale on which Russian exports took place and the low prices brought difficulties in the Anglo-Russian relations. Dumping of lumber which was the product of "forced labor" threatened the Soviet market but did not actually bring a rupture.

With France relations remained equally tense. Negotiations over the Russian pre-war debt held by French investors resulted finally in 1927, in that debt being whittled down to something

like twelve per cent of its pre-war value, whose repayment was to be spread over sixty-two years, and to be facilitated by a French credit and the purchase by France of Russian goods. The French navy began to purchase the output of Soviet oil wells, and thus to emancipate itself from Standard Oil, Royal Dutch Shell, and Anglo-Persian. Cross-currents in the situation were the hostility of Deterding, the head of the Royal Dutch Shell interests, to this arrangement; the espousal by Rakovskii, the Soviet ambassador in France, of the cause of Trotsky; the question of dumping. France made common cause with England and other capitalist countries against Soviet dumping. The Soviet government replied by withdrawing its business from France and giving it to Italy and Germany.

Meanwhile the commercial relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain were anything but satisfactory. Out of the commercial treaty of 1930 there had developed a system of credits for Anglo-Soviet trade which ultimately expanded to something like \$40,000,000. But the payments that accrued from the importation of Soviet goods to England went to finance Soviet purchases of German and American machinery. Eventually the cry of "dumping" and "forced labor" was taken up, backed by the complaints of Canadian lumbermen, who were suffering from the loss of their business. In 1931 there had come into existence a coalition known as the "National Government," really conservative, though MacDonald was nominally at its head. This government negotiated, during the summer of 1932, a series of commercial pacts with the various Dominions, and as one of the conditions of this, gave the requisite six months' notice of the denunciation of the trade treaty with the Soviet Union.

THE RISE OF HITLER

Meanwhile the Soviet Union had itself run into difficulties. The famine of 1932, whose full effects were not felt till 1933, reduced the country for the moment to impotence, in both a political and a military sense. This coincided almost exactly with the rise of the German National Socialist party to power,

to which the communists in Germany had made no small contribution. Almost immediately the German communists were subjected to rigorous persecution, and relations with the Soviet Union became embittered. Still Hitler was willing to renew the treaty of 1926 (and 1931) and extend further ample credits for Soviet orders, at the same time that his associates were openly talking of a new German "*Drang nach Osten*." This brought a rupture between the two former allies of Rapallo. Germany, as Japan had already done, withdrew from the League of Nations on October 14, 1933. In 1934 some compensation was found for this in the entrance of the Soviet Union into the League.

In 1932 relations with Great Britain, in consequence of a campaign of persecution undertaken in the Soviet Union against Metropolitan-Vickers, an English company operating in the Union, were strained. Several of the English representatives of Vickers and their Russian associates were put on trial, and two of the English were found guilty and sentenced to prison. In consequence, an embargo was placed by England on Soviet trade. The prisoners, however, were eventually released and deported and the embargo raised.

RECOGNITION BY THE UNITED STATES

French relations with the Soviet Union had become more cordial and intimate as the German menace loomed larger and larger. On November 29, 1932, a pact was signed between the two countries. This was modified by a protocol in 1934. It was, of course, due to the activity of France that the Soviet Union was admitted to the League of Nations. The French treaty was followed by a similar one with Czecho-Slovakia in 1935 for mutual assistance. One further gain for the year 1934 was the recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States. This came about as a result of the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had some hopes that, with the establishment of regular political and commercial relations, the share of the United States in Soviet trade would be much increased, a hope only partly fulfilled.

THE KOMINTERN AND POPULAR FRONTS

It was at this time that the *Komintern* executed a complete *volte face*. Hitherto the *Komintern* had drawn the general party line sharply in the activity of its agents abroad, who were held to the same strict "orthodoxy" as that demanded at home. They were required to abstain from coöperating with the "reformist" or "opportunist" groups. Thus the Communist party in Germany had combined with the Nazis to compass the fall of the Social Democrats only to find itself, in turn, liquidated. This disillusionment taught them a lesson, and a sharp reversal in policy was the result. Henceforth communists in foreign countries were urged to join forces with all "fellow-travelers" (*soputniki*), that is, all who could by any liberal construction be conceived as having aims similar to those of the communists. Thus were formed those *blocs* known by the name of the "popular front" in France, Spain, the United States, and elsewhere. It need hardly be stressed that the communists reserved to themselves the right to use this alliance only so long as it served their purpose. Once they had achieved the victory, it was assumed that the partnership would be dissolved. Indeed, communist *mores* did not look askance at the policy of "boring from within" which meant, in plain English, doing all that could be done to undermine the power and influence of their allies. The success achieved by this move in Spain and France is too well-known to require further comment. In foreign affairs it was used by the *Komintern* to shift the foreign policies of various states, in which the popular front was active, in a direction advantageous to the Soviet Union and to build up an anti-fascist *bloc*.

To meet this threat there was called into existence a formidable anti-communist *bloc*. At the time of the crisis over Ethiopia in 1935, Germany, having withdrawn from the League of Nations, adopted a policy of watchful waiting. But it was noticed that she was not unsympathetic towards Italy, to whom she sold supplies during the application of sanctions. After the conclusion of the war, Mussolini made advances towards

Hitler and there grew up, as a result, the Rome-Berlin axis in which both dictators agreed to coöperate in achieving their objectives. In 1936 this pact was given an anti-*Komintern* twist. With the growing bitterness of the crisis in China which grew out of the Manchurian episode, the setting up of Manchukuo, and later (1937) the invasion of central China by the Japanese—when the interests of all the world powers were threatened—Japan found it much to her advantage to accede to this agreement which, more and more, was directed against the Soviet Union.

The strength of the Rome-Berlin axis and the potential menace of the anti-*Komintern* pact was amply demonstrated in the crisis over Czecho-Slovakia in September 1938, when Great Britain and France were forced under the threat of the combined action of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, and of simultaneous action by Japan in the Far East, to agree to the separation of Sudetenland from Czecho-Slovakia. Indeed, the British and French governments even assumed the odious role of themselves coercing the Czechs, who thus were unable to invoke their mutual aid pact with France. Hence, the Czech agreement with the Soviet Union, which was contingent on the receipt of assistance from France, could not become operative. In neither the original discussions between Chamberlain and Hitler at Berchtesgaden nor those at Godesberg was the Soviet Union consulted. It was likewise excluded from the final settlement at Munich on September 29. This affront to the Russians seemed to many anxious observers to provide a poor foundation for Europe's security. To the Communists it carried the implication that Hitler was to be allowed a free hand in the east, a wish to which the Nazi leader had often given expression.

The uneasy truce arranged at Munich lasted only until March 15, 1939, when German troops occupied what was left of Czecho-Slovakia and further dismembered that state by the separation of Slovakia from Bohemia and Moravia. The latter were eventually combined in a Bohemian and Moravian protectorate which was incorporated in the Reich, while Slovakia

was allowed a nominal independence. The signatories of the Munich agreement protested. Even the Soviet press gave vent to intense indignation. Great Britain and France decided, now that agreements had failed to check Nazi aggression, to throw their weight into the formation of a peace front of those European states who considered themselves menaced. Right on the heels of the absorption of Czecho-Slovakia came German demands on Poland for the recognition of the right of the Reich to annex the Free City of Danzig and the cession of a wide strip of territory across the Polish corridor, with rights of extraterritoriality to provide transportation facilities between East Prussia and the rest of Germany. The Polish government rejected both these demands and appealed to England and France for aid. The result was a guarantee by them of Poland's independence, fortified later by an alliance between Poland and the western powers. Guarantees were also offered to and accepted by Rumania and Greece, though in the latter case the agreements were unilateral.

THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION

It was somewhat naïvely assumed by the governments of Great Britain and France that the Soviet Union would be eager to join the new *bloc*. Certainly Soviet professions tended to support this view. But a speech by Stalin on the very eve of the German march into Prague contained a hint tending to disturb the complacency of the western powers. On March 10 Stalin had publicly stated that the Soviet Union "refused to be drawn into conflicts by war mongers accustomed to having others pull their chestnuts out of the fire." Nevertheless, Stalin did not repel the advances of England and France but agreed to enter on negotiations looking to the formation of an anti-aggression front. But now came another disturbing move. The Soviet press announced the resignation of Maxim Litvinov, who had been Commissar of Foreign Affairs since the retirement of Chicherin in 1927, and who had consistently championed the cause of collective security. Ill health was given as the reason for Litvinov's retirement, and the press was at some

pains to deny the rumors of feelers having been put out to Nazi Germany. Vyacheslav Molotov, a close confidant of Stalin, was named in Litvinov's place.

Negotiations of the Soviet Union with France and England opened at Moscow under anything but favorable auspices. The official amenities were observed but could not conceal the mutual distrust. The success of the conference was further imperiled by failure to send plenipotentiaries. Crucial questions therefore had to be referred back to the respective governments. Hence interminable delays and consequent friction ensued. Moreover, negotiations brought proposals from the Soviet government with reference to the Baltic states that ill-accorded with the role assumed by Great Britain and France as the champions of free peoples. It seemed difficult to bridge the gap on political issues, and the Soviet authorities suggested that the deadlock might be broken by postponing these in favor of a consultation on naval and military problems. Accordingly staff officers of the respective armies and navies were despatched to Moscow and the political negotiations were suspended. But Poland was reported to have balked at schemes for military aid that would involve opening her frontiers to Soviet troops. Months of discussion had brought the two sides no closer when in August a German commercial mission somewhat ostentatiously made its appearance in Moscow. There was nothing alarming in this, for Nazi Germany had maintained rather close commercial relations with the Soviet Union, and there was no reason to distrust the professions of the Russians that they wished merely to revive trade with Nazi Germany which recently had declined. A new commercial treaty was signed on August 20 which provided for a German credit of 200,000,000 marks over a period of seven years and the purchase by Germany of Soviet raw materials to the extent of 180,000,000 marks.

Hard on the heels of the announcement of the trade treaty, however, came the stunning news that the Soviet government had agreed to conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany and that Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop would arrive in Moscow on August 23 to conclude the negotiations. At first,

the public, so long accustomed to mutual denunciation of Bolshevik and Nazi, was incredulous. But with von Ribbentrop's arrival in Moscow, and the speedy consummation of the pact definitely announced on August 23, incredulity gave way to consternation. Article III provided that "Neither of the high contracting parties will associate itself with any other grouping of powers which directly or indirectly is aimed at the other party." Thus the hopes of the western powers of drawing Russia into the anti-aggression front were effectively blasted and Poland's chances of resisting a German attack reduced almost to zero, deprived as she would be of Soviet aid. But the Polish leaders were not so much oppressed by the prospect of Soviet neutrality as by the haunting fear that behind the treaty, which was innocuous enough, there might lurk a secret pledge of joint military action to effect a fourth partition of their country.

The conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet pact immediately precipitated a diplomatic crisis. Despite their dismay at the unexpected turn of events, France and Great Britain renewed their pledges to Poland. Hitler countered with a demand that they withdraw their support and allow him to deal directly with that country on the question of Danzig and the Polish corridor. The western powers, however, insisted that any such negotiations should be free from the element of coercion. Great Britain and France would agree to a settlement on that basis but would come to Poland's aid if she were compelled to resist the application of force. On August 29, 1939, Hitler seemed to acquiesce in such a settlement but he attached the condition that a special Polish plenipotentiary should come to Berlin to receive his offer. He is also said to have intimated that he was bound to consult the Soviet Union before giving any territorial guarantee. Presumably Hitler's message was transmitted, but late on the night of August 30 von Ribbentrop summoned the British ambassador and read him the text of the offer which Germany had prepared but which was now, apparently in view of the non-arrival of a Polish plenipotentiary, withdrawn. Though never offered directly to the Polish government, the

conditions seem to have been considered unacceptable, and orders for general mobilization went out. On the morning of September 1 German troops crossed the frontier at numerous points, and war had begun. That day both France and England despatched ultimatums to Berlin demanding the withdrawal of German troops from Poland and the cessation of hostilities. No reply having been received, both powers, on September 3, 1939, declared war on Germany.

The German onslaught on Poland was swift and terrible. Relays of bombing planes assailed the capital Warsaw and a score of other cities simultaneously. Bridges and other vital points on the lines of communication were sought out and destroyed. Contact between the front and the rear areas was disrupted. Even liaison between various sectors of the line completely broke down. Troops in retreat or reinforcements coming up were ceaselessly harried by swarms of German airmen. Gdynia was subjected to bombardment from German warships. With tanks and armored divisions leading the way, the German army, thoroughly motorized, thrust deep into Polish territory. The Poles, with antiquated equipment and with an inadequate air force, were at a grave disadvantage. The Corridor, entered from both sides simultaneously, was immediately isolated and its defenders cut off. Pushed back in the first rush to their prepared positions, the Poles were blasted out of these by heavy guns, of which the Germans had a crushing superiority. The invading armies did not rely on frontal assaults but strove to encircle the Polish armies by converging attacks of their armies from all points of the compass—from East Prussia far to the northeast to the Carpathian passes in Slovakia in the southeast. Only in the west did the Polish line hold where around Kutno Polish divisions put up a stubborn rear-guard action. But this respite to the Polish armies was temporary. The San in the south and the Narew in the north, those twin bastions of Poland's defense, were crossed. Mobile detachments were thus enabled to strike far to the east and southeast. Brest Litovsk fell to a motorized division. Other mobile detachments appeared in the neigh-

borhood of Lvov (Lemberg). Finally in the west Kutno fell, though its garrison cut its way through to the east where Modlin and Warsaw held out. Light detachments of Germans reached even the outskirts of the capital, though these fell back before the desperate resistance of the garrison. At length Modlin, flattened by incessant air raids and prolonged artillery fire, was given up, and this enabled the Germans to close in on Warsaw. The Polish government and most of the embassies left the capital, but their trains were continuously harassed from the air and menaced by raiding columns on their way to the Rumanian frontier. The rout of the Polish armies was all but a debacle.

And now the full implications of the Nazi-Soviet pact were to be revealed. At the opening of hostilities, the Red army had begun to mass troops along the Soviet Union's western border. On September 15, 1939, was announced a truce in the bitter border fighting that had been going on in Outer Mongolia between Japanese and Mongol forces (these obviously equipped and directed by the Soviet Union). On September 16 the Red army crossed the frontier and, brushing aside the feeble resistance of the Polish detachments, occupied eastern and southeastern Poland. Two days later they joined hands with Nazi forces at Brest-Litovsk, where they arranged for the delimitation of their respective zones of occupation. The line between the Russian and German spheres was to follow the Pisa, the Narew, the Bug, the Vistula, and the San rivers to the Beskide mountains on the Hungarian frontier. Warsaw was to remain in German hands, while its eastern suburb, Praga, was to go to the Soviet Union. Later the line, while remaining unchanged at the north and south ends, was drawn back in the center to the Bug. This assigned to the Russians an area in which White Russian and Ukrainian population predominated. On September 27, 1939, after undergoing a three weeks' bombardment of unprecedented ferocity by German artillery and from the air, Warsaw surrendered, and within a few days Polish resistance collapsed.

The division of the Polish spoils was immediately followed

by a Soviet diplomatic drive in the Baltic. A naval demonstration was staged in the Gulf of Finland; divisions of the Red army appeared on the frontiers of Esthonia. The foreign minister of this small Baltic state, summoned to Moscow, received the demands of the Soviet government: the signing of a mutual-aid pact; the cession of the islands of Dagoe and Oesel; the right to establish a naval base at the Baltic port of Paldiski, and to quarter permanently on Esthonian soil a force of approximately 25,000 Red troops. Diplomatic support from Germany not being forthcoming, Esthonia yielded. The same procedure was followed with Latvia, which likewise on October 5 signed away her independence by the acceptance of a mutual-aid pact with the Soviet Union, the cession of naval bases at Libau and Windau, and permission to station a permanent garrison of Red troops in Latvia. Lithuania was given the same treatment. A mutual-aid pact, a naval base to be established between Polanga and Shwentoja, air bases on the coast, transit rights for the Soviet Union on the railroads, the right to navigate the Niemen river and to establish a fortified line along the frontier of East Prussia, was the price she paid for peace. As partial compensation, the city of Vilna with a small area surrounding it was returned to Lithuania.

RUSO-FINNISH WAR

It proved a much more difficult task to arrange a settlement with Finland. A heritage of bitterness had been transmitted from the civil war (1918-1920) owing to the ruthlessness with which the Finnish communists had been crushed by the White Guards. The Russian communists singled out for their special detestation Marshal Gustav Mannerheim, the leader in that epic struggle, whose military genius and powers of leadership had combined to bring victory to the Whites. Since she had achieved independence in that unhappy struggle, Finland had gone her own way. Representative institutions and a capitalist economy based on numerous coöperatives had been preferred to a dictatorship of the proletariat and a regimented economy, and had brought

prosperity and contentment. But there was no love lost between the Finns and their erstwhile rulers.

It was, however, the threat to their security in the Baltic that stirred the Russians to action. From the time of Hitler's rise to power, there had been much talk of German aggrandizement in the East at Russia's expense. There were rumors, which the Nazi government did not take the trouble to contradict, that plans had been drafted for a military campaign against the Soviet Union, one variant of which provided for the penetration of Russia through the Baltic States. Obviously, the most dangerous threat to Soviet power was Finland, whose frontier with the Soviet Union lay almost in the suburbs of Leningrad. Moreover, Russia's most important naval base in the Gulf of Finland on the island of Kronstadt was exposed to air and sea attack from foreign territory. She suffered from the additional handicap that her fleets would be immobilized unless they could be provided with bases nearer the open Baltic, which does not as a rule freeze in winter. These considerations led the Soviet government to strive to crown its moves to secure its strategic position by an arrangement with Finland.

On October 7, 1939, the Soviet government, therefore, invited the Finnish government to despatch representatives to Moscow to discuss a solution of these problems. The negotiations were conducted in secret, and the world could only infer what actually were the Russian demands or deduce them from later events. These demands seem to have included three main provisions:

1. The removal of the frontier on the Karelian isthmus to a distance sufficiently great to remove the threat to Leningrad. This would involve the surrender by Finland of some 3,970 square miles of territory and some lines of railway (for which the Soviet government agreed to pay compensation), as well as all of the frontier fortifications, collectively known as the Mannerheim line.

2. The granting to the Soviet Union of a thirty-year lease of

the peninsula of Hangö and the surrounding waters, with a number of neighboring islands, for the establishment of a naval base. This included the right to maintain at such base a military and air force adequate for its protection.

3. Sale to the Soviet Union of a number of additional islands in the Gulf of Finland as well as parts of the peninsulas of Rybachii and Srednii on the coast of the Arctic Ocean for the agreed sum of 300,000,000 Finnish marks.

Finland stoutly resisted these encroachments on her sovereignty and territorial integrity, and negotiations, after having been protracted for six weeks, finally reached an *impasse* on November 14, when the Finnish delegation left Moscow. After keeping the world in suspense for nearly ten days, the Soviet government broke silence by a complaint, addressed to the government of M. Ryti, making formal charges of a frontier incident against the Finnish army. This charge was hotly denied, and when the Communist government demanded the withdrawal of frontier forces in the Karelian isthmus, the Finns countered by agreeing to such withdrawal if it was executed simultaneously by both sides. In reply, the Soviet government on November 28 denounced its non-aggression pact with Finland. Three days later there was established at Terijoki in southern Finland, along the Russian frontier, the so-called "People's Government." It addressed an appeal to Finnish workers to rise against the Finnish "White Guards" and two days later signed a treaty of mutual assistance and friendship with the Soviet government, whose demands on Finland were all conceded. On the morning of November 30, Red army units crossed the frontier and began the invasion of Finland. Almost simultaneously the capital, Helsinki (Helsingfors), and other towns in southern Finland were subjected to a heavy bombardment from the air. In Finland the government immediately resigned, but the new government that was constituted adopted an attitude toward Russia no less firm than that of its predecessor, and prepared to resist the Russian invasion.

The indignation that ran high throughout the world at what seemed the wanton aggression of the Soviet Union received expression through the League of Nations. On December 14, on the initiative of Argentina, the League Assembly, after considering Russia's refusal to cease hostilities or submit the issue to negotiations, roundly condemned her action and formally dropped the Soviet Union from membership in the League.

The Red army offensive took the form of a series of simultaneous thrusts against Finland's long and exposed eastern frontier: (1) on the Karelian isthmus against the Mannerheim line; (2) immediately to the north of Lake Ladoga; (3) westward from the Murmansk railway through Suomussalmi toward the town of Tornea on the Swedish border; (4) southwest from Kandalaksha toward Salla and also toward the head of the Gulf of Bothnia to cut Finland's rail communication with the Scandinavian countries; and (5) from Murmansk toward Petsamo on the Rybachii peninsula along the Arctic coast.

The Finns were unable to reply to the air offensive of the Russians, but on the ground their military forces displayed marvellous powers of resistance. The Mannerheim line, fortified by both nature and art, defied the assaults of the Red army even though these were supported by an intense artillery and air bombardment and led by masses of tanks. In the offensive directed toward Suomussalmi and Salla, the Russians scored a surprise and brought up strong and well-equipped forces that drove the Finns back. In the north the Finns, having neither naval nor air forces, could not resist the combined military, naval, and air attacks on Petsamo, which was lost by the Finns, retaken, and then lost again. This time the Finns were forced to retreat southward into the forest and to abandon the valuable nickel mines located there.

But certain natural advantages such as terrain and climate began to tell heavily in the Finns' favor. The Finns were inured to the most severe climatic conditions; they were provided with the clothing necessary to withstand the severities of weather. Their infantry was equipped with skis, in the

use of which practically every Finn is an expert. In the northern forest, almost devoid of roads, they were perfectly at home and could move with a speed and a sure sense of direction that bewildered their opponents, who were forced to proceed on the main highways in long and slow-moving columns which were continually harassed by swarms of the enemies' scouts and patrols that hung on their flanks and rear. Finnish mobility more than offset Russia's superiority in man power and mechanical equipment. The sudden advent of severely cold weather and snow early in December considerably augmented the difficulties of the Russians. During December, 1939, beyond their capture of Petsamo in the north, the Soviet troops had no successes to their credit. Even their superiority in the air was at first nullified by weather which was unfavorable for flying.

Early in January, 1940, the Finns astonished the world by two striking successes attained in the neighborhood of Suomussalmi. Here on the shores of Lake Kianta the Finns first trapped and later annihilated the 163rd Russian Division in the Battle of Kemijärvi, and ten days later repeated this exploit with the 44th Division that was coming to the assistance of their Red army comrades. Considerable booty fell to the victors. Shortly after this, the columns advancing in the neighborhood of Salla, consisting apparently of an army corps, were turned back and compelled to retreat to the frontier. In February for a third time a Russian division was surrounded and destroyed north of Lake Ladoga. These exploits, however, failed materially to affect the issue, which was decided elsewhere. To compensate them for their losses on land and sea, the Soviets redoubled their offensive from the air. Helsinki (Helsingfors), Viipuri (Viborg), Tammerfors (Tampere), Turku, and Åbo in southern Finland were selected especially as targets, while Tornea (Tornio) and Uleaborg on the railway running to Sweden were subjected to frightful and repeated bombardments. No pretense was made of restricting the attacks to military objectives. The Soviet government had determined to resort to frightfulness to overawe the population.

On the Karelian isthmus the lines, despite repeated assaults, held firm, and it was obvious that the only hope of victory for the Soviet Union was by wearing down by sheer weight of numbers her hardy and resourceful opponents.

At the beginning of February events took a new direction. The Russians had assembled troops and munitions for a large-scale offensive against the Mannerheim line covering the Karelian isthmus. Guns of all caliber were concentrated in a devastating bombardment of the positions to prepare the way for the massed attacks of tanks and the infantry assaults launched in their wake. Relays of bombers coöperated with the ground troops and incessantly harassed the defenders. Casualties were inevitably heavy; most of the tanks also were put out of action and many of the attacks were either repelled or their results nullified by counterattacks. But the pressure of the Russians never for a moment relaxed. Fresh troops moved in to take the place of the divisions which had been cut up. Gradually this persistent pressure began to yield results and the outlying strong points to pass into the hands of the Russians. After two weeks of continual attacks, Summa, on the road to Viborg, fell. The loss of Summa partially uncovered the fortress of Koivisto, the western anchor of the Mannerheim line by which the Finns commanded the sea approaches to Viborg. Koivisto was lost to the Finns, who retired to a line in front of Viborg running from Lake Muola to the sea. Apparently nothing could stay the Russian advance, which moved irresistibly on Viborg. Russian patrols reached the outskirts on March 3, but the Finns held on to the city to enable new positions to the north and west to be hastily improvised to check the Russian advance. Though there was no evidence of Finnish resistance cracking, the war had obviously entered on a critical phase.

The loss of Koivisto to the Finns now allowed the Russians to enter Viborg bay and to take possession of outlying forts situated on islands in the bay, as well as to cross to the western shores of the bay. The immediate prospect of the loss of Viborg—which would allow the Russians to take the Man-

nerheim line in reverse and to extend the front to the west in the direction of Helsinki—opened up gloomy prospects for the Finns, already wearied by the incessant assaults of the Soviet troops and profoundly depressed by their defeats. But if the Finns were disposed to listen to offers of peace, the Russians were no less anxious to stop the drain of a costly war. Feelers were put out by the Soviet government to the British and the Swedish governments. Though the former refused even to pass on the terms offered, the Swedish government showed less reluctance, and, as a result, M. Ryti and three Finnish representatives proceeded to Stockholm, from where they flew to Moscow. Here, after nearly a week's negotiations, a settlement was reached. Pronouncements from Great Britain and France that they were prepared to send an expedition to Finland's rescue came too late to alter the course of events. On March 12 the Finnish representatives agreed to Soviet Russia's terms, which were:

1. The surrender of the entire Karelian isthmus, including the fortifications of the Mannerheim line and the city of Viborg, and the northern and western shores of Lake Ladoga.
2. A thirty-year lease of Hangö as a naval base to be fortified and garrisoned by Soviet troops and air forces.
3. Both countries agreed to the joint construction of a railway, presumably from Kandalaksha at the western end of the White Sea and an important junction on the Murmansk railway, across northern Finland, to the Swedish border.
4. Both parties agreed not to conclude any alliances nor to participate in any coalitions against the other.

Demands for the cession of Petsamo and Rybachii peninsula were not pressed, and these northern outposts remained in Finnish hands, though with the proviso that they be entirely demilitarized. Nor was any mention made of the "People's Government" of Otto Kuusinen, which had been granted recognition by the Soviet government on December 2, 1939.

Its usefulness now being at an end, it was allowed to drop quietly into oblivion.

The Finnish "incident," while hardly comparable to the Polish campaign, was without question of great importance in the history of the Soviet State. Russia had now, by her diplomatic offensive in the Baltic and the campaign in Finland, in great part recovered the strategic advantages forfeited at the time of the revolution. The fighting also revealed that the Russian soldier had lost none of those great qualities of courage and endurance he had shown in Tsarist times. It also demonstrated the ability of the government to put in the field and maintain there a military force equipped with the most up-to-date weapons. It had also given some indication of the size and efficiency of Russian air arm. But in the matter of leadership, the balance struck was not so favorable. The arrival of General Stern from the Far East to assume command of operations seemed to synchronize with a new tempo in the military operations, but the final breach in the Mannerheim line was brought about by the most orthodox methods and showed no strategic or tactical innovations. It must be admitted that in the competition in heavy armaments, Finland could not hope to match her gargantuan opponent. But where daring and speed and resourcefulness could be brought into play, the Finns in their native forest proved themselves superior to their Muscovite foes.

A diplomatic offensive in the Balkans was less successful. The common frontier which the Soviet Union had been able to establish with Hungary and Rumania seemed to give it a distinct advantage. It was assumed that Russia could pay off her old score with Rumania for the rape of Bessarabia in 1918. But action in the Balkans required the closing by Turkey of the Dardanelles, which were opened under certain conditions to foreign warships by the treaty of Montreux (1936). With this in view negotiations were begun at Moscow early in October, but Turkey demurred. She had already, before the Nazi-Soviet *rapprochement*, agreed to a mutual-aid pact with Great Britain and France. M. Saracoglu, the Turkish foreign

minister, refused to abandon this pact or to attempt a unilateral revision of the treaty of Montreux. In deference, however, to Turkey's wishes, the pact as finally concluded with Great Britain and France left her free from the obligation to go to war with Russia directly.

It would be idle to deny that the Nazi-Soviet pact had completely shifted the European balance of power in Germany's favor. Stalin had finally repudiated the policy of collective security and made peace with the aggressor in order to resume the march of Russia westward, which had been suspended since the Great War. Within a few weeks he had recovered a great part of the ground lost after 1917 and had acquired ice-free ports and naval bases on the Baltic, thus reopening Russia's window on Europe. But while Germany's acquiescence alone could ensure the success of Russia's Baltic policy, in the Balkans the ground had to be prepared by an understanding with the great Mediterranean powers. Italy, and Great Britain with Turkey's support, for the moment succeeded in arresting her progress.

The role of the Soviet Union was entirely equivocal. The non-aggression pact with Germany seemed in late September, while the two were engaged in the partition of Poland, to assume the character of an alliance. Moreover, Germany's seeming generosity in dividing the Polish spoils, the abandonment in the Baltic of ancient outposts of German influence, seemed to provide confirmation for the German boast of a promise of active assistance from the Soviet government. But there was no move to put either the Red army or air force at the disposal of Germany. Britain and France refrained from declaring war on the Soviet Union and scrupulously abstained from hostile acts against it. Britain likewise negotiated a commercial treaty providing for the exchange of Soviet timber for English rubber and tin. On the other hand, a commercial treaty with Germany provided for extensive exchange of Soviet raw materials for German manufactured goods, particularly machinery. The first earnest of this was an undertaking to deliver immediately 1,000,000 metric tons of fodder and food-

stuffs. It appeared that Germany had bartered away her dominance in the Baltic and her future in eastern Europe in exchange for undertakings of a most unsubstantial character.

The Nazi-Soviet pact had even more unhappy results elsewhere. It was received by Germany's associates in the anti-*Komintern* pact with nothing less than dismay. Franco at once announced that Spain had now discharged her debt to those who had befriended her during the civil war and that Germany's act had released her from all obligations involved in the anti-*Komintern* pact. In Japan it produced a government crisis, for it meant, in addition to a diplomatic check, that loss of face so feared by the Oriental. There were bitter denunciations of Nazi Germany's treachery. It snapped almost to the breaking point the Rome-Berlin axis, on which Hitler's conduct had already put an almost intolerable strain. The conclusion of the Turkish pact finally succeeded in immobilizing Italian power in the Mediterranean.

It was, however, left-wing socialism that received the rudest shock from this Soviet change of front. The Communist party had for long proclaimed the brotherhood of all workers and denounced the imperialism of the capitalist powers. The Third International had sought to promote the cause of the proletariat and latterly had invited all "fellow-travellers" who were seeking to further the cause of democracy and of freedom to join the communists in "popular fronts" whose aim was to free the peoples everywhere from oppression by fascism. True, the purges of old and loyal communists, the almost mass executions of Red army leaders and others, ruthless measures by which unanimity of opinion in Russia had been secured, had raised doubts in earnest minds abroad of the sincerity of communist professions of humanitarian aims. There was the lurking suspicion that a noble cause was being prostituted to the national interests of the Soviet Union or the maintenance in power of a ruling clique. Looked at from this point of view exclusively, Russia's foreign policy has been perfectly logical—and, in view of repeated slights to her national pride, and the seeming absence of any basis of coöperation with the democratic

countries, quite intelligible. But despite the iron control exercised by the Soviet government over all their organs of publicity, the abandonment of the principles which again and again had been invoked by them in seeking popular support had undoubtedly put to a severe test the confidence of their people in the sincerity of their professions of humanitarianism.

The policy pursued by Stalin after his rise to power, by which the cause of communism has been identified with the interests of a single state, produced this *impasse*. At first communism was in the nature of a gospel that appealed to multitudes who wished to end human oppression. It knew no national barriers and triumphantly proclaimed the approaching end of all states. Its leaders eagerly courted the sympathy of the labor movements and of the intellectuals everywhere on behalf of a cause that was world-wide in its appeal. But with the passage of time such support was more and more enlisted by the Third International on behalf of the Soviet state and of its new ruling class. The profession of solicitude for the oppressed in all lands had been, for many years, successfully combined with the pursuit of a foreign policy that was becoming more and more narrowly national. Public opinion in the Soviet Union had no alternative but to acquiesce in the recent violation of principles which the people had been taught to believe were basic. But a world-wide movement of social regeneration can scarcely rest solely on coercion. After all, the use of force and deception, which have ever played their role in the pursuit of political ends, are subject to severe limitations. Force reaches only so far as the national frontier, and the devious devices of conspiracy and intrigue are, after all, merely substitutes for force and must at length be unmasked. The policy of the Soviet Union under Stalin has been directed toward the maintenance of his own power, the promotion of national interests, and the raising of Soviet prestige abroad. But the cause of communism tied to those national interests has suffered from the disavowal of some of its most cherished principles, a renunciation made for political reasons.

Measures of coercion found in the Soviet Union being inop-

erative abroad, those who were formerly sympathetic with the cause of communism stood appalled at what seemed to them a betrayal of its first principles. The Soviet Union, in exchange for certain strategic and political advantages, forfeited the support of many of its former well-wishers abroad.

The immediate effect of the Nazi-Soviet pact was the disintegration of the various "popular fronts" in Europe and the United States. In France the government of M. Daladier dissolved the Communist party and suppressed its press and subsidiary organizations. In the United States the Dies Committee on un-American Activities received a new lease of life and with a fine impartiality subjected the activities and organization of the Nazi Bund and the Communist Front to a most searching investigation. The effect was to brand both movements as groups that sought to promote the interests of the Nazis or of the Soviet Union, which the state was compelled in its own interests to bring within bounds. Thousands of "fellow-travellers" suffered profound disillusionment and the Communist party in America passed into eclipse.

CULTURAL LIFE

THE STORY of Russia has been told thus far with little reference to the actors—men and women—in the narrative and the human qualities that they have displayed. Their lives have been perhaps buried in oblivion, but much has been enshrined in their literature and art and thus transmitted to after ages. In forming an appreciation of Russian civilization it is imperative that we turn to the art and the ideals that have there taken shape. These are the key to much that has happened in their history.

EARLY LITERATURE

Literature came to the eastern Slavs in the wake of Christianity. Perhaps the unique event in their literary history was the adoption of the language of the Macedonian Slavs for transmitting to them the Scriptures and other ecclesiastical literature. Tradition ascribes this to Cyril (sometimes known as Constantine) and his brother Methodius, born in the city of Salonika, who were sent by the Emperor Michael as apostles to the Slavs during the course of the tenth century. The alphabet which they improvised for the transliteration of Slavic sounds gave way to a new alphabet based on Greek uncial script of the ninth century, but the early Balkan dialect they used became the ecclesiastical and literary language of the eastern Slavs. This circumstance was destined to have far-reaching results. In the first place, it gave all the east and south Slavs a common literary heritage and tended to provide them with a common written language. But as a necessary consequence, it obviated the necessity to adopt Greek as a

vehicle for literary expression. This meant that few of the works of even the purely ecclesiastical of the Byzantine writers were translated into either the Church Slavonic or the vernacular; but what is of more significance, it also prevented the spread of Greek culture or the revival of the ancient learning. What that meant to Russia is seen by a comparison with western Europe. It can hardly be conceived what western culture would have been had it not been for the widespread use of Latin in the instruction of the people, which not only gave them access to the literature of the ancient world but also went far to prepare the way for the revival of learning in the fifteenth century.

Sprung thus out of the practical needs of the missionary compelled to cast his liturgies, his sermons, and his biblical stories in a medium suitable for the people, the new literary language had no native tradition behind it. What wealth it had was borrowed from the jejune Byzantine chronicles and ecclesiastical literature at the lowest point of their development. The new literature, though based on Greek models, quickly established its own tradition and that a very narrow one. The first compositions of note were the chronicles, the earliest of which was begun in the Pechersky crypt at Kiev in the tenth century, was continued by several hands, and saw the light of day for the first time at the beginning of the twelfth century. It was carried on by successive continuators. As new centers of learning and of culture were established, local chronicles were begun, a start usually being made by lifting the earliest portions of this Kievan chronicle and using it as a basis for their own chronicles superimposed on the old one. Thus from the original grew a whole series of annals whose volume continued to increase till towards the end of the Mongol period, when, after a long process of disintegration, Russ began once more to acquire unity under the aegis of Moscow. While this early literature, clothed in biblical and archaic language, had a certain vigor and dignity, it does not transcend the circumstances of the time. It more often reflects merely the prej-

udices of the monkish writers or recites the glories of the princely house under whose protection it was composed.

The unique exception to this uniform ecclesiastical literature of the early Kievan period is the *Tale of the Armament of Igor*. This poem, probably a product of the twelfth century, recounts a raid of Prince Igor Svyatoslavich of Novgorod-Syeveriskii against the Polovtsi in 1185. It is almost entirely secular and, in addition, has many references to the old pagan religion which have led some critics to believe that it is the sole survivor of a vast popular literature.

Other representatives of this popular literature that have come down to us are folk songs of various kinds that have, since the eighteenth century, been assiduously collected by scholars. Many of these are the *byliny* of the Kievan, of the Novgorod, and of the Vladimir cycles, and enshrine a good deal of Kievan and early Muscovite tradition. Apart from these examples, the Kievan and Mongol periods were meager in literary output. Not till the isolation of Russia began to break down in the fifteenth century do we get a revival of literary production.

The restless urge that swept over Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries did not leave Russia quite untouched, but the direction it took was entirely different from that taken in the west. Russia had come into contact with Byzantium exactly at the time of greatest cultural poverty. Its literature at this period was narrowly ecclesiastical. This original bent gave the peculiar character to the writings of subsequent ages, and despite the fact that many of the early metropolitans were Greeks and the native church remained for long under Greek tutelage, the tendency of the church and of the national cultural life was to deepen and strengthen these characteristics. With the establishment of Muscovite hegemony coming shortly after the capture of Constantinople by the Turks, the need of establishing contacts with Europe became more pressing. The tangled thread of political maneuvers by which the Byzantine Empire, menaced by destruction by the Turks, sought to

avert that fate, set in motion events destined to have great significance for Russia. First was the Œcumenical Council of Florence (1439), which decreed the union of the two churches, but whose work broke against the invincible antipathy of the Russian people to everything western. The fall of Constantinople in 1453 and the marriage of Ivan III to Sophia Paleolog also helped to break down the isolation of Muscovite Russia. The revival of diplomatic relations with the west went far to open up Russia to foreign influences. Scholars from Constantinople and Mount Athos journeyed to the west or found their way to the court of the Tsar of Muscovy, bringing with them a flood of new ideas. But the secular and humanistic seeds of the Renaissance could not germinate on Russian soil. Even Maxim, the Greek who had been educated on Mount Athos and had been at Florence during the stirring times of Savonarola, when invited to Russia during the time of Vasilii III brought with him not humanism, but asceticism. His real aim was to rid the church from the false traditions which had sprung up in it. The impetus towards learning that came with this movement lost itself in ecclesiastical sands and could not produce any genuine literary results. But there were other ways in which the movement bore fruit. By the importation of Italian artists and craftsmen, a new era was begun in art and the amenities of life hitherto undreamed of. Indeed, all through the sixteenth century a constantly growing circle of cultural contacts with western Europe gave a great stimulus to indigenous art.

WESTERN INFLUENCES

But it was the seventeenth century that finally broke down the old Muscovite isolation. Under the early Romanovs, Europe literally knocked at every one of Russia's doors. Though Russia had now acquired her own patriarch, and thus her spiritual independence, many of her ecclesiastical ties were with Constantinople and the eastern world. But now it was from the west that the new pulses of life were felt. Lithuania had been finally united with Poland, and with the counter-

reformation began a tide of Catholic and scholastic cultural influences. Kiev became a strong center of this movement, and many of the Ukrainian nobility and churchmen were filled with the spirit of western learning. This meant inevitably that such men were, whatever their professions, suspected of heretical leanings. Nevertheless, not only did scholastic learning make great progress at Kiev but the need to raise the level of education and erudition forced Moscow to invite many of the Kievan clerics to the capital.

To these two vitalizing streams a third was added, that from Protestant Europe. Accident had a good deal to do with this. During the Livonian War Ivan IV captured numbers of prisoners from the Baltic cities. These were either invited or impressed into his service—the first Germans found in the armies and among the officials of the Muscovite tsar. During the Time of Troubles, foreign influence grew apace. The Thirty Years' War turned adrift thousands of men from the camps of the Elector Palatine, Tilley and Wallenstein, and Gustavus Adolphus. Finally the Civil War in England added its not inconsiderable quota. Mannstein, writing in the eighteenth century, attests the fact that after the collapse of the royal cause in the Civil War, three thousand Scots found their way to Russia. And the annals of the country during the next century were filled with Bruces, Gordons, Keiths, and Douglasses. There came into existence the famous German Quarter of Moscow where Peter the Great learned so many of the lessons that started him out on the road to reform. But Russian society distrusted Protestant Europe, and it was with the greatest difficulty that these people secured the right to their own form of religious worship. Though barely tolerated and sometimes persecuted, this foreign community, filled with something of the ardor of the Protestant Reformation and having ties with the mercantile life of the British Isles and the Baltic, was the intermediary through which the Muscovite world drew on the practical, commercial, and industrial world of western Europe for its technique and its science.

EFFECTS OF THE FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT

While Peter's mind ranged far and wide over the field of knowledge, he was too absorbed in practical and pressing needs to spend much time on problems that lay more remote or that promised merely to raise the cultural level of the country. Nevertheless Peter had almost no sympathy with the barren Muscovite tradition of ecclesiastical learning, and throughout his life he endeavored to turn men's minds into more practical channels. But the other was not entirely neglected. He took steps that led to the founding of the Academy of Sciences, carried on long correspondence with Leibniz, and set on foot far-reaching schemes of exploration and research. It is not too much to say that it was largely thanks to Peter's efforts that Russia's vast Asiatic possessions were explored and that the way was opened across the Pacific to America. Hardly can one touch a single phase of Russian life in which the influence of Peter cannot be felt.

It remained for the century that followed Peter to lay the foundation of a real Russian literature. Peter had led the way. Under his successors the trails he had blazed were now trod with confidence. But much of the early literature that came out of this cultural movement was pedantic and bore traces of the schoolroom. Peter had modernized the Russian language by discarding old forms and simplifying the alphabet, but it was still stiff and awkward. The first literary products in the new medium were for the most part translations and adaptations of western models. Such were the poems and prose works of Lomonosov and the odes and plays of Sumarokov. Most of these works were written under the now rising influence of the French court, which had become the pattern for most of western Christendom in art and literature.

HISTORIOGRAPHY

One field in which new ground was broken was that of history. Russia had had no historian in the true sense of the word. With the rise of Moscow the local chronicle declined

and native talent was not adequate to the task of improvising a substitute. This came in from Poland, where cultural influences of the Renaissance were making themselves felt. The Polish chronographs wove into Russian tradition legends borrowed from, or modeled on, classical antiquity. The result was the *Stepennaya Kniga*, or Book of Degrees, published in the first half of the sixteenth century and composed at the court of the metropolitan Macarius. About the first serious history attempted was by Kotoshikhin, in the seventeenth century, who wrote an account of the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich. But the older interpretation of Russian history held the field still, as we see from the *Synopsis* which appeared in 1674, the *Epitome of Russian History* of Mankievich (1711), and the *Barkhatnaya Kniga* (Velvet Book) published during the regency of the Tsarevna Sophia (1682-1689). Most of these quasi-historical works were in reality inspired by political motives. In most cases the various dynasties sought to bolster up their positions by appealing to the antiquity of their origin, and this same tendency ran to great lengths in the later part of this period when noble genealogies were bestowed by court heralds on various noble families as a mark of favor.

In this as in other fields, Peter made a complete break with the past. His friendship and correspondence with Leibniz left him cold to this pseudo-learning, and he proposed to make a fresh start in historical study. This policy did not come to fruition under Peter, but he brought German scholars to Russia to organize Russian studies. Bayer, a native of Königsberg, was the first of these; in 1726 appeared his first book, *De Variagis* (On the Varangians), in which he went back to the early Russian chronicles for his accounts of Russian history. His work was carried on by Müller, whose *Sammlung russischer Geschichte* marked an epoch. It contains in Volume III the first account of the history of Siberia.

The movement thus set in motion was continued by other hands. Schlözer, a graduate of Wittenberg and Göttingen, was invited to Russia by Müller and prepared for publication the first edition of the chronicle, which he published under the

title *Nestor*. Thus was launched the controversy regarding the Varangians which was destined to last down through the nineteenth century. But towards the end of the eighteenth century, native Russians who had gone to school to the Germans were now in a position to take up the thread of Russian history. And so we have Tatishchev, a brilliant member of the reforming circle in the service of Peter the Great. Tatishchev's was the first serious attempt to write a history of Russia, followed by Tredyakovskii, a poet as well as a historian, and Boltin. These men challenged the views of the Germans as to the origins of the Varangians.

During the eighteenth century, the hitherto almost exclusive German influence of the court gave way under Elizabeth to the French enlightenment. But while French fashions in clothes, foods, and pleasures were introduced under Elizabeth, it was not till the time of Catherine that we find French intellectual influences predominating. Catherine herself was a brilliant writer, composing a number of comedies and tragedies in addition to conducting a satirical journal. But it was the writers whom she patronized that made the chief contributions—Shcherbatov, who wrote a *History of Russia* using native sources and giving a philosophical interpretation; Von Vizin, the author of a number of comedies and editor of one of Catherine's satirical journals; Radishchev, who wrote *A Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow*; and Derzhavin, the poet. Most of these show the influence of French writers.

Up to the time of the French Revolution, the Russian government seemed to be in the vanguard of progress; that is, the state, in its efforts to introduce western ideas and western science in order to increase the wealth of the people and the power of the government, actually was more progressive than the people. But towards the end of the reign of Catherine, the state began to pull back, to feel apparently that it had moved too fast, and to avail itself of its coercive power in restraining its subjects. Thus arose the paradox, that the state which in Peter's time had inaugurated a revolution now turned reactionary and sought to put a brake on progress. This anomaly

appears constantly throughout the nineteenth century. Alexander, who above all had been brought up in a liberal atmosphere and imbued with many of the ideas of the enlightenment and of the French Revolution, felt himself constrained to try to check the very movements which the state itself had called into life.

One of the greatest literary figures of the reign of Alexander was Karamzin, who was possessed of many attainments but whose chief claim to distinction was the writing of the *History of the Russian State* in eleven volumes, a work of fundamental importance in Russian literature. Apart from its claim to notice as a history, Karamzin broke new ground in writing one of the first works in modern Russian prose. The Russian literary language had continued to be the Church Slavonic, and even the efforts of Peter to free Russia from this literary tyranny and his reform of the alphabet were only partly successful. The language of the eighteenth century remained stiff, archaic, and unnatural. Most literary Russians preferred to write in French. But Karamzin molded the awkward, harsh vernacular to his purposes and, by adopting either English or French as his models, brought Russian into line with the languages of modern Europe.

THE DECEMBRISTS AND THEIR INFLUENCE

Possibly the greatest event in the intellectual development of Russia in the nineteenth century was the Decembrist conspiracy. Down to the end of the eighteenth century Russian society (that is, the aristocracy) tended to be conservative, to cling to its privileges and its property. But with Catherine, the influences of the enlightenment reached their height. The first signs of social unrest and intellectual ferment were the Freemasons, whose organizations spread to Russia. Membership became so numerous and active that the movement was finally banned. Under Paul restriction and censorship became even more general. Russians were forbidden to travel abroad, and the importation of foreign literature was checked. But under Alexander the floodgates were once more opened. For

one thing, the Russian armies fought abroad from Austerlitz to Waterloo, and even the common soldier could not help absorbing disturbing ideas. Among the army officers the contacts with western Europe stirred a powerful ferment, and thus there came into existence a movement of active protest which culminated in the Decembrist rising. Russian society was profoundly affected; the army, the nobility, and the world of the two capitals were caught in the meshes of this plot. Pushkin's brother was one of the conspirators; Pushkin himself was in touch with them; Alexander Turgenev, the writer, happened to be abroad when the revolt broke out but for his connections with it was kept in exile for many years. The vindictiveness of Nicholas I and the rigor with which the movement was suppressed paralyzed for a time the intellectual life of Russia, and the age of Nicholas is essentially an age of reaction.

The thirty years of the reign of Nicholas I were by no means unfruitful. But while the Emperor was determined that the country should play a leading role in European affairs, he failed to ensure its internal development. His conception of his position as autocrat was not to be reconciled with the free and spontaneous intellectual activity of his people. Education became a means of instilling discipline. The press was strongly censored, and this at a time when contact with the west had given birth to new and invigorating forces. With these Nicholas had to reckon as he had had to reckon with the Decembrists. The less important figures were brought to heel by the censor; the greater by Nicholas himself, who exercised his censorship in person, as in the case of Pushkin and Shevchenko (the Ukrainian national poet), both of whom were closely watched by Nicholas' instructions and had to submit their productions direct to the Emperor.

BEGINNINGS OF INTELLECTUAL REVOLT

It was a curious paradox that Nicholas himself was the occasion of launching the great intellectual progress of the nineteenth century. When the universities were reorganized between 1828 and 1835, difficulty was found in staffing them

with native instructors, so it was decided to encourage students to travel and study abroad to prepare themselves for these and other positions. These students, most of whom went to Germany, were brought under the influence of the new German philosophy then the vogue in the universities of that country, so that they returned brimming over with the ideas they had drawn from Hegel, Schelling, Fichte, and others. These transplanted philosophies soon struck their roots deep in Russian soil. Hegel and Schelling both had occupied themselves with the philosophy of history. It was natural that their influence in Russia was felt first in historical studies. The chief subjects of interest were the growth of European and of Russian culture, and particularly the development of the church.

The writers who participated in this movement took sides on various questions of current interest, such as the respective merits of the modern world as compared with antiquity, romanticism versus classicism. These intellectual growing pains for the most part passed off without leaving any traces. But there was one exception. The writers eventually split into opposing camps—the Slavophiles and the Westerners. The view of the former was that Slavdom constituted a world by itself and that its institutions and culture must perforce be measured by its own and not by alien standards; and that by any such test, Slavic culture was superior to western. The Westerners, on the other hand, believed that Russia was destined to share the culture of the rest of Europe; that, being by this criterion a backward nation, she must put herself abreast of the modern world in order to share to the full its intellectual and artistic life.

It is to be noted as a mark of the new age that, in general, literature begins to develop a definite attitude towards political problems. It is true that a few writers seemed to be little concerned with the world around them, and either idealized or satirized without special regard to the political implications of what they wrote. Such writers were Pushkin, Lermontov (of the romantic school), and Gogol of the realistic school. The belletrist tradition continued through the nineteenth century

and produced some notable writers—Turgenev, Dostoyevskii, Count Alexei Tolstoi, Nekrasov, Chekhov; perhaps even Count Leo Tolstoi should be included among them. But in general, most of the writers during the reign of Nicholas took a stand on one or the other side—first in the controversy of the Slavophiles and the Westerners; later, many came out for some definite political program.

The economic changes in Russia and the new vistas in literature and philosophy opened to the youth had lured them away from the careers of service for which the higher education was supposed to train them. To tell the truth, the ideal of education which came in with Catherine was not without its dangers, for it fostered the growth of a dissatisfied intellectual class. The opening of the universities to all had accentuated this tendency despite the mental strait-jacket imposed on them by Nicholas. But if studies were forbidden or frowned on, there were ways in which the students could taste the forbidden fruit. Such were the groups or circles of congenial persons who met in one another's homes for the study of special social, political, or economic problems of the day. The results of their discussions found expression readily in the periodical literature that was blossoming in the capitals, for the writers soon learned to disguise their thoughts or opinions in language harmless enough to pass the censor, while to the initiated the real meaning would be read between the lines.

THE SLAVOPHILES

The Slavophiles were led by Kireevskii, and their cause was taken up by Khomyakov and the Aksakov brothers. For the Westerners we have the literary critic Byelinskii, whose brief career spans the forties. Then came Herzen, whose periodical *KoloKol*, published in exile, was a clarion call to those who would put an end to the regime of Nicholas; and Ogarev, who like Herzen insisted on the European origin of Russian culture. All of these writers, however, were fully conscious of the insistent problems that confronted Russia, and particularly the

peasant question. At this time social reform was in the air, and it was hardly possible for anyone to remain neutral.

THE PERIOD OF THE GREAT REFORMS

With the Crimean war and the accession of Alexander II, the intellectual movement entered on a new phase. The controversy of Slavophil versus Westerner died down. Some of the problems had received a practical answer, though a partial one. But the Polish revolt and attempts on the life of Alexander precipitated a fresh crisis. The immediate effect of reaction was that the state decided on the recall of Russian students from abroad. Under the influence of Bakunin, these returning students pledged themselves to go "*v narod*" (to the people) with their revolutionary doctrines. This was the so-called *narodniki* movement which endeavored to rouse the people to a sense of their own misery and win them over to a program of opposition to the old order. But the movement had no practical results to offer. The peasants were in no mood to listen to these agitators—the white-handed gentry—from the cities. Defeated in this program of agitation, the latter turned to the more violent methods of the "Will of the People," a terrorist organization that developed out of this group. The "Will of the People" dominated the field till the 'eighties, when it was repressed, to be in turn superseded by the new Marxian philosophy. Ultimately in the bosom of Marxism there grew up the Social Democratic Party while the Social Revolutionary Party, organized at the beginning of the century, carried on the tradition of the *Narodniki* and the "Will of the People."

COUNT LEO TOLSTOI

The great literary figure at the turn of the century was Count Leo Tolstoi, whose estate *Yasnaya Polyana* in the neighborhood of Tula was a great rendezvous for literary visitors attracted from abroad by Tolstoi's fame. Tolstoi was a wealthy landowner. He had served in the army during the Crimean

War at the siege of Sevastopol. After the war he retired to his estates, the exploitation of which he supervised while, at the same time, he gave himself up to writing. He early produced a number of novels whose publication brought him world-fame. After 1870 he went through a spiritual crisis which resulted in his ideas becoming strongly tinged with religion of a unique character. Tolstoi's views on himself, on life, and on society were profoundly modified. He affected the costume and ways of the peasant, though without denying himself contact with the world of polite society.

He formulated his ethical views in a system whose cornerstone was the words of Christ in Matthew, v, 39, "I say unto you that ye resist not evil." The most positive precept of his new code was the injunction, "Love all men alike, making no distinction of races and peoples; recognize neither kings nor kingdoms." While Tolstoi became strongly preoccupied with religious questions, his views on these matters did not coincide with those of the church. He rejected the idea of personal immortality and denied also the efficacy of the church as guide and supreme arbiter in man's religious life.

Tolstoi's views on nationality were a challenge to the tsarist state, and his rejection of the authority of the Orthodox church brought him into conflict with that body, which finally excommunicated him in 1901. The state, owing to his worldwide reputation, hesitated to enter the lists against him. While Tolstoi can hardly be called a revolutionary, he was a constant thorn in the side of church and state.

On the whole the literary output of Russia during the course of the past one hundred years has been almost unrivalled. Its greatest figure in poetry was Pushkin, who with his circle was under the influence of the English romantic poets. Russia had soon passed over into realism, in which the outstanding figure was Gogol. Prose was the medium of the newer writers. Gradually the novel superseded all other literary forms, though the drama still had its votaries. Its later form, which some call naturalism, as exemplified by Dostoyevskii and Tolstoi, dominated the field at the end of the century.

MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORIANS

Among influential writers of history in Russia were Shcherbatov, Tatishchev, Boltin, in the eighteenth century, and Karamzin in the nineteenth. Much of their energy was expended on the discussion as to the racial origin of the Varangian conquerors of early Russia, some asserting their Norse origin, others claiming that they were Baltic Slavs or had other racial affinities. The controversy had little scholarly value until the Academy of Science published the critical edition of the Chronicle, beginning with 1846. Contributions to the polemics were made by the Arabists, Fraehn and Harkavy. Perhaps the most significant works in this field were Gedeonov in *Varyagi i Rus*, who took the anti-Normanist side, and Vasil'evskii for the Normanists. The advantage remained with the Normanists, that is, those who held to the Norse origin. This controversy was merely a phase of the Slavophil-Westerner controversy.

Another historical writer of importance was S. M. Solov'ev, whose *History of Russia* in twenty-nine volumes was completed in 1879. It is easily the most monumental work on Russian history ever published. It is packed with facts and contains many documents, owing rather to the author's fear of the censorship than to Solov'ev's lack of the interpretative faculty. Solov'ev claimed that from the time of Ivan the Terrible, Russia had been striving towards union with Europe, an interpretation which ranks him among the Westerners. Other historians are Pogodin and Polevoi (both Slavophiles), Zabyelin, Bestuzhev-Riumin, and Ilovaiskii, and at the beginning of the century, Pavlov-Silvanskii, who made a study of Russian feudalism and of the Russian serving nobility. Perhaps the most significant figure for the twentieth century was V. I. Klyuchevskii, a pupil of Solov'ev whose best-known work, *Kurs Russkoi Istorii*, has been translated into English as *The History of Russia*. It is a masterly outline of the internal development of the Russian people and state, and ignores diplomatic and military history. Sergei Platonov has also written, among other things, a scholarly history of the Time of Troubles. Kareyev is a historian of

western Europe rather than Russia, but has written on Russian feudalism. Perhaps it would not be unfitting to make mention of Sir Paul Vinogradov, at one time a professor at the University of Moscow, who found himself out of sympathy with the reactionary academic policy of the tsarist regime and, in consequence, left the country. He found a haven at Oxford, where his studies in medieval history and law are too well known to require specific mention.

POST-REVOLUTIONARY LITERATURE

After the Great War and the Revolution, Marxian philosophy and history were the vogue at Moscow. At first conformity was not enforced too rigidly, though non-Marxians, and non-Communists, were at a definite disadvantage. But with the triumph of Stalin and the inauguration of the Five Year Plan, a thoroughgoing effort was made to liquidate all bourgeois scientists and scholars. This applied to many left over from the old tsarist regime and also to many others who had come under the official ban. Censorship was drawn tighter and tighter. Marxian doctrines and party lines were defined and redefined, and those who did not conform strictly became anathema. The principal historian of the new regime was Michael Pokrovskii, who for long was the mouthpiece of the government on matters of historical scholarship. But his orthodoxy was at last called in question and he fell from favor. The historian had not only to be Marxian and Communist; he must also conform to the party line, a task that is fraught with considerable difficulty and danger in view of the frequency with which the Communist party has, within the past few years, reversed its stand on controversial issues.

Art and literature were also required to conform. In fact both of these occupy definite places in the party program of propaganda. For long the *RAPP*, the society of Marxist writers, formed a sort of closed corporation for the literary world. But *RAPP* itself came under the ban and was dissolved; there is now no general society but several organizations for those engaged in writing. But as Max Eastman has made

clear from his *Artists in Uniform*, the Soviet conception in art and literature is that the writer and the artist must subordinate his art and his literature to the general program of the state.

Literary production does not, of course, exhaust the cultural life of any people, least of all the Russian. Their progress from the paganism and primitive barbarism of pre-Christian days to the present stage has been infinitely slow and has encountered disheartening obstacles. For centuries all the expressive arts were devoted to the cause of the church. The ecclesiastical regime had almost a monopoly of them. Secular culture there was none. This tendency was shared with western Europe. But in the west there were forces to offset this, and these led to the rise of medieval scholasticism and later the Italian renaissance of the fifteenth century. But circumstances closed Russia against these influences. Maxim Grec, who visited Florence at the time of Savonarola and later headed a religious revival in Russia, was an ascetic who sought to purify church ritual rather than to introduce reforms. Not till the time of Alexei were there signs of an intellectual ferment, this time stimulated by contact with the west. But this movement took a peculiar character and, instead of reform, produced the reactionary sectarianism of the *raskol* (schism) that plagued the Orthodox Church. Real progress measured in the western sense only began with Peter the Great.

CENSORSHIP

In pre-Petrine Russia, questions that agitated society were altogether religious. The state and the church had been so closely identified and each had so served the purposes of the other that public issues that arose took on an ecclesiastical color. Political controversies eventually resolved themselves into claims to orthodoxy and charges of heterodoxy, beneath which it was not difficult to see secular issues lurking. The ecclesiastical anathema was the readiest means of enforcing conformity though at times the state supplemented these with its own. These expedients, however, broke down in the face of the great schism of the seventeenth century when Russia

was rent from top to bottom with heresy and the severest measures were used in the effort to repress it. Hitherto the state had been able to keep within limits the modest intellectual forces of the age. Indeed, in the time of Alexei, as under Peter, it was the government that forced an unwilling people along the road of reform and disturbed their medieval torpor with foreign innovations in dress and thought.

During the course of the eighteenth century the role of government and people was gradually reversed. A people now stirred to its depths by the dangerous ideas of western Europe began to strain at its bonds. The factor that produced this new orientation was undoubtedly the introduction of printing and the spread of literacy that attended it. Printing had been introduced into Moscow as early as the reign of Ivan IV but had only begun to make substantial progress in the seventeenth century. Under Peter there was a definite surge forward, and writers and literature became a force to be reckoned with.

There seems to have been a persistent streak of anarchy in the Russian nature that at critical times plunged the country into chaos. Such had been the Time of Troubles; such was the revolt of Sten'ka Razin; and this trait was greatly accentuated by the great schism. When the enlightenment and the disturbing ideas of western Europe were added to the ferment, it was inevitable that the state should seek to put a curb on new ideas. Peter had sent the sons of his serving people abroad to study; he had imported and caused the translation of foreign scientific and technical books. This contact with alien peoples and novel ideas stirred the depths of Russian lethargy. But it was under Elizabeth and Catherine that there began the importation of the dangerous literature of the French enlightenment. Under Peter the only attempt at censorship was an *ukaz* requiring that ecclesiastical books should be passed by the Holy Synod before being printed. Historical, scientific, literary books, in fact anything of a secular character was exempt from their scrutiny. There was at first remarkable freedom in their production. Books as such did not escape censorship, but as a rule this was done by administrative order. In the

case of learned works the Academy of Science was consulted.

It is difficult to describe in simple language the situation that developed under Catherine. The knowledge of current literature displayed by the Empress was remarkable even for that remarkable age. At the beginning of her reign she showed herself determined on reform, and the summoning of the famous Commission of 1767 attests the sincerity of her motives. But she quickly became disillusioned and disappointed, and the following year the sessions of that body were suspended in view of the exigencies created by the war with Turkey.

In a general way Catherine was far in advance of her age, so that at least at the beginning of her reign it was she who urged the country forward. But the Pugachev rising disclosed to her the dangerous forces that could be unleashed at a moment's notice. The French revolution, while she sympathized with it, gave her further pause. These warnings put her on her guard and led her to change her views on the free expression of opinions.

In 1790 the appearance of Radishchev's *Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow* brought a crisis in relations of court and literature. Radishchev was sentenced to death for having substituted pages for those excluded by the censor, though the sentence was commuted. But the outbreak of the French revolution made the government wary. Not only were the precautions of the censorship redoubled but actually frontier posts were set up to prevent the importation of literature from abroad (which meant from France, whose government was spreading revolutionary literature). It was but natural that the Emperor Paul, whose whole nature was antagonistic to the revolution, should have redoubled precautions against the infiltration of subversive propaganda and have prevented Russian nobles from travelling abroad.

Under Alexander there was a great increase of interest in education and scholarship. Printing had become an industry like any other. Towards the close of Catherine's reign it was proposed that books might be freely published, except ecclesiastical books and those of learned societies (which were to be

censored by themselves). Ordinary books were to be printed only with the consent of the police save in the provinces, where the governor could call on school authorities to undertake this duty. Thus the so-called precautionary censorship came into existence. This, however, did not prevent the government from interfering and stopping the sale of a book or a periodical, or even of confiscating all existing copies of it.

The first legislation with regard to censorship was that of 1804. The law was simple and admirably worded and was phrased to indicate the character of the sentiments which, if expressed, would expose the editor to having his publication suppressed. Censorship was a function of the Ministry of Public Instruction (ecclesiastical books, scientific periodicals and publications, and foreign publications were excluded). The Minister of the Interior was required to see that books were not sold without the necessary authority, a provision which gave the latter ministry a fulcrum in the matter of censorship.

Censorship of books and periodicals during Alexander's time followed the political see-saw of that reign. In 1811, when the ministries were reorganized, there was a special department of police which was charged, along with other duties, with oversight of the sale of books as well as control over the production of plays and operas. The joint consent of both the Minister of Police and of the Minister of Public Instruction was required for the opening of a publishing house. A committee was set up (with several sub-committees) under the Minister of Police actually to do the work of censoring. But even their approval could not always guarantee the immunity of a book from seizure and destruction by the commander-in-chief of the garrison of the capital. Indeed, a practice grew up whereby magazine articles that had any reference to matters within the cognizance of a department of the government had to be submitted to that department for approval before being published.

It was but natural that the reactionary tendencies that became apparent during the latter years of the reign of Alexander and the beginning of that of Nicholas should be reflected in the

censorship of that period. The Decembrist rising led to a complete reorganization of the system. Anyone wishing to begin publication of a periodical had to secure permission to do so from the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who appointed committees in the capital and in each of the university cities. In addition there were a whole series of committees of censors for different subjects. Some responsibility was laid on the author in addition to the responsibility borne by the censors themselves. The government departments were more and more protected against the publication of anything that might reflect on them. But in view of the rapid material progress of the country, the increasing literacy and other contacts with the outer world, the publishing business expanded its scope and activity to an unheard of degree. Especially was this true in the field of periodicals, whose number grew by leaps and bounds. In a general way the system of censorship which came into existence in 1828 was conceived on somewhat broad lines. It was not entirely reactionary. Its aim was to guide and direct literary production into the channels which would best serve the state, and promote enlightenment and the general welfare. But beyond these broad generalities there was almost nothing to guide the censors. Each department of the state looked to the censors to guard their prerogatives and prestige, and individuals likewise, while, of course, the autocracy was also to be shielded from criticism. The multitude of interests that sought protection from the flood of publicity that was inundating the country led to a multiplication of the officials and branches of the censorship and to conflict and contradiction of rulings, which depended for the most part on the caprice of the authorities. The result was that the public and the writers were merely exasperated and antagonized by the apparent chaos without any guiding principle.

With the accession of Alexander II the system of censorship was due for a radical overhauling. The first change came in December 1855, when the central committee on censorship was suppressed, leaving, however, the subordinate authorities still

functioning. For three years the press enjoyed almost unfettered liberty, but control was tightened up once more in 1859. At the time of emancipation in 1861, moves were made for relaxing it but, with the occurrence of untoward incidents, there was a return to the old order. It was not till 1865, after the courts had been reorganized, that the whole machinery of censorship was subjected to a radical reconstruction. On the 6th of April was published a decree providing that all publications were, as formerly, to be placed officially under the "precautionary censorship"—that is, they could be required to submit everything they published beforehand to the censors. However, publishers of periodicals and newspapers could be released from this requirement on the understanding that they took full responsibility for what appeared in their publications and, in case they published anything contrary to the public interest, they would be summoned and tried before special courts.

THE RISE OF A REVOLUTIONARY LITERATURE

The intellectual development of the Russian people took a decisive turn during the reign of Nicholas I. The influences of French rationalism and of the Freemasons had ceased with the outbreak on the Senate Square on December 14, 1825. The new board of censors was on the alert for signs of their reappearance in Russia or in the kingdom of Poland. But though signs of any overt revolt were lacking, the way was being prepared for a new and no less momentous change. Repressive measures adopted towards the universities by the central government were not effective in checking development; many of the upper classes turned to other means for the education of their sons. Despite the government's policy there came into existence in both capitals during this period groups of young men of the leisured class who had acquired in some way the new liberal education which had begun under Catherine, and who were absorbed with current political and philosophical problems. Many of these men conducted periodicals or contributed to them. The growing wealth and leisure of the upper

classes constantly swelled the number of those who found their pleasure and relaxation in cultural things. In addition to the theater and the opera, there was the periodical literature which created the nearest approach to what might be called public opinion. Such public opinion could not ignore nor defy the authorities and was forced to keep within bounds of the censorship. But gradually acquiring boldness and experience, the writers managed to evade the censors and broaden the scope of their public appeal. It is out of these groups that the modern revolutionary movement in Russia took its rise.

Most of these writers drew their inspiration from the German philosophy of the early nineteenth century and later were to be influenced by Comte, Buckle, and Marx. They were, however, at first merely interested in the discussion of Hegel, of Schelling, and of Feuerbach, and in applying the new philosophy of history to Russia. Almost of necessity they were compelled to ponder on the role which Russia was to play in the affairs of Europe. The earliest writer of this movement was Chadaev (1794-1856), whose work *Philosophical Writing* was published in 1836. But this intellectual activity quickly took an unusual turn with the appearance of Kireevskii, Aksakov, and Khomyakov, who, taking their departure from orthodoxy, developed the idea that Russia differed from Europe in its cultural life, which was destined to continue to remain remote. The reply to this Slavophil philosophy was given by Byelinskii (1811-1848), the literary critic whose works were frequently polemical discussions of the philosophical questions of the day and their application to Russian society. He was but nominally a literary critic. His successor was Alexander Herzen, whose literary activity had drawn on him the unwelcome attentions of Uvarov, the Minister of the Interior, and compelled him to leave Russia in 1847 to found a radical press abroad for the propagation of a new gospel, the review, *Polyarnaya Zvezda* (Northern Star), 1855-1867, and the *Koloķol* (Bell). Herzen was much influenced by French socialist writers. Both Byelinskii and Herzen are classified as Westerners in contrast to the Slavophil school. Herzen was fol-

lowed by Bakunin, the first of the Russian anarchists who went abroad in 1840 to study in Germany. During the *annus mirabilis* of 1848 he took part in the rising in Vienna, was taken prisoner, and was handed over to the Russian government, which sentenced him to exile in Siberia. Bakunin later escaped, and became a professional revolutionist and the chief rival of Marx in his International Society of Workingmen.

The Crimean War and the death of Nicholas I closed this era of Russian life and opened an entirely new one. The reforms of Alexander II were partly an answer to the insistent demands of these writers and publicists of the period of Nicholas; in part they were a recognition of the fact that Russia was hopelessly behind western Europe and that, if she wished merely to hold her own, she must take over Europe's social and political structure. The halting steps which Alexander took along the path of progress were probably tacitly inspired by the political and economic doctrines which emanated from England during the early nineteenth century and were best represented there by the Manchester school. But the Russian public was not thus to be appeased by what it termed half-measures, nor did such reforms meet the economic needs of the time. The resultant discontent drove Alexander into the arms of the bureaucrats and the reactionaries. As a challenge to this reaction, there thus came into existence during the 'sixties the movement to which the term *nihilism* was applied. It ultimately gave birth to the terrorist groups of the 'seventies who finally brought about the death of Alexander II. From this time on, pure reaction set in, against which were arrayed the underground organizations of the revolutionaries.

The close of the century was therefore a period in which the rich intellectual life of the time of Nicholas had ebbed. A few overtowering figures like Dostoyevskii, Chekhov, and Tolstoi still kept the torch aloft; those whose eminence could not protect them against the censor of the bureaucrat became discouraged and went into exile. Such were Vinogradov, who became a professor at Oxford University, and Prince Kropotkin, who combined literary activity with the role of professional revolu-

tionary. Apart from these, most of the real intellectual vigor was to be found among the conspiratorial groups or exiles abroad.

EDUCATION

Education in the modern sense of the word began in Russia with Peter the Great. Like other problems to which he addressed himself, the Tsar solved this in the most practical way possible. In his program for reform he needed specialists, so he decided that he would train specialists for these tasks. He therefore called into existence schools for this express purpose. The first of these was the Naval Academy, which he formed in 1715, though strictly speaking it did not confine itself to navigation and naval tactics but also concerned itself with military matters. Another professional school was the Theological Seminary, commonly known as the *Slavogreco-Latin Academy*. But in order to foster the training of the provincial nobility, Peter proposed to extend the system to the newly created *guberniyas* as fast as instructors at the central academy became available. This led to the development, by the end of his reign, of a series of "cypher" schools, which trained the sons of the gentry and others in arithmetic and geometry. Parallel with them were a series of ecclesiastical schools that trained for service in the church. After Peter's death the Admiralty sought to have them turned over to the Holy Synod, which, however, declined to accept them. These secular schools thus lasted only till 1744, when out of the original twenty-eight but eight remained. They were then merged with the garrison schools founded in 1732 in each of the provincial capitals. The ecclesiastical proved much more tenacious to life and lasted on into the reign of Catherine, though the scheme to make each provincial school the center of a number of elementary schools in the country round about proved abortive. The truth was that the task of educating the Russian people which Peter took on himself was too vast for his successors, and without his great driving power the movement eventually came to a dead stop. It was not till the second part of the century that it began again.

Peter's aims had been entirely practical but had ended by catering to the narrow interests of the serving class who wished to advance their children up the official ladder. Towards the end of his reign he began to see the short-sightedness of this restricted view of education and invited a German scholar, Wolff, to Petersburg to consult him with reference to the establishment of an Academy of Science in Russia. The occasion of this was the announcement that a certain scientist had succeeded in discovering perpetual motion, which Peter wished to exploit, but Wolff insisted that it would be more to Russia's advantage to found an institution of learning and invite promising young scholars from Europe to deliver lectures and carry on research. In connection with the Academy, a university was to be started and a *Gymnasium* to prepare the students. This institution had moderate success during its early years, but the slender supply of candidates was soon exhausted. Despite the relaxation of class restrictions, the *Gymnasium* had difficulty in recruiting students. The opening of the *military corps of the gentry* drew away numbers of the nobility and still further thinned the ranks of the *Gymnasium* students. This in turn depleted the ranks of the university students. The government had recourse to a generous distribution of scholarships and the provision of dormitories for the students. But despite every effort to attract candidates, the university had at times to suspend lectures for lack of listeners. It did, however, undertake the translation of foreign publications in the *Ezhemyesyachnie Sochinenii* (The Monthly). Despite the handicaps under which it worked, the Academy turned out the first Russian scholars who were trained in western methods—Krashenninikov, Lomonosov, Rukovskii, among others. In 1755 the government, on the initiative of Shuvalov, decided to establish a university at Moscow, with two *Gymnasias* attached to it—one for the nobles and one for the *raznochintsy* (the commoners), with curricula adapted to their stations in life. Another reform, the fruit of Shuvalov's thought, was the foundation of two similar *Gymnasias* at Kazan, the sole achievement to his credit in a scheme of general education. Here, too,

generous distribution of scholarships was used to attract students of all classes.

CATHERINE AND EDUCATION

With the accession of Catherine, the whole problem took a new turn. The government found itself much handicapped in 1767, at the time of summoning the Legislative Commission, by a lack of competent jurists to assist in the work of codification. This lack of educated persons was felt in all departments of the administration as well as in society itself. But Catherine was guided by other than narrowly practical motives in her schemes of education, as she drew her inspiration from the French enlightenment. Moreover, the emancipation of the nobility from compulsory service broke down the professional restrictions with which the education of the nobles had hitherto been hedged. This enabled the Empress to lay a much broader foundation than her predecessors. She looked beyond immediate objectives to the humanistic ideals of the writers such as Locke, Comenius, and Fénelon, towards the creation of new moral forces within the people by appeal to reason. But with her thoroughgoing reliance on those from whom she drew her inspiration, Catherine decided that children must be separated from their parents, their families, and the whole outer world. This led her to open the doors of the *Gymnasia* and the *corpus* to infants of four to five years of age, with a view to working a transformation in their lives. To match this work for the female sex, Catherine opened the Smolny Institute in St. Petersburg in the former Smolny monastery, for girls of the nobility. The candidates were selected at a like early age and subjected to a similar regimen. But Catherine's ambitious projects achieved indifferent results and her ardor waned.

She became disillusioned and lost her enthusiasm for extending to the whole country a system of popular education. Her preoccupation with foreign affairs perhaps had something to do with her failure to press her reforms in this direction. But she did not altogether give up hope. At the conclusion of

the Turkish war her attention was drawn to the Prussian school system, which had been introduced with great success in Austria by the Prussian reformer Felbiger. The enthusiasm of Joseph II was communicated to Catherine, and she asked the Austrian Emperor to recommend an experienced educator to introduce the reforms into Russia. Joseph thereupon sent Yankevich de Mirievo, a Serb, who had tested the new schools in parts of Hungary. On the recommendations of Yankevich a fresh start was made and the foundation for a system of popular schools was laid. These new schools were divided into three classes: the lower schools (giving instruction in the bare essentials) for the lower classes, the intermediate for the middle classes, and the higher for the nobility, whose curriculum was much more comprehensive than the others. Instruction was to be carried on in classes by the instructor and the old noisy system by which individual students conned their lessons aloud and recited individually gave way to the modern classroom system. Corporal punishment was dispensed with and moral suasion substituted for it. The text books adopted were those translated by Yankevich from the Austrian originals. The task of training teachers was also taken in hand. A special Central Public School was founded at St. Petersburg in 1783, with students drawn from the ecclesiastical seminaries and the Academy at Moscow. A separate teachers' training school was organized in 1786. By 1801, 425 teachers had been turned out. It had been found possible in 1786 to found 28 public schools in the provincial capitals and in 1788, 14 more were opened. It was proposed to extend the system to the districts (*uyezdy*), but here local initiative and support were vital and it was just these elements that were lacking. The people had little desire save of the meagerest education for their children whom they preferred to train at home. Teachers were woefully underpaid, or their pay fell into arrears. They were despised by the people among whom they worked, and found all doors to advancement in their own or in another profession blocked.

Even in the towns recourse must often be had to compul-

sion to bring students in, or if there was a previously existing institution to compete with the new foundations, the former was closed, so that the number of students was not thereby increased. As the academician Fischer had told Shuvalov in 1760, the great bulk of the population in Russia had no appreciation of the value of education and no desire for it. To transplant a system ready-made from western Europe would not solve the difficulty; real progress could be made only when the masses as a whole were ready to accept the change. The reforms of Catherine were unfortunately ahead of their time, and the great bulk of the instructors were satisfied to go through the motions to comply with the regulations in order to fool the authorities and the local population into thinking that the children were receiving a substantial education.

The net result of all the efforts put forth by the administration was insignificant as measured by the standards of today. The number of schools had increased during the period from 1786 to 1800 from 40 to 315 and the number of students in attendance from slightly over 4,000 to 20,000. Of these a negligible number were women. The forward-looking views of the School Commission (formed in connection with the Great Congress of 1767), which contemplated opening schools in every village, were doomed to disappointment and were not even fulfilled by the time of the Great War.

UNIVERSITIES AND GYMNASIA

The reign of Alexander I promised untold blessings for Russia. Among them was the organization of popular education. By a decree of 1803 this responsibility was assumed by the state and placed on a special minister with a central school administration under his direction. Following the analogy of the scheme created by Napoleon, the government proceeded with the inauguration of a system of national education which should radiate from the universities, one for each subdivision (*okrug*) of the Empire. For this purpose it was necessary to call into existence universities that would be conveniently situated throughout the country. In addition to

those of Moscow, Vilna, and Dorpat, already in existence, universities were founded at Penza, Chernigov, and Pskov. Each province was to have its own *Gymnasium*, the *Gymnasiam* of the *okrug* being under the administration of the rector of the university. The director of the *Gymnasium* in turn was to administer the schools of the *uyezd* or district, while the director of each district school was to have supervision over the parochial schools that lay within his district. The old schools of the time of Catherine were fitted into the scheme, the lower classes of the common schools becoming the parochial schools, while the intermediate, with certain classes added, constituted the secondary schools. The *Gymnasias* became the upper in the series, the work of each being based on that of the preceding. Each step of necessity led to the following, the *Gymnasium* constituting a necessary prelude to the university. The passing of the university examination in turn was an indispensable prelude to receiving appointment as collegiate assessor (the lowest rank in the official ladder). The budget for schools was doubled, reaching about 1,300,000 roubles. Generous "stipends" (free scholarships) were given to deserving poor students. A university was founded at Kazan as well as one at Kharkov. In 1819 the Pedagogical Institute at St. Petersburg was turned finally into the University of St. Petersburg. In 1817 the curricula of the *Gymnasias* were formulated to give greater attention to the classics.

The universities were given a large measure of self-government, with their own courts, their own administrative council, elected rector, and deans. But each of the *okrugi*, into which Russia was divided for the purposes of school administration, was under a curator, resident at St. Petersburg. At the first sign of independence on the part of an administrative council, its decisions were reversed by the curator. Its so-called autonomy thus proved illusory.

The second great period of reform of education in the nineteenth century came between 1828 and 1835 as an aftermath of the Decembrist rising. A commission was appointed in 1826 by the Emperor Nicholas to undertake a reform of the

school system. At the basis of its work lay the idea of moral instruction which Pushkin persuaded the Emperor it was the duty of the state to impart. The new system retained the schools of Alexander's time with this difference: the three divisions—parochial, district, and provincial schools—instead of being merely divisions of a single whole progressing by stages, became each to a certain extent separate entities and provided for a distinct class of society. To attract children of the serving classes to the *Gymnasia* and the district schools, certain additional subjects were added to the curriculum. The district schools became separate and complete units not intended to prepare students for the *Gymnasia*. The maintenance of the elementary schools was at this time assumed by the state. The *Gymnasia* in the upper classes provided two alternative types of training: one in which the classical languages predominated, and one in which instruction in these was reduced to a minimum. As a concession to the nobility, special institutes of *Gymnasia* status were created in the provincial capitals for the nobility.

Under Nicholas an effort was made to rid the universities of superfluous studies and to concentrate on the useful ones. Despite the fears of the government, they continued to attract and hold many members of the nobility, who, after completing the course for a degree, remained in the capitals rather than enter governmental service. It was from this class that the contributors to the new periodical literature were recruited. Gradually the universities, especially after 1848, were brought under more and more strict control of the central administration, and a sharp watch was kept over the conduct of the students and the utterances of the professors.

With the accession of Alexander II a new era dawned for the universities. Once more a return was made to the principle of autonomy which had been made the basis of the reform of 1804. The members of the faculty were given control over the instruction and powers of discipline over one another. The student body was made amenable to control by the faculty, whose court was empowered to sit in judg-

ment on students. In practice this right was considerably abridged.

With regard to the *Gymnasia* (the secondary schools), it was decided that half of these would become *Gymnasia* requiring one classical language; of the rest, half (one quarter of the whole) became pure classical *Gymnasia* with both Latin and Greek; while the other quarter included neither in their curriculum, substituting natural sciences and mathematics. This arrangement was further modified in 1871. In 1872, as a result of disorders in St. Petersburg, the administration of the universities was altered so as to bring them under central control, turning the rector and deans into officials of the crown. The latter, together with an "inspector" and a council of the professors, had disciplinary control over the students. There was considerable opposition to this in university circles, and it was held up for some years, becoming law only in 1883-1884 under Alexander III, though it was not enforced in full. Indeed, the system provided by statute with reference to the universities and secondary schools was more and more modified in practice by administrative order of the ministry.

POPULAR EDUCATION

Pari passu with the peasant emancipation, the question of popular education was once more passed in review: first by two committees, one of educationists, and one formed of the members of all the departments of the administration having schools under their control. Their recommendations were then brought before the state council and considered in a special session. As a result it was decided to create district (*uyezd*) and provincial (*guberniya*) school committees, on each of which two members of the *zemstva* should sit. It was not considered possible at that stage of Russia's development to make elementary schools compulsory everywhere, so these were left to local initiative. In the case of the former state peasants, the committees fell heir to schools formerly maintained by the department of state property and for which a

special tax had been levied on the peasants. Here the *zemstva* had a clear field, as the peasant communes showed almost no interest in the schools and left them entirely to the central committees and the *zemstva*. In the case of former landlord serfs, two types of schools had been in existence: the old parochial schools, manned by the local priests, but dependent for support entirely on the clergy; and the "schools of literacy," haphazard schools started by the peasants and taught by old soldiers or other literates who chanced to be found in the village. In reality it meant that the burden largely rested on the *zemstva*, so that by 1893 these were paying almost 70 per cent of the cost of these village schools. The parochial schools at first declined, owing to lack of interest, but in 1887 interest in them was revived on the initiative of the government, supported by the *narodniki*.

By 1893 there was a total of nearly 60,000 elementary schools throughout the Empire, with about 3,000,000 children in attendance. No real attempt was made to make education compulsory or universal, largely owing to fear of the cost and the practical difficulty of supplying teachers.

The further development of education in Russia attended on political events. During the period of industrial expansion and railroad building of the 'nineties, when there was an increasing demand for engineers and technicians of all kinds, a number of technical schools were founded under the Ministry of Finance. These were the special creations of the then Minister of Finance Sergei Yulevich Witte, and they made important contributions to the economic development of the country. But the expansion of the public school system did not come till after the revolution, when Russia received the quasi-constitutional government of the Dumas. With the help of the central government and of the *zemstva*, which at that time experienced a great accession of strength, by the outbreak of the Great War the percentage of literacy had been raised for the population of the Empire to about 50 per cent. Illiteracy was on the way to being liquidated.

COMMUNIST ACHIEVEMENTS

The revolution of 1917, however, gave a completely new turn to events. The victory of the Bolsheviks, the inauguration of a dictatorship of the proletariat, the extermination or flight of the former upper and middle classes left the way clear for a great popular reform. The Bolsheviks, with their plan for the building of a new social order, were committed in advance to a plan of popular education; their strictures on the tsarist government went far to reinforce this. But other factors made it absolutely imperative. In the first place their control over the people depended not a little on securing hold of the popular mind through propaganda. While the radio had come into wide use in the cities, there were vast stretches of the country and many millions of the population which could be reached only by newspaper or some form of literature. Especially was this true of the races of central Asia and of Siberia. In self-defense, therefore, the Communists had to liquidate the illiteracy left by the tsarist regime in order to get their message to the people and indoctrinate them with the Marxian view of life. Literacy was also a weapon in the campaign against religion.

The Communists had recourse to heroic measures in this field, and with very substantial results. Not only the government but also the party, as well as the various party organizations, and private individuals all over the Union were drawn into the movement. There were, of course, neither schools nor teachers enough to provide instruction in the regular way. In distant villages, in cities, in factories, improvisations had to be made to teach all in the Union to read and write. An essential part of the program has been adult education, much of which must be carried on in groups under volunteer instructors at nights, on holidays, and rest days, to supplement the work of the regular schools.

The schools themselves have, of course, become an essential tool in the hands of the party for spreading literacy and for purposes of propaganda. During the first rush of enthusiasm

at the end of the civil war, zealots ran wild with their new schemes suggested by the most advanced educationists in other lands, especially the United States. There was launched also a vast program of building, and many of the schools of the cities were equipped in the most up-to-date methods of instruction for children. Undoubtedly many mistakes were made, and for these early extravagances the people of the Soviet Union have had to pay dearly. After experimenting for nearly ten years, the educationists and the Communist party made a complete *volte face* in educational matters. The system was shorn of the excesses; a return was made to older and proven methods of classroom instruction by experienced instructors, and to discipline enforced by the teachers. This reform was applied not only to the elementary and secondary schools, but also to the universities, where there had been much disorganization owing to the wholesale admission of children of the proletariat without adequate preparation, through failure to require the passing of an examination. Here it was necessary for the party to step in and demand that the Augean stables be cleansed and that the universities and all the higher institutions of learning be put on a sound basis.

The new schools were organized according to a plan laid down by a decree of May 16, 1934. There were three types in the public school system—elementary, junior high, and high schools. (These seem to be the nearest American equivalents of the Russian classification.) But unlike their American prototypes, the three proceeded on parallel lines, were not successive stages in one system. The elementary consisted of four grades—one to four; junior high schools comprised seven grades—one to seven; high schools proper consisted of grades one to ten. It is not expressly stated, but may be inferred, that all children not going into any of the professions or the skilled crafts—that is, those who would become common laborers—would receive at least an elementary school education. Junior high schools prepared children for entrance to the *Tekhikums*, that is the trade schools, while the high schools proper prepared for entrance to the VUZ, or higher educational institutions—

the name applied to the universities and institutions of higher education of equivalent rank.

The chief task of the state was to liquidate illiteracy, especially in the remote districts. The "three R's" therefore were the fundamentals imparted in the lower schools. In all the schools emphasis was placed on political education. History was presented in Marxian form to junior high schools and high schools and special texts were written for use in this connection. Emphasis was also placed on practical subjects, especially science. In the lower grades geography was stressed, and the foremost scientists were pressed into service to compose appropriate texts. In the high schools elementary science seems to have received special attention, and a great effort was made to arouse interest in the practical application of such science. There was also, at least in the cities, careful instruction in foreign languages; indeed, the state had at its service thousands of young people who had mastered at least one foreign language, a fact that testifies, if such testimony were needed, to the very thorough work done in this field.

The state, of course, commanded the services of at least two important auxiliary organizations in the training of citizens: the League of Young Communists, commonly called *Komsomol*, a kind of novitiate for entrance to the Communist party; and the *Pioneers*, a boy scout movement which recruited children at a very tender age and secured them valued privileges in addition to indoctrinating them in the tenets of communism. Both of these performed useful functions in providing for children who would otherwise be underprivileged, secured them outings and holidays in the country, instilled into them the creed of communism, and encouraged in many ways their mental and moral development.

It is perhaps here in the realm of higher education that the new regime has had its most impressive results. The demands for autarky and the economic exploitation of the resources of the Soviet Union for the people of the Soviet Union required thousands of foreign engineers and technicians of all kinds to carry through the first and the second Five Year Plans. But

financial considerations (in addition to others) demanded that the government should be freed from dependence on other more advanced states for skilled workmen, engineers, chemists, and all other technical workers. In self-defense the government had to expand the universities and other institutions of higher learning and to draft the young into them. This was done by a careful selection of candidates of promise from among those attending the secondary and elementary schools. Students thus selected were paid a stipend to enable them to pursue their studies at the university or other institution of higher learning, and its continuance depended solely on their giving a good account of themselves. In this way the Soviet Union was, after 1928, able to recruit the ranks of its higher professions and to render itself comparatively independent of foreign countries for its experts in all branches of industry. At a time when other countries of Europe were drastically reducing the number of students at the universities, the Soviet Union increased the number of those in attendance at the institutions of higher learning from 112,000 of the pre-war period to something over half a million annually.

RUSSIAN ARCHITECTURE

Russia is a region where many streams of cultures have met. Russian arts represent in great part the results of such fusion. Art, like literature, came to the Eastern Slavs with Christianity, for of rudimentary pre-Christian art few traces have remained. Christian priests from the Byzantine world brought images (ikons), vestments, and ecclesiastical insignia with them from the south, for purposes of worship. For the introduction of church worship the clergy must needs have suitable buildings, so architects and artificers were imported from the south, and noble churches in the Byzantine style soon rose on the banks of the Dnieper. Such were the Desyatinnaya Church (989-996 A. D.) in Kiev (few traces of which remain), and the cathedral of St. Sophia in Kiev, built by Yaroslav (still standing). It is interesting to note that the first of these was built, not under Byzantine, but apparently under Bulgarian influ-

ence (Kiev formed at first a part of the metropolitanate of Lake Ochrida) and, planned as a basilica, shows distinct western influence. But this fashion was fleeting. St. Sophia at Kiev followed the plan then in vogue at Constantinople—a five-aisle cross surmounted by a central dome. The place of worship at first was the central ambon. The east end had five apses where the altar stood. This general scheme was the prevailing type throughout Russian history. The buildings were usually of stone. While this style is called Byzantine, it borrowed rather widely from neighboring types, from Asia Minor and the Caucasus. At times the five-aisle type was replaced by a three-aisle, without essentially modifying the general scheme.

This form spread throughout southern Russia and eventually extended to the far north, where it took root in Novgorod. Here it usually adopted the three-aisle in place of the five, with other modifications. Further developments of Russian art are to be seen in the area of Vladimir-Suzdal, where a new Russia came into existence in the twelfth century. Here concrete was used in addition to stone. In this region the church on the river Nerli, built in 1165-1166, represents one of the gems of this type, a three-aisle cross surmounted by a central cupola. The region of Polotsk-Smolensk (upper Dnieper-upper Niemen) likewise developed early, in the Kievan period, a distinct local type, in which the basilica principle has been introduced under western influences. All of these Kievan types are aristocratic in that they were built by the local princes and were intended for the noble class.

In the Mongol period, Novgorod stood somewhat apart from the main current of Russian life. The government here was democratic and its architecture was largely the product of these conditions. The churches were built by the associations of merchants. These churches were small, built on the plan of four piers surmounted by the cross-cupola instead of the six-pier structures common in the aristocratic churches of the south. The cupola is still a modification of the Byzantine dome. In the early fifteenth century the bishops of Novgorod

imported German workmen and German materials, and the results were modifications in the traditional style by way of details of distinctly Gothic origin.

One of the early manifestations of this Mongol period is that centering in the city of Moscow, whose architecture shows close affinities with that of Vladimir-Suzdal. Numerous Gothic elements appear which seem to have been introduced by artists from Serbia, which at that time was much under western influences. But the Muscovite style was rather a synthesis of various types which were blended into a style that was truly representative of the people. The religious influences of the time spread out over the land and led to the establishment of many monasteries which were all, at this time, foundations that drew for their support on the main mass of the people.

With the accession of Ivan III new forces made themselves felt in Muscovite life—the marriage of Ivan to Sophia Paleolog, the fall of Constantinople, and the claim advanced by the rulers of Moscow to the position of “the third Rome.” This new dignity was reflected in a program of building for which architects and builders had to be imported, the most famous of whom was Aristoteles Fioraventi of Bologna. One of his masterpieces, the Koimesis Cathedral in the Kremlin, shows the influence of the west and the Renaissance. Another Italian, Aloisi Novi of Milan, supervised the construction of other churches in the Kremlin. Two other Italians, Marco Ruffio and Pietro Antonio Solario, planned the famous *Granolitaya Palata* in the Kremlin, 1484-1491. Most of these structures were great buildings for public ceremonies rather than small and intimate as many of the earlier churches had been. The tendency towards building to commemorate events and to add prestige to the new Moscow led to the erection of churches like the Diakovo (1547) and Kolomenskoe (1532) churches. These are the forerunners of a new style, the distinguishing feature of which is a lofty central tower around which may be grouped rather insignificant turrets or, as at Kolomenskoe, a horizontal gallery. This type is sometimes

thought to have developed out of the wooden church, but it is now agreed that it probably had an oriental prototype, and that the wooden church is really a derivative. On the occasion of the taking of Kazan, Ivan the Terrible entrusted to two architects, Barma and Postnik, the task of constructing a memorial to this event on the Red Square. The result was the Pokrov Cathedral, better known as the church of Vasilii Blazhennyi, a fantastic structure consisting of seven separate structures surmounted mostly by cupolas, grouped around a central church. The original (partly in wood) was later replaced by a stone structure with the addition of a number of towers. The cupolas with which the separate towers are surmounted now have a definite onion-like form which the west usually associates with Russian architecture.

In contrast with the earlier Mongol period of building, which was the expression of popular piety, the art of the sixteenth century was official, intended primarily to glorify a dynasty, to commemorate great events, and to serve state purposes. Thus we have a great outburst of building activity promoted by the state all over the land, especially monasteries and monastic churches, which were regarded as outposts of Muscovite influence. In the north is the church of the Cloister of St. Cyril at Kirillov, built by Ivan IV.

The seventeenth century brought the movement to its final fulfillment. New influences were slowly undermining the old native art. Many of the buildings in this period were no longer state buildings, for now private citizens had sufficient wealth to build for their own comfort. The new style was much affected by the inrush of new forces to the Muscovite world. But at the same time there was also a reaction to what was traditional, as is seen in the churches erected by the Patriarch Nikon and in the Cathedral of the Twelve Apostles in the Kremlin, at Moscow. But elsewhere—as in the Savvakloster, Svenigorod (1652), the Taininskoe church (1677), the church of the Trinity, "*V Nikitnikakh*" (of the middle of the seventeenth century), the Fili Pokrov church, the Elias church at Yaroslavl—is seen the new picturesque style, some with elab-

orate galleries or façades; all these buildings bear witness to the complete development and elaboration of this native style at its greatest epoch.

ICONOGRAPHY


The churches erected by the builder were not complete without ornament; hence architects brought with them the decorative arts. At first the chief forms of decoration were borrowed from Byzantium—mosaics, frescoes, images, and ikons. Climatic conditions and other factors led to the decline of the first two, but through all the periods of Russian art, iconography has held an important place. The earliest ikons were probably simply representations of the saint to whom the church was dedicated. But gradually ikons came to play a much larger role in Christian teaching and art, and they became an important feature of the service. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries there evolved the *iconostasis*. This was partly due to the change in religious worship, which ceased to be at the center of the building and was relegated to the apse. Here a partition was erected behind which the altar stood and from which the priest brought forth the host for the adoration of the people. The ikons were paintings on wood in which coloring was a predominating feature. In the *iconostasis* they came to be grouped in two or more rows and had their faces turned towards the center as though taking part in the act of worship. Iconography reached its highest development in the fifteenth century when Andrei Rublev, the founder of the Muscovite school, achieved renown as one of the greatest of ikon painters. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the art became over-refined and declined from its early freshness and originality.

WESTERN INFLUENCES

Peter turned Russia's face toward the west, and with this reorientation a whole stream of new influences poured into the country. These all but completely submerged the original native Russian art. The new era that was ushered in was

largely European, subject to much the same influences as western art. Hence from then on, Russian art became national, a mere subdivision of European art.

Peter was a confirmed builder. The founding of St. Petersburg was a prodigious achievement that called for the highest engineering and architectural skill of the time, which had to be imported. The new structures were therefore built in the




From Stoddard: "Glimpses of the World."

THE BUILDINGS IN THE KREMLIN, FACING THE MOSKVA RIVER. The building on the extreme left is the Kremlin palace.

prevailing European mode—late baroque. This style was followed in the Church of Peter and Paul, in the palace of *Mon-plaisir*, and in the great palaces at Peterhof and Tsarskoe Selo. There gradually came into existence a mixed style of the period of Anne. By the time of Elizabeth, the royal palaces at Versailles were beginning to cast their shadow across the architectural world, and much of the building of Elizabeth followed these as a model. Baroque shaded off into rococo, an example of which is the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg. With

Catherine one sees a transition to classicism, of which the Taurid Palace of Potemkin is an illustration. The classical style became more and more pronounced as time went on and reached its highest development under Paul and Alexander—the Bourse in St. Petersburg, built by Thoman in 1801; the Cathedral of the Mother of God of Kazan in St. Petersburg on the *Nevskii Prospekt*; and finally the great *Isaakevskii Sobor*. The



Brown Brothers.

MERCHANTS' ROW, FACING THE RED SQUARE, MOSCOW (NOW OCCUPIED BY THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE).

second was built under Alexander I; the third was projected and begun under Alexander I, continued under Nicholas I, but finally completed only under Alexander II. With Nicholas there first developed, as a reaction, a sort of eclecticism, but later there was a distinct revival of the native Russian style, exemplified by the great Kremlin Palace (facing the Moskva), and by the Cathedral of the Redeemer, in Moscow. Both were built by Thon, the latter definitely going back for its models to the Russian Middle Ages. Private buildings and some

public buildings were frequently constructed in the mixed style without any dominating features, such as the Historical Museum on the Red Square, Moscow. But the pseudo-national style prevailed in public buildings—as in the Merchants' Row, also facing the Red Square in Moscow, in the Kazan Railway Station, and in the Cathedral of Vladimir in Kiev. This style held the field, with an occasional reaction towards classicism, down to the Great War.

SOVIET ARCHITECTURE

With the period of reconstruction begun by the Soviet regime, utility rather than aesthetic qualities have been the first consideration. But the Union has felt the impulse of the post-war art, and the newer buildings all show the sincere (and severe) lines and square, geometric designs. There has been some tendency to adopt extreme and even grotesque forms. But whatever the reason, the general effect of the new construction, especially in Moscow, is depressing. It may be that the material used in the buildings or the generally drab colors do not set the buildings off. But one has a hard time recalling one impressive building among the new structures in Moscow, despite the conspicuous size of many of them. The new Palace of Soviets on skyscraper lines marks something of a departure.

In contrast with Moscow, Leningrad is full of noble buildings, and the general effect is impressive. One may not like the baroque and neo-classical styles, which have nothing in common with native Russian art, but the building activities of two centuries have turned Leningrad into one of the most beautiful capitals of Europe. The neglect of two decades has not altered this fact. One speaks here of the buildings, but there are in addition literally scores of monuments, largely the work of the nineteenth century, which enshrine in a rich and striking manner much of the national history. Beside Leningrad, Moscow, which for two centuries suffered neglect, cannot claim to be more than an undistinguished provincial town, a character which the Soviet government, harassed as it

was with so many other problems—particularly the need for housing facilities—was unable to redeem to any extent.

PAINTING

Painting was introduced into Russia in the eighteenth century from abroad and therefore has not a long tradition. Nevertheless, it has occupied an important place in the national life. In its development it has in the main followed western Europe. The eighteenth century saw the slow growth (mostly in the hands of foreign artists) of classical art, in which portrait painting played by far the chief role. Classicism continued to dominate the scene till the early nineteenth century, when it gave way to romanticism. But during the reign of Nicholas I the hand of officialdom lay heavy on its development, while the entire field of art was dominated by the Academy. Two of the great figures of this early period were Brullov and Bruni. But despite the reaction which proclaimed the slogan, "Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality," and put the country in a strait-jacket, the 'forties saw a new spirit in culture to which reference has already been made. After the revolution of 1848 this change was rapid and parallel with developments in literature; art began to reflect political and social philosophy.

The new note that came in is usually called realism. The great forerunner of this transition was Ivanov. Of course, the movement was strongly affected (as was all art) by the emancipation of the serfs and the liberal influences of the mid-century. One of the significant artists of this period was Perov (1833-1882). In 1863 there occurred a break in the ranks of the Academy which resulted in fourteen of its members refusing to take part in the competition for that year and requesting to be struck off the list of members. Henceforth the school of realism stood on its own feet and developed along its own lines. Of this group the leader was Ivan Kramskoi (1837-1887). As a result, realism in art won a resounding victory that surely, in the course of time, wrought a complete transformation. From this time art developed without official

control. In this later period the name of Repin is perhaps the most distinguished. From realism, painting has passed through various phases: landscape painting, symbolism, new romanticism, impressionism, colorism, to be followed, of course, by many of the forces that affected western European art in the twentieth century. The early Soviet art was quite frankly propagandistic, under more or less rigid official control.

The plastic arts scarcely call for any comment. These, too, were for the most part importations. They filled an important role in beautifying the two capitals, especially Leningrad. The outsider is struck with the frequency with which foreign names are associated with this or that work, though the incentive was usually national and patriotic; yet names of distinguished native sons are not wanting. But such art, even more than painting, is bound to officialdom and hardly reflects so faithfully the intellectual development of the age.

The state in Russia has in the past shown considerable solicitude for art, and the Soviet government continued and expanded this policy. In addition to extensive patronage in the opera and theater, art galleries were constantly visited by streams of tourists and personally conducted groups of workers. Such are the Museum of Modern French Art, the Tretyakov Gallery (both in Moscow), and the famous Hermitage in Leningrad, second only to the Louvre as a collection of masterpieces. The Tretyakov contains the products of Russian art, but the Hermitage is international in its scope. The Soviet regime has been at great pains to preserve the artistic treasures of the past and to make them accessible to even the very humblest member of the working class.

MUSIC

One of the unique processes through which Europe has passed has been that whereby the cultural unity of medieval Europe gave way to the cultural diversity of modern times. In no country has national culture experienced so remarkable a growth as it did in Russia, and in no field has this been so well exemplified as in music.

The Muscovite world had not been without its musical life. Indeed, in addition to the music of the Byzantine church, the Eastern Slavs have possessed a rich folklore and a great wealth of native music. This native music departed from the forms of rhythm which had become accepted in western Europe and allowed itself further latitude by the adoption of unusual scales and modes. Much of it arose from the fact that the performance of work done collectively was attended by songs sung by the workers in unison. Such were planting songs, boating songs, reaping songs. There were likewise songs for weddings and songs sung at funerals. Such music intimately reflects the life of the people.

It was into this fertile seedbed that the culture of western Europe was transplanted in the eighteenth century. In the time of the Empress Elizabeth, Italian musicians were brought to Russia and Italian musicians continued to monopolize the field throughout the eighteenth century. But early in the nineteenth century a person destined to bring about an epochal transformation was born into the Russian world. Michael Glinka was a member of the serving nobility, and was trained for the service of the state. In the field of music he was at first a dilettante but was finally persuaded to give up a lucrative post for the precarious profession of musical composer. His great compositions were *A Life for the Tsar*, *Ruslan and Lyudmila*, an opera based on Pushkin's version of a tale drawn from old Russian folklore. By his skilful adaptation of the cultural elements of Russian traditional music and folklore, Glinka really became the father of the national school. His mantle fell first on Serov and later on Dargomizhskii (Dargomysky). While the former left little of note, the latter is known for his great operas—*Rusalka*, based on a theme drawn from early folklore, and *The Stone Guest*. These three composers were all epoch-making in the formative stage of Russian music.

The 'sixties, the era which saw the emancipation of the serfs, heralded the development of a great new school. The leading members, usually referred to as "The Five," included Bala-

kirev, César Cui, Alexander Borodin, Nikolai Rimskii-Korsakov (Rimsky-Korsakoff), and Modeste Musorgskii (Mousorgsky). None of these were professional musicians, but like Glinka, they drew their living from posts in the Imperial service.

Balakirev was the foremost of these in point of time and perhaps the most important, for, following the example of Glinka, he persisted in using a technique adapted from the folk music, intermingling passages in keys at intervals other than those commonly used. These bold innovations, adopted in Balakirev's *Tamara* and *Islamey*, discomfited the critics, but time and familiarity eventually dulled the edge of their criticism and accustomed the world to these exotic qualities of Russian music.

Rimskii-Korsakov (1844-1908), who drew some of his inspiration from Berlioz, became an enthusiastic pupil of Balakirev. Despite his preoccupation with a naval career, he found time to compose a number of operas—*The Snow Maiden*, *The Golden Cock*, *A Night in May*, symphonies including his best, *Scheherazade* (based on the Arabian Nights) and *Capriccio Espagnol*.

But the most original figure in the group was Musorgskii, who relinquished his military career in 1859 to devote himself thenceforth to music. His chief claim to distinction as a national composer rests on his operas *Boris Godunov* and *The Marriage Broker*, but he also wrote a number of songs and lesser musical pieces. His great work *Boris Godunov* had to wait fifty years before it was produced in its original form and received acclaim as an artistic masterpiece.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Russian music was dominated by the figure of Peter Ilyich Chaikovskii (Tchaikowsky). Like his predecessors, he only gradually realized that he was drawn to a musical career. But in 1861 he decided to devote himself entirely to his beloved art. He rejected many of the principles of "The Five." Indeed, he stood half-way between the out-and-out nationalists and those who adhered to the classical tradition. After a long struggle

with poverty he was fortunate in securing a wealthy patron in the person of Madame Nadezhda von Meck, a wealthy widow from the Baltic provinces who settled on him a pension for life that allowed him the leisure to compose. Many of his compositions were operas—*Eugenii Onyegin*, *The Oprichnik*, *Mazeppa*, *The Queen of Spades*. He composed a number of ballets, *The Nutcracker* and *The Sleeping Beauty*, as well as a number of symphonies and concertos. His work is distinguished by lyricism but lacks profundity. He remained aloof from the hitherto prevailing trend of accentuating national traits in music and hence does not make so direct an appeal to the Russian public.

Other artists familiar to the musical world of that day were Anton Rubinstein (together with his brother Nikolai), who was identified with the Moscow Conservatory of Music and was also acclaimed by the European musical world as a finished piano virtuoso. Rubinstein's productivity as a composer was as great as his performing activity, but he was known chiefly for his compositions in short forms—a few sonatas, the rest being concertos and orchestral works.

Russian music continued to develop along national lines even in the twentieth century. Alexander Scriabin (1872-1915) gained fame as a virtuoso and as a teacher of music at the Moscow Conservatory, but he resigned in 1903 to devote his time to composition. His fame rests on his symphonies of a novel style characterized by a tendency towards mysticism. Sergei Rakhmaninov (Rachmaninoff), his successor, composed a unique symphonic poem, *The Isle of the Dead*, in a manner characteristically Russian. His symphonies also reflect the national trend. Stravinskii's symphonies, while distinctly original, show the influence of Strauss and are ultra modern in their technique.

Modern Soviet music reflects the same trends as the other arts. In the words of Lenin, "Art functions in conjunction with the formation of social consciousness and influences the social-economic relations of society." This means that under the new regime, art must express the aspirations, the feelings,

of the proletariat, and must make a direct contribution towards their cultural life. In order to ensure that this would be the case, there was established in 1924 an Association of Proletarian Musicians, known as RAPM. The nucleus of this group was formed by the younger men who from the first had thrown themselves into the new movement, but an effort was made to bring in some of the older men who, while without perhaps definite political convictions, were devoted to their art and could make a contribution. Such men were Glazunov, Ippolitov-Ivanov, Gliere, and Maximilian Steinberg. But latterly others have come to the fore, not only from the workers, but also from the formerly depressed nationalities. Special attention has been given to the effort to fit the new musical art into the program of the state by stimulating interest in industry and in the problems of the workers. As the fruit of this movement we have: *The Soviet Iron Foundry*, *The Hero* (an opera), as well as a sonata, *Nights in Turkestan*, by Alexander Mossolov; a number of operas with a distinctly revolutionary flavor, such as Andrei Pashchenko's *The Revolt of the Eagles*, Triodin's *Stephan Razin*, and Zolotarev's *The Decembrists*. The ballet made an attempt to adapt revolutionary themes to its methods, as we see in Gliere's *Red Poppy* and Asafiev's *Age of Steel* and *Age of Gold*.

As in the case of literature, the new music has yet to prove its ability to serve two masters—both the aesthetic sense and the political aims. The ready assumption that these can be made to coincide is hardly proven. The casual observer finds the results still somewhat unconvincing, and the fact that the Soviet producers are going back to the classical artists seems to indicate that in spite of the differences of time, the older art still has its appeal.

[36]

THE RUSSIAN CHURCH

THE HISTORY of the Russian people would not be complete without some account of their religious life. The Eastern Slavs, as we have seen, were apparently won to Christianity in the course of the tenth century, and this adoption of Christianity was made final by Vladimir towards the end of that century. There was at first no hostility to the western Church, and at one time, apparently, the Metropolitan had been under the Bulgarian patriarch of Lake Ochrida and recognized the authority of the Papacy. By the eleventh century, Byzantium had resumed control. The immediate effect of the conversion of the prince and the people was the spread of foreign influences to Kievan Russ. At first these came indifferently from western Europe and from Byzantium, but after 1054, with the schism between eastern and western churches, the ties with the west were snapped. Most of the clergy were from the south, and up to the time of the Mongol invasion the metropolitans were always Greek.

The final rift between the two churches was partly due to the eastern Church's protests at the insertion of the words "*filioque*" in the creed in explaining the procession of the Holy Spirit; in part, to the Papacy's having come, in the absence of any strong competing power, to occupy a commanding position in the west and its refusal to submit to Constantinople.

The Mongol invasion made few alterations in the Church. The Khan of the Golden Horde was inclined to tolerate or even protect the Church and its property, though individual Russian princes met martyrdom at the hands of the Mongols. The Church during this period became the great unifying and

civilizing agency in Russia. The seat of the Metropolitan was moved from Kiev to Vladimir during the time of Ivan Kalita and shortly afterwards to Moscow. This fact proved of great assistance to Moscow in its rise to power.

THE UNION OF FLORENCE

During the Middle Ages the rift between the two churches was not looked on as final and from time to time negotiations took place looking towards a reconciliation. This was es-



Brown Brothers.

GROUP OF HIGH DIGNITARIES OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH. (In the center is the Metropolitan of Kiev; to his left, Innokentii, Archbishop of North America—for many years head of the Orthodox Church in Alaska.)

pecially true during the time of the Crusades when the Russian princes more than once turned their gaze anxiously westward in the expectation or hope of receiving aid against the Mongols as the Empire had sought aid against the Seljuk Turks. Gregory VII had corresponded with Izyaslav, Prince of Kiev; Gregory IX with Yuri Vsevolodovich; Innocent IV corresponded with Daniel of Galich; in each case the Papacy sought their submission to the See of Rome in return for recognition of their title as king or of assistance against the Mongols. But

no help was forthcoming and the princes, one after another, submitted to the Horde. Eventually, in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, the Ottoman Turks began to menace the Eastern Empire, which had never recovered from the blows received during the Fourth Crusade when the Empire had been conquered by the Crusaders. The Emperor began to make advances to the Papacy with a view to the promotion of another crusade to save his realm. The Pope, Eugenius IV, demanded submission to Rome as the price for such succor. The result was that an Œcumenical Council was summoned for 1438 to meet at Ferrara, being later adjourned to Florence. Here in 1439 the reunion of the two churches was proclaimed by the council and the Russian Metropolitan Isidore promised a cardinal's hat. Isidore returned to Moscow and celebrated mass according to the Roman rite, in the great Cathedral of the Assumption in Moscow. At once people and sovereign united in passionate opposition. A council of bishops summoned by Vasilii deposed Isidore, ordering him into confinement, from which he managed to escape to Rome. Here he was named Roman Catholic Bishop of Russia and later Metropolitan of Constantinople under the Roman church. The so-called Union of Florence remained a dead letter.

Whatever may have been the circumstances that impelled the patriarch of Constantinople and the Byzantine emperor to make their peace with the Papacy, the princes of Moscow had no mind to submit to Rome. If Constantinople had resigned its claims to be the head of the Œcumenical Church, when once the latter had ceased to be the capital of the ecclesiastical world, Moscow was determined to succeed to its position. After the fall of Constantinople, Ivan III had married a daughter of the former imperial house and demanded to be hailed as "*velikii gosudar*" (great lord). Moscow was now to be the "third Rome," as Constantinople had been the second. The liberation of the Muscovite Grand Prince from the yoke of the Golden Horde and his succession to the place formerly occupied by the Byzantine emperor was signalized by the summoning of an Œcumenical Council in 1551 to draft

a special code to deal with ecclesiastical matters. The deliberations of the council issued in the *Stoglav*, or the "book of one hundred chapters," which for long was accepted as the authority in Church affairs.

Ivan IV's relations with the Church were far from happy. This was partly due to personal factors, partly to his policy. To curb the power of the patriarch, Ivan sought as a successor to Macarius, who died in 1563, one who would be a more pliant tool. The cleric who was first selected withdrew to a monastery rather than brave the Tsar's displeasure. When the second, Herman, undertook to rebuke the sovereign, the latter refused to ratify his appointment and thus got rid of him. To fill the vacant post, he summoned the nobly-born monk Philip from the Solovetskii monastery in the far north. Philip was loath to accept the post; but his reluctance was overborne. As he had anticipated, Ivan's conduct gave cause for scandal. The Metropolitan, true to his upright character, did not hesitate to rebuke the Tsar. As a result he was stripped of his vestments and consigned to a prison in Tver. The following year, 1569, he was strangled by order of the Tsar for refusing to bless one of Ivan's *oprichniki*, Malyuta Skuratov. His successors in office, the Metropolitans Cyril and Antonius, proved more tractable. The latter even condoned the sovereign's fourth, fifth, and sixth marriages, all of which were uncanonical.

Ivan's policy was to introduce a system of land tenure conditioned on the performance of military service. He looked, therefore, with grave misgivings on the reduction in the amount of available land occasioned by the acquisition of secular lands by the Church. He determined to prevent the accumulation of landed property in ecclesiastical hands, much as Edward I of England had done by his statute of Mortmain. In 1572 he induced the council of ecclesiastics and *boyars* to pass a decree that *vochiny* were not to be alienated by any landholder to any of the larger monasteries, but that at the death of the holder, the land must pass to his heirs. The poorer monasteries

might receive such land as gifts, but only with the consent of the Tsar. A further decree of 1580 stated that land might not be mortgaged to pay for prayers for the repose of the soul. In the absence of heirs, the land should escheat to the crown.

During the reign of Ivan eastern Europe became the scene of a dramatic and bitter struggle between the churches. The Papacy had become involved in the long military and diplomatic feud that began with the invasion of Italy by Charles VIII of France and continued under his successor. Then came the Protestant Reformation that shook the Church to its foundations. Threatened by complete dissolution, the Church laid hold of the means that hitherto had been found effective in a crisis—the calling of a Church council. And out of the Council of Trent, originally summoned to heal the wounds of the church, had come the Counter Reformation. With the assistance of the militant Order of Jesus, the Papacy now passed to the offensive and sought to recover lost ground as well as to win new. The Union of Lublin, in 1569, by which the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Principality of Lithuania became one, opened up new vistas in the east for the Catholic Church. The death of Sigismund Augustus (the last of the Jagiellos) in 1572 brought on an election the following year—1573. This election was followed almost immediately by a second, in which Stephen Bathory was named king. In 1577 war broke out between Ivan and Bathory for the possession of Livonia. The Papal Legate in Poland, Cardinal Caligari, sought to turn the occasion to account in the interests of the Holy See. He first sought to mediate between the belligerents, but without success. In 1582 a special ambassador, Antonio Possevino, a member of the Jesuit order, was sent from Rome direct to Moscow. Possevino apparently succeeded in gaining Ivan's confidence and at one time entertained hopes of Ivan's apostatizing and joining a crusade against the Ottoman Turks. The Tsar was induced to agree to the surrender of Livonia and peace was made on this basis. Ivan's death in 1584 terminated negotiations for the recognition of the Papacy.

THE UNIATE CHURCH

The Union of Lublin had profoundly altered the religious situation. After the Council of Florence, 1439, at which the Metropolitan Isidore had consented to recognize the Papacy, there had been considerable confusion in Lithuania over religion. Polonization and acceptance of the Roman faith had made steady progress among the Lithuanian nobility. At the beginning of the sixteenth century the Reformation had spread to Poland and made the confusion even greater. But the Counter Reformation had turned the tide against Protestantism. The way was also prepared for efforts to win over to the Catholic Church the orthodox clergy in Poland, now severed from Moscow by political frontiers. A synod of the clergy was summoned to meet at Brest. Here, in 1596, a group of the Orthodox clerics agreed to make their submission to Rome and elected delegates to petition the Holy See to accept them into the Catholic Church. Some of its members seceded from the synod and proceeded to anathematize the apostates. The Orthodox Church in Lithuania was thus split in two: the small remnant of the Orthodox who remained true to their faith and the Uniate Church which was joined to Rome. The conditions on which they were admitted was that the Uniate Church should retain the doctrines, the practices, and the language (Slavonic) of their ritual. All that they were required to do was to acknowledge the authority of the Papacy.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PATRIARCHATE

The Time of Troubles had brought a new factor into the religious situation. In 1587 the initiative was taken by Fedor Ivanovich looking towards raising the Metropolitan of Moscow to the position of patriarch. Many political factors contributed—the unsatisfactory religious situation of the Orthodox in Lithuania, the fact that the Metropolitan of Kiev (in Lithuania) was under the Patriarch of Constantinople, and the Catholic and scholastic influences coming into Moscow from Kiev. At any rate, the Metropolitan Job was duly chosen by the synod

and his election confirmed by the Tsar Fedor with the approval of the Patriarch Jeremiah of Constantinople. This somewhat uncanonical election was afterwards confirmed by the four Œcumenical patriarchs of the east.

During the disturbances that succeeded the death of Fedor, the Church went through severe trials. The various pretenders brought in Polish and Catholic followers and finally Moscow was occupied by Polish troops. But few of the Church officers came to terms with the foreigners. Ultimately a national movement, originating in the Church, led to the expulsion of the Poles. After the accession of Michael (1613) and the conclusion of the Polish war (1618) the Tsar's father returned from captivity and was consecrated patriarch (he had been appointed by the Thief of Tushino). In recognition of his services to the state he was given the title *Velikii Gosudar* (Great Lord) and recognized as co-equal of the Tsar. Philaret frequently received foreign ambassadors, and documents were signed by both monarch and patriarch. After Philaret's death this practice lapsed until the time of Nikon.

NIKON AND THE GREAT SCHISM

The Church had acquired new power and influence during the Troubles and it was but natural that Michael's successor should likewise fall under the influence of the Patriarch Nikon who was advanced by Alexei to that position in 1652. On his appointment he exacted recognition of his exclusive position and, like his predecessor, Philaret, regarded himself as endowed with supreme moral authority, assuming the title of *Velikii Gosudar*. In his capacity as patriarch he undertook to reform Church ritual and ceremonies. He incurred the displeasure of the sovereign and laid down his office in 1658, though the post remained unfilled till 1667. The reforms introduced and enforced in the face of strong popular resistance led to the *Raskol*, or schism, the great breach in the Orthodox Church that remained unhealed for two hundred years. It involved more than doctrinal and ceremonial differences. Nikon was finally deposed by a special Œcumenical

Council summoned by Alexei in 1667. Nikon's fall meant the final humiliation of the Church and the toppling of the patriarch from his lofty pedestal as co-equal with the Tsar. Henceforth he became a mere servant of the government.

ABOLITION OF THE PATRIARCHATE

On the death of the Patriarch Adrian in 1700 Peter left the patriarchal throne vacant, providing for its administration temporarily by the synod as had been done in the time of the Patriarch Nikon. His failure to provide a successor was partly due to his inability to find someone whose views accorded with his (Peter's) own; partly to his desire for complete reorganization. It was not, however, till the peace of Nystadt (1721) that Peter was able to take the matter up again. In that year he had drawn up by Theophan Prokopovich, Archbishop of Pskov and Narva, the Spiritual Regulation. The government of the Church was entrusted to what was at first called a Spiritual College, but later the Holy Synod, consisting at first of ten members at the head of whom was a layman. Peter proposed to raise the standard of education among the clergy, since he regarded ignorance and superstition as the cause of heresies in the church, as well as the undue pretensions of the Clergy. He likewise held a census of the monastic clergy and took the first step in their dissolution by requiring that monasteries with less than thirty inmates should be turned into parish schools and churches. He was determined that the Church should be entirely subject to the state, and that a halt should be called in the great increase in Church property which had been bewailed since the time of Ivan the Terrible.

An interesting event of the reign of Peter, in the history of the Church, was the attempt launched in 1723 to bring about a union between the Church of England and the Eastern Orthodox Church. On the suggestion of Peter the Great, the Holy Synod had addressed an invitation to the Church of England that they send two representatives to Russia to have a friendly discussion of doctrinal and other differences and to explore possibilities for a union of the two churches. The

renewed contacts of Russia with the west had raised the question of the ecclesiastical relations with the Catholic world. Certain theological savants at the Sorbonne communicated with Peter and attempted to minimize doctrinal differences and emphasize agreement with the west. Whether they represented the Papacy or merely the Gallican church was of little consequence, for the reply of the Synod was uncompromising. But the way was left open for further exploring possibilities between the whole Catholic Church of the west and the churches under the various Œcumenical patriarchs in the east. In 1723 the visit of a certain bishop of the Thebaid to Great Britain to raise money suggested to certain bishops of the Church of England, the idea of uniting themselves with the eastern Church. The matter was apparently discussed at a council of eastern ecclesiastics and a reply given to the Anglicans. Evidently the veneration of saints and worshipping of ikons proved a stumbling block to the English. But it was the death of Peter that put an end to the matter.

A second event of more fundamental importance for Russia was the appointment during the joint reign of Peter and Ivan of a Metropolitan of Kiev once more after an interval of twenty-eight years when, owing to the wars, there had been no incumbent. Practically all the sees of Lithuania (Little Russia), with the exception of Mohilev, had been suppressed, and the way was clear for the spread of Uniate influence at the expense of the Orthodox Church. An embassy was therefore despatched to Constantinople by Peter and the *hetman* (Mazeppa) of the Ukraine, asking that Kiev, which had for so long been directly dependent on Constantinople, should now, the better to be able to resist the Uniate Church, be brought directly under Moscow.

CHURCH LANDS ARE SECULARIZED

The greatest calamity to the Church, the spoliation of the lands accumulated through centuries, which had so long threatened it, was finally accomplished during the reign of Catherine. On the accession of Peter III in 1762, his indifference

to the Orthodox faith and his regard for the good opinion of the nobility gave him the idea of secularizing the monastic lands. The process was begun by Peter and continued by Catherine. While Catherine had no special prejudice against the Church, her views on ecclesiastical matters were determined by what she considered as the interests of the state and her rational approach to all political problems. During her reign, therefore, the state assumed possession of the greater part of the Church lands, many of which were sold and the proceeds deposited in a special fund for charity and education. The monastic holdings were much reduced and the orders themselves were confined within strict numerical limits. The clergy from now on ceased to have either political or economic independence. Most of its members became little more than state officials. Thus the cesaropapism of the Byzantine emperors was practically restored.

The lot of the estranged Orthodox in Poland during their separation from Russia was extremely painful. The Uniate Church was the only church tolerated among these Russian subjects of the Polish king. Most of the nobility had gone over to the Roman Catholic Church and already been Polonized. The Uniate Church, founded on the understanding that the people could retain their ritual and language (Slavonic), had gradually been brought more and more closely into conformity with the Roman Church, and been penetrated by ecclesiastics from western Europe. The colleges and seminaries were manned with western theologians and the higher ranks of the clergy, Poles or Roman clerics. None but those who would embrace the Roman Catholic faith received their full civil rights. Thus the Church had ceased to retain its original character. After the partition of Poland, many of the adherents of the Uniate Church in the areas now restored to Russia again apostatized though Catherine, who had intervened on behalf of the Orthodox, could hardly apply coercive measures against the Uniates. But after the accession of Nicholas I in 1825 things were different. The first step was the organization of the Greek Uniate Church, a body which sought

proselytes among the Uniates and endeavored to instil in them Orthodox doctrines while allowing them to remain nominally Uniates. The effort was largely educational. After the Polish revolt in 1831, Poland, by the Organic Statute, became an integral part of the Russian Empire. In 1839 the Uniate Church was finally incorporated once more in the Orthodox Church, and the schism of centuries was thus brought to an end as far as Russia was concerned.

DISSIDENT SECTS

Throughout the nineteenth century the history of the Orthodox Church in Russia was uneventful but Orthodoxy became, along with nationalism, one of the great pillars of the autocracy, and every effort was made by the authorities to enforce conformity in the interests of national homogeneity and political centralization. Outward conformity became the rule, except where political considerations had made for toleration of a dissenting Christian sect or of a non-Christian religion. About 75 per cent of the total population of the Empire was Orthodox; 10 per cent Roman Catholic (Poland); about 5 per cent Lutheran and Calvinist (mostly in the Baltic provinces, and the German settlements on the Volga); while about 5 per cent were dissenters of Russian origin. The greater number of these were the *Raskolniki* with their various sects, the *Popovtsi*, the *Bezpopovtsi*, the *Pomortsi*, the *Preobrazhenskii*, the *Rogozhskii*, the *Stranniki*, the *Edinoverts*. In addition there were other mystical and erratic sects not belonging to the *Raskol*, the *Khyltsi*, the *Shakouni* or jumpers, the *Skopts* or eunuchs. Some of these sects show points of similarity with the Protestant sects, perhaps due to the great immigration into New Russia in the time of Catherine and subsequently. The affinity of Alexander I with German pietism (Mme. de Krüdener) and with the Quakers, and the activity of the *Russian Bible Society* which was openly patronized by Alexander, made way for the flooding of Russia with new religious influences that were at variance with orthodoxy. One of the nineteenth century heresies was *Stundism*, a movement which was widely

spread among the German colonists. Other religious sects among the native Russian population were the *Molokani* (sometimes called the Milk Drinkers, but whose name is probably derived from the *Molochnaya Rechka*, or Milk River in southeastern Russia). Numbers of these sectarians have migrated to the United States, there being a strong colony in southern California (Los Angeles). Another unique sect are the *Doukhoborts* (Spirit Wrestlers), commonly called the Doukhobors, a sect who, with the *Molokani*, were transported to the Caucasus in 1840 by order of the Emperor Nicholas I. The Doukhobors took the gospel literally, were vegetarians out of reluctance to take the life of an animal, practiced communism, refused to resist evil, and so had a deep-rooted prejudice against war and military service, but otherwise have been distinguished by thrift, industry, and sobriety. Nevertheless, they were a thorn in the side of the Russian government, which continued to oppress them. About 1900, through the agency of Count Leo Tolstoi and Professor James Mavor, arrangements were made for them to migrate to western Canada, where they secured grants of free land. Here they were for many years under the control of their leader, Peter Verigin. They were exempt from military service and were allowed to till their land in common. But they refused to pay taxes or to tolerate public schools. They met efforts of the government to coerce them by marching nude—men and women—into the nearest town, where their appearance dismayed the townsfolk, and though they were usually rounded up by the police and transported to their homes, their protests were largely successful. Later the colony split, the more extreme party moving to the upper Columbia valley in British Columbia, where they have tried the patience of the government of that province, whose government in the summer of 1933 had to arrest most of the adult population and mete out wholesale penalties to stop the burning down of public schools. Most of the colony was transported to Peer's Island to serve time while the children were farmed out to the people of British Columbia.

THE GODLESS STATE

On the outbreak of the revolution in 1917, the Orthodox Church ceased to be the state church. Religious toleration was proclaimed for all. The property of the Church passed into the hands of the state. From the very beginning there was ill will between the clergy and the Communists, all of whom were materialists and hostile to all forms of religion. The clergy resisted expropriation of Church property, and the upper clergy resented the rigid secular control that was set up. Many of them were associated with the White Armies and so brought the whole Church under suspicion. Without actually using force, the Communists did all they could to discredit the Church and to undermine its prestige. The growth of Protestant sects was encouraged with a view to weakening the Church. Protestants sprang up like mushrooms in the first years of their toleration. But the government felt itself forced to take firmer measures in order to root out religion of all kinds. The Archbishop Tikhon, who had been active at the time of the famine of 1921, was very popular. He clashed with the government, which found a pretext for removing him and substituting a more pliant tool at the head of the Church. A militant society of Atheists (*Bezhozniiki*) was started that sought proselytes among the young everywhere, and through its instrumentality many were weaned away from Church teaching. All forms of religious instruction or proselytizing in public was banned. Some of the most venerated religious shrines were torn down, the most famous being the chapel of Our Lady of Iberia in Moscow; many of the churches were closed by the state or taken over to help relieve the housing situation in the overcrowded capital. In the Cathedral of St. Isaac's in Leningrad was set up an atheist exhibition. Formal religion seems almost to have died out in Russia.

It is difficult to determine exactly what part religion plays today in the life of the people of the Soviet Union. To judge from appearances the Communist party's policy has triumphed.

There seem to be no manifestations of religious life anywhere, at least in the cities. The clerical garb is never seen on the streets. The churches are becoming dilapidated—a sorry contrast to the new construction going on elsewhere. Many of them have been turned into dwellings in the effort to relieve the frightful crowding. Some have become national museums. A mere handful are needed to meet the devotional needs of the few of the older generation who have remained true to the faith and seek spiritual consolation in the furtive religious services that, braving official displeasure, awake echoes at rare intervals in the vast unheated spaces of ancient cathedrals. At times one sees an old-style funeral procession that drags its pathetic way through the bustling traffic of the city streets—reminder of the comfort suffering humanity still seeks midst its grief, in heavenly things. At intervals outbreaks among the peasants are disclosed to have had some connection with religion. The press hastens, however, to brand them counter-revolutionary, fanned by former “popes” or *kulaks* who have wormed their way into a collective farm. One is constrained to ask himself whether a people, every act or incident of whose life for centuries had a religious association, can suddenly divest themselves entirely of their traditions and accept the hard, material philosophy of Marxism, which, despite its solicitude for the physical welfare of its adherents, contains no grain of spiritual comfort for the unsuccessful or consolation for the sorrowing.

APPENDICES

MAPS OF
EUROPEAN AND ASIATIC RUSSIA

GLOSSARY

- Aoul*—A Tartar term for village (in the Caucasus).
- Barshchina*—The obligation of the peasant to labor for the lord.
- Boyar*—Member of highest social and political class in Russia.
Voluntary follower of a prince.
- Boyarskaya Duma*—Council of Boyars, corresponding to the *magnum concilium* of the Norman kings of England.
- Byliny*—Ballads.
- Cherta*—A line, usually applied to a line of fortified posts manned by Cossacks.
- Chetvert*—(a) A measurement of land equal to half a desyatina;
(b) a dry measure equal to something under six bushels.
- Desyatina*—A measurement of land equal to 2.7 acres.
- Distrikty*—Term applied to smallest divisions of the provinces (*guberniye*).
- Druzhina*—A retinue of free men who serve a prince. (Like the German *Comitatus*).
- Duma*—The elective assembly created in 1905 by the Tsar Nicholas II.
- Dvor*—Peasant homestead.
- Dvoryanin*—One of the landholding class under obligation to render military or other service.
- Dvoryanstvo*—Nobility (collective noun).
- Dyak*—Clerk. A minor official attached to an administrative organ.
- Gorodishche*—A place where there was some time a town or fortified post.
- Gosplan*—State Planning Commission.
- Gospodin*—Lord. A more general term than *gosudar*.
- Gosudar*—"Lord," an exclusive term of respect usually applied to the Tsar.
- Gramota*—A document, especially one referring to treaties, charters, and so forth.
- Guberniya*—One of the administrative units created by Peter the Great; includes a number of counties.

- Iconostasis*—The altar screen in an Orthodox church displaying ikons. *
- Ispravnik*—One of the elected officials of the nobility.
- Janissaries*—The *corps d'élite* of the Ottoman army. Recruited chiefly from Christians, they became a privileged caste. Destroyed in 1826.
- Kholop*—A bondsman.
- Kibitkas*—The felt tents of the Turkomans.
- Knyaginya*—The wife of a prince.
- Knyaz*—Prince.
- Kormchaya*—Adjective derived from *Kormlenie*.
- Kormlenie*—A system according to which administrative posts such as provincial or district governor in Muscovite Russ were maintained by local contributions.
- Kosh*—General Assembly of the Zaporozhian Cossacks.
- Kremlin*—The citadel in a Russian town.
- Krestyanin*—General name for a peasant.
- Kryepostnie Lyudi*—Serfs.
- Kryepostnoe Pravo*—The status of serfdom applied to peasants of private landlords.
- Kulak*—At first the term generally applied in a Russian village to the well-to-do peasants who were usually money lenders.
- Kurgans*—Tombs covered by mounds.
- Kuriltai*—A great congress of all the princes of the Mongol Empire summoned to elect a Great Khan.
- Myestnichestvo*—System of "places" which governed appointments to offices and safeguarded the political power of the *boyars*.
- Narodniki*—The name applied to those who participated in the movement "To the People" (*V Narod*), under Alexander II, and the group that carried it on.
- Nyemtskaya Sloboda*—German (or foreign) quarter.
- Oblast*—Region.
- Obrok*—"Dues" paid in kind until after the sixteenth century.
- Odnodvorsti*—Single homesteaders, applied to persons receiving small grants of land (which they cultivated themselves) in return for military service.
- Okhrana*—Tsar's secret police.
- Okrug*—"Circle." A general term for a district or region.
- Oprichniki*—Those who served in *oprichnina*.
- Oprichnina*—An organization created by Ivan IV to overthrow the power of the *boyars*.

- Otchina*—The hereditary patrimony of a prince in Kievan Russ; used interchangeably with *Votchina* for allodial lands in Muscovite Russia. The dictionary of Alexandrov makes no distinction.
- Pan*—A Polish landlord.
- Perepisnaya kniga*—A register.
- Pisets*—A scribe.
- Podyak*—An assistant clerk (*dyak*).
- Pomyestye*—An estate held in return for military or other service.
- Posad*—That portion of towns outside the Kremlin.
- Posadnik*—Chief official of a town.
- Preobrazhenskii Prikaz*—An institution founded by Peter the Great for the preservation of public order and named after the village where the Preobrazhenskii Regiment was quartered. It was the prototype of the third section of the Imperial Chancellery, Cheka, and GPU.
- Prikaz*—Administrative bureau.
- Promyshlenniki*—Fur traders.
- Protopop*—Arch priest.
- Provintsia*—A division of a province (*guberniya*).
- Pud*—A measurement of weight—36 pounds avoirdupois.
- Raskolniki*—Old Believers who refused to accept ritual reforms of Nikon.
- Razryadnaya kniga*—An official record of service.
- Shaik*—The well worn trails used by the Tartars in their raids. Usually along the water partings so as to avoid having to ford rivers.
- Slovo i dyelo*—Word and deed. An archaic expression which signifies information on a major crime.
- Socha, Sochi*—Plow land. A land measure like medieval *jugum*.
- Starosta*—A local Polish functionary, or the area he administers.
- Starshinas*—Elders, among the Cossacks.
- Stoglav*—"Hundred chapters," the code drafted by Ivan IV.
- Stryeltsi*—Semi-professional soldiers, organized by Ivan IV, living in special Stryelets Quarters and engaging in trade.
- Sudebniki*—Law books. First one published in 1497.
- Svod Zakonov*—Code of laws drafted under Nicholas I.
- Syech*—Name of the place of meeting of the General Assembly of the Zaporozhian Cossacks.
- Szchlachta*—Gentry. A name applied originally to Polish lesser nobility, transplanted to Russia.

- Taiga*—The open mixed forest of Siberia.
- Tamga*—Tribute. A Tartar word.
- Terem*—Tsar's private living quarters.
- Tundra*—Marshy land along the northern part of Russia and Siberia, resting on subsoil perpetually frozen.
- Tyaglo*—A direct tax paid by peasants and townsmen.
- Udyely*—The portion each son received as inheritance with full sovereign rights.
- Ukaz*—Decree.
- Ulozhenie*—Law code drafted in 1648-1649 to replace the *sudebnik* of 1550.
- Usadba*—House, outshouses, and land surrounding them.
- Uyezdi*—Counties.
- Verst*—A linear measurement equal to two-thirds of a mile.
- Volnitsa*—Volunteers.
- Volož*—A water parting across which travellers carried their boats, almost equivalent to a "portage."
- Volost*—Province. In early times, the area under the jurisdiction of a town.
- Votchina*—Unconditionally held estate; gradually became fused with *pomyestye*; used interchangeably with *otchina* (q.v.).
- Voyevode*—A military commander or provincial governor.
- Vyeche*—Town assembly in early Russian towns.
- Yarliq*—A decree of the Khan usually naming the Grand Prince.
- Zakladchiki*—Those peasants who had mortgaged or pledged their land.
- Zakreplenie*—Literally "fastening"—the process by which peasants became bound to the soil.
- Zemshchina*—That portion of the realm left under the boyars' rule.
- Zemskii Sobor*—The Russian parliament or estates general.
- Zheldaki*—One of the special military forces of pre-Petrine Russia.

RUSSIAN HISTORY

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

Note: Unless otherwise indicated, days of the month, for the period up to 1917 are given according to the Julian calendar (Old Style: O. S.); subsequent to the November revolution, according to the Gregorian calendar (New Style: N. S.).

- 852-862 Traditional beginning of the Russian nation (Rurik).
- 912 Death of Oleg.
- 912-945 Igor, Grand Prince.
- 945-972 Svyatoslav, Grand Prince.
- 945 Igor's treaty with the Greeks.
- 987 Vladimir summons *boyars* and city council.
- 988-989 Christianity established as the religion of Russia.
- 991 Vladimir builds city of Byelgorod.
- 1039 Beginning of Early Chronicle.
- 1076 Svyatoslav dies.
- 1087 Vsevolod succeeds Svyatoslav to throne of Kiev.
- 1093 Vsevolod dies.
- 1097 Council at Lyubech.
- 1113-1125 Vladimir Monomakh, Grand Prince of Kiev.
- 1132 Death of Mstislav, son of Monomakh.
- 1146 Igor assumes throne of Kiev.
- 1149-1154 Struggle between Yuri Dolgorukii and Iziaslav of Volhynia.
- 1160 Rostov destroyed by fire.
- 1162 Birth of Jinghis Khan.
- 1168 Rostislav dies at Kiev. Vladimir succeeds.
- 1169 Andrew Bogolubskii captures Kiev and assumes title of Grand Prince.
- 1174 Andrew Bogolubskii assassinated.
- 1176 Mikhail and Vsevolod install themselves at Vladimir.
- 1177 Mikhail dies.
- 1178 Battle on river Koloksha.
- 1184 Vsevolod carries out a successful campaign against the Bulgars.
- 1195 Death of Svyatoslav.
- 1206 Constantine sent to Novgorod as prince.

- 1212 Vsevolod rules Suzdal. Dies same year.
- 1224 (May 21) Battle on the Kalka.
- 1227 Death of Jinghis Khan.
- 1237 Death of Yuri.
- 1240-1263 Alexander Nevskii, Grand Prince of Novgorod.
- 1242 Yaroslav confirmed in office by the Great Khan.
- 1245 Peace made with Livonian Knights.
- 1246-1248 Svyatoslav, Grand Prince.
- 1248 Death of Michael Khorobriti.
- 1251 Andrei denounced to the Khan.
- 1252-1263 Alexander Nevskii, Grand Prince of Vladimir.
- 1257 Death of Baty.
- 1268 Svyatoslav victorious over Lithuanians at Rakovar.
- 1270 Revolt in Novgorod.
- 1271 Yaroslav Yaroslavich journeys to the Horde.
- 1276 Vasilii, Prince of Kostroma, succeeds to Vladimir on the Kliazma, Senior Suzerain throne. Dies same year.
- 1303 Daniel secures Pereyasavl.
- 1304 Death of Daniel Alexandrovich.
- 1304-1319 Michael of Tver, Grand Prince of Vladimir.
- 1318 Death of Michael of Tver at the Golden Horde.
- 1319 Yuri named Grand Prince.
- 1324 Dmitrii named Grand Prince.
- 1327 Revolt in Tver.
- 1328-1341 Grand Prince Ivan Kalita.
- 1339 Alexander Mikhailovich put to death at the Horde.
- 1341 Death of Gedymin.
- 1345-1377 Prince Olgerd in Lithuania.
- 1353 Simeon Gordyi, Suzerain Prince of Moscow, dies, bequeathing his appanage to his wife, who in her turn bequeathes it to her late husband's brother, Ivan.
- 1353-1359 Ivan II.
- 1362 Podolia taken from Tartars and incorporated in Lithuania.
- 1370 Battle of Rudau near Königsberg.
- 1377-1434 Jagiello, Duke of the Lithuanians.
- 1380 Battle of Kulikovo—victory by Dmitrii.
- 1382 Tokhtamysh, who superseded Mamai as Khan of the Golden Horde, inflicts vengeance on Moscow for Dmitrii's victory at Kulikovo (1380).
- 1386 Jagiello marries Princess Hedwig of Poland.

- 1389 (May 19) Death of Dmitrii.
- 1389-1425 Vasilii I, Grand Prince of Moscow.
- 1392-1430 Prince Witold in Lithuania.
- 1395 Tamerlane invades southern steppes.
- 1399 Tamerlane defeats the Lithuanians on the Vorskla at Poltava.
- 1410 Battle of Tannenberg (Grünwald).
- 1413 Diet of Horodlo.
- 1425 Death of Grand Prince Vasilii I.
- 1425-1462 Vasilii II.
- 1430 Death of Witold.
- 1439 Council of Florence.
- 1446 (February) Vasilii blinded and sent to Vologda; restored in 1447.
- 1453 Constantinople falls to Mohammed II.
- 1462-1505 Grand Prince Ivan III.
- 1470 Death of Archbishop Jonas.
- 1471 Novgorod begins its last decisive struggle with Moscow.
Conquest of Novgorod.
- 1472 Ivan III marries Sophia Paleolog, a Greek Princess.
- 1474 Representatives of the Golden Horde appear in Moscow to demand tribute for the last time.
- ~1480 Boris and Maurice Andrei revolt.
- 1484-1485 Ivan III takes Ryazan and Tver.
- 1486 Arrival of Papal ambassador from Emperor Frederick III.
- 1487 Peace between Poland and Lithuania.
- 1489 Ivan despatches Trachaniotes as ambassador to the Emperor.
- 1490 Grand Prince Ivan opens relations with Chagatai.
- 1491 First stone palace—*Granovitaya Palata*.
- 1492 Death of Casimir.
- 1493 First diplomatic relations with Georgia.
- 1495 Moscow attacked and Vasilii defeated at Suzdal.
- 1497 *Sudebnik* enacts a legal code for peasants to change abode.
Beginning of serfdom.
- 1498 Ivan's son Vasilii proclaimed Grand Prince and Gosudar of Novgorod and Pskov.
- 1505-1533 Grand Prince Vasilii III.
- 1508 Tartar Khan threatens Moscow.
- 1510 Fall of Pskov. Pskov added to Moscow in 1511.
- 1514 Smolensk was added to Moscow.
- 1522 Vasilii arranges armistice with Lithuania.

- 1525 Vasilii divorces Salamonia.
- 1526 End of war with Poland.
- 1526-1533 Herberstein, envoy of Charles V, in Moscow.
- 1530 Birth of Ivan IV (the Terrible).
- 1533-1584 Grand Prince and Tsar, Ivan IV (the Terrible).
- 1545-1563 Council of Trent.
- 1547 Assumption of title of "Tsar" on January 16 and marriage of Ivan IV and Anastasia Romanovna on February 3.
- 1550 The *Sudebnik* and *Stoglav* codes.
- 1550 Tsar summons an assembly in Moscow (the first). *Zemskii Sobor*.
- 1551 An ecclesiastical Council convenes.
- 1552 Conquest of Kazan. Brought under Russian control.
- 1553 Chancellor reaches Archangel'sk, Bay of St. Nicholas, and opens direct communication between England and Russia.
- 1553 Establishment of the Muscovy company.
- 1556 Conquest of Astrakhan.
- 1558-1583 Ivan IV begins war with Livonia.
- 1560 Ivan IV's wife (Anastasia Romanovna) dies.
- 1563 Peace negotiations with Poland. Treaty of Dorpat.
- 1564 Ivan IV leaves Moscow for Alexandrov.
- 1565 Ivan IV makes triumphal return to Moscow.
- 1565 The *Oprichnina*.
- 1569 Diet and Union of Lublin. Poland absorbs Lithuania.
- 1571 and 1572 The Khan of the Crimea succeeds in attacking Moscow.
- 1571 Treaty of Stettin isolating Ivan.
- 1572 Death of Sigismund II, Augustus, King of Poland, last of the line of Jagiello.
- 1573 Henry of Valois chosen King of Poland.
- 1575-1586 Stephen Bathory, King of Poland.
- 1579 Bathory declares war on Moscow.
- 1581 Possevino, Jesuit emissary, despatched to Moscow.
- 1582-1583 Ivan the Terrible concludes truce with Bathory and Sweden at Yam Zapolskii.
- 1584 Yermak overthrows Khanate of Siberia.
- 1584 Dmitrii exiled to Uglich.
- 1585 Yermak ambushed and killed.
- 1589 Establishment of Patriarchate at Moscow.
- 1591 Death of Tsarevich Dmitrii at Uglich.

- 1595 Council of Brest.
- 1603 Turukhansk founded.
- 1604 The "False Demetrius" enters Russia from Poland.
- 1604 Foundation of Tomsk, on the river Tom, a tributary of the Ob'.
- 1605 Death of Tsar Boris and accession of the Pretender Dmitrii.
- 1606-1610 Tsar Vasilii Shuiskii.
- 1606 (May 19) Vasilii Ivanovich Shuiskii proclaimed Tsar.
- 1609 Invasion of Russia by King Sigismund of Poland. Siege of Smolensk.
- 1610 Vasilii deposed and forced to enter a monastery.
- 1611 First national levy.
- 1611 Hermogenes, Patriarch of Moscow, heads a revolt.
- 1611 The army of Procopius Liapunov.
- 1611-1612 The army of Prince Pozharskii and Minin.
- 1611 Thief of Tushino killed December 11.
- 1613 (February 21) Michael Fedorovich Romanov elected Tsar.
- 1616 Hostilities break out with Poland.
- 1617 (March 10) Treaty of Peace of Stolbovo with Sweden.
- 1618 Foundation of Kuznetskii on the river Tom, a tributary of the Ob'.
- 1618 (October 12) The peace with Poland (Truce of Deulino).
- 1622 Kuznetskii becomes a town with its own *voyevode*.
- 1632 Death of King Sigismund III of Poland.
- 1632-1634 War with Poland.
- 1633 Death of Patriarch Philaret.
- 1634 Treaty of Polyanovka between Poland and Russia.
- 1637 Azov captured by Don Cossacks.
- 1640 Tartars raid Poland.
- 1642 *Zemskii Sobor*.
- 1644 Waldemar of Denmark arrives in Moscow to marry Helen.
- 1645 (July 12) Death of Mikhail.
- 1645-1676 Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich.
- 1648 Death of Vladislav.
- 1648 Bogdan Khmel'nitskii heads a rising of the Zaporozhian Cossacks.
- 1648 Battle of Zel'tye Vody (Yellow Waters).
- 1649 *Ulozhenie* printed.
- 1649 (August 21) Compact of Zborow.
- 1651 Russians first encounter the Buryats.

- 1651 (July) Poles defeat Khmelnitskii.
- 1654 Cossacks finally received into Muscovite allegiance.
- 1655 Charles X of Sweden declares war against Poland.
- 1655 War between Moscow and Sweden.
- 1655 (October 10) Charles X formally annexes Estates of Lithuania.
- 1657 (July 26) Tsar Alexei invades Livonia.
- 1657 Alliance between Emperor Leopold I and John Casimir.
- 1657 Death of Bogdan Khmelnitskii.
- 1658 Patriarch Nikon retires to a monastery.
- 1658 Truce between Russia and Sweden.
- 1659 (July 8) Muscovite army annihilated at Konotop.
- 1660 Peace of Oliva between Poland and Sweden.
- 1661 Tsar forced to make peace with Sweden (Peace of Kardis)
July 2.
- 1662 (July) Revolt in Moscow.
- 1667 (February 11) Truce of Andrussovo; Moscow secures Smolensk, Kiev, and Little Russia east of the Dnieper.
- 1667 Sten'ka Razin appears on the scene.
- 1667 Patriarch Nikon deposed.
- 1669-1671 Sten'ka Razin's rebellion.
- 1669-1670 Peace of Andrussovo.
- 1672 (October 17) Treaty of Budziak.
- 1673 Jan Sobieski elected King of Poland.
- 1673 War with Turkey.
- 1675 (October 16) Peace of Zorawno.
- 1676 (January) Death of Tsar Alexei.
- 1676-1682 Tsar Fedor Alexeyevich.
- 1677 War between Russia and Turkey.
- 1682-1689 Regency of Tsarevna Sophia.
- 1682 Accession of Peter the Great and the revolt of the *stryeltsi*.
- 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk.
- 1689 Attempted *coup d'état* by Sophia against Peter. Sophia imprisoned in a convent.
- 1689 V. V. Golitsyn leads second expedition upon the Crimea.
- 1689 Marriage of Peter with Evdokia Lopukhina.
- 1690-1718 Alexei Petrovich, Tsarevich (only son of Peter I).
- 1695-1696 The Azov campaigns.
- 1696 Election to the Polish throne of Augustus, Elector of Saxony (Augustus II).
- 1697-1698 Peter's foreign travels.

- 1699 (January) Treaty of Carlowitz.
1703 Foundation of St. Petersburg.
1704 Russians take Narva.
1705 Revolt of the *stryeltsi* at Astrakhan.
1706 Election of Stanislaus Leszczyński as King of Poland.
1706 Treaty of Alt-Ranstadt between Sweden and Poland.
1709 (May) Charles XII lays siege to Poltava.
1709 (June 27) Battle of Poltava. Augustus returns to Poland.
1711 Campaign of the Pruth. Treaty of Pruth (Russia and Turkey, July 12).
1711 Establishment of the Senate.
1715 Russian expedition into central Asia.
1717 Peter sends military expedition to Khiva.
1717 Alexei escapes abroad.
1718 (September 26) *Ukaz* regarding census.
1718 Death of Alexei (Petrovich).
1721 Treaty of Nystadt between Sweden and Russia (September).
1722 Russian expansion in the Caspian provinces of Persia.
1722 (January 24) Table of Ranks.
1723 (September 12) Treaty signed between Russia and Persia.
1727 Treaty of Bura (Kiakhtha).
1735 Treaty of Gandja restored Russian conquests to Persia.
1735 Russo-Turkish war begins.
1739 Peace signed with Turkey.
1742 Charles Peter Ulrich, Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, brought to Russia and proclaimed heir by Elizabeth.
1742 Defensive alliance with England.
1743 (August) Treaty of Åbo between Sweden and Russia.
1744 Princess Sophia of Anhalt-Zerbst arrives in St. Petersburg.
1745 Treaty of Warsaw—England and Holland join Austria and Saxony.
1745 (June) Austro-Russian alliance.
1747 (December 9) Treaty of St. Petersburg.
1754 (September 20) Birth of Emperor Paul.
1754 Line of the Irtysh superseded by line on the Ishim.
1756-1762 Russia's part in the Seven Years' War.
1757 (February) Austro-Russian Convention. Alliance with France.
1762 Emancipation of the nobility from compulsory service by *ukaz*.
1762 (June) Junker revolution raising Catherine to the throne.

- λ 1762 Russo-Prussian Peace and Alliance.
- 1763 Death of King Augustus III of Poland.
- 1767-1768 The Commission for framing a new code of laws.
- 1768 Turkey declares war on Russia.
- 1768-1774 First Turkish War.
- 1770 Austria formally annexes Zips.
- 1772 (August) First Partition of Poland.
- 1774 (July) Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji.
- 1774 Paul marries Princess Wilhelmina of Schleswig Arnstadt.
- 1777 (December 12 [23]) Birth of Alexander I.
- 1779 Treaty of Teschen between Austria and Prussia.
- 1783 Russia annexes the Crimea.
- 1784 Russian troops withdrawn from Georgia.
- 1787 (August 15) Turkey declares war on Russia.
- 1787 (October 27) Treaty of Paris.
- 1788-1790 Swedish War.
- 1790 (February) Death of Joseph II. Accession of Leopold II.
- 1790 (July) Leopold II and Frederick William II meet at Reichenbach. Convention signed.
- 1791 The Russians attack Turkey.
- 1792 Peace of Jassy between Russia and Turkey in January.
- 1793 Alexander marries Louisa Augusta.
- 1793 (January) Second partition of Poland.
- 1794 (October 10) Battle of Maciejowice.
- 1795 (January 3) Treaty between the Emperor and Catherine II for the partition or acquisition of Turkey, Venice, Bavaria, and Poland. Third partition of Poland.
- 1796 Tiflis sacked and taken by Persia.
- 1796 (November 16) Death of Catherine II.
- 1796-1801 Emperor Paul I.
- 1797 (October 17) Peace of Campo Formio (France and Austria).
- 1799 Suvorov's campaigns in Italy and Switzerland.
- 1799 (January 2) Great Britain joins the Russo-Turkish Alliance.
- 1799 Second Coalition (Great Britain, Austria, Russia, Naples, and the Porte).
- 1800 (May 17) Death of Suvorov.
- 1800 (June) Battle of Marengo.
- 1800 King of Georgia dies, leaving his kingdom to Paul.
- 1800 (May) Bonaparte crosses the St. Bernard.
- 1801 Murder of Emperor Paul, March 23.

- 1801 (September 12) Annexation of Georgia.
- 1801 (September 26) Treaty between Russia and France.
- 1801 (March) Accession of Alexander I. Reigned to 1825.
- 1802 (March 26) Peace of Amiens.
- 1802 Derbend, Daghestan, and Baku give allegiance to Russia.
- 1803 Peasants in Baltic Province freed.
- 1804 (March 9) Duc d'Enghien killed.
- 1804 Treaties of alliance between Russia, Austria, Great Britain, and Sweden.
- 1805 Russia participates in Austrian coalition against France (Great Britain and Austria). Third Coalition.
- 1805 Battle of Austerlitz, December 2.
- 1805 (December 26) Peace of Pressburg.
- 1806 (December) War between Russia and Turkey.
- 1806 (October 14) Battle of Jena.
- 1807 Fourth Coalition. Russia participates in Prussian coalition against France.
- 1807 (April) Convention of Bartenstein between Alexander and Frederick William.
- 1807 (July 9) Treaty of Tilsit between France and Russia.
- 1808 (October 12) Congress and Convention of Erfurt.
- 1809 (January) Mobilization of Austrians.
- 1809 Russia annexes Finland.
- 1809 (July 12) France and Austria sign armistice.
- 1809 (October 14) Treaty of Peace between Austria and France.
- 1810 (January 1) Opening of Speranskii's new Council of State.
- 1812 Persian forces defeated by Abbas Mirza in alliance with Napoleon.
- 1812 (May) Peace of Bucharest between Russia and Turkey.
- 1812 (August 24-25 [O.S.]) Battle of Borodino.
- 1812 (September 2) The burning of Moscow.
- 1812 French occupy Moscow September 14 to October 15, when the retreat begins.
- 1812 (December) Napoleon reaches Paris.
- 1812 (November) The crossing of the Beresina.
- 1813 (January) Alexander I sets out to carry war beyond frontiers of Russia.
- 1813 (October 12 [24]) Treaty of Gulistan.
- ✕ 1813 (February) Convention of Kalisch (alliance between Russia and Prussia).

- 1813 (May-August) Armistice in Germany.
- 1813 (May) Battle of Bautzen.
- 1813 (July 15-27) Treaty of Reichenbach (Russia, Prussia, Austria).
- 1813 (September) Battle of Kulm.
- 1813 (September 9) Treaty of Teplitz (Austria and Prussia).
- 1813 (September 4, 5, 6, 7 [16, 17, 18, 19]) "Battle of the Nations."
- 1814 (January) Conference at Chantillon (conference of ambassadors).
- 1814 (March) Quadruple alliance of Chaumont.
- 1814 (March 31) Alexander enters Paris.
- 1814 (February 17) Treaty between Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England.
- 1814 (May [18] 30) First Treaty of Paris.
- 1814 (September) Congress of Vienna meets.
- 1815 (May 25-June 9) The Treaty of Vienna.
- 1815 The Holy Alliance.
- 1815 (June 18) Battle of Waterloo.
- 1815 (November) Ionian islands pass from double sovereignty of Turkey and Russia to complete independence under guarantee of Britain.
- 1815 (November) Second Peace of Paris.
- 1815 (November 27) Alexander approves the new constitution for Poland.
- 1816 (January 1) Manifesto of Alexander I.
- 1816 (April 17) Birth of Alexander II.
- 1817 (March) Alexander I opens first meeting of Polish Diet.
- 1817 Union of Welfare.
- 1818 (October) Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle.
- 1820 Congress of Troppau.
- 1820 Neapolitan revolt.
- 1821 Conference of Laibach.
- 1822 (January) Constantine formally renounces rights to the throne.
- 1822 Polish conspiracy unearthed.
- 1822 Congress of Verona.
- 1825 Conference of St. Petersburg.
- 1825 (November 19) Death of Alexander I.
- 1825 (December 14) Rising.
- 1825-1855 Nicholas I.
- 1826-1828 Persian War.

- 1826 Treaty of Akkerman between Russia and Turkey.
1826 (April 4) Protocol of St. Petersburg.
1827 (October) Battle of Navarino.
1827 (July) Treaty of London between Great Britain, Russia, and France.
1828-1829 The Turkish War.
1828 (February 10-22) Treaty of Turkmenchai between Russia and Persia.
1829 (September 2 [14]) Treaty of Adrianople between Russia and Turkey gives Caucasus to Russia.
1830 (Feb. 3 [NS]) Protocol of London.
1830 The Polish Rebellion.
1831 (February) Battle of Grochow, near Warsaw.
1831 (September 8) Entry of Russian troops into Warsaw.
1832 (February 14 [26]) The "Organic Statute."
1832 Campaign begins for conquest of the Caucasus under the command of Rosen and Veliaminov.
1833 Convention of Münchengrätz between Russia, Prussia, and Austria.
1833 Appearance of the Complete Collection of Laws (*Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov*), and of the Code of Laws (*Svod Zakonov*) of the Russian Empire.
1833 Convention of Teplitz.
1833 Convention of Kiutayeh (Sultan and Mehemet Ali).
1833 (July) Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi between Russia and the Porte.
1835 Death of Emperor Francis.
1836 Struggle begins between Russia and Lesghian Tartars under Shamyl.
1839 Anglo-Russian understanding.
1839 Second expedition sent to Khiva.
1840 Dost Mohammed recovers his throne.
1841 Treaty of London.
1842 Peace concluded between Russia and Khan of Khiva.
1842 Amu Darya brought under Russian influence.
1847 Russian port established at the mouth of the Syr Darya.
1847 Town of Kopal founded.
1847 Nikolai Muravyev-Amurskii, Governor General of Eastern Siberia.
1848 (February 22) Revolution breaks out in Paris.

- 1849 Russia joins Austria in suppressing Hungarian revolt.
1849 (December 15) Franz Joseph deposed.
1851-1858 Muravyev-Amurskii's campaigns in Amur district.
1852 Conference in London gives Schleswig and Holstein to Denmark.
1853 Congress of Vienna (Austria and Prussia, England and France).
1853 Russians captured the Kokandian stronghold of Ak-Mechet.
1853 (January) Nicholas I reopens the Eastern question to Sir Hamilton Seymour.
1853 (October 1) Turkey declares war.
1853 (October) Sultan demands that Russia evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia; declares war on Russia.
1853 (November) Russian fleet destroys Turkish squadron at Sinope.
1854 Great Britain and France declare war on March 27.
1854 (March) Crimean war begins.
1854 (September 20) Franco-British forces defeat Russians at the Alma and advance on Sevastopol.
1855 (March 2) Death of Nicholas.
1855-1881 Emperor Alexander II.
1855 (March) Peace conference between Russia and the Allies opens at Vienna.
1855 (Summer) Occupation of points along the lower Amur by Russian settlers with official sanction.
1855 (September 8) French capture Malakov redoubt at Sevastopol.
1855 (September 9) Fall of Sevastopol.
1856 Treaty of Paris ends Crimean War.
1857 (January 3) Alexander's committee on peasant reforms.
1858 Treaty of Aigun. China surrenders left bank of Amur to Russia.
1859 Northeastern Caucasus finally conquered. August 25, Shamyl surrenders Guneeb to the Russians.
1860 Russian party occupies a site on Peter the Great Bay, Vladivostok.
1860 (November 2) Treaty of Peking.
1861 (February 19) *Polozhenie* (the Act of Emancipation).
1863 (January) Polish Insurrection.
1864 (October 15) Treaty of Vienna.

- 1864 (November 20) Court reforms. *Zemstvo* institutions.
1866 Kojent falls.
1867 (October 18) Russia sells Alaska to United States.
1868 Emir of Bokhara is deprived of Samarkand.
1868 Annexation of Bokhara.
1871 Death of Shamyl.
1871 (April 27 [May 10]) Treaty of Frankfurt.
1872 "Three Emperors League" revived.
1873 (August) Khiva submitted to the Russians.
1874 Transcaspian military district formed.
1875 (September) Russians take Kokand.
1876 Annexation of Kokand. (Ferghana).
1876 (July) Alexander and Franz Joseph meet at Reichstadt.
1877 (January) The agreement of Reichstadt is converted into a formal treaty. Convention of Budapest.
1877-1878 The Turkish War and the fall of Plevna.
1878 (February 19) Treaty of San Stefano.
1878 Congress of Berlin. Treaty signed July 13.
1880 Trans-Caspian line is begun.
1880 (February 5 [17]) Explosion in Winter Palace.
1881 General Skobelev storms the stronghold of Geok Tepe. Assassination of Alexander II.
1881 Skobelev subdues the Turcomans.
1883 "Freedom of Labor" formed.
1885 (March) Afghans driven out of Pandjeh by the Russians.
1888 Russian railway reaches Samarkand.
1891 First protective tariff.
1892 Witte becomes Minister of Finance. Financial reforms in Russia begin.
1893 Commercial treaty with France.
1894 Commercial treaty with Germany.
1894 Dual Alliance concluded—Russia and France.
1894 Death of Alexander III.
1894-1917 Emperor Nicholas II. Accession on November 1.
1894 Sino-Japanese War.
1895 (April 17) Treaty of Shimonoseki.
1895 Joint Anglo-Russian Commission fixes the boundary in the Pamir region.
1898 (March 1) Meeting at Minsk of group which formed the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' party.

- 1900 Boxer Revolt.
- 1901 Lenin escapes from Siberia.
- 1902 Japanese alliance with Great Britain.
- 1903 Pogroms on Jews.
- 1903 Witte dismissed from his post as minister of finance. Named Chairman of committee of ministers; Kokovtsev becomes minister of finance.
- 1904 (February) Russo-Japanese War breaks out.
- 1904 (April) Entente Cordiale.
- 1904 (May 14) Port Arthur isolated.
- 1904 (August 29) Kuroki begins battle of Liao Yang.
- 1904 (October 5) Battles of the Sha Ho.
- 1905 (January) Fall of Port Arthur. General Stoessel's surrender.
- 1905 (January 9 [O.S.] Bloody Sunday.
- 1905 (February 23-March 16) Battle of Mukden.
- 1905 (May 27-28) Battle of Tsushima. Defeat and destruction of Russian navy.
- 1905 (August 29) Treaty of Portsmouth.
- 1905 (November 16) Manifesto ends altogether (as of January 1, 1906) payment of redemptory sums on *Nadyeli*.
- 1905 (October 17) Manifesto conceding civil rights and Constitution.
- 1905 (December) Revolution under way.
- 1906 (May 10) Meeting of first Duma.
- 1906 (July 21) Duma dissolved.
- 1909 Treaty of Racconigi.
- 1914 (June 28) Assassination of Franz Ferdinand at Sarejevo.
- 1914 (October 14) Turkey joins Central Powers.
- 1914 (August 17) Rennenkampf crosses frontier.
- 1914 (August 31) Last day of Battle of Tannenberg.
- 1915 (June 20) Fall of Lemberg.
- 1915 (September 5) Tsar Nicholas II takes personal command of army.
- 1917 (February 23 [O.S.]) Revolution begins.
- 1917 (March 15) Abdication of Nicholas.
- 1917 Imperial family transferred from Tobolsk to Ekaterinburg.
- 1917 (April 6) U. S. enters war.
- 1917 (May 18) Provisional government reorganized.
- 1917 (September 13) Kerensky heads Directory.
- 1917 (October 20) Pre-Parliament opens in Petrograd.

- 1917 (October 25) State power passed into hands of Military Revolutionary Committee.
- 1917 (October 24) Final preparations for uprising made. Provisional Government closes Bolshevik newspapers—*Soldat* and *Rabochii Put*.
- 1917 (October 25) Provisional Government overthrown. Kerensky flees.
- 1917 (October 25) Second Congress of Soviets opened in Petrograd.
- 1917 (December 14) Armistice concluded with the Central Powers.
- 1917 (December 22) Peace negotiations start at Brest Litovsk.
- 1918 (January 8-February 10) Negotiations resumed at Brest Litovsk.
- 1918 (January 19) Constituent Assembly dismissed by the commander of the guard of sailors and soldiers appointed to watch it.
- 1918 (February 19) Soviet Government agrees to sign peace.
- 1918 (July) The former Tsar and members of his family murdered at Ekaterinburg.
- 1918 (November 11) Armistice ending Great War.
- 1918 (November) Bolsheviks denounce Treaty of Brest Litovsk.
- 1918 Organization of *Cheka*.
- 1919 (August 23) Denikin takes Odessa.
- 1919 (October 14) Denikin occupies Orel. Farthest point of his advance.
- 1920 (June 6) Wrangel moves forward into Ukraine.
- 1920 (October 12) Preliminary Peace Treaty signed with Poland at Riga.
- 1920 (October 28) Red forces attack Wrangel.
- 1920 (November) Wrangel evacuates the Crimea.
- 1921 (March 21) Lenin proclaims NEP.
- 1922 Treaty of Union (Ukraine, White Russia, R.S.F.S.R., and Transcaucasian Republic) ratified by Congress of Soviets.
- 1922-1923 Conference at Lausanne.
- 1923 Reform of the currency.
- 1923 (June 13) Soviet government accedes to Lord Curzon's ultimatum.
- 1924 (January 31) Second Congress of Soviets of U.S.S.R. ratifies constitution.
- 1924 (January 31) Death of Lenin.
- 1924 (October 8-9) Campbell affair in British House of Commons. Zinovyev letter.

- 1924 (November) France formally recognizes Soviet Russia.
- 1925 Revolution in China.
- 1926 Russo-German trade treaty.
- 1926 Locarno pact.
- 1927 (November 7) Trotsky attempts demonstration in streets on anniversary of Revolution.
- 1930 Commercial treaty between Russia and England.
- 1931-1932 Famine in Ukraine.
- 1934 United States recognizes Soviet Russia.
- 1934 Soviet Russia joins League of Nations.
- 1934 Assassination of Kirov.
- 1935 Mutual assistance treaty signed with Czecho-Slovakia.
- 1936 Adoption of the New Soviet Constitution.
- 1936 Treaty of Montreux.
- 1936 Anti-*Komintern* Pact.
- 1937 Trotsky deported from Norway. Goes to Mexico.
- 1937 Marshal Tukachevskii condemned to death.
- 1939 (August 20) Trade Treaty with Germany.
- 1939 (August 23) Announcement of non-aggression pact with Germany.
- 1939 (September 15) Truce between Japan and Mongol forces.
- 1939 (September 16) Soviet forces occupy part of Poland.
- 1939 (October 5) Latvia signs pact with Soviet Union, giving up her independence.
- 1939 (November 30) War begins with Finland.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

TO GAIN a knowledge of Russian history, one must face the fact that the basic work in this field has been done by Russian scholars, few of whose books are available in English or in any other language of western Europe. In preparing subjects for further reading, preference has been given to books in English; books in French or German are a second choice. It is felt, however, that the student should be familiar with at least the names of Russian scholars and their works where these have been vital contributions. An effort has been made to restrict the list to works which are indispensable for the student who has not a command of Russian. Attention is here drawn to two foreign scholars whose books are invaluable; these are Kazimierz Waliszewski, who has to his credit a large number of monographs, and R. Nisbet Bain, an English scholar whose books deal with special periods of Russian history.

Note: Under the present regime, the publication and sale of books, as of everything else in the Soviet Union, is entirely controlled by the government. Publishing houses that existed before the revolution have been suppressed. Their productions can now be obtained from the Antiquarian Department of the *Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga*, 18 Kuznetskii Most, Moscow. Current publications of any agency of the Soviet Government must be ordered abroad through the same *Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga*. The latter maintains representatives in countries with which the Soviet Union has diplomatic relations. In the case of the United States, the agency is *Bookniga Corporation*, New York.

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GEOGRAPHY OF RUSSIA

- Reclus, Jean J. Élisée, *Earth and Its Inhabitants: The Universal Geography*, 19 vols. Vols. V and VI, edited by E. G. Ravenstein and A. H. Keane. New York: Appleton, 1882-1895.
- Vidal de la Blache, P., and Gallois, L. (eds.), *Géographie universelle*, vol. V. Paris: A. Colin, 1927—.
- Kudrashev, K. V., *Russkii Istoricheskii Atlas* (Russian Historical Atlas). Moscow and Leningrad: 1928. Extremely difficult to obtain, but seems to be the only adequate and up-to-date historical atlas.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

- Ikonnikov, V. S., *Opyt russkoi istoriografii* (Essay in Russian Historiography), 2 vols. Kiev: 1891-1892.

- Kerner, Robert J., *Slavic Europe: A selected bibliography in the Western European Languages*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918. Treats historiography only incidentally.
- Mezhov, V. I., *Russkaya istoricheskaya bibliografiya, 1800-1854* (Russian historical bibliography), 3 vols. St. Petersburg: 1892-1893.

There are also extensive historical bibliographies covering different phases of Russian history by V. I. Mezhov and P. and B. Lambin (see Kerner).

RUSSIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

The following are suggested as introductory material:

- Mazour, Anatole G., *An Outline of Modern Russian Historiography* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1939.
- , "Modern Russian Historiography," *The Journal of Modern History*, pp. 169-202, vol. IX (June 1937). No. 2.
- Milyukov, P., *Glavniya Tечения russkoi istoricheskoi mysli* (Main Currents of Russian Historical Thought). St. Petersburg: 1913. Third edition, 1937.
- Picheta, V. I., *Vvedenie v Russkuyu Istoriyu (Istochniki i Istorio-grafiya)* (Introduction to Russian History: Sources and Historiography). Moscow: 1923.
- Starchevskii, A., *Ocherk Literatury russkoi istorii do Karamzina* (Outline of the literature of Russian history up to Karamzin). St. Petersburg: 1845.

PRINTED SOURCE MATERIAL

Primary Sources

For the Kievan and Mongol periods, the chief sources for Russian history are the chronicles, the earliest being that known as the *Pov'est Vremmenykh Lyet* (Chronicle of Past Times), composed at the Pecherskii Crypt at Kiev about 1039. This chronicle served as a nucleus for a whole series of annals which accumulated in the course of time by adding to and continuing the original. These chronicles were assembled and edited critically by the Archaeographical Commission beginning in 1846 in a collection known as *Polnoe Sobranie Lyetopisei* (Complete Collection of Chronicles). A new edition is now in course of publication.

Little documentary material has survived from early times. There is a collection entitled *Treaties dealing with the Relations of Northwestern Russia with Riga and the Hanseatic Cities in the XIIth, XIIIth, and XIVth Centuries* (St. Petersburg: 1857, Archeographical Commission, 1857). For the internal development of Russia in the late Middle Ages and early modern times, we have a series published also by the Archeographical Commission. The most important of these are:

- Akty odnosyashchiesya k istorii zapadnoi Rossii* (Documents relating to the history of western Russia), 5 vols. St. Petersburg: 1846-1853.
- Akty odnosyashchiesya k istorii yuzhnoi i zapadnoi Rossii* (Documents relating to the history of southern and western Russia), 15 vols. 1361-1659. St. Petersburg: 1861-1892.
- Akty odnosyashchiesya do yuridicheskago byta drevnei Rossii* (Documents relating to the legal customs of ancient Russia), 3 vols. St. Petersburg: 1857-1884.
- Akty yuridicheskie ili sobranie form starinnago dyeloporizvodstva* (Legal documents or a collection of ancient forms of procedure). St. Petersburg: 1838.
- Akty istoricheskiye sobrannye i izdannye Arkheograficheskoyu Kommissieyu* (Historical documents collected and published by the Archeographical Commission), 5 vols. St. Petersburg: 1841-1842.
- Akty sobrannye Kavkazskoiu Arkheograficheskoiu Kommissieyu. Arkhiv Glavnago Upravleniya Namestika Kavkaza* (Documents collected by the Caucasian Archeographical Commission. The Archive of the Central Office of the Viceroy of the Caucasus), 12 vols. Tiflis: 1866-1904.
- Dopolneniya k aktam istoricheskim* (Supplement to historical documents). St. Petersburg: 1896.
- Akty sobrannye Arkheograficheskoyu ekspedytsieyu imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk* (Documents collected by the Archeographical Board of the Academy of Science), 4 vols. St. Petersburg: 1836-1839.
- Akty izdavaemye kommissieyu vysochaishe-uchrezhdemoyu dlya razbora drevnikh aktov v Vil'nie* (Documents published by the Commission established by His Majesty for the collection of documents in Vilna), 39 vols. Vilna: 1865-1915.
- Akty sobrannye v bibliotekakh i arkhivakh Rossiiskoi Imperii Ar-*

kheograficheskoyu ekspeditsiyu (Documents collected by the Archeographic Board in the libraries and archives of the Russian Empire), 4 vols. 1294-1700. St. Petersburg: 1836.

There is likewise a series embodying materials drawn from the archives of the various ministries and departments of the government. A list of these is given below:

Arkhiiv starykh dyel (Archive of Antiquity).

Arkhiiv Svyatyeishago pravitel'stvuyushchago sinoda (The Archive of the Holy Governing Synod).

Arkhiiv voenno-uchenyi (The archive of military science).

Arkhiiv Morskago ministerstva (The archive of the Ministry of Marine).

Arkhiiv Pravitel'stvuyushchago senata (The archive of the administrative senate).

Arkhiiv sobstvennoi Ego Imperatorskago Kantseliarii (Archive of the special chancellery of His Imperial Majesty).

Arkhiiv ministerstva inostrannykh dyel (Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Arkhiiv ministerstva Yustitsii (Archive of the Ministry of Justice).

Arkhiiv ministerstva narodnago provyeshcheniya (Archive of the Ministry of Popular Education).

Arkhiiv glavnago upravleniya udyelov (Archive of the central administration of appanages).

Arkhiiv gosudarstvennago sovyeta (Archive of the state council).

Arkhiiv imperatorskikh teatrov (Archive of the imperial theaters).

Arkhiiv ministerstva imperatorskago dvora (Archive of the imperial court).

Arkhiiv Yugozapadnoi Rossii, izdavaemyi vremennoi Kommissiyei dlya razbora drevnikh aktov (The Archive of Southwestern Russia published by the provisional commission for the assembling of old documents), 32 vols. Kiev: 1859-1907.

Among the most valuable of source materials is the collection issued by the "Russian Historical Society" bearing the title *Sbornik Imperatorskago istoricheskago obshchestva* (Collection of the Imperial Historical Society). The contents are archive material. A list of these covering the pre-Petrine period is given in the bibliography to chapter XVI of volume V of the *Cambridge Modern History* (Bury). Later volumes include materials on the reigns of Peter I and Catherine II. There are a number of less well known

collections such as *Sbornik Knyazya Obolenskago* (The Collection of Prince Obolenskii).

For the study of Russia's foreign relations from early times, mention should be made of *Recueil des Traités et Conventions conclus par la Russie avec les Puissances*, a monumental work in 15 volumes, edited by F. Martens and published between 1874 and 1909.

Published collections of archive material dealing with special periods are mentioned in the appropriate place.

In 1922 the Soviet government began the publication of archive material in a serial, *Krasnyi Arkhiv* (Red Archive). These come out at the rate of about four a year. The contents are somewhat heterogeneous without any very definite arrangement but they are extremely valuable for the pre-war period and the war years, containing largely extracts from tsarist diplomatic documents.

COLLECTIONS OF SPECIAL STUDIES

Second only in importance to the archives themselves are historical researches carried out by scholars, the results of which are published in serial publications sponsored by some of the departments of the government, or some of the learned societies that formerly enjoyed (a number of which still enjoy) official favor. Foremost among these are various publications of the Academy of Science and its departments. No attempt is made to list these. They are given in full on pages 31-33 of Winifred Gregory's *Union List of Serials in Libraries of U. S. and Canada* (New York: 1927). In addition to the Academy of Science and the universities of Moscow and St. Petersburg (now Leningrad), the various learned societies attached to these have made important historical contributions. At Moscow we have the *Obshchestvo istorii i drevnostei Rossiiskikh* (The Society of Russian History and Antiquities), which, beginning in 1815, has published a number of serials—*Chteniia* (Readings), *Vremmenik* (Annals), *Trudy i Lyetopisi* (Works and Annals), *Trudy i Zapiski* (Works and Commentaries). The *Istoriko-filologicheskii fakultet* (The faculty of history and philology) of the University of St. Petersburg from 1876 to 1918 issued publications, among them the *Zapiski* (Commentaries), which were of outstanding historical value. There are two noteworthy serials of non-official character, *Russkaya Starina* (Russian Antiquity), published at St. Petersburg from 1870 to 1918, and *Kievskaya Starina* (Kievan Antiquity), issued at Kiev from 1882 to 1906.

Special mention should be made of one official publication which contains valuable material on history. This is the *Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnago Prosvyeshcheniya* (Journal of the Ministry of Public Instruction), prior to 1829 published as the *Zapiski Ministerstva*, etc.

A list of these serials can be found in the above-cited work of Winifred Gregory. Serial publications of the Russian government are grouped under three heads: (1) Imperial Russia, (2) Russia under the Provisional Government, (3) Soviet Russia. There is the merest thread of continuity, since the revolution forms a sharp break with the past. The Academy of Science (*Akademiya Nauk*) has, however, lived on into the new regime though it has undergone a drastic reorganization.

Complete files of these serials are possessed by few libraries. The Library of Congress, New York Public Library, Harvard University, and Columbia University are well equipped, but certain smaller libraries—Cleveland Public Library and the University of California—also possess some in special fields. The Union Card Catalogue, to be found at central institutions like the Library of Congress and the University of Chicago, show where these are attainable. For official publications one can also consult Winifred Gregory's *List of Serial Publications by Foreign Governments* for information where they can be obtained. If not found there, one must consult her *Union List of Serials in Libraries of United States and Canada*. In England these are available in the British Museum.

The archives in the Soviet Union are open to foreign scholars only under severe restrictions. Moreover, the state archives are not well placed for those wishing to do research. Their organization on paper is impressive, but they are not centrally housed. When the government moved to Moscow in 1918, an attempt was made to move the archives, but no central buildings were available. Those actually transferred are scattered around Moscow. Many of the archives were retained in Leningrad, where conditions are distinctly better than in Moscow. The Leningrad archives are described in *Arkhivy SSSR Leningradskoe Otdelenie Tsentralnago Istoricheskogo Arkhiva* (The Archives of the USSR, The Leningrad Branch of the Central Historical Archives), edited by A. K. Drezen (Leningrad: 1933).

At present the Soviet authorities regard every foreigner, even a scholar, with suspicion. He must secure a written order to enable

him to pass the soldier who stands at the entrance to every public building. Notes made by the scholar are submitted to *Glavlit* (The State Censorship) under the Commissary of the Interior, who retain all but the most innocuous matter. By comparison, Nazi Germany seems liberal in its treatment of foreign scholars.

Scholars wishing to pursue studies of American history in the Soviet Union can consult:

Golder, F. A., *Guide to the Printed Materials for American History in Russian Archives*. Published by the Carnegie Institution of Washington. First volume published in 1917. Second volume, prepared by David M. Matteson, published in 1937.

GENERAL HISTORIES

Perhaps the most fundamental contributions to the writing of Russian history have been made by three men: N. M. Karamzin, S. M. Solov'ev, and V. O. Kluchevsky. Their interpretations are not necessarily accepted without question, but their works have laid the foundation. Kluchevsky's best-known work is his general history. Its Russian title is *Kurs Russkoi Istorii* (first edition Moscow: 1904; second edition Petrograd: 1920). Of this there is an English translation, *A History of Russia* (five volumes, New York, 1911-1926). Solov'ev's first work, *Istoriya Rossii sdrevneyshikh vremen* (History of Russia from Earliest Times), published originally in Moscow, 1851-1879, in 29 volumes; later at St. Petersburg, 1893-1897, in seven volumes, has run through three editions. It is extremely valuable for the documentary material which it contains. There is no English translation. Karamzin's *Istoriya Gosudarstva Rossiiskago* (History of the Russian State), published originally in 1818, has gone through a number of editions and has been translated into both French and German.

The following brief histories are available in English:

Beazley, Raymond; Forbes, Nevill; and Birkett, G. A., *Russia from the Varangians to the Bolsheviks*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1918.

Brianchaninov, N., *A History of Russia*. New York: Dutton, 1930. London and Toronto: Dent, 1930.

Eckardt, Hans von, *Russia*. New York: Knopf, 1932. A translation and revision of the German edition. The supplement brings the work well up to date.

- Morfill, Wm. R., *The Story of Russia*. London: Unwin, 1907.
- Pares, Sir Bernard, *A History of Russia*. New York: Knopf, 1928. Second edition, 1937.
- Platonov, S. F., *A History of Russia*. New York: Macmillan, 1925. A translation of the author's very excellent little text in Russian; unfortunately inadequate for the recent period.
- Vernadsky, George, *A History of Russia*. London: Milford, Oxford University Press, 1929.
- , *Political and Diplomatic History of Russia*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1936.
- Rambaud, A. N., *A History of Russia from Earliest Times to 1877*. Originally published in French. Its first English translation appeared in Boston in 1879-1882 (A. L. Burt Co.). It has run through many editions since, but it is now much out of date.
- O'Hara, Valentine, and Makeef, N., *Russia*. New York: Scribner's, 1925.

Certain phases of Russian history are given in:

- Mavor, James, *An Economic History of Russia*, 2 vols., second edition. New York: Dutton, 1925. London: Dent and Sons.
- Mirsky, D. S., *Russia: A Social History*. London: The Cresset Press, 1931.
- Brianchaninov, N., *The Russian Church*. London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1931.
- Shestakov, A. V. (Editor), *A Short History of the U.S.S.R.* Moscow: 1938. Textbook for third and fourth classes. This is an English translation of the official text on Russian history for secondary schools (*Istoriya SSSR Kratkii Kurs*).

The Nineteenth Century

- Kornilov, A., *Modern Russian History*, revised ed. New York: Knopf, 1924.

Pokrovsky, M. N., was a Communist historian, high in the councils of the Communist party down to his death in 1930. His work, therefore, represented the Marxian point of view. His books cannot be said to represent the official party point of view, which has changed from time to time. Two works are now available in English.

- Pokrovsky, M. N., *A Brief History of Russia*, 2 vols. New York: International Publishers, 1933. Translated by D. S. Mirsky.

- , *Russkaya istoriya s dreveneyshikh vremen* (A History of Russia from Earliest Times), 6th ed., 4 vols. Lenin-grad: 1924. An English translation of this was begun, but one volume only has appeared as,
 ———, *History of Russia*. New York: International Publishers, 1931.

There is also a new composite work by the following authors: Milyukov, Paul N.; Seignobos, Ch.; and Eisenmann, L.; *Histoire de Russie*, 3 vols. Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1932.

Among general works in German, see:

Stählin, Karl, *Geschichte Russlands von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*, 4 vols. Berlin, Leipzig, Königsberg: Ost-Europa-Verlag, 1923-1939. An excellent handbook with little that is original. Four volumes have been completed, bringing the story down to the fall of the monarchy.

The following are standard short histories in Russian:

- Bestuzhev-Ryumin, K. N., *Russkaya Istoriya* (Russian History), 2 vols. St. Petersburg: 1872.
 Bagalyei, D., *Russkaya Istoriya* (Russian History). Khar'kov: 1914.
 Zabyelin, I. E., *Istoriya Russkoi Zhizni* (History of Russian Life), 2 vols. Moscow: 1876.

MISCELLANEOUS HISTORIES

- Leroy-Beaulieu, A., *L'Empire des Tsars*, 3 vols. Paris: Hachette et Cie., 1890. A valuable study of Russian life and institutions. Also available in English as *The Empire of the Tsars and the Russians*, 3 vols. New York and London: Putnam, 1905.
 Masaryk, G. T., *The Spirit of Russia*, 2 vols. London: Unwin, New York: Macmillan, 1919. This is an extremely valuable study of intellectual and revolutionary movements in Russia prior to the Great War.
 Milyukov, Paul, *Ocherki po istorii russkoi kultury* (Essays in the History of Russian Culture). St. Petersburg: 1900. A work of fundamental importance, and translated into French and German.
 Wallace, D. M., *Russia*, 2 vols. New York: Holt, 1905. This book, published originally in 1877, has run through several editions. It is a very valuable description of Russian life.

RUSSIAN LITERATURE

A knowledge of Russian literature is indispensable for students of Russian history. A number of histories of Russian literature are available in English:

- Brückner, A., *A Literary History of Russia*. London: Unwin, 1908.
 Kropotkin, A., *Russian Literature*. New York: McClure, Phillips, 1905.
 Mirsky, D. S., *Contemporary Russian Literature*. New York: Knopf, 1926.
 Waliszewski, K., *A History of Russian Literature*. New York, London: D. Appleton, 1900.
 Wiener, Leo, *Anthology of Russian Literature from Earliest Period to the Present Time*. New York and London: Putnam, 1902-1903. This is a particularly valuable work.
 Pypin, A. I., *Istoriya Russkoi Literatury* (History of Russian Literature), 6 vols. Petrograd: 1898. The standard work on this subject.

PERIODICALS

The following periodicals are devoted, at least in part, to Russian history and letters:

- The Slavonic and East European Review*. London: 1922 ff.
Le Monde slave. Paris: 1917 ff.
Zeitschrift für osteuropäische Geschichte. Berlin: 1932 ff.
Revue des études slaves. Paris: 1921 ff.
Ost-Europa. Königsberg: 1925 ff.
Istoriĭ-Marksisť (Marxist Historian). Moscow: 1926 ff. The organ of the Institute of History of the Academy of Science. Published by the *Pravda* Press.

PRE-SLAVIC RUSSIA

The history of Russia prior to the founding of the state on the Dnieper in the ninth century A.D. is wrapped in obscurity. Efforts have been made to dispel this fog by recourse to the writers of antiquity or of the early Middle Ages in an effort to throw some light on the origins of the Russian people. The writings of Herodotus and of Strabo, Tacitus' *Germania*, Jordanes' *The Origin and Deeds of the Goths*, Procopius' *History of the Gothic Wars* (Books V and

VI of his *Works*), as well as works of certain lesser writers, have been laid under contribution. Efforts have been made to synthesize this material; V. L. Latyshev, *Scythica et Caucasica* (St. Petersburg: 1896), attempts to assemble all the passages from classical authors bearing on the history of the early Slavs and their country. This material has been interpreted by Ernst Bonnell in his *Beiträge zur Alterthumskunde Russlands* (St. Petersburg: 1882). E. H. Minns, in his *Scythians and Greeks* (Cambridge University Press, 1913), has endeavored to render available for English readers the vast amount of archeological material bearing on the antiquities of the Pontic steppes. Some of this material is summarized in his "The Scythians and Northern Nomads," chap. IX, vol. III, *Cambridge Ancient History*. The history of these regions in the days of classical Greece as well as in the times of the Roman Empire is retraced by Mikhail I. Rostovtsev in his *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922). In addition, Professor Rostovtsev has written a number of chapters in the *Cambridge Ancient History* bearing on the early history of the Black Sea region. An article by him called "South Russia in the Pre-historic and Classical Period" appears in the *American Historical Review* (January 1921), vol. 26. Also see "The Origin of the Russian State on the Dnieper," American Historical Association *Annual Report*, 1920.

EARLY SLAV SOCIETY

The early history of the Slavs is covered in:

Šafarik, Pavel Joseph, *Slowenské starozitnosti* (Slavonic Antiquities). Prague: 1837.

Niederle, Lubor, *Manuel de l'antiquité slave*, 2 vols. Paris: Edouard Champion, 1923.

For the medieval history of the Pontic steppes and the expansion of the Slavs, see:

Peisker, J., "The Asiatic Background," *The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. I, chap. XII.

———, "The Expansion of the Slavs," *Ibid.*, vol. II, chap. XIV.

In the ninth century Christianity penetrated Russia and brought with it the seeds of western civilization, particularly the art of writing. Early in the eleventh century chronicles began to be composed in imitation of Byzantine writers. The first to appear was the

Povest' Vremennykh Lyet (Chronicle of Past Times), which appeared at the Pecherskii Monastery in Kiev about 1120. This original chronicle was continued and served as the basis for other chronicles which arose elsewhere: for instance, at Novgorod, Suzdal, and other places. These chronicles, many of them local and dynastic, continued down to the time when the Russian state was united under Moscow in the fifteenth century. They then were neglected in favor of chronicles composed on the lines of models imported from Europe. Peter the Great, however, interested himself in Russian antiquities and directed, though without success, that the chronicles be assembled. Catherine took up the task also, but the work was not seriously begun until the nineteenth century, when the Academy of Science undertook the work of assembling and publishing them. The first volume appeared in 1846 (the complete collection consisted of 24 volumes). Some of the early volumes were reprinted in 1872, and a new edition has been begun by the present government of the Soviet Union. These chronicles are fundamental for a knowledge of the coming of the Varangians and the founding of the Russian state. A few of the chronicles have been translated into western European languages. In English the following have appeared:

- Cross, Samuel H., *The Russian Primary Chronicle*. Vol. XII, Harvard Studies and Notes in Philology, Literature. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1930.
- Michell, Robert, and Forbes, Nevill, *The Chronicle of Novgorod*, vol. 25. London: Camden Society, 1914. Third series. This carries the history of Novgorod down to its fall in the time of Ivan III.

The following French and German translations are available:

- Paris, Louis (tr. and ed.), *La Chronique de Nestor*, 2 vols. Paris: Heideloff et Campe, 1834. This was completed before the appearance of the Russian critical edition in 1846 and is therefore full of errors.
- Leger, Louis (tr. and ed.), *Chronique dite de Nestor, traduite sur le texte slavon-russe, avec introduction et commentaire*. Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1884.
- Trautmann, Reinhold, *Die altrussische Nestorchronik—Povest' Vremennykh Lyet—mit einer Karte Osteuropas*. Leipzig: Markart & Petters, 1931.

THE VARANGIANS

The interpretation of the early chronicles has given rise to a great controversy over the Varangian question, that is, the beginning of Russian history. A specific problem arises as to who the Russians were. Various historians have made notable contributions.

Kunik, A. A., *Die Berufung der swedischen Rodsen durch Finnen und Slawen*. St. Petersburg: 1842-1845.

Vasil'evskii, V. G., *Trudy* (Works). St. Petersburg: 1908. Various articles included in his *Works* have maintained the theory of the Norse origin of the Varangians, while others, led by Gedeonov, contradict this theory.

Gedeonov, S. A., *Varyagi i Rus'* (Varangians and Rus'). St. Petersburg: 1876.

The generally accepted conclusions on this subject have been summed up for the English-speaking world by:

Thomsen, Wilhelm, *The Relations between Ancient Russia and Scandinavia and the Origin of the Russian State*. Oxford and London: J. Parker and Co., 1877.

The contributions of the Arab world to a knowledge of the early Russians has been the subject of investigations by a number of writers, particularly:

Fraehn, C. M., *Ibn Fozzlan's und anderer araber Berichte über die Russen älterer Zeit*. St. Petersburg: 1823. This was pioneer work in this field and has been much improved on by:

Harkavy, A. E., *Skazaniya musulmanskikh pisatelei o Slavyanakh i Russkikh* (Narratives of Moslem Authors on the Slavs and the Russians). St. Petersburg: 1870.

Puteshestvie Ibn Fadlana na Volgy (Travels of Ibn Fadlan on the Volga). Edited by Academician I. Iu. Krachkovskii. Akademiya Nauk, Moscow and Leningrad: 1939.

This new translation of the famous work of Ibn Fadlan (or Fozzlan), the celebrated Arab traveller of the tenth century, is based on a manuscript discovered at Meshed, Iran, in 1923, and put at the disposal of the Soviet government by the government of Iran. This edition of the work of Ibn Fozzlan by the *Akademiya Nauk* (Academy of Sciences) illustrates the admirable work being undertaken by that body in opening up to the learned world material hitherto inaccessible to

the western scholar in the fields of the history, folklore, linguistics, and ethnography of the non-Slavic peoples of Asia.

The same subject has been discussed by:

Marquart (Markvart), Joseph, *Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*. Leipzig: Theodor Weicher, 1903.

A sidelight on this problem comes from the Norse sources, more particularly from:

Sturlason, Snorre, *Heimskringla, or the Lives of the Norse Kings*. Cambridge: Heffer, 1932.

See also article by:

Stender-Petersen, Ad., "Die varägersage als Quelle der Altrussischen Chronik," *Acta Jutlandica*, vol. VI, No. 1.

The main points in this whole controversy have been summarized by:

Tompkins, Stuart R., "The Varangians in Russian History," in *Medieval and Historiographical Essays in Honor of James Westfall Thompson*. The University of Chicago Press, 1937.

THE KIEVAN PERIOD

(From the time of Vladimir the Great to the coming of the Mongols)

Grushevskii (Hrushevskii), Professor Mikhail, *Istoriya Ukrainy Rusi* (History of Ukraine-Rus'), 9 vols. Lvov: 1899-1900. There is a French abridgment of this work: *Abrégé de l'histoire de l'Ukraine* (Paris: Giard, 1920), but it does not appear in English.

———, *Ocherk istorii Ukraïnskogo naroda* (An Outline of the history of the people of the Ukraine), 2nd ed. St. Petersburg: 1906.

A useful account of the "Ukrainian" problem written from the Great Russian viewpoint is:

Wolkonsky, Prince Alexandre, *The Ukrainian Question*. Rome: Ditto E. Armani, 1920.

To be used with caution.

Other works of considerable importance are:

Presnyakov, A., *Knyazhoe Pravo v drevnei Rusi ocherki po istorii*

- X-XII stolyetii* (Princely Law in Old Russia). St. Petersburg: 1909.
- Rozhkov, N., *Obzor russkoi istorii* (Survey of Russian History), 2 parts. Moscow: 1905.
- Solov'ev, S. M., *Istoriya otnoschenii mezhdru Russkimi knyaz'yami Ryurikova Doma* (History of Relations between the Princes of the House of Rurik). Moscow: 1847.
- Klyuchevskii, V., *Boyarskaya Duma Drevnei Rusi* (The Boyars' Duma in Ancient Russia). Moscow: 1909.

For English readers the only adequate treatment of this period is:

- Klyuchevskii, V. O., *A History of Russia*, 5 vols. New York: Dutton, and London: Dent, 1911-1926. See above under general works.

THE MONGOL YOKE

The literature on the Mongol period is the least satisfactory of any era of Russian history, perhaps because it is the least heroic, since the Russian princes made their peace with the Mongol Horde and became its tax collectors. Solov'ev and Klyuchevskii's main works are our chief reliance. Klyuchevskii tells us little of the Mongols, for he holds that the Mongols were an unimportant episode in Russian history.

- Curtin, Jeremiah, *The Mongols: A History*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1908.
- , *The Mongols in Russia*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1908.
- Hammer-Purgstall, Joseph Freiherr von, *Geschichte der Goldenen Horde in Kiptschak, das ist: der Mongolen in Russland*. Pesth: C. A. Hartleben, 1840.
- Howorth, Sir H. H., *History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century*, 3 vols. London: Longmans, Green, 1876-1888. Standard history of the Mongols in English; has some information with reference to the Mongols in Russia.
- Rubruck, William of, *The Journey of William of Rubruck to the Eastern Parts of the World 1253-1255 (as narrated by himself). With Two Accounts of the Earlier Journey of John of Pian de Carpine*. London: Hakluyt Society, 2nd series, 1900. Translation by William Woodville Rockhill.
- Yule, Sir Henry (tr. and ed.), *The Book of Ser Marco Polo, the*

Venetian, Concerning the Kingdoms and Marvels of the East, 3rd ed. revised, 2 vols. New York: Scribner's, 1926.

———, (tr. and ed.), *Cathay and the Way Thither*, 4 vols. London: Hakluyt Society, 2nd series, 1914, 1915, 1916.

For the Great Russian principalities:

Eck, Alexandre, *Le Moyen Age Russe*. Paris: Maison du livre étranger, 1933.

Eksemplyarskii, A. V., *Velikie i Udielnye Kniaz'ya Syevernoi Rusi v Tatarskii Period s 1238-po 1505 g.* (Grand Princes and Appanage Princes in North Russia during the Tartar Period from 1238 to 1505), 3 vols. St. Petersburg: 1889.

Livonia and Lithuania:

Schiemann, Theodor, *Russland, Polen und Livland bis ins 17 Jahrhundert*, 2 vols. Berlin: G. Grote, 1886-1887. Useful for the history of the rise of Livonia and Lithuania.

Presnyakov, A. E., *Obrazovanie Velikorusskogo gosudarstva* (Formation of the Great Russian State). Petrograd: 1918. An excellent summary of the rise of the Great Russian state; carries the story down into Muscovite times.

Rozhkov, N., *Obzor russkoi istorii* (Survey of Russian history), 2nd ed., 2 parts. Moscow: 1905. The second part covers the Mongol and Muscovite periods. Deals exclusively with economic development.

On the Hanseatic League:

Berezhkov, M., *O Torgovlye Rusi s Ganzoi do kontsa XV vieka* (On the Trade of Russia and the Hanseatic League, up to the end of the 15th century). St. Petersburg: 1879. A brief account of the trade of Novgorod during the Mongol period.

Sartorius, G., *Geschichte des Hanseatischen Bundes*, 3 vols. Göttingen: H. Dieterich, 1802-1808. The standard history of the Hanse.

Winckler, Arthur, *Die deutsche Hansa in Russland*. Berlin: Praeger, 1886.

FEUDALISM

Feudalism in Russia has received scant treatment. Kareyev engaged in a controversy with Pavlov-Silvanskii during the early years of the twentieth century. The following are their contributions:

Kareyev, N., *V Kakom smyslye mozžno govorit' o sushchestvovanii feodalizma v Rossii? Po povodu teorii Pavlova-Silvanskogo* (In what sense can we speak of the existence of feudalism in Russia? With reference to the theory of Pavlov-Silvanskii). St. Petersburg: 1910.

Pavlov-Silvanskii, N. P., *Feodalizm v drevnei Rusi* (Feudalism in Ancient Russia). St. Petersburg: 1907.

———, *Feodalnyiia Otnosheniya v Udiel'noi Rusi* (Feudal Relations in Appanage Russia). St. Petersburg: 1901.

———, *Gosudarstvennye sluzhilye Lyudi* (The State "Serving" Class). St. Petersburg: 1898. A discussion of the serving nobility, a knowledge of which is fundamental for the understanding of the modern Russian state.

Miller, Alexander, "Feudalism in England and Russia," *The Slavonic Review* (London, April 1936), vol. XIV, No. 42.

Colonization:

Platonov, S. F., *Proshloe russkago syevera* (History of the Russian North). St. Petersburg: 1923. Deals with the history of the colonization of northeastern Russia, first by Novgorod, and afterwards by Moscow.

Institutions:

Klyuchevskii, V. O., *Boyarskaya Duma drevnei Rusi* (The Boyars' Duma in Ancient Russia). Moscow: 1909.

The basis for the narrative of Russian history during this period is still the chronicles, that is, all the later ones which cover this period. *The Chronicle of Novgorod*, translated by Michell and Forbes (see bibliography for the Kievan period), covers the story of Novgorod down to its fall in 1480.

With few exceptions, of which *The Chronicle of Novgorod* is one, none of the sources, or the authorities covering this period, is in English. The reader who has no language but English will be forced to rely on Klyuchevskii for the history of the rise of the Great Russian state; fortunately he can supplement with the above-noted treatments of the Mongols, and with the narratives of travellers who visited the Tartars during this time.

THE MUSCOVITE PERIOD

The Muscovite period is somewhat richer in historical materials than the preceding. The best narrative for the period is Klyuchev-

skii's *Russian History* (see list for general reading), vol. III; see also the chapter by J. B. Bury in *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. V, chap. XVI, "Russia, 1462-1682," pp. 477 ff. A bibliography to accompany this chapter appears on pp. 861-871. Important for source material.

Following is a list of works according to subject:

Ivan the Terrible:

- Beucler, André, *La Vie de Ivan le Terrible*. Paris: Gallimard, 1931.
 Graham, Stephen, *Ivan the Terrible, Life of Ivan IV of Russia*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1933.
 Kizevetter (Kizewetter), A. D., *Ivan Groznyi i ego oponenty*. (Ivan the Terrible and his Opponents). Moscow: 1898.
 Semenoff, Marc, *Ivan le Terrible*. Paris: 1928.
 Waliszewski, K., *Ivan le Terrible*. Paris: 1904. Also appears in an English translation by Lady Mary Lloyd (London: Heinemann, 1904).

Relations with England:

- Cawston, G., and Keane, A. H., *The Early Chartered Companies, A.D. 1296-1858*. London: E. Arnold, 1896.
 Fletcher, Giles, *On the Russe Commonwealth*, 1st ed. London: 1591. Reprinted in the Hakluyt Society Publications, series 1. A classic. Summarized in the following:
 Hakluyt, Richard, *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation*, 1st ed. (in one volume). London: 1589. Second edition in three volumes. London: 1598-1600. A readily accessible edition is that published in 12 volumes (Glasgow: MacLehose & Sons, 1903-1905).
 Horsey, Sir Jerome, *A Relacion or Memorial*, vol. XX, Hakluyt Society Publications, 1st series, and numerous other editions, 1847-19—.
 Jenkinson, Anthony (and other Englishmen), *With some account of the first intercourse of the English with Russia and Central Asia by way of the Caspian Sea*. Edited by Edward Delmar Morgan and C. H. Coote (London: printed for the Hakluyt Society, 1866), vol. II, No. 73.
 Purchas, Samuel, *Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas his Pilgrimes*, 4 vols. London: 1625. Also Glasgow: MacLehose, 1906, in 20 volumes. Based on the unpublished material left by Hakluyt at his death.

- Tolstoi, I. I., *The First Forty Years of Intercourse between England and Russia, 1553-1593*. St. Petersburg: 1875.
- Yakobson, S., "Early Anglo-Russian Relations, 1553-1613," *The Slavonic Review*, London, April 1935, vol. XIII, No. 39.
- Milton, John, *A Brief History of Moscovia*. London: The Blackmore Press, 1929. Of little value as history, but summarizes, for the benefit of seventeenth-century England, information recently acquired by travellers.

Other descriptions of Moscovy by foreigners:

- Documenti Che si Conservano nei R. Archivio di Stato in Firenze, Sezione Medicea, Regularidanti l'antica Moscovia (Russia)*. Moscow: 1871.
- Fiedler, J., *Nikolaus Poppel, erster Gesandter Österreichs in Russland*. Vienna: 1857.
- Herberstein, Sigmund, Freiherr von, *Rerum Moscoviticarum Commentarii*, Basileae (Basel): 1551. First edition, tr. and ed. by R. M. Major, Hakluyt Society Publications, x, xii (London: 1851-1852). Herberstein was ambassador of the Emperor Charles V at the court of Ivan IV, and has given us one of the earliest and the most reliable descriptions by a foreigner of the court of Ivan.
- Jovius Paulus, *De Legatione Basilii Magni ad Clementem VII, Pont. Max.*, 1st. ed. Basel: 1525. Printed in Hakluyt Society Publications, volumes on Herberstein. Printed also in *Biblioteka Inostrannykh Pisatelei o Rossii* (Library of Foreign Writers on Russia), vol. I, edited by V. Semenov. St. Petersburg: 1836. In the original Latin with a Russian translation.
- Kampanze, Albert (Campense, Alberte), *Lettera d'Alberte Campense Interno le Cose di Moscovia al Beatissimo Padre Clemente VII, Pontefice Massimo. Biblioteca Inostrannykh Pisatelei o Rossii* (Library of Foreign Writers on Russia), vol. I, edited by V. Semenov, in the original Italian with a Russian translation. St. Petersburg: 1836.
- Historica Russiae Monimenta*, edited by A. I. Turgenev, 2 vols. St. Petersburg: 1841. Supplementum, 1848. Contains a miscellaneous collection of documents drawn from various European archives, some dealing with the early commercial and diplomatic relations of Russia with England during the Muscovite period.

On Russia's relations with the Holy See:

Pierling, le P., *La Russie et la Sainte Siège, études diplomatiques*, 3 vols. Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie., 1896-1901. Parts dealing with this period published separately.

Many of the documents covering the diplomatic relations of Moscow and the Papacy from the Vatican library are contained in *Historica Monimenta Russiae* (see above).

The Economic Condition of Russia:

Rozhkov, N., *Sel'skoye Khozyaistvo v moskovskoi rusi v XVI vyeke* (Agriculture in Muscovite Rus in the 16th Century). Moscow: 1899.

Ivan's quarrel with his nobility:

Kurbinskii, Prince A. M., *Skazaniya* (Sayings). Edited by Ustryalov. St. Petersburg: 1868.

Relations with Poland:

Bain, R. Nisbet, *Slavonic Europe; a Political History of Poland and Russia from 1447-1796*. Cambridge University Press, 1908. Most important, as it is the only treatment of Russo-Polish relations in English.

With the capture of Kazan and Astrakhan, the way was open for the exploration and exploitation of Asia. For literature dealing with the opening up of Siberia, see the list of readings on "Asiatic Russia," below.

TIME OF TROUBLES

The Time of Troubles, from the death of Ivan the Terrible in 1584 to the election of Michael Romanov in 1613, was crucial in the history of Muscovite Russia. Unfortunately, scarcely any literature on this topic is available in languages other than Russian. Giles Fletcher visited the country in 1588-1589 as ambassador of Elizabeth at the court of Fedor Ivanovich. His work *On the Russe Commonwealth*, published in London in 1591, is justly famous for its incomparable picture of Muscovy at the end of the sixteenth century. It has been reprinted in series 1 of the Hakluyt Society Publications.

We have likewise:

- Gourdon, William, *Voyage made to Pechora 1611*. Published in *Purchas' Pilgrimes*, vol. III. London: 1625. Glasgow: James MacLehose & Sons, 1904. 20 vols.
- Margeret (Marzhereta), Jacques, *Estat présent de l'Empire de Russie*. Paris: 1607. St. Petersburg: 1830 (R).
- Russell, William, *The Report of a bloudie and terrible massacre in the city of Mosco, with the fearfull and tragicall end of Demetrius, the last Duke before him rainging at the present*. London: 1607.
- Rerum Rossicarum Scriptores Exteri*. A Collegio Archeographico editi (Petropoli, 1851). (Published by the Archeographical Commission, St. Petersburg: 1851). Contains the *Chronicon of Conrad Bussow*, first published at Riga in 1612, as well as that of Petrus Petraeus, his continuator, who carried the story down to 1617 and published his work at Leipzig. Both are in seventeenth-century High German.

Modern writers who have interpreted this period:

- Graham, Stephen, *Boris Godunof*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1933. Rather an appreciation of Boris Godunov than an attempt at a serious historical study.
- Merimée, Prosper, *Épisode de l'histoire de Russie; les faux Demetrius*, new edition. Paris: Calmann Levy, 1889. Appeared in English as *Demetrius the Impostor. An Episode in Russian History*, tr. by Andrew Scoble. London: 1853.
- Pantenius, Theodor Herman, *Der falsche Demetrius*. Leipzig: Velhagen und Klasing, 1904.
- Shchepkin (Sčépkin), E. N., "Wer War Pseudo-Demetrius?" *Arkiv für slavische Philologie*, vols. XX-XXII. Berlin: 1898-1900.
- Waliszewski, K., *Les Origines de la Russie moderne; la crise révolutionnaire*. Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie., 1906. Many editions.

Russian works on this subject:

- Buturlin, D. P., *Istoriya smutnago vremeni v Rossii v Nachalye XVII vyeķa* (A History of the Time of Troubles in Russia at the Beginning of the 17th Century), 3 parts. St. Petersburg: 1839-1846.

- Ilovaiskii, D. I., *Smutnoye vremya moskovskago gosudarstva* (The Time of Troubles of the Muscovite State), vol. IV, Part I of his *Istoriya Rossii*. Moscow: 1894-1899.
- Kovalevskii, M. N., *Moskovskaya smuta XVII Vyeķa* (The Muscovite Troubles of the 17th Century).
- Platonov, S. F., *Drevnerusskie skazaniya i povyesti o smutnom vremeni* (Old Russian Accounts and Tales of the Time of Troubles). St. Petersburg: 1888.
- , *Ocherki po istorii smuty v Moskovskom gosudarstve, XVI-XVII vv.* (Studies in the History of the Troubles in the Muscovite State in the 16th and 17th Centuries). St. Petersburg: 1910. A fairly recent and very scholarly treatment of the period. Platonov has incorporated substantially this account in an abridged form in his text on Russian history translated into English and appearing as *A History of Russia*. New York: Macmillan, 1925.

A collection of documents comprising nine volumes was made and published by the Imperial Society of History and Antiquities of the University of Moscow under the title:

- Smutnoe Vremya Moskovskago Gosudarstva 1604-1613 gg.* (The Time of Troubles of the Muscovite State, 1604-1613). Moscow: 1914.

THE EARLY ROMANOVs

Peter the Great has so absorbed the attention of the historian that the age preceding him has suffered relatively from neglect. This is to be regretted because, actually, some at least of the changes usually ascribed to the initiative of Peter were under way before his time. This applies to the Europeanization of Russia in particular. Of general treatments of this period we have the following:

- Bain, R. Nisbet, *The First Romanovs, 1613-1725*. London: Constable, 1905.
- Waliszewski, Kazimierz, *Les Origines de la Russie moderne; la crise révolutionnaire, 1584-1614*. Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie., 1906.
- , *Le Berceau d'une dynastie; les premiers Romanov, 1613-1682*. Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie., 1909.

In Russian:

- Kotoshikhin, G., *O Rossii v tsarstvovanii Alekseye Mikhailovicha*

(On Russia under Alexei Mikhailovich). St. Petersburg: 1840. Revised by Korkunov. St. Petersburg: 1859.

On Western influences:

Brückner, A., *Die Europäisierung Russlands*. Gotha: F. A. Berthes, 1888.

On the Schism in the Church:

Muravyev, A. N., *A History of the Church of Russia*, tr. by Blackmore. Oxford, 1842.

Heard, A. F., *The Russian Church and Russian Dissent*. New York: Harpers, 1887.

Palmer, W., *The Patriarch and the Tsar*, 3 vols. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1871-1876. New edition, 1905.

In Russian:

Stendman (Shtendman) G. Ph., *Dyelo o patriarkhye Nikonye* (The Affair of the Patriarch Nikon). With documents. St. Petersburg: 1897.

The seventeenth century in Russia was distinguished by the fierce revolt of the Cossack leader Sten'ka Razin, in the region of the middle Volga. There is no adequate treatment of this event in any western European language. There is, however, the following contemporary account:

Relation des particularités de la rebellion de Sten'ko Razin contre le Grand Duc de Moscovie. La naissance, le progrès et la fin de cette rebellion, avec la manière dont fut pris ce rebelle, sa sentence de mort et son exécution. Traduit de l'anglois, par C. Desmares, à Paris chez Frédéric Léonard, imprimeur du Roy, MDCLXXII.

A Russian scholar has assembled material on this event and subjected it to critical examination. The results of his labors are contained in two works:

Popov, Aleksandr Nikolaevich, *Materialy dlya Istorii Vozmushcheniya Sten'ki Razina* (Materials for the history of the revolt of Sten'ka Razin). Moscow: 1857.

———, *Istoriya Vozmushcheniya Sten'ki Razina* (History of the revolt of Sten'ka Razin), pp. 132. Moscow: 1857.

English travellers of the seventeenth century have materially contributed to our knowledge of Russia during this period:

Collins, Dr. Samuel, *The Present State of Russia, in a Letter to a Friend at London*. London: 1671. Collins was physician to Peter's father, Alexei.

Crull, Judocus, *The Ancient and Present State of Muscovy*. London: 1698.

Olearius, Adam, *The Voyages and Travels of the Ambassadors sent by Frederick, Duke of Holstein, to the Great Duke of Muscovy, and the King of Persia . . . Faithfully rendered into English by John Davies of Kidwelly*. MDCLXII. Two parts, London: 1662. Second edition, London: printed for J. Starkey and T. Basset, 1669. The most famous of foreign travellers in the reign of Alexei was Olearius, who was one of an embassy sent by Frederick, the Duke of Holstein, to Muscovy and to Persia in 1633.

PETER THE GREAT

The literature on Peter is of vast extent. We have confined ourselves to the standard biographies for the study of his reign:

Schuyler, Eugene, *Peter the Great*. New York: 1884. Anecdotal in treatment.

Browning, Oscar, *Peter the Great*. London: Hutchinson, 1898.

Brückner, A., *Peter der Grosse*. Berlin: G. Grote, 1879. In Oncken, *Allgemeine Geschichte*, III, 6. Admirable.

Graham, Stephen, *Peter the Great*. London: E. Benn, 1929.

Motley, J. L., *Peter the Great*. New York: Merrill & Co., 1893.

Oudard, Georges, *Peter the Great*. New York: Brewer & Warren, Inc., 1929. Popular.

Tolstoi, Count Alexei, *Peter the Great*. New York: Covici Friede, 1932.

Voltaire, F. M. A., *Life of Peter the Great: History of the Russian Empire Under Peter the Great*, vol. XVIII, 1901. *Works*. London: Frederick-Town, 1813.

Waliszewski, K., *Peter the Great*, 2 vols. London and New York: 1897.

Documentary material:

Shmurlo, E. F., *Recueil de documents relatifs au regne de l'empereur, Pierre le Grand*. Dorpat: 1903.

Bogoslovskii, M. M., *Petr I. Materialy dlya Biografii* (Peter I. Material for a Biography), Vol. I. Moscow: Sotsegiz, 1939. Covers the years 1672-1689.

PETER'S SUCCESSORS

The chief stand-bys for the period following Peter are the works of R. Nisbet Bain and Kasimierz Waliszewski.

Bain, R. Nisbet, *The Pupils of Peter the Great*. Westminster: Constable, 1897.

———, *The Daughter of Peter the Great*. Westminster: Constable, 1899.

———, *Peter the Third, Emperor of Russia*. Westminster: Constable, 1902. In this he discusses in some detail the death of Peter and the question as to who was responsible for it.

———, "Peter the Great and His Pupils, 1689-1730," *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. V, chap. XVII, pp. 518 ff. New York and Cambridge, England: 1934.

———, "Russia under Anne and Elizabeth," *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. VI, chap. X, pp. 301 ff.

Waliszewski, K., *L'Héritage de Pierre le Grand*. Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie., 1900.

———, *La dernière des Romanoff*. Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie., 1902.

———, *La Russie au temps d'Elizabeth I^{ère}, dernière des Romanov*. Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie., 1933.

Valuable for the light they throw on the life of the time are:

Manstein, C. H. von, *Memoirs of Russia from the year 1727 to 1744*, Historical, Political and Military. First edition London: 1770. New edition 1856.

Rondeau, Mrs. (Vigor), *Letters from a Lady who resided some time in Russia (1728-1740)*. London: printed for J. Dodsley, 1777. By the wife of the English ambassador.

The Record Office, London, has the following important papers:

Hyndford, John, Earl of, *Dispatches from the Russian Court, 1746-1748*. Foreign state papers, Russia.

Mardefeld, Baron, G. von, *Dispatches from Russia, 1739-1748*. Foreign state papers, Russia.

Williams, Sir Charles Hanbury, *Dispatches from Russia, 1755-1758*. Foreign state papers, Russia.

The *Politische Correspondenz* of Frederick II of Prussia, vols. I-X, has considerable information on affairs in Russia during this period. For Russian sources, perhaps the most valuable are the *Vorontsov Archives* (Moscow: 1876-1897). Especially important are the letters of Count Alexei Bestuzhev-Ryumin to Count M. Vorontsov, 1744-1760, vol. II. The Russian Historical Society (*Sbornik*) has much source material, the despatches and correspondence of many of the foreign ambassadors.

Stählin, Karl, *Geschichte Russlands*, 4 vols. Berlin and Königsberg: Ost Europa Verlag, 1923-1935. Volume II is especially good on this period.

CATHERINE II

The amount of literature on the great Catherine is formidable, both the product of her admiring contemporaries and the diligent researches of curious after-ages. The late nineteenth century promised to put forth the definitive work on Catherine, but the author, Bil'basov, ran afoul of the censorship and only the volumes on the earlier years of Catherine's life saw light. They carried the story down to 1764 and appeared in both Russian and German.

Bil'basov, V. A., *Istoriya Ekateriny Vtoroi* (History of Catherine II), 2 vols. Berlin: 1900. St. Petersburg, 1890-1891.

Bilbassoff, V. A., *Geschichte Katherina II*, 4 parts in 3 vols. Berlin: 1891-1893.

The same author has written on the extensive bibliography of Catherine:

Bilbassoff, V. A., *Katharina II von Russland im Urteile der Weltliteratur*, 2 vols. Tr. from the Russian. Berlin: Norddeutsches Verlags Institut, 1897.

There are two works of the Polish writer Waliszewski for this period:

Waliszewski, K., *Le Roman d'une Impératrice Catherine II de Russie*. Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie., 1893. In many editions. Contains a bibliography; has appeared in English under the following title:

- , *The Romance of an Empress, Catherine II of Russia*. New York: Appleton, 1916.
- , *Autour d'un trône*, 4th ed. Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie., 1894. The English translation appears as:
- , *The Story of a Throne*, 2 vols. London: W. Heinemann, 1895.

The following accounts of Catherine in English will be useful:

- Anthony, Katherine, *Catherine the Great*. New York: Garden City Pub. Co., 1925.
- Botkin, Gleb, *Her Wanton Majesty*. New York: The Macaulay Co., 1933. Perhaps not to be taken as serious history.
- Dashkova, Princess Ekaterina Romanovna, *Memoirs of the History of the Empress Catherine II*. English translation by Mrs. W. Bradford. 2 vols. London: H. Colburn, 1840. The original French text is in the *Arkhiiv Vorontsova*, vol. XXI. Extremely valuable for Catherine's *coup d'état* and the part played by Dashkova.
- Gribble, Francis, *The Comedy of Catherine the Great*. New York: Putnam, 1912. The title indicates a somewhat flippant approach.
- Hodgetts, E. A. B., *Life of Catherine the Great*. New York: Brentano's, 1914.
- Hoetzsch, Otto, "Catherine II," *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. VI, chap. XIX, pp. 657 ff. Cambridge (Eng.) at the Univ. Press, and Macmillan, 1934.
- Ilchester, The Earl of, and Mrs. Langford Brooke, *Correspondence of Catherine the Great*. London: Thornton Butterworth, 1928.
- Kaus, Gina, *Catherine: The portrait of an Empress*. New York: 1935.
- Molloy, Joseph F., *The Russian Court in the 18th Century*. London: Hutchinson, 1905.
- Reddaway, W. F., *Documents of Catherine the Great* (Correspondence with Voltaire and Instruction of 1767). Cambridge: 1931.
- Tooke, William, *The Life of Catherine II, Empress of Russia*, 4th edition, 3 vols. London: printed by A. Strahan for T. Longmans and O. Rees, 1800.

The reign of Catherine is memorable for the partition of Poland.

The following deal with the events that led up to the disappearance of Poland from the map of Europe.

On the partition of Poland:

Bain, R. Nisbet, *The Last King of Poland and His Contemporaries*. London: Methuen, 1909.

———, *Slavonic Europe*. Cambridge, England: Constable, 1908.

Lord, R. H., *The Second Partition of Poland*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1915. An excellent discussion of the Polish question is given in the early chapters, followed by an exceedingly scholarly exposition of the events that precipitated the second and crucial partition.

The greater part of the source material for Catherine, that is, her correspondence and private papers, is to be found in the Russian Historical Society (*Sbornik*), and in the *Vorontsov Archives* 41 vols. Moscow: 1870-1895. The literary works of Catherine herself were published originally in five volumes, edited by A. N. Pypin (St. Petersburg, 1901-1903); also published in three volumes, edited by A. Smirdin (St. Petersburg, 1849-1850). Her correspondence with Joseph is contained in:

Joseph II und Katharina von Russland. Herausgegeben von A. R. von Arneth. Vienna: 1869. See also: *Politische Correspondenz* of Frederick II of Prussia. Berlin: 1879-1900.

An epochal event of the reign of Catherine was the publication of A. N. Radischev's *Puteshestvie iz Peterburga v Moskvu* (Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow) in 1790. It was one of the most original works published in the eighteenth century and is extremely valuable today for the picture it gives of contemporary Russia and of its social conditions.

Mention must also be made of the following German works:

Brückner, A., *Katharina die Zweite*. Berlin: G. Grote, 1883. *Allgemeine Geschichte in Einzeldarstellungen*. III, X. A scholarly brief summary of the chief events of the life of Catherine; principally political.

Stählin, Karl, *Geschichte Russlands*, 4 vols. Berlin and Königsberg: Ost-Europa-Verlag, 1923-1935. It is quite ample for the reign of Catherine. His footnotes indicate the chief primary sources for the reign.

PAUL I

The most readily accessible account in English of the tragic life and reign of Paul is to be found in:

Waliszewski, K., *Paul I*. London: 1913. The translation into English of *Le Fils de la grande Catherine, Paul I^{er}, Empereur de Russie*, 4th ed. Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie., 1912.

The standard life of Paul is:

Shilder, N. K., *Imperator Pavel Pervyi* (Emperor Paul I). St. Petersburg: 1901. The appendix contains copies of some remarkable documents. This work is a valuable study of the life and enigmatic personality of Paul. It glosses over the events connected with his murder, obviously from fear of the censorship.

For the circumstances of Paul's death, see:

Schiemann, Theodor, *Die Ermordung Pauls und die Thronbesteigung Nikolaus I. Neue Materialien veröffentlicht und eingeleitet*. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1902.

For the life and achievements of Suvorov, see:

Blease, W. L., *Suvorof*. (New York, n.d.) London: Constable, 1920.

La Verne, Leger Marie Philippe Trenchant, *The Life of Field Marshal Souvarof*. Tr. from the French. New York: Eastburn, Kirk and Co., 1814.

Petrushevskii, A., *Generalissimus Kn. Suvorov*. St. Petersburg: 1884. 3 vols. The definitive biography of Suvorov.

ALEXANDER I

The readiest account of Alexander's reign and life in a western European language is:

Waliszewski, K., *La Russie il y a cent ans: le règne d'Alexandre I*, 3 vols. Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie., 1923-1925.

English readers must rely for this period on:

Kornilov, A. A., *Modern Russian History*, 2 vols. New York: Knopf, 1924. Tr. by A. S. Kaun, with a continuation down to 1917.

The standard biography of Alexander I is:

Schilder, N. K., *Imperator Alexandr Pervyi; ego Zhizn i Tsarstvovanie* (The Emperor Alexander I; his life and reign), 4 vols. St. Petersburg: 1897-1898.

The role of Alexander I was so important in the wars of Napoleon that for ten years it might almost be said that the history of Alexander is the history of Europe. For this phase of his reign the standard work is that of Albert Sorel, *L'Europe et la révolution française*, 9 vols. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1906. A brilliant and powerful description of revolutionary Europe. Other works bearing on this period:

Choiseul-Gouffier, la Comtesse de, *Historical Memoirs of the Emperor Alexander I and the Court of Russia*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1904. Translated from the original French by Mary Berenice Patterson. Memoirs of a Polish lady who was present in Vilna during the French campaign of 1812. An extremely vivid picture of the French retreat.

Gribble, Francis Henry, *Emperor and Mystic*. London: Nash and Grayson, 1931. Stresses the abnormal and extravagant in Alexander's conduct and belief.

Kulomzin, Anatole, "The Siberian Hermit, Theodore Kuzmich," *The Slavonic Review*, vol. 2. London: 1923-1924. Recounts the famous legend that Alexander's death was a fiction which enabled him to escape from a life he loathed and to reappear in the role of a hermit.

Paléologue, Maurice, "La Fin mystérieuse d'Alexandre I," *Revue des deux mondes*, February and March, 1937. Discusses the events that preceded the death of Alexander and the evidence for the Kuzmich legend.

———, *Le Règne d'Alexandre I*.

English edition:

———, *The Enigmatic Czar. The life of Alexander I of Russia*.

Tr. by Edwin and Willa Muir. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1938.

Webster, Charles K., *Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815*. London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1934.

The war of 1812, or as the Russians prefer to call it, "the War of the

Fatherland," stirred Russia to its depths and has been a source of perennial interest to writers ever since. Few accounts of these stirring times are available in English. There are, however:

Memoirs of General de Caulaincourt, vol. I (London: Cassell, 1935), vol. II (London: 1938). Edited by Jean Hanoteau and translated by Hamish Miles.

For the military events we have:

Bogdanovich, M., *Istoriya obshchestvennoi Voyny* (History of the War of the Fatherland), 3 vols. St. Petersburg: 1860.

George, Hereford B., *Napoleon's Invasion of Russia*. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1899.

To catch the general atmosphere of the time one cannot do better than read Leo Tolstoi's *War and Peace*, perhaps the greatest historical novel ever written.

The Holy Alliance and the various alliances that formed the European concert during the period 1815-1830 are well covered in:

Webster, C. K., *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh: 1812-1815*. London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1931.

———, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh: 1815-1822*. London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1934.

Temperley, Harold, *The Foreign Policy of Canning: 1822-1827*. London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1925.

Valuable material for the reign of Alexander I is found in:

Arkhiiv brat'ev Turgenevykh (Archive of the Turgenev Brothers), 4 vols. St. Petersburg: 1911-1915.

THE DECEMBRIST RISING

The Decembrist rising, which came between the reigns of Alexander I and Nicholas I, belonged to neither or to both of them. But the root of it lay deep in the troubled times of the struggle with Napoleon. Nearly everything on the Decembrists is at present out of date. The government for long withheld the material documents and severely censored everything that appeared on this movement, but in 1925 the Soviet Government began the publication of the depositions taken before the special court that was impanelled to try the members. The official title is:

M. N. Pokrovskii (general editor), *Vosstanie Dekabristov Materialy*, 6 vols. Moscow-Leningrad: 1925-1929.

It will compel a revision of our views on the Decembrists. The literature on this movement has become so vast that a guide has been found indispensable. One has now appeared:

Chentsov, N. M., *Vosstanie Dekabristov, Bibliografiya*. Moscow-Leningrad: 1929.

An older book that has a good deal of interest in connection with the Decembrists was:

Tourgenieff, N. I., *La Russie et les Russes*, 3 vols. Paris: Meline, Caus, et Cie., 1847.

Tourgenieff was closely identified with the movement and was later refused permission to return to Russia, but his views are somewhat romantic and distorted. His knowledge of his own country is now known to have been almost juvenile. Of considerable value for the understanding of the Decembrists is:

Masaryk, T. H., *The Spirit of Russia*, 2 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1919.

Mirsky, D. S., "The Decembrist Conspiracy," *The Slavonic Review*, vol. 4, No. 11. London: 1925.

Mazour, Anatole G., *The First Russian Revolution, 1825*. Berkeley, Cal.: Univ. of California Press, 1937. An attempt to summarize material recently made available from the Russian archives by the Soviet regime.

Perhaps the best of the older interpretations is:

Semevskii, V. I., *Politicheskie i Obshchestvennyie Idei Dekabristov* (Political and Social Ideas of the Decembrists). St. Petersburg: 1909.

NICHOLAS I

There is relatively little literature on Nicholas I. The most authoritative work is in German:

Schiemann, T., *Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I*, 4 vols. Berlin and Leipzig: Druck und Verlag von Georg Reimer, 1904-1919.

In Russian we have:

Shilder, N. K., *Imperator Nikolai Pervyi: ego Zhizn i tsarstvovanie* (The Emperor Nicholas I: His Life and Reign), 2 vols. St.

Petersburg: 1903. This was never completed. It carries the story down to 1830.

The foreign policy of Nicholas on the Greek question is given in: Temperley, Harold, *The Foreign Policy of Canning: 1822-1827*. London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1925.

Egerton, Hugh E., *British foreign policy in Europe to the end of the 19th century, a rough outline*. London: Macmillan, 1917.

For the circumstances leading up to the Crimean War, see:

Schmitt, B. E., "The Diplomatic Preliminaries of the Crimean War," *American Historical Review*, October 1919, pp. 36-67.

For the military operations in the Crimea there are:

Hamley, Sir Edward B., *The War in the Crimea*, 2nd ed. London: Seeley, 1910. An admirable short survey.

Kinglake, Alexander W., *Invasion of the Crimea*, 8 vols. Edinburgh: Blackwood and Sons, 1863-1867. Prejudiced.

An important work for the study of Russia under Nicholas I is:

Haxthausen, Baron A. von, *The Russian Empire, Its People, Institutions and Resources*, 2 vols. London: Chapman and Hall, 1856.

Baron August von Haxthausen-Ahlenburg, a distinguished German student of agrarian problems, was invited by the Emperor to make a study of agricultural conditions in Russia. His work on the peasant was the best that had appeared up to that time.

The distinguishing feature of the later years of Nicholas I was the intellectual ferment. This has been admirably dealt with by Masaryk in his *Spirit of Russia*. Others are:

Kulczycki, Ludwik, *Geschichte der russischen Revolution*, 3 vols. Gotha: 1910-1914. Traces the Russian revolutionary movement from the Decembrists (1825) down to the beginning of the twentieth century.

Thun, Alphons von, *Geschichte der revolutionären Bewegungen in Russland*. Leipzig: Dunckler und Humblot, 1883. Also a Russian edition in 1924. A brief but admirable survey.

The growth of the revolutionary parties and the revolution of 1905 are dealt with in:

Mavor, James, *An Economic History of Russia*, 2 vols. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1928.

ALEXANDER II

The standard life in Russian of Alexander II is:

Tatishchev, S. S., *Imperator Aleksandr Vtoroi, ego Zhizn i tsarstvovanie* (Alexander II, his Life and Reign), 2 vols. St. Petersburg: 1903.

In English we have:

Graham, Stephen, *The Tsar of Freedom*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1935.

This appeared in England as:

———, *A Life of Alexander II*. London: 1935.

The chief interest in Alexander centers around the reforms and more especially the emancipation of the peasants. Fortunately we have a recent study in English on this subject:

Robinson, Geroid Tanquary, *Rural Russia Under the Old Regime*. New York, London: Longmans, Green, 1932. Carefully annotated with an extensive bibliography on the peasant question.

An older book is:

Engel'man, Ivan Egorovich (Johann), *Istoriya Kryepostnago Prava v Rossii* (History of Serfdom in Russia), Moscow, 1900.

An important book on the peasants subsequent to emancipation is:

Nicolai-on (Danielson, N. F.), *Die Volkswirtschaft in Russland nach der Baueremanzipation*. Munich: 1899. Written from the point of view of the *Narodniki*. Also in French.

For the revolutionary movements, see the titles cited for Nicholas I. For diplomatic relations between Russia and the United States, see:

Thomas, Benjamin Platt, *Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867*. Series XLVIII, No. 2, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science. Baltimore: 1930.

The Balkan crisis and the Russo-Turkish War are dealt with in:

Sumner, B. H., *Russia and the Balkans, 1870-1880*. London: Milford, 1937.

Greene, F. V., *The Russian Campaigns in Turkey, 1877-78*. New York: D. Appleton, 1908.

ALEXANDER III AND NICHOLAS II

For the latter part of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the present, there is no comprehensive treatment of the internal history of Russia. This is in part due to the strict tsarist censorship and the inaccessibility of the public archives to scholars; in part it is because sufficient time has not been allowed for the accumulation of monographs and special studies on which the historian could build. One work claims to cover this period:

Hedenstrom, Alfred von, *Geschichte Russlands von 1878 bis 1918*. Stuttgart and Berlin, 1924.

Much valuable light is thrown on Russia under Alexander III in the following:

Stepniak (Kravcinskii, S. M.), *Underground Russia*. New York: Scribner's, 1883.

———, *Russia under the Tsars*. London: Ward and Downey, 1885.

———, *The Russian Storm Cloud, or Russia in her Relations to Neighbouring Countries*. New York: Harpers, 1886.

———, *The Career of a Nihilist*. New York: Harpers, 1889.

———, *Nihilism as It Is*. London: W. Scott, 1901.

———, *The Russian Peasantry, their Agrarian Condition, Social Life and Religion*. New York: Dutton, and London: G. Routledge, 1905.

Lowe, Charles, *Alexander III of Russia*. New York: Macmillan, 1895.

For the period immediately preceding the Great War:

Hoetzsch, Otto, *Russland*. Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1917. Valuable for internal conditions.

Pares, Sir Bernard, *Russia and Reform*. London: Constable, 1907. A good study of the period of reforms after the revolution of 1905.

In the absence of comprehensive treatments by secondary authorities, we must have recourse to memoirs and biographies.

Witte, Graf S. Yu., *Vospominanya* (Reminiscences), 3 vols. Berlin: 1922-1923. This appeared in English in a greatly abridged edition:

———, *The Memoirs of Count Witte*. New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1921. Translated from the original Russian manuscript and edited by Abraham Yarmolinsky.

Witte was Minister of Finance in the tsarist government from 1892 to 1903, later played a prominent role in negotiating peace with Japan and in launching the new constitutional regime in 1906.

Kokovtsev, V. N., *Iz Moego Proshlago. Vospominanya* (Reminiscences out of my Past), 2 vols. Paris: 1933. Appeared in English as:

———, *Out of My Past*. Stanford, Cal., University Press, 1933.

Kokovtsev was Minister of Finance (with a short interruption) from 1904 to 1913. His memoirs throw much-needed light on the administration and court during this period.

Gurko, V. I., *Features and Figures of the Past. Government and Opinion in the Reign of Nicholas II*. Stanford University Press, 1939.

For the reforms of Stolypin see:

Dietze, von Dr. Constantin, *Stolypinsche Agrarreform und Feldgemeinschaft*. Leipzig und Berlin: Verlag von B. C. Teubner, 1920.

For Russia's foreign relations under Alexander III and Nicholas II, see:

Korff, Baron S. A., *Russia's Foreign Relations during the Last Half Century*. New York: Macmillan, 1922.

Taube, M. de, *La Politique d'avant guerre et la fin de l'empire des Tsars*. Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1928.

Special phases and periods are covered in:

Langer, W. L., *The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1890-1894*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1929.

———, *European Alliances and Alignments*. New York: Knopf, 1931.

———, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902*, 2 vols. New York: Knopf, 1936.

Michon, Georges, *The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1891-1917*. New York: Macmillan, 1929. Translated by Norman Thomas.

Reference may also be had to two standard works on pre-war diplomacy:

Fay, Sidney B., *The Origins of the World War*, 2 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1928. Covers the period from 1871 to 1914.

Schmitt, Bernadotte E., *The Coming of the War, 1914*, 2 vols. New York: Scribner's, 1930. The first two chapters summarize diplomatic history of Europe, 1871-1914. The remainder of the work is devoted to the crisis of July 1914.

The Russian documentary sources for the period 1914-1917 are contained in Series III of:

Mezhdunarodniya Otnocheniya v Epokhu imperializma (International Relations under Imperialism). Moscow and Leningrad: 1933.

THE GREAT WAR

Churchill, Winston, *The Unknown War*. New York: Scribner's, 1931. Drawn largely from the German version.

Golovin, Nicholas, "The Russian War Plan of 1914," *The Slavonic Review*, April and July, 1936. A discussion by a Russian military writer, formerly on the staff of the tsarist armies, of the opening phases of the War.

———, *The Russian Army in the World War*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1931.

———, "Brusilov's Offensive," *The Slavonic Review*, April 1935, vol. XIII, No. 39.

Johnson, Douglas Wilson, *Topography and Strategy in the War*. New York: Holt, 1917.

Der Weltkrieg, 10 vols. (to date). Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1925-1935. The German official account of the Great War.

Brusilov, A. A., *A Soldier's Notebook: 1914-1918*. London: Macmillan, 1930.

On the internal conditions in Russia during the war one can consult the publications of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Economics and History, especially:

Florinsky, Michael T., *The End of the Russian Empire*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1931.

For the Russian Peasant problem, see:

Owen, Launcelot A., *The Russian Peasant Movement, 1906-1917*. Westminster: P. S. King, 1937.

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1917

The output of books on the Russian revolution and the post-revolutionary epoch is almost infinite. In Russia the printing presses have been for twenty years doing their best to render immortal the achievements of the heroes of 1917. Very little of this literature has found its way into the languages of western Europe. Much of it is of purely ephemeral interest and it would be of little use to attempt to catalogue it. Three important books on the revolution are:

- Trotsky, Leon, *The History of the Russian Revolution*, 3 vols. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1932. Translated from the Russian by Max Eastman. Carries the story down only to October 1917.
- Chamberlin, William Henry, *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921*. New York: Macmillan, 1935. Covers both the March and the October revolutions, as well as the period of Civil War, and War Communism. Has a full bibliography.
- Pares, Sir Bernard, *The Fall of the Russian Monarchy*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1939.

For a complete bibliography of the Russian revolutions, see:

- Postnikov, S. P., *Bibliografiya russkoi revoliutsyi i grazhdanskoi voyny 1917-1921* (Bibliography of the Russian Revolution and Civil War, 1917-1921.) Prague: 1938. In addition to works in Russian books in other European languages are listed.

For a bibliography in English:

- Karpovich, Michael, "The Russian Revolution of 1917," *Journal of Modern History*, vol. II, pp. 258-280. The University of Chicago Press, 1930.

Documentary material for the revolution is contained in:

- Golder, F. A., *Documents of Russian History, 1914-1917*. New York and London: The Century Co., 1927.
- Bunyan, James, and Fisher, H. H. (eds.), *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918*. Stanford University Press, 1934.
- Bunyan, James, *Intervention, Civil War and Communism in Russia, April-December, 1918*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1936. London: Milford.

There are a number of biographies of Lenin, few of any value.

More important are Lenin's own works, especially those covering the period of the revolution and the civil war. The English edition does not contain all of his works but has the more important ones.

Lenin, V. I., *Selected Works*, 12 vols. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1936.

POST-REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD

Soviet Russia in international affairs is treated in:

Fischer, Louis, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, 2 vols. London: Jonathan Cape, 1930.

Milioukov, P., *La Politique Extérieure des Soviets*. Paris: R. Pichon, 1936.

Wheeler-Bennett, John W., *Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace, March, 1918*. London: Macmillan, 1938.

It is not yet possible to get a clear picture of events in the Soviet Union since the death of Lenin, more particularly of the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky. But fundamental is the authorized version contained in the official history of the Communist party:

Yaroslavskii, E. (ed.), *Istoriya VKP(B)* (History of the All-Union Communist Party [Bolsheviks]), 2 vols. Moscow and Leningrad: 1933. Heavily edited. Edition in English, New York: International Publishers, 1939.

Souvarine, Boris, *Stalin*. New York: Alliance Book Corporation; Longmans, Green & Co., 1939.

Fisher, H. H., *The Famine in Soviet Russia, 1919-1923*. New York: Macmillan, 1927.

The student who wishes to understand the history of the Communist party in the Soviet Union should, in addition to knowing the works of Lenin, thoroughly familiarize himself with:

Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*. Published originally in 1848. A recent edition has been issued by International Publishers, New York: 1930.

No effort is made to give any account of the phenomenal economic developments of the past ten years. Hundreds of books have been written on the first and second Five Year Plans. Perhaps the best description of the economic organization under the first Five Year Plan is:

Hoover, Calvin B., *The Economic Life of Soviet Russia*. New York: Macmillan, 1931.

Chamberlin, W. H., *Soviet Russia. A Living Record and History*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1931.

———, *Russia's Iron Age*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1934.

Dean, Vera Micheles, *Soviet Russia: 1917-1933*. World Affairs Pamphlets, No. 2. New York and Boston: 1933.

For the administrative machinery of the Soviet Union, see:

Batsell, Walter Russell, *Soviet Rule in Russia*. New York: Macmillan, 1929.

Maxwell, Bertram W., *The Soviet State*. Topeka, Kansas: Steves and Wayburn, 1934.

Owing to the strictness of the press censorship in the Soviet Union, few accounts of current happenings have any value from an objective point of view, whether they be of official origin or otherwise. The most reliable guide is the press itself, especially the daily newspaper *Pravda*, the organ of the Central Committee of the Communist party, or *Izvestia* (also daily), organ of the Central Executive Committee.

RUSSIA IN ASIA

Siberia

Russia's possessions in Asia are divided into two widely diverse regions, each with its own peculiar historical development, differing likewise in their climatic and topographical conditions. Siberia, though stretching through one hundred meridians of longitude, and twenty-five degrees of latitude, and representing every variety of soil and topography, is characterized throughout by abundant rainfall. It is uniformly clothed with fairly luxuriant forest and vegetation. Central Asia, on the other hand, whether mountain or steppe, is a land of scanty precipitation, the only exceptions to its generally desert character being the infrequent oases along the streams that issue from the mountains to the south. It has been traditionally the home of the nomad, whereas Siberia has been occupied by hunters, fishermen, or reindeer breeders of the north. A general history of the whole of Asiatic Russia is:

Lobanov-Rostovsky, Prince A., *Russia and Asia*. New York: Macmillan, 1933.

Fundamental for an introduction to the study of the history of Siberia is:

Müller, Gerhard Friedrich, *Sammlung russischer Geschichte*, 9 vols. St. Petersburg: 1732-1764. Volume III, which appeared in Russian as *Opisanie Sibirskago Tsarstva i Vsyekh proizshedsikh V nem.dyel* (Account of the Khanate of Siberia and of all the things that transpired in it.) St. Petersburg: 1750, deals with Russian discoveries in Siberia and on the coast of North America. A new edition of this fundamental work has been issued by the Soviet government. This was summarized in English by Thomas Jeffreys and appeared under the title *Voyages from Asia to America, for Completing the Discoveries of the North West Coast of America*, 2nd ed. London: T. Jeffreys, 1744. Second only to Müller is:

Coxe, Wm., *Account of Russian Discoveries*. Fourth edition. London: Cadell and Davies, 1803. Gives an account of the fur trade with China.

For a good account of Siberian geography, ethnography, and history, see:

Wright, George F., *Asiatic Russia*, 2 vols. New York: McClure, Phillips, 1902.

Inasmuch as Muscovite penetration of Siberia was simply a continuation of the commercial activity of Novgorod, the earliest references to Siberia will be found in the chronicles. Some scattered material with reference to northern Russia and the adjacent region of the Urals is in:

Chronicle of Novgorod. Translated into English by Michell and Forbes. London: Camden Society, third series, 1914.

For the ethnology of Siberia, consult:

Czaplicka, M. A., *Aboriginal Siberia*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914.

After the conquest of Novgorod by Moscow, the trade of the former through the Baltic languished, owing to the opposition of the Baltic powers—Denmark, Sweden, and even Poland. The opening up of the sea route from England to the White Sea by English explorers in the sixteenth century was welcomed by the Tsar Ivan IV as a means of escape from this virtual blockade of Russia by her neigh-

bors. The aim of the English merchants was rather to open up trade with the Far and Middle East by the Arctic Ocean or across Russia. A good deal of material dealing with their activities is contained in Hakluyt (especially volumes I and II) and Purchas. (See page 743.)

The fundamental published source material for the early history of Siberia is found in:

Sibirskiya Lyetopisi (Siberian Chronicles). St. Petersburg: 1907.
Published by the Imperial Archeographical Commission.

It contains among other things, an *Account of Siberia* (*Opisanie Sibiri*), a brief summary of the history of Siberia, composed probably about 1750. A good deal of material for the history of Siberia is contained in printed official sources such as:

Akty Istoricheskíe (Historical Documents), 5 vols. St. Petersburg: 1841-1842.

Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii (Complete Collection of the Laws of the Russian Empire), 44 vols. St. Petersburg: 1830.

Dopolnenie k Akтам Istoricheskím (Supplement to the Historical Documents), 12 vols. St. Petersburg: 1846-1877.

Also in the archives of the various government departments of the tsarist regime.

Standard histories of Siberia are:

Andrievich, V. K., *Istoriya Sibiri* (History of Siberia). St. Petersburg: 1889.

Butsinskii, P. N., *Zaselenie Sibirii* (Settlement of Siberia). Kharkov: 1889.

Bakrushin, Prof. S. V., *Ocherki po istorii Kolonizatsii Sibiri* (An Outline of the History of Siberian Colonization). Moscow: 1927.

There is also the official:

Kolonizatsiya Sibiri (Colonization of Siberia). St. Petersburg: 1900.
Published by the Committee of the Transsiberian Railway for the World Exhibition at Paris, 1900.

The most authoritative account of the early history of the Stroganovs is to be found in Ilovaiskii, D. I., *Istoriya Rossii* (History of Russia), vol. III (1890), note 68.

Russian exploration along the coast of the Arctic and the Pacific is dealt with in:

Golder, Frank A., *Russian Expansion on the Pacific, 1641-1850*.
Cleveland: A. H. Clark, 1914.

The same writer has published in his *Bering's Voyages* (New York: 1922) the log of Bering's ship, the *St. Peter*, on his memorable voyage of discovery to America in 1841. The story of Russian contact with China is given in:

Ravenstein, E. G., *The Russians on the Amoor*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1861.

The voyages of Cook, Dixon, and Vancouver in the north Pacific brought them in touch with Russian interests in those regions, hence the accounts of their voyages have considerable bearing on Russian history in those regions.

Bancroft, H. H., *History of Alaska, 1730-1885*. San Francisco: The History Co. Pubs., 1890. Gives a brief account of Russian expansion over Siberia to Alaska and has an extensive bibliography.

Krasheninnikov, Stepan Petrovich, *Histoire de Kamtschatka, des Isles Kurilski et des Contrées voisines*, publiée à Petersbourg en langue Russe . . . trad. par M.E(ideris), 2 vols. Lyon: Chez Benoit Duplain, 1767.

Kerner, Robert J., "Russian Expansion to America," *Bibliographical Society of America Papers*, vol. 25, 1931.

For a full bibliography of the Russian period of Alaskan history, consult:

Wickersham, James E., *A Bibliography of Alaskan Literature*. Cordova, Alaska: Cordova Daily Times, 1927.

There is no satisfactory history of Alaska under the Russians or of the activity of the Russian-American Company. We still have to rely on:

Tikhmenev, P., *Istoricheskoye obozryenie obrazovaniya Ross. Am. Kompanii i deystvii eya do nastoyashnago vremeni* (Historical Survey of the Formation of the Russian-American Company and its Activity down to the present), 2 vols. St. Petersburg: 1861-1863.

A recent history of Alaska is:

Andrews, C. F., *The Story of Alaska*. Seattle: Lowman and Hanford, 1931. Revised edition, Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, 1938.

Other miscellaneous material on Siberia is contained in:

Barsukov, Graf A. P., *Muravyev-Amurskii, materialy dlya biografii* (Materials for a biography of Count Muravyev-Amurskii). Moscow: 1891.

Pallas, P. S., *Neue Nördische Beyträge* (St. Petersburg, 1787-1793).
 ———, *Travels through the southern Provinces of the Russian Empire*. London: printed for J. Stockdale, 1812. French edition, *Voyages de M. Pallas*, 6 vols. Paris: Maradan, 1789-1793.

Gmelin, Johann Georg, *Reise durch Sibirien*. Göttingen: A Vandenhoecks, 1751.

Central Asia

Central Asia in the antiquity of its civilization far outranks Siberia, but its connection with Russia is of more recent date. Until the nineteenth century it comprised a group of states ruled by native Turkoman, Arab, Persian, Turk, or Mongol dynasties. Its early history parallels Greece, Persia, the Roman Empire, and the Mongols. Works that recount the whole of its long story are rare:

Howorth, Sir H. H., *History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century*, 3 vols. London: 1876-1888. Gives the story of the Mongol empire.

Parker, E. H., *A Thousand Years of the Tartars*. London and New York: Knopf, 1924. Goes back to an even earlier date.

Sykes, P. M., *A History of Persia*, 2 vols. London: Macmillan, 1915. Gives, incidentally, a good deal of the history of Central Asia.

Yule, Sir Henry, *The Book of Ser Marco Polo*, 2 vols. New York: Scribner's, 1926.

———, *Cathay and the Way Thither*, 4 vols. London: Hakluyt Society Publications, 2nd series, 1914, 1915, and 1916. These two books of Sir Henry Yule's have inexhaustible treasures of lore on the history of this part of Asia.

A complete list would, of course, have perforce to include many of the writers of antiquity, but must necessarily be omitted from this very brief outline.

Perhaps the most successful attempt to span the whole history of Central Asia, including its incorporation into the Russian Empire, is:

Skrine, E. S., and Ross, D. E., *The Heart of Asia*. London: Methuen, 1899. Carries the story down to the storming of Geok Tepe by the forces of Skobeleyev in 1881.

A book of a different kind is:

Curzon, Lord George N., *Russia in Central Asia*. London: Longmans, Green, 1889. The record of a visit paid by him to Central Asia shortly after Russia had completed her conquest. Besides travel notes, it has some account of the geography and of its recent history. It contains an admirable bibliography, which is about as complete as such a list can hope to be. We can do little more than draw attention to a few of the more important of these.

As the earliest efforts of English travellers in the sixteenth century were directed toward opening trade with Persia and the Middle East, one should consult the accounts of the journeys of Anthony Jenkinson in Hakluyt's *Voyages* as well as two volumes in the Hakluyt Society Publications:

Early Voyages and Travels to Russia and Persia by A. J. London: 1886. Edited by E. D. Morgan and C. H. Coote. 2 vols., No. 73.

England's connection with this trade was continued into the eighteenth century, as can be seen by reference to:

Hanway, Jonas, *An Historical Account of the British Trade Over the Caspian Sea*, 4 vols. London: 1753. 2nd ed., 2 vols. London: T. Osborne, 1754. Volume II of this work (second edition) is entitled *The Revolutions of Persia, Containing the Reign of Shah Sultan Hussein*. . . . The writer gives a rambling but highly interesting account of his travels in the East, of the experience of himself and other English traders in Persia and Central Asia.

Since the conquest of the Caucasus by Russia and the inauguration by that country of a forward policy in the Middle East, the more important studies on Central Asia have been made by Russian scholars or with the official patronage of the tsarist government. One of the most prolific writers on this subject was the Hungarian

scholar A. Vambéry, who travelled widely and wrote on many phases of the culture of these regions. No attempt will be made to give a list of his works. Vivid accounts of the Merv Oasis on the eve of Russian occupation are given in:

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